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Abstract 
This thesis brings a new methodology to an under studied episode in 
the development of the Royal Navy. The thesis analyses the British 
Pacific Fleet [BPF] by examining its activities and their consequences 
through the perspective of the levels of war. The levels of war exist in 
modern military doctrine and although histories have been written 
focusing upon one, or sometimes two levels, the application of all four to 
an historical case study is currently unique. This study therefore fulfills 
two purposes. First it demonstrates how such a methodology, borrowed 
from contemporary practice, can be used to gain a greater understanding 
of the past. Second, it also provides further insights into the way levels of 
war interact. 
The case study utilised is concerned with how the experiences of the 
British Pacific Fleet impacted upon the Royal Navy [RNI in the period 
following Japan's surrender up to the RN's initial deployment in the 
Korean War. This is examined at the grand strategic level of war, the 
military strategic level, operational level and tactical level. Adopting this 
persepective has demonstrated that the British Pacific Fleet was of more 
significance at every level than has been acknowledged in existing 
published work. It also shows that these experiences constituted an 
entirely new style of naval warfare and in crucial respects set the tone 
and shape for the Post-War RN. 
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THE BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET, EXPERIENCE AND 
LEGACY: 
A LEVELS OF WARFARE ANALYSIS 
No romance should form more attractive reading to young and old 
than the history of our Navy. The narrative of its rise and progress 
teems with incident of the most varied and exciting character, which 
fiction cannot surpass. It comprises biography, travel, and adventure; 
while the events which gave us our maritime position are so 
connected with the general history, that no study of the one can be 
satisfactory which does not show its influence on the other. 1 
This is a naval history thesis. It seeks to broaden and deepen 
understanding of an aspect of the Royal Navy's history. The passage 
quoted above, which opens an illustrated school textbook on the Royal 
Navy, neatly encapsulates some of the problems and one of the promises 
of naval history. To deal first with the problems. When Captain Eardley- 
Wilmot used the term'romance'he was not attempting to create a "bodice 
ripping pot boiler", but at the same time it is doubtful whether he really 
intended to refer to the literary genre with its highly imaginative 
unrealistic episodes forming the central theme. It does however convey a 
certain taste of things to come. This is history not as rigorous scholarship 
directed at uncovering the pattern and relationship of past events, rather 
it is story telling. The reader is carried along by the 'action', paying scant 
regard to any founding in reality. This may seem rather harsh criticism of 
a book designed to inspire the youth of late Victorian England but naval 
history has toiled away under the consequences of this type of popular 
history for most of its existence. The thrills and excitement that sea stories 
can convey have led to naval history being neglected by the wider 
lEardley-Wilmot Capt, Our Nayy for a Thousand Years Sampson Low, Marston & Co. 
[London] 1900 p. vi 
6 
academic community, its output suitable only for either young boys 
before they move onto more serious areas of study or the province of 
quaint amateurs. As a result of this it has been difficult to establish and 
maintain a body of professional naval historians working in universities 
or other research posts that could raise the standing of the subject and 
train the following generation of scholars. 2 
This perceived readership constituency has created a further 
problem for the discipline. As Eardley-Wilmot alludes to, incident, 
however exciting, has been focused upon as all that needs to be 
understood to arrive at an appreciation of naval Wstory. Navies are such 
huge and complicated organisations which do indeed engage in the most 
fascinating of activities that there is a tendency to consider only the latter 
and overlook how dependent that is on the former. This might partially 
equate to the adage about amateurs studying tactics and professionals 
logistics, but it does in fact go deeper still. The structure, administration 
and activities of a navy during peacetime are as critical to an 
understanding of any eventual wartime success as its prebattle 
dispositions and movements once action has been joined. There may not 
be much 'adventure' in Admiralty arrangements for the import of timber 
from Scandinavia, but without these there would have been no 'far 
distant ships' to dispute Napoleonýs grand designs. 3 
Navies are tools of Government. They are instruments of state policy 
and consequently any understanding of their roles and activities is bound 
up with an analysis of the wider issues facing state behaviour. Internal 
domestic politics and the international environment both impact upon 
navies and much work has been carried out drawing together these 
2For a more detailed discussion of the development of naval scholarship in Britain see N 
A M. Rodger article in Ubi Sumus? The State of Naval and Maritime History edited by 
J. B. Hattendorf, Naval War College Press [Newport]1994 
3AIbion R. G. Forests and Seapower - The Timber Problem of the Royal Nayy 1652-1862 
Harvard University Press 1926 
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themes. 4 Whilst a grand sweeping iiiagninii opus exploring the issue of 
whether particular state forms have consequent particular forms of 
navies is still waiting to be written, the assumption that some form of 
relationship exists is clear. The key issue is not whether domestic factors 
influence the size, shape and character of naval forces, rather it is one of 
degree and kind of influence that is exerted. Beyond this general 
problem, there is a broader concern about the relationship between the 
character of a regime and the character of its military forces. 5 
This is one half of the promise alluded to above. An understanding 
of the wider issues of state behaviour leads to a fuller and more 
comprehensive understanding of that nation's naval and maritime past. 
The other half of the promise articulated by Eardley-Willmott is that by 
an appreciation of the nautical issues that confronted a state its history, 
social, economic, political, cultural and military, can be seen in its true 
context. Indeed, to exclude this side of a nation's narrative, even if much 
of it takes place over the horizon, is to present a story far from complete. 
Sir Michael Howard has commented that in order to derive anything 
from a study of history the reader must study in breadth and depth6. 
Breadth to insure that no pertinent issues are overlooked and depth to 
avoid a superficial examination that fails to be rigorously critical where 
necessary. It is argued that without an understanding of all the levels of 
warfare and an appreciation of how these interact, then the significance 
of tactical changes, or developments in operational concepts, or 
command arrangements at the military strategic level or restrictions on 
policy, cannot be arrived at. 
4Kennedy P. The Rise and Fall of British Naval MasteKy Fontana Press [London] 1991 
5R. S. Wood in Hattendorf J. B. (Ed) Doing Naval Histoly: Essays Toward Improvement 
Naval War College Press [Newport], 1995 p. 67 
61-loward M. The Use atid Abuse of Militanj Histonj p. 215-216 in The Causes of Wars 
Univin [London] 1985 
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This chapter has three sections exploring in turn, the methodology 
employed in this study, the case study itself and the source material 
employed. All go some way to addressing the concerns raised above. 
Methodology 
This thesis brings a new methodology to an under studied episode in 
the development of the Royal Navy. It analyses the British Pacific Fleet by 
examining its activities through the perspective of the levels of war. The 
levels of war exist in contemporary military doctrine and although 
histories have been written focusing upon one, or sometimes two levels, 
the application of all four to an historical case study is currently unique. 
This study therefore fulfils two purposes. First it demonstrates how such 
a methodology, borrowed from contemporary practice, can be used to 
gain a greater understanding of the past. Second, it provides further 
insights into the manner in which the levels of war interact. 
The decision to organise this thesis on the basis of the levels of war 
was taken in response to developments in the wider field of military 
studies. One thing historiography demonstrates with clarity is that any 
work must be understood in its intellectual context. In the same way the 
decisions, actions, plans and arguments examined in this thesis must be 
viewed in the light of their own. It is important to appreciate the 
intellectual, political, international backdrop to decisions before analysis 
and judgement is passed. 
The emergence of a distinct doctrine, articulated and written down in 
British military thought during the closing decades of the last century 
produced a range of issues which military historians would do well to 
address. 
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Doctrine is the body of thought which underpins and permeates 
defence policy. It is a set of fundamental principles which are employed 
as an aid to judgement. 
Doctrine embodies the formal and informal rules for using 
military force toward national ends. It'incorporates the bundle 
of ideas by which capabilities are translated into military action 
to the fulfilment of goals. It includes ideas about the nature of 
future war, and... it reveals something of a country's 
conception of the ffireat it faces. 7 
The UK military have produced a number of differing doctrinal 
publications which, though not equating exactly, mirror in many ways 
the different levels of warfare. British Defence Doctrine describes the 
linkages between national policy and military operations. 8 It therefore 
sits at the interface between the grand and military strategic levels. At the 
next level down the individual branches of the armed forces have 
produced single service doctrine; BR1806 British Maritime Doctrine, BMD 
British Military Doctrine and AP3000 Air Power Doctrine. 9 These 
publications analyse issues at the operational level but also discuss the 
context created by the objectives set at the military strategic level. 
Underneath these doctrine publications there is the plethora of material 
at the tactical level. These tactical level publications cover techniques and 
procedures for handling the employment of individual units. It will be 
noted that there is no published doctrine, identified as such, for the grand 
strategic level of warfare, partly because this level is the responsibility of 
the government and its most senior military advisors. Perhaps the nearest 
available publications at this level are such documents as the Foreign 
Office Aims and Objectives statement, the government party"s election 
7K. Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy Crane, Russak [New York] 1977 p. 177-178 
8 JWP 0-001 British Defence Doctrine HMSO [London] 1996 
9 BR1806 The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine, HMSO [London] 1995, Design 
for Militaly Operations - The British Militaly Doctrine, [BMD] Army Code 71451,1989, 
AP3000 Air Power Doctrine, HMSO [London] 1993 
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manifesto, the various White papers on defence and possibly even the 
Strategic Defence Review. 10 
During the period covered by this study similar publications existed 
and these were utilised extensively. As will be discussed below, there 
was no explicit recognition of the operational level of warfare at this time. 
As a consequence, the levels to which these publications speak, is even 
more blurred than in contemporary publications. The various tactical 
level books and pamphlets discussing techniques and procedures for the 
optimum employment of particular equipment or units are the easiest to 
locate in the framework. These give an indication of how the Navy 
anticipated actually fighting. At the interface between tactical and 
operational levels the most important document produced by the 
Admiralty was the Fighting Instructions [FI]. 11 These have a long history 
in the Royal Navy. The English developed a set of Sailhig atid Fighting 
histnictions as general guidance for the fleet in the second half of the 
Seventeenth Century. 12 For the duration of the BPF's participation in the 
Pacific campaign the latest version of the Fighting Instructions, was that 
dated 1939, though this was updated and amended throughout the war. 
The result of wartime experience was assessed in the 1947 edition of the 
FI's. The publication contains a set of tactical principles but also address 
issues at what would now be considered the operational level. In the 
same year as the Fl's were updated, so too was the publication which 
corresponds most closely to the operational level, indeed it bears the 
same reference number as the contemporary doctrine, BR1806L4Z) Naval 
War Manual. The issues discussed in this Confidential Book [CBj relate to 
the way in which the Navy envisaged the conduct of maritime 
10Ministry of Defence The Strategic Defence Revie The Stationary Office [London] 
1998 
11 See for instance ADM 239/382 Confidential Book CB04487 The Fighting Instructions 
1947 
12 See for example JB Hattendorf, RjB Knight, AWH Pearsall, NAM Rodger &G Till 
(eds) British Naval Documents 1204-1960 Navy Records Society, Scolar Press 
[Aldershot] 1993, p. 77-90 
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operations. In addition it also addresses topics that would be considered 
military strategic. 
Andrew Gordon has argued that doctrine in its published form 
appears when there is 'no publicly obvious mission. '13 This over 
simplifies the issue somewhat and does not make a distinction as to what 
level of doctrine is being discussed. As has been pointed out, tactical level 
doctrine has a long history within the Royal Navy. Nevertheless there is a 
degree of truth to it. The search for enduring principles lying behind 
naval warfare which identify what strengths and weaknesses, 
opportunities and restrictions, naval power possesses does indeed appear 
to feature when there is discussion, debate and uncertainty over the role 
of naval power. It is certainly the case that the RN found itself in a 
position where the post War World appeared to be very unkind toward 
navies. New geostrategic circumstances and new technologies, to 
highlight but two issues, appeared to undermine the traditional roles of 
the Navy in the post war period. The revised FI's and Naval War Manual 
mentioned above, can be seen as part of the process whereby the Navy 
sought to set out its roles and n-dssions, attributes and characteristics, in 
this changed environment. 
Contemporary military doctrine identifies four levels of war; grand 
strategic, military strategic, operational and tactical. 14 It was during the 
1980's that the levels of war and in particular the operational level began 
to enter into British military thinking and writings. 15 This was in part a 
response to developments on the other side of the Atlantic and the 
emergence of the Air/Land battle concept. The RN's formal, written 
13 A Gordon 7he Doctrim Debate: Havitig the Last Word, in M Duffy, Farrell &G Sloan 
[eds] Doctrine and MilitarV Effectiveness, Strategic Policy Studies Group & University of 
Exeter, 1997 p. 47 
14 Design for Militaly 012erations - The British Militaly Doctrine [BMD] Army Code 
71451 
15 BMD was first issued in 1989, the RAF equivalent Air Power Doctrine [AP30001 
appeared in 1991. 
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down doctrine, which contains explicit articulation of the levels of war, 
did not emerge until 199516. 
An immediate question follows from this conceptual issue; can the 
levels of war exist independently of their recognition? This thesis argues, 
indeed it is predicated upon the assertion, that regardless of whether or 
not the levels were acknowledged, they existed. Discussing specifically 
the operational level of command Captain AWj West, later First Sea 
Lord noted that, 'the operational level of command has always existed 
and historical examples abound of commanders whose success has 
hinged on understanding the principles inherent in that level. '17 
In many cases their success relied on intuitive understanding that 
there existed a level of war between the strategic and the tactical. This 
was explicitly recognised in the nineteenth century by the use of the term 
'Grand Tactics! Success came more easily to those who acted as though 
there was an operational level of war, even if they did not acknowledge 
the concept in quite the terms used today. In 1772 a young French noble, 
the count de Guibert published his Essai general de tactiqtie. 181n it he 
draws a distinction between grand tactics and elementary tactics, where 
the former is the orchestration of engagements for the achievement of 
political objectives. 
When Julian Corbett published his War College lectures in 1911, he 
discussed the linkage of a level above tactics to strategic objectives. 
By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war 
in which the sea is a substantial factor. Naval strategy is but that 
part of it which determines the movements of the fleet when 
maritime strategy has determined what part the fleet must play in 
relation to the action of the land forces; for it scarcely needs saying 
16 British Maritime Doctrine [BR1806] HMSO 1995, second edition cited hereafter 1999 
17 West Capt. AjW, The Operational Level of Connnand in the Royal Navy, paper Higher 
Command and Staff Course VI, Camberley, February 1993, p. 1. 
18 See RR Palmer Frederick Me Great, Gidbert, Bulow: Froin Dynastic to National War, in P 
Paret (ed) Makers of Modem StrateM Clarendon Press [Oxford] 1986, p. 91-119 
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that it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval 
action alone. 19 
From this it can be seen that there was a recognition that a level of 
warfare existed above the tactical and below the strategic. There have 
been, and do, remain a number of problems in applying concepts 
developed from a land perspective to another environment. This point 
was echoed to a degree by Brigadier ASH Irwin who argued that even 
though the operational level of war had been identified and developed 
with reference to land warfare it did not end there. He wrote in 1993, 
while discussing the way that the British Army had responded to 
developments in thinking about the levels, Jit is] suggest[ed] that the 
operational level of war is applicable only to large scale armoured 
conflicts. This is not the case; a failure to recognize that the operational 
level exists in all forms of warfare would more or less inevitably lead to 
failure[.. ]120 Extrapolating this argument to the RN in the closing stages of 
WWII and its immediate aftermath clearly has its problems; while there 
was no recognition of the operational level, there was no overall failure to 
achieve grand strategic objectives. 
Captain West made the point that there are difficulties in translating a 
concept originally developed with regard to land warfare into a maritime 
environment. 'what is true is that in maritime[sea/air] warfare the 
boundaries between tactics, operations and strategy are less clearly 
defined than in the continental [land/air]. '21 Many issues do not fit neatly 
into the levels of warfare framework; there is a great deal of blurring of 
distinctions at the interface between levels. 
This is certainly borne out by this thesis. Issues, influencing factors 
and actors exist which affect more than one level. The levels themselves 
19J. S. Corbett Some Principles of Maritime Stra!! ja Conway Maritime Press [London] 
1972 p. 13 
2013rig. ASH Irwin The levels of War; Operational Art and Campai&Li Plannin The 
Occasional Strategic & Combat Studies Institute 1993 
21 West Capt. AWJ, op. cit. p. 3. 
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also have a wider influence than just immediately above or below. 
Technology, for example, affects what is possible at the tactical level; but 
this is also transn-dtted upwards. At the same time decisions taken at the 
grand and military strategic levels influence the direction in which 
technological developments flow. 
The highest level of warfare is that of Grand Strategy. It is the level at 
which national political objectives are determined and is the 
responsibility of government and its most senior n-dlitary advisors. It is 
the level at which decisions concerning the allocation of national 
resources to achieve these objectives are taken. It is also the level at which 
alliances or coalitions are established. Military policy is obviously only 
one aspect of this. In addition to military policy, economic, foreign and 
diplomatic policies also operate at this level. The decisions taken in these 
other areas of grand strategy clearly set the parameters within which the 
military operate. A country's grand strategy is the level at which the 
relationship between defence policy and the rest of government policy is 
articulated. The setting of foreign policy objectives identifies the goals 
toward which all services work as well as the balance between them. 
Although this suggests that policy flows from grand strategy down to the 
other levels of military decision-making, it is important to appreciate that 
this process also contains a strong element of feedback from the bottom 
up. This thesis argues that through an examination of the British Pacific 
Fleet [BPF] a greater appreciation of this process can be arrived at. At the 
grand strategic level sea power provides a range of means by which the 
country's security, diplomatic and economic goals may be achieved. 
Navies can be used to underpin alliances, reassure friends and deter 
enen-des, and express a state's interest in areas of concern. 
The military stra tegic level is concerned with the application of 
n-dlitary resources to meet national objectives. It is the level at which the 
required end state of any military action is detern-dned. It is the 
responsibility of the armed forces most senior officers. Decisions taken at 
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this level illustrate an armed forces" [or military establishment's] 
conception of warfare as whole. This thesis covers not only a period of 
the Second World War but also the first years of peace. In so doing, it 
demonstrates that issues of concern during wartime at the various levels 
do not carry over into peace along smooth [academically neat] lines. 
Under peacetime conditions one of the major concerns at the military 
strategic level is the appreciation of future warfare; clearly not something 
of paramount interest whilst war is actually underway. For the Royal 
Navy [RN] the primary focus at this level was undoubtedly the defence 
of sea communications, in particular ideas concerning the securing and 
exploitation of command of the sea and how these could be adapted to 
new circumstances and threats. 
The translation of objectives set at the military strategic level into 
action is undertaken at the operational level. It is the level at which 
campaigns and major operations are planned, sequenced and directed. 
The operational level provides the crucial link between the setting of 
military strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces. The 
orchestration of military activities at this level is termed Operational Art. 
This level of warfare is perhaps the most difficult to understand. It is a 
term which derives from German and Soviet thinking with regard to land 
warfare and though, as argued above, it is not restricted to that 
environment, its acceptance into maritime thinking has been contentious. 
Edward Luttwak has explained the operational level of war as 
follows, 
In theater strategy [military strategy], political goals and 
constraints on one hand and available resources on the other 
determine projected outcomes. At a much lower level, tactics 
deal with specific techniques. In the operational dimension, by 
contrast, schemes of warfare such as blitzkrieg or defense in 
depth evolve or are exploited. Such schemes seek to attain the 
goals set by theater strategy through suitable combination of 
tactics. It is not surprising that the major works of military 
16 
literature tend to focus on the operational level, evidenced by 
the writings of Clausewitz. 22 
In the naval field concepts emerge at this level which seek to guide 
the employment of forces in order to attain military strategic objectives. 
Such ideas as attack at source and their role in defending sea 
communications are examples of operational concepts. 
The tactical level of warfare is that level at which engagement with 
the enemy actually takes place, the way in which military force is actually 
applied in battle. Although the parameters of this level are determined by 
the higher levels of war, the tactical level also has a significant influence 
upwards. The tactical employment of forces and technology shapes what 
is possible at the operational level. This influence continues up; what is 
possible at the operational level shapes what can be achieved at the 
military strategic level and so on to the grand strategic level. 
The division of warfare into the various levels is a tool of analysis; it 
assists in the ordering of issues, the understanding of cause and effect, 
but is not always clear where these artificial divisions should lie. Captain 
NR Essenhigh, later First Sea Lord, wrote in 1992 that whereas, 'in land 
warfare the boundaries between these levels of conflict are reasonably 
well defined [ ... 
] in maritime war the stages of progression from tactics 
through operational art to strategy are less clearly identifiable! 23 It is 
clear from the analysis of the BPF that the distinctions between the 
various levels of warfare are not fixed; indeed, there is a considerable 
amount of overlap between them. As a result of this a number of 
judgements are made about the level at wl-dch particular issues are 
addressed. These are not intended to be the last words on the subject, 
rather they are seen as a starting point for a wider debate on the levels of 
war. 
22 Edward Luttwak The Operational Level of War, International Securi Winter 1980/81 
(Vol. 5, No. 3) p. 61. 
23 Captain NR Essenhigh'Command of the Sea at the Operational Level of War', 
Higher Command and Staff Course Papers, 1992 p. 1 
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Retrospectively applying contemporary military thinking to an 
historical period is obviously fraught with danger. There is a tendency to 
see all issues through the light of current concepts, even when these may 
not be applicable. It does have however, the advantage of providing a 
structure through wl-dch to analyse and assess the full range of 
experiences, decisions and influences of what was an incredibly complex 
and rapidly changing environment. 
The advantage of this approach of applying a levels of warfare 
analysis to the experience of the BPF is that is helps us better understand 
both the theory and the practice of naval warfare - the conceptual 
framework on the one hand, and the practical war fighting on the other. 
Argument: The BPF as a Case Study 
This thesis is concerned with the manner in which the experiences of 
the British Pacific Fleet impacted upon the Royal Navy in the period 
leading up to the Korean War. It is also contended that these experiences 
constituted an entirely new style of naval warfare. The Royal Navy's 
Historical Branch described the Fleet that left Australia as being given' an 
assignment to a type of warfare which under the conditions of the 
German war it had not been able to practise before. 24The BPF's 
Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, bemoaned the handicap 
of the 'older fashioned harbour based type of warfare'25 when it came to 
this 'Pacific type of warfare'. 26 Rear-Adn-dral Sir Philip Vian, perhaps one 
of the RN's most experienced fighting officerS27 explained that 'an 
24 Confidential Book 3081 (32) Naval Staff History of the Second World War, Battle 
Summary No. 47 Naval Operations: Okinawa 1950 p. 99 
25 ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov 1944-july 1945 para 107(b) 
26 ADM 199/1478 Reports of Naval Operations Against Japan 17/7/45-2/9/45 From 
Fraser to Admiralty 6/11/45 Operations July/August 
27 Vian had first attracted attention as Captain of the Destroyer Cossack during the 
Altinark affair, he had been Captain (D) of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla during the Bismarck 
chase, a cruiser admiral defending the Malta convoys, the assault force commander for 
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entirely new form of campaigning had been evolved in the vast spaces of 
the PacifiC. '28 Fraser saw this as 'the most modern type of naval warfare 
yet evolved, [a] revolutionary form of modern naval warfare. '29Within 
this new type of naval warfare 'Task Force 57[BPF] made British naval 
history, 30, which would be 'of lasting benefit to the British Navy. '31 
All these comments refer to an almost forgotten episode in the 
development of the Royal Navy. The experiences cover a period during 
the Second World War that lasted less than a year. The total operational 
achievement of the British Pacific Fleet's surface ships amounted to thirty 
six air-strike days, and four bombardments of enemy territory. In 
comparison with the fight waged against the U-boat, this n-dght seem a 
mere drop in the ocean. The Allies lost 12.8 million tons of shipping in the 
grey Atlantic, the majority of the 73,642 deaths the RN suffered were also 
in that theatre. The British Pacific Fleet may have comprised the largest 
concentration of naval fighting power ever put together by the Admiralty 
but its contribution to the bookshelves of the naval historian displays the 
level of interest its existence has created. Winton accurately described the 
contribution of the BPF to the defeat of Japan when he wrote 'even the 
most eager British historian could never claim that the British Pacific 
Fleet played anything more than an ancillary part in the war at sea in the 
Pacific. '32 What is more intriguing is an aside that follows Winton's 
comment, claiming that the BPF 'set the pattern for the shape of the Royal 
Navy after the war. ' 
the invasion of Sicily and the naval commander of the Eastern Task Force for the 
landings in Normandy 
28Admiral of the Fleet Sir Philip Vian Action This L)ýjy Frederick Muller Ltd [London] 
1960 p. 155 
29 ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov 1944-july 1945 para 4 
30 ADM 199/1492 Summary of Naval Air Operations - May - August 1945,1st Sea 
Lord's Memoranda to War Cabinet 
31ADM 199/1478 Reports of Naval Operations Against Japan 17/7/45-2/9/45 Enc. 
Report from Vice Admiral Rawlings 1/10/45 
32J Winton The Forgotten Fleet Michael Joseph Ltd 1969 (re-print Douglas-Boyd Books 
Warhust 1991) p. 348 
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On the morning of Sunday 2nd September 1945 at 0914, Admiral Sir 
Bruce Fraser added his signature to the document of japanýs surrender. 
He signed on behalf of His Majesty's Government seated at a table on the 
deck of the United States battleship USS Missouri moored in Tokyo Bay. 
Admiral Fraser's name followed that of Mr Shigemitsu, the Japanese 
Foreign Minister, General Umezu of the Imperial General Staff, General 
MacArthur as Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Admiral Nimitz for 
the United States, and General Hsu Yung-chang for China. 33 After the 
short ceremony some four hundred and fifty aircraft from the U. S. Fast 
Carrier Task Force roared over head to take part in a fly past of a 
thousand machines in the skies above Tokyo. 
The surrender ceremony was a clear display of American power, stage 
managed by General MacArthur, the British playing a supporting role 
epitornised by the loan of the chairs for the ceremony34. Some years latter, 
after Admiral Fraser had retired, Fleet Adn-dral Chester W Nimitz sent 
him a copy of the two pages from the Missouri's deck log detailing the 
ceremony that lasted forty four minutes and brought to an end six years 
of disparate global conflict linked together by the sea. 
The Royal Navy had fought on, above and under almost all the 
world's oceans. It had begun deploying and carrying out its wartime 
tasks before the first shots were fired and it had been there at the end. But 
only just. The navy that had begun the war was not the same as that 
which witnessed the events in Tokyo Bay that Sunday morning. By the 
time the British returned to the Pacific command of the sea had already 
been won and navies turned their attention to projecting their power 
33The other signatories were General Sir Thomas Blamey for Australia, Colonel 
L. M. Cosgrove for Canada, Air Vice Marshal L. M. Isitt for New Zealand, General 
P. LecIerc for France, Adn-dral C. E. L. Helfrich for the Netherlands and Lieutenant 
General K. N. Derevyanko for the Soviet Union. MS83/158 File 21 Lord Fraser of North 
Cape papers National Maritime Museum. [Hereafter Fraser Papers] 
34The BPF Liaison Officer, Commander Michael Le Fanu, recalled later how he and 
Admiral Halsey's Flag Secretary were told to go and fix the surrender. 'I provided the 
chairs which came from King George V- nice wooden ones instead of these American 
metal ones. 'Quoted in R. Baker DKy Ginger: The Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Sir 
Michael Le Fanu W. H. Allen [London] 1977 
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ashore. Navies have always projected power ashore, their importance has 
waxed and waned with the degree to which they could influence ashore. 
That influence could be the slow pressure of economic blockade or the 
delivery of military force, from small scale raids to full scale invasion, to 
the theatre of operations. What appeared to be distinct about the Pacific 
campaign was the development of long range, sustainable task force 
operations capable of striking strategic targets deep inland. 
Willmott described the BPF as the 'most powerful single strike force 
assembled by Britain in the course of the Second World War and, relative 
to its own time, was probably as powerful a force as any raised by the 
Royal Navy at any stage in its long history. '35 But its origins and initial 
deployment were hardly auspicious. The British Pacific Fleet was a long 
time in gestation, had a troubled birth, taking its first unsteady solo steps 
before it was even properly formed, and then had to learn to run 
alongside the world's foremost marathon athlete after the briefest 
adolescence. That it managed to arrive, let alone compete, in the final 
event of the Second World War, is a testament to the strength in character 
it possessed. Fraser described what the BPF had to accomplish by saying: 
'The fact that the British Fleet was able to take its place alongside the U. S. 
Fleet and to enter at short notice into their highly specialised type of 
warfare demonstrates the two qualities of "adaptability" and "readiness" 
of which the British Navy is justly proud. '36 
The combat record of the BPF may seem to sit uneasily with the fact 
that the Fleet was probably the most powerful force the Admiralty had 
deployed in war. It participated in four operations amounting to only 140 
carrier strike days between its formation on the 99 December and the end 
of the war. For a force that comprised four battleships, five fleet, four 
light fleet and eight escort carriers, ten cruisers, forty destroyers and over 
one hundred and seventy minesweepers and support vessels, not 
35H. P. Willmott just Being There Paper presented to the Institute of Historical Research 
for the Julian Corbett Prize in Modern Naval History 1986 p2 
36ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov. 1944-july 1945 23/11/45 
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counting some tl-drty submarines, it is not the most illustrious battle roll. 
Not even the most ardent advocate of the BPF could claim that it was 
essential to the defeat of Japan; its significance must therefore lie 
elsewhere. 
In brief, the BPF was formed following a commitment given by the 
Prime Minister to the American President at the Octagon conference. 
Raised from the Eastern Fleet, based in the Indian Ocean, and additional 
units sent from the European theatre when they could be spared, the BPF 
attacked Sumatra as part of Operation Outbreak whilst on passage to 
Australia. After reaching the Dominion it sailed north to undertake 
strikes in support of the American landings on Okinawa, Operation 
Iceberg. Following replenishment and a brief sortie against Truk, the 
Fleet operated with the American Sixth Fleet off the coast of Japan until 
the Japanese surrender brought a halt to combat activities. 
The thesis is divided into four sections each corresponding to a level 
of warfare. The sections have two chapters each one dealing with the 
experience of the BPF and the other exan-tining that experience's legacy. 
Section one examines the grand strategic level of warfare and the role 
played within this of the BPF. It is concerned with the way in which the 
BPF was used to support the Government's developing grand strategy. It 
explores the constraints placed upon British policy by the perilous nature 
of the British economy, how the manpower crisis restricted the British 
contribution and the way in which both American and British attitudes 
toward each other were changed as a result of the BPF. These themes are 
then followed through into the post war period in Chapter Three. This 
chapter examines the policies of the post war Labour Government. It 
illustrates how these developed over the course of five years in response 
to many of the issues that beset Britain's contribution to the Pacific 
campaign. It also addresses the changing conceptions of the Soviet Union, 
the attitude of the US toward Britain, drawing these themes together with 
an assessment of BritaiWs initial contribution to the Korean War. 
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Section Two explores the significance of, the BPF at the military 
strategic level. Again, the BPF's experience at this level forms Chapter 
Four and its legacy Chapter Five. The value of the levels of warfare 
approach can be seen in this section. It illustrates how dependent British 
aspirations at the grand strategic were on agreements and success at the 
military strategic level. The experience of establishing command and 
control arrangements with the USN prefigured the relationship that both 
navies would seek to maintain in the post war period. The arguments 
over where exactly the British contribution would operate are examined 
in some depth. The importance of a sin-dlar intellectual heritage in both 
navies for the successful achievement of military strategic goals is evident 
from this analysis. 
The operational level of warfare is, as we have seen, the least distinct. 
As has been explored above it is the level at which tactical engagements 
are sequenced into an overall campaign in order to achieve military 
strategic objectives. For the BPF this entailed the adaptation to 
conceptions of war at sea developed by the USN between 1941 and 1945. 
The establishment of the Fast Carrier Task Force [FCTF] as the centre 
piece of the USN, the manner in which logistics were used to alter and 
expand the strategic and operational range of naval forces, were but two 
features that would came to fruition in the Pacific and would come to 
feature in the post war period. However, this was not a smooth 
transmission of accepted 'lessons' from the Pacific. As the world emerged 
from WWII to be confronted with a new international structure, 
questions were raised concerning the relevance of previous experience. 
The world during the first five years of peace was vastly different from 
the one that had begun the war. New technology in the shape of aton-lic 
weapons threatened to change the whole relationship between society 
and war. What role then for a navy? Other technologies in the shape of 
missiles, jet propulsion, sensor and sub-surface capabilities, also 
questioned the shape, structure, purpose and procedure of a navy framed 
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in terms of the Second World War. Adapting to this produces what jj 
Tritten and many others, have described as a revolution in m ilitary 
affairs. 'A revolution in military affairs is a fundamental shift in military 
strategy, doctrine, and tactics, which occurs generally, but not always, as 
a result of a change in technology'37 
Tritten argues that the type of naval conflict in the Pacific created, 
for navies, a revolution. 
At sea, there was a revolution in military affairs that paralleled, 
although not exactly, the blitzkrieg. The development 
comparable to the blitzkrieg was the mobile fast carrier task 
force and its accompanying logistics train. Such forces were 
able to roam the oceans, virtually at will, in search of enemy 
battlefleets that could be engaged at vast distances from one's 
own fleet. Alternatively, naval task groups could be formed to 
attack enemy shore installations, using their own form of 
manoeuvre warfare which bypassed strong points. 38 
Tritten discusses the US Navy [USNI, examining how the style of 
naval warfare undertaken in the Pacific has set the pattern for the worlds 
pre-eminent sea power ever since. What has not been explored to any 
great extent, however is the way that participation in that campaign 
shaped the Royal Navy in the immediate Post-War period 
At the tactical level, covered in Section Four, the influence of the BPF 
is perhaps most evident. The procedures for operating a naval force at 
great distance from its base over an extended period of time were 
established in the Pacific and reinforced in the years before the Korean 
War. 
The experiences of the BPF were transmitted to the wider RN and the 
more general post-war UK defence community in a number of ways. First 
there were the obvious official written reports from participants. Fraser's 
37J. J. Tritten & Vice Admiral L. Donolo A Doctrine Reader: The Navies of the United 
States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Spain Naval War College [Newport] 1995 p. 125. 
381bid. p. 127 
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dispatches, after action reports from Admirals Rawlings and Vian, for 
example, were just the tip of an iceberg of information at every level 
which the BPF sent back to London. These were carefully studied by 
various departments within the Admiralty. They were used as the basis 
for lectures in training, became internal publications on tactical actions 
and helped formulate policy at the operational and strategic levels. They 
formed the raw material of the Navy's own Staff History of the War and 
the Official Histories. Participants attended conferences where they 
shared their experience, often having these talks published in the 
professional journals. 
As well as the written word transmitting the Pacific experience 
personal contacts and subsequent appointments were important. The 
Navy had sent their best and most modern ships to the Pacific to work 
with the Americans, crewed with some of their most able officers who 
would go on to major command in the post war period. The BPF's 
Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Fraser, became First Sea Lord in 1948 
having first turned down the appointment in favour of Andrew 
Cunningham in 1943. Charles Lambe, commander of HMS Illustrious, 
returned to the Admiralty as Vice Chief of the Naval Staff (Air) and 
ultimately First Sea Lord. Michael Le Fanu, who was both Admiral 
Halsey's then Spruance's liaison officer, also attained this lofty height. 
His successor in the Royal Navy's most senior appointment, Peter Hill- 
Norton, had been gunnery officer on the battleship Howe in the Pacific. 
Edward Ashmore, who was mentioned in dispatches during the 
Okinawa campaign when he was flag lieutenant and communications 
officer with the Fourth Cruiser Squadron, also made the top job. Admiral 
Vian, commander of the BPF 1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron, became Fifth 
Sea Lord, responsible for naval aviation. The commander of the Fourth 
Cruiser Squadron, Rear Admiral EJP Brind, would be back in Eastern 
waters as CinC Far East Station when the Korean War erupted with Rear 
Admiral WG Andrewes, his Flag Officer 2nd in Command, who had been 
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captain of the fleet carrier HMS Formidable. In addition, a host of lesser 
appointments would be filled in the post war navy by officers with 
Pacific experience where their influence could be great. Capt RM Dick, 
for example, commanded the cruiser HMS Belfast with the BPF and 
subsequently became Director of Plans in the Admiralty. 
Sources 
This study brings to light some new material, re-examines primary 
source material and reassesses the available secondary literature. As this 
thesis covers both the end of the war and the beginning of the cold war, 
the published, secondary literature falls into two camps chronologically 
and will be dealt with as such. For the British Pacific Fleet the most 
widely known is probably John Winton's The Forgotten Fleet: The Story 
of the British Pacific Fleet 1944-45.39 It was first published in 1969 and 
then enjoyed a series of reprints in the late 1980's and early 90's. Winton 
provides a narrative history of the BPFs activities that is on the whole 
accurate in fact if somewhat lacking in analysis. Winton wrote with the 
benefit of a large volume of correspondence and interviews with some of 
the participants, admittedly some years after the event. The value of his 
work is indeed this correspondence, giving as it does some insight into 
how individuals saw the BPFs activities. In addition it is clear from his 
text that access was pern-dtted to the then still restricted, Naval Historical 
Branch account of the War with Tqpan - six volumes in total, eventually 
published by HMSO in 1995. In many instances this History transcribes 
material from then still classified reports. Material from these reports also 
appeared as supplements to the London Gazette. The Official Histories of 
the Korean War and Grand Strategy and the War at Sea, are treated here 
as primary source material. Not so much as for the factual information 
39Winton J The Forgotten Fleet Michael Joseph Ltd 1969 (re-print Douglas-Boyd Books 
Warhust 1991). 
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that they contain, though this has been useful, but for the insight that 
they give into how the commissioning authorities viewed the 
experiences. 
In the same year that Winton published his book on the BPF another 
book, Task Force 5 also appeared in print. 40 Though, like Winton, Smith 
had access to a number of the participants this is a popular narrative 
history which does not go beyond the recounting of events. An oral 
history collection of the BPFs experiences has been assembled by Stuart 
Eadon, Kamikaze: The Story of the British Pacific Fleet. 41 However the 
most scholarly treatment of the BPF is to be found in the work of HP 
Willmott. Willmott has published widely on the Second World War and 
particularly the Far Eastern campaigns. Most pertinent to this study has 
been his work on the British search for a strategy with regard the 
Japanese, for which he received his Ph. D. and subsequently published as 
Grave of a Dozen Schemes. 42 This work built upon a paper presented to 
the Institute of Historical Research for the Julian Corbett Prize in Modern 
Naval History in 1986.43 In this paper Willmott sets out his thesis that the 
significance of the BPF was as a signal of intent, to both the Japanese and 
Americans that Britain was prepared to continue the war until Japan's 
unconditional surrender. This was not a new argument; it had been 
deployed by Arthur Marder in his two volume history of the Royal Navy 
and the Imperial Japanese Navy. 44 However Willmott grounds this work 
40 Peter C Smith Task Force 57, William Kimber & Co. Ltd. [London] 1969 
41 S Eadon (ed. ) Kamikaze: The Story of the British Pacific Flee Crecy Books Ltd. [Bath] 
1995 
42 H. P. Willmott Grave of a Dozen Schemes AirLife Publishing England 1996 
43 H. P. Willmott Just Being There 
44 The argument is most strongly developed in the second volume, Old friends, new 
enemies; the Royal Nayy and the Imperial Japanese Nayy, Volume H: the Pacific war, 
1942-1945 Clarendon Press [Oxford] 1990. Unfortunately Marder died before the 
completion of this volume, whereupon it was finished by two of his research students, 
Mark Jacobsen and John Horsfield. 
27 
in a much more thorough and complete examination of the available 
primary source material. 
For the post war period the most important secondary source must 
remain Eric Grove's Vanguard to Trident. 45 This book covers the period 
from 1945 until the 1980's. It carefully charts the development of the 
Royal Navy against a background of changing international relations, 
diplomatic issues and economic circumstances. It is essential reading for 
anybody wishing to comment on the Royal Navy in the period after the 
war. The mixture of grand and military strategic issues that it assess 
provided an invaluable starting point for the arguments developed in this 
thesis. Other publications which have influenced this study include the 
work of Norman Friedman, particularly his Post War Naval Revolution. 46 
Friedman's major contribution is his analysis of how technological 
change fitted into the wider development of navies in the post war 
period. 
In addition to the works cited above, other publications informed 
particular aspects of this study. Richard Moore's book, The Royal Navy 
and Nuclear Weapons for example, was used extensively in the writing 
of the section on the Adn-dralty's response to nuclear issues. These works 
will be highlighted and assessed as they appear in the main body of this 
study. One final book merits mention at this point be cause it in part 
utilises a levels of warfare analysis. Jock Gardner's Decoding HiLtgm. 
The Battle of the Atlantic and Ultra utilises a levels of warfare analysis to 
give context to signals intelligence during the Battle of the Atlantic as 
well as assess its significance. As Gardner points out 
An understanding of relative levels of war as defined by such a 
system is an essential tool in understanding both the Battle of the 
45 Grove E. Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Poligy since World War Two Naval 
Institute Press [Annapolis] 1987 
46 N Friedman The Post War Naval Revolution Conway Maritime Press, [Bath] 1986 
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Atlantic as a whole and the applicability and utility of Ultra 
intelligence to its conduct. 47 
The main sources utilised in this study are primary source material in 
a number of collections both in the UK and the US. The largest collection 
of primary source material consulted was the Admiralty records held in 
the Public Records Office [PRO]. These included the First Sea Lord's 
papers, the material relating to the BPF contained in the War History and 
Cases files, records of the Directorate of Naval Operational Research 
[DNOR], the Directorate of Tactical and Staff Duties [DTSD], the 
Admiralty Board minutes and memorandum for the period covered, the 
BPF' War Diaries, the collection of Confidential Books, the records of the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee 
The foregoing collections of documents give a picture of the RN's 
/official views' on various subjects. However to understand some of the 
thinking bel-dnd these reports and files further research was necessary. 
This included Admiral Lord Fraser of North Cape's papers held in the 
National Maritime Museum, Greenwich. Admiral Fraser kept no personal 
diary but these papers contain correspondence with his flag officers, the 
First Sea Lord, Admiral Cunningham, the British Adn-dralty Delegation 
[BAD] in Washington, the Australian authorities and the Americans. 
Examination of these papers reveals some of the motivations behind 
Fraser's actions and adds to our understanding of his official reports from 
the Pacific. To take but one example. Fraser's report to the Admiralty 
covering the period November 1944 to July 1945 contains the following 
paragraph. 
The distances involved are sin-dlar to those of a fleet based in 
ALEXANDRIA, and with advanced anchorages at GIBRALTAR 
47 WjR Gardner Decoding HistoEy. The Battle of the Atlantic and Ultra Macmillan 
Press Ltd. [London], 1999, p. 2 
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and the Azores, attacking the North American coast between 
LABRADOR and NOVA SCOTIA. 48 
The report was actually sent back to London in November 1945 after 
the end of the war. The first time Fraser deployed the analogy of 
European war distances in the hope of bringing his predicament home 
was in a signal to the First Sea Lord, Cunningham, the previous July, at 
which time his sense of frustration is more evident; 
When you also consider that our Fleet operations are 
equivalent in distances to 
i) A Fleet based on Alexandria under Egyptian control 
ii) An advanced anchorage at Gibraltar under Spanish 
control 
iii) A fuelling service in the Azores, the Portuguese allotting 
the area 
iv) Operating against Labradore [sic] under Canadian 
control 
v) The Russian Admiralty assigning the units to the Fleet 
Train and controlling logistic support 
one can perhaps more readily understand the difficult 
nature of the problem. Perhaps the comparison to the Russian 
Admiralty is a little unfair, but they are fairly autocratic! 49 
Fraser is attempting to get across the message that his physical 
separation from the area of operations and immense supply line is only 
one aspect of his difficulties. The other, that Winton seems to have 
missed, was his political separation from the authorities which the 
situation demanded he deal with. The witticism directed at the 
Admiralty may be tempered by his closing remarks and comes at the end 
of a long running debate with London concerning every aspect of his 
operation, but perhaps gives a truer picture of Fraser's inner thoughts. 
Admiral Nimitz's papers concerning the period of British 
participation in the Pacific have also been researched. 50 These provide a 
48 ADM 199/118 British Pacific Fleet. C-in-C's Dispatches November 1944 to July 1945 
23/11/45 
49 Signal to First Sea Lord 17/7/45 MS83/158 File 23Fraser Papers 
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glimpse of the changing attitude of the USN toward the Royal Navy and 
the way in which senior officers in the BPF interacted with their 
American counterparts and superiors. 
The new primary source material that this thesis brings to the fore is 
the collection of Monthly Intelligence Reports. During the period covered 
by the second half of this study the Admiralty produced a Monthly 
Intelligence Report. 51 These reports provide a fascinating insight into 
what the Adn-dralty considered it important for the Navy to know. It was 
produced under the auspices of the Director of Naval Intelligence [DNI] 
from January 1946 onwards and distributed throughout the Navy. 
Commanders-in-Chief got four copies, Flag Officers and their staffs 
received three copies, battleships cruisers and carriers eight, destroyers, 
corvettes and a host of other smaller n-dnor war vessels including boom 
carriers, received one. Its contents were wide and varied and it was 
recommended that lectures should be given to ships' companies on its 
contents, thus the Admiralty was able to disseminate its message 
throughout the ranks of the service. The MIR's give a picture of the Royal 
Navy and the Admiralty's conception of its purposes, its roles and 
n-dssions. It promulgated information on the Royal Navy's deployment, 
exercises and procurement. It carried news of foreign naval 
developments, it discussed international affairs, commenting on treaties 
and diplomatic developments as well as providing intelligence on 
specific countries. Particular attention was paid to the military capability, 
political developments and econon-dc issues of both the Soviet Union and 
the USA. The MIR's reprinted excerpts from American weekly 
intelligence summaries. It also discussed American military posture at 
length. It produced analysis of Soviet capabilities at sea and carried 
edited parts of Soviet military journals such as Red Fleet. It reproduced 
50 Nimitz Papers Serial 1 Command Summary Book 6,1944-45, US Naval Historical 
Centre, Washington Navy Yard [hereafter Nimitz Papers] 
51 Admiralty Monthly Intelligence Report [hereafter MIR], Naval Historical Branch 
Library 
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lectures by senior officers on subjects such as their conception of war at 
sea. Finally each Report carried an editorial which commented on all 
aspects of its coverage. From an examination of this material it is possible 
to build up a picture of how the Admiralty viewed the world. There was 
clearly much which informed the Admiralty's thinking that could not be 
published in the MIR, even acknowledging DNI's instruction that 'care 
be taken to eliminate any matter which Commanding Officers consider 
unsuitable' when lecturing to ships' companies. 52 Despite this the MIR's 
still provide the historian with an account of how the Adn-dralty 
understood and explained events. To give an example; though the MIR is 
not as explicit as the First Sea Lord's file in acknowledging manpower 
shortages as the reason behind the placing of battleships into reserve 
status, it does reveal that it was the focus on maintaining smaller vessels 
in conu-nission that shaped the decision and the Admiralty's continuing 
belief that they might be required for future operational use. 53 It is the 
careful comparison of primary source material, building upon the 
secondary literature, which reveals the true significance of the BPF. 
As well as unpublished primary source material this study also 
examines the available published primary sources. The memoirs of the 
major participants have been used to exan-tine their individual reasoning 
behind events. Though not always based on contemporary 
documentation and obviously written with hindsight, sometimes self 
justification, they can provide insights into an individual's attitude 
toward issues, which helps understanding of the official record. 
Another major source of published primary material employed in 
this thesis are the major professional military journals of the period. 
Debates concerning all aspects of political and military policy were 
carried on in the pages of Royal United Services Institution journal, the 
52 MIR back cover 
53 See ADM 1/21473 Future Policy on Battle Ship Employment and MIR No 43 July 1949 
p. 4 
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Naval Review, Brassey's Naval Annual, the United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings and the US Naval War College Review. These debates reveal 
how the officer corps in both the USN and the Royal Navy conceived arýd 
thought about issues affecting their profession. The Naval Review can 
often be particularly revealing as it encouraged anonymous articles with 
deliberate aim of stimulating discussion. 
If history is the search for causal explanations for events, why did 
Britainýs commitment to the war in the Pacific look and perform as it did? 
How did this effect the Royal Navy in the post war period? Was this 
important for producing the naval contribution to the war in Korea? An 
understanding of the grand strategic level of warfare is crucial. Grand 
strategy shapes and directs all subsequent levels. It is meaningless to 
develop an operational history without reference to the political object 
towards which operations are directed and the manner and means 
through wl-dch its influence flows up and down. The issues raised by a 
consideration of this level, domestic politics, international relations and 
economics, impact upon all levels of warfare. In addition, the objectives 
set at the grand strategic level are subject to what can be achieved at the 
lower levels of warfare, thus creating a bottom up feedback loop. The 
way in which this process operates will be illustrated through the 
examination of the BPF, its experience and its legacy. 
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Section One 
The Grand Strategic Level of War 
The application of national resources to achieve national policy 
objectives (including alliance or coalition objectives). Its purpose is to 
direct and provide coherence to all aspects of national policy. It is the 
province of ministers and their most senior advisers. Grand strategy 
defines policy objectives, forges alliances and stipulates limits on 
enabling activities. It also makes available the appropriate resources and, 
where necessary, gives direction to the national effort. Nato describes this 
as the 'political strategic level'. Churchill said that the art of grand 
strategy was to foresee the outlines of the future and be prepared to deal 
with it. Thus grand strategy must be forward looking to anticipate the 
various ways in which a potential opponent (and any other participants) 
might react both before and after military action has been initiated. 54 
54 jWp 0-01 British Defence Doctrine HMSO [London] 1996 p. 1.8 
34 
Chapter Two 
The BPF Experience and British Grand Strategy 
Introduction 
Navies are both instruments and expressions of national policy at the 
highest level. They influence and are influenced by grand strategy. The 
BPF, by design and default, sat at the heart of British grand strategy with 
regard to the war in the Far East. Examination of its conception, gestation, 
birth and existence reveals much about Britain's changing position as a 
global power, imperial overstretch, disagreements between the Chiefs of 
Staff and the Prime Minister, and above all the UK's evolving relationship 
with the United States. Many of the features that emerge from this story 
of proposal and counter proposal, argument, disagreement and eventual 
compromise were to set the framework for UK - USN relations, strategic 
as well as naval, in the immediate post-war period and indeed longer. 
This chapter is concerned with the changing balance of power 
between the UK and the USA. How the BPF was utilised as a tool of 
alliance building by both countries within this context. It begins by 
exploring the problems that beset British planning for the dispatch of a 
significant military force to participate in the Pacific theatre. This reveals 
how British resource paucity constrained the country's options. Attention 
is then turned to the consequences for the BPF of this difficult gestation 
and birth. It also considers the role of the BPF with regard to relations 
with Australia. This demonstrates that at the grand strategic level the 
focus of British naval policy was as much, if not more, American opinion 
rather than Japanese destruction. 
The BPF and Alliance Building 
Navies have long been associated with alliance building. From 
Athenian control of the Delian League, through Papal, Venetian and 
Spanish opposition to the Ottomans in the Fifteenth century, to US 
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attempts at confidence building measures in the South China Sea, navies 
have been at the forefront of state foreign policy. Whether or not the 
attempts by the BPF toward this end have received the academic 
attention they deserve, it is clear that this aspect of the Fleets activities 
was well understood at the time. The British Foreign Office, the Chiefs of 
Staff and the American State Department all saw British participation as 
essential not just as a gesture of allied solidarity directed at Japan, but as 
crucial for the development of Anglo-American relations post war. 
Overshadowing everything else that was planned, attempted and 
accomplished by the BPF was the relationship fostered with the United 
States of America. What came to be in the words of the British Official 
History, ' the closest and most far reaching combination of sovereign 
states in war, ... that has yet been seen55 , was not easily formed. The 
deliberations concerning British participation in the Pacific theatre reveal 
much about the changing nature of the UK's relationship with the USA, a 
clear difference in strategic priorities as well as her relative decline from 
the ranks of first class powers. 
Whilst Churchill crossed the Atlantic for his first conference with 
Roosevelt following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the President 
was considering an opinion poll which indicated that eight out of ten 
Americans considered China to be the United States' natural democratic 
ally, about twice the number who saw Great Britain as their long term 
international partner56. It should be noted that this perspective probably 
had a great deal to do with America's focus on Japan as her most likely 
opponent. This was the latest manifestation of a strong American cultural 
factor, which viewed Europe as something old and degenerate, to be 
avoided, whilst their destiny lay to the West and across the Pacific. 
Despite this, and over the heads of the American Chiefs of Staff, the 
British were able to secure their objective, which was to get American 
55J Ehrman Grand Strategy Volume VI October 1944 -August 1945 HMSO [London] 
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agreement for the defeat of Germany to take precedence over that of 
Japan. It has been argued that this was the result of the British actually 
having a grand strategic plan for the defeat of the AxiS57 whilst the 
Americans were caught somewhat flatfooted by the outbreak of 
hostilities. However, evidence appears to support the conclusion that the 
Americans had already reached a similar conclusion independently. The 
previous November the chiefs of the Naval and Army Staffs, and 
approved by the President, had come to the conclusion that should the 
United States become involved in a war with both Germany and Japan 
'the European theatre must be regarded as the decisive one and a 
strategic defensive adopted in the Pacific. 158 The first meeting of the 
American and British Chiefs of Staff, held on Christmas Eve 1941, 
appeared to quash British fears that the events at Pearl Harbor would 
alter the US position. At the meeting General Marshall and Admiral Stark 
presented a statement to be used as the planning basis for the two allies. 
The paper explained, 
1. At the American-British staff conversations in February 
1941, it was agreed that Germany was the dominant 
member of the Axis powers, and consequently the 
Atlantic and European area was considered to be the 
decisive theatre. 
2. Much has happened since February last, but 
notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the war, our 
view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy 
and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is 
defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan 
must follow. 59 
Morrison points out that the initial strategic decisions concerning the 
higher direction of the war and the balance to be struck between 
European and Pacific theatres were taken in March 1941 at a secret 
57jackson, General Sir William & Bramall, Field Marshal Lord, The Chiefs. The Story o 
the UK Chiefs of Staff Brassey's (UK) [London] 1992 Chapter, 8 p. 217-260 
58 jRM Butler Grand Strategy Vol. Il Sept 1939-june 1941 HMSO [London] 1957 p. 496 
59 EJ King &WM Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record Evre & Spottiswoode, 
1953, p. 152 [Hereafter Fleet Admiral King 
37 
meeting in Washington between the British and American joint Chiefs of 
Staff. The policy adopted and incorporated in the ABC-1 Staff Agreement 
of 27 March 1941, was that if and when America entered the war, she 
would exert "the principal United States military effort" in the European 
theatre. America would continue to try diplomatically to prevent war 
with Japan, but even if that proved impossible, operations in the Pacific 
would be conducted in such a manner as "to facilitate" the effort against 
the European AxiS. 60 It was these decisions which were reaffirmed over 
Christmas 1941 much to the relief of the British. 
The two allies now developed the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the 
vehicle through which Allied grand strategy would be developed. The 
British, while not at first particularly enthusiastic, soon came perforce to 
place their faith in the CCS. As the weaker partner, they appreciated that, 
in the words of one of the British Chiefs of Staff, 'the combined 
organization ... give[s] us the constitutional figlit to discuss our needs on 
equal terms', whatever the relative strengths of the two nations. The 
Americans on the other hand, were not under the same stimulus in the 
last two years of the war to keep in touch with British intentions; they 
had the economic wherewithal to call the tune and their attitude towards 
the Committee accordingly tended to reflect more precisely their views 
on the subject of its business. 61 
Indeed as the British Official History recognized, '... as the campaigns 
in Europe and in the Far East gathered momentum, the Americans 
became increasingly reluctant to consult the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 
and regarded the British attempts to intervene in what they now 
considered to be local strategy with increasing and ill concealed 
impatience. ' 62 With the conclusion of the war against Germany, the 
British were becoming concerned that the Americans 'seemed anxious to 
60 Samuel E. Morison Thoughts oiz Naval Strategy, World War II, Naval War CgIlege 
Review March 1968 
61Grand Strategy Volume VI p. 348 
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limit the functions of the Committee as far as possible! In July 1945 the 
British raised the possibility of the Committee's continuation after the 
war but received 'only unofficial benevolent replies. 163 
Although it hardly needs reiterating, British grand strategy saw the 
defeat of Germany as a question of national survival whereas the threat 
posed by Japan concerned imperial possessions. For the Americans, the 
situation was clearly different. It was obviously the 'day of infamy' that 
brought the Americans fully into the war, and although a strong case 
could be, and was, put together for the greater danger being in Europe, 
there continued to exist at all levels of American society, public, political 
and military, the feeling that the British had managed 'to pull a fast one'. 
The sense that America was being used to rescue 'Britain's chestnuts from 
the fire' was something that the United Kingdom had to be overcome. 
This required a conu-nitment to participate as soon as was practicable in 
the main operations against Japan. The BPF eventually became the 
vehicle with which this commitment was realised. 
At the Quadrant Conference [Quebec, 14-24 August 1943] the British 
accepted as the basis of future planning the American idea that the defeat 
of Japan should follow within a year of the defeat of Germany, which was 
set as October 1944. Whereas at the first meeting between the Chiefs of 
Staff in Washington post Pearl Harbor at the Arcadia conference (22 
December 1941), the British had prevailed over the Americans and had 
obtained a conu-nitment to prosecute the European war to its completion 
first, it was now clear to all concerned who was drawing up the 
timetable. By the time that serious consideration of British participation 
in the Pacific was undertaken, it was already obvious that as far as grand 
strategy was concerned the British had lost much of their early war 
influence. Marc Milner, amongst others, points to the Casablanca 
Conference in January 1943 as the last time that the British were able to 
631bid. 
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dominate strategic planning. 64 Here they were able to extract another 
corrunitment to the 'Germany-first' strategy in exchange for an agreement 
to increase forces in the Pacific. 
There remained a distinct feeling in Washington that the British were 
vacillating over a commitment to the Pacific precisely because it was 
peripheral to their overall grand strategy. This explanation however only 
reveals part of the story. An exan-dnation of the constantly modified 
estimates for the defeat of Germany reveals something of the difficulties 
that beset British grand and military strategy when attempting to 
produce a coherent structure for planning the UK's contribution in the 
Far East. In December 1943 it was believed that Germany would 
capitulate before the end of the following year. 65 Between August 1944 
and March 1945 the date of Germany's anticipated surrender was 
variously predicted between January and December 1945. Moved 
forward and backward on a monthly basis these varying estimates, and 
the anxiety to produce them, reflected the difficulties confronting the 
military and political authorities. The former did not know the shape of 
their effort in the Pacific until September 1944, and thereafter could not 
judge the rate at which it would develop until the date of Germany's 
surrender could be foreseen. The latter found it equally difficult to 
foretell the shape of the British economy until they could judge with 
some precision both the extent of the military programme and the extent 
of American co-operation, all decisions that turned on the end of the war 
in Europe. What appeared to the Americans, pressing for firm 
conu-nitments, as vacillation was in fact, given the circumstances, the best 
the British could manage. 
64M. Milner Anglo-Ainerican Naval Co-operation, 1939-45 p. 256, in J. B. Hattendorf & R. S. 
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Despite the problems and priorities outlined above the British had 
first considered a scheme to develop fleet bases in Australia as early as 
27th December 194166. This was only two days after the loss of Hong 
Kong and a month and a half before the fall of Singapore. Yet it was to be 
nearly three years to the day before Adn-dral Fraser eventually opened 
offices for a new headquarters in Barrack House, Sydney. 67 There were a 
number of related reasons, economic, political and strategic, why it had 
taken so long for the Royal Navy to put into action their schemes of 
Christmas 1941. Geostrategic politics dictated that the focus of Britain's 
effort had to be the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The fall of France 
and Norway had created a situation whereby the Western Approaches 
were the only possible ones open to merchant vessels. Without the vital 
sea lines of communication [SLoC] the, UK would simply "wither on the 
vine". North Africa was the only place where Commonwealth troops 
were engaged on the ground with those of the European Axis powers, 
and that necessitated the holding of Malta. Which was so vital to the 
Navy's attempts to secure a working control of the Mediterranean. 
Withdrawal from the Mediterranean, though considered at one point, 
was disn-dssed. 
S. Roskill's official history of the Royal Navy in the Second World War 
concluded that the conflict reaffirmed the eternal verities of sea power. 
He argued that sea power had enabled Britain to shift ships from theatre 
to theatre and thus withstand three widely separated enemies and to 
serve as the linchpin of a coalition that finally overcame them. Roskill 
made much of the way in which British ships shuttled in and out of the 
Mediterranean, and used these movements to exemplify his rendition of 
maritime strategy. In contrast both Marder and Correlli Barnett have 
proposed that far from providing the flexibility necessary for the British 
to prove victorious in far off theatres, the emphasis on the Mediterranean 
66ADM 199/2376 Report of Experience of the BPF Jan-Aug 1945 15/3/46 
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and the defence of her disparate possessions, restricted the UK's options 
and diverted attention from what should have been the main war effort. 
Marder et. al. have argued that the Mediterranean became a drain on 
British reserves, consuming a disproportionate number of ships. 68 The 
conclusions of the Defence Requirements Committee [DRC] in 1934 led to 
the Mediterranean becoming the focus of British sea power. The DRC 
proposed that because Britain could not fight such widely separated 
enemies as Germany and Japan, the Mediterranean had to be the pivot 
point of British strategy between them. The temporary transfer of forces 
to the Indian Ocean was possible because of victories won by Admiral 
Cunningham in the Mediterranean, but their transitory nature underlined 
the fact that what mattered was the Middle Eastern Empire, not the Far 
East. The Antipodes, Southeast Asia, and long-standing British trading 
interests in China - none mattered as much as Britain's position in the 
Middle East. It was here that forces from all parts of the Commonwealth 
could be most easily concentrated against the Axis on a scale most 
favourable to Britain and where the possibility of victory was most 
achievable. 69 
Econon-dcally Britain was hard pressed to produce the means of 
fighting in its most crucial theatres. Ship building in the United Kingdom 
just could not produce sufficient vessels to station more than a limited 
number of obsolete battleships on the defensive in East Africa. Until the 
Italian naval presence in the Mediterranean had been removed, the 
Atlantic secured and the threat from German surface raiders dealt with 
there was little that could be spared for a return to the Pacific. The 
position that the British were, therefore, able to adopt in relation to the 
Japanese was clearly not a very dynamic one. 
68A. J. Marder, Op. Cit. 
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The official British history of the Second World War claims that until 
the Octagon conference of September 1944 events in the Pacific had 
'affected the British only indirectly or by implication. ' 70 British concerns 
with regard the war against Japan were focused upon Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Malaya. The developing naval thrust from Pearl Harbor 
across the central Pacific was almost exclusively an American concern. 
Though the British did acquiesce to an American request for the loan of a 
carrier in November 1942 when the USN was reduced to only one carrier 
operating at 50% capacity, it was at the Octagon conference that the 
Western Allies agreed that a British Fleet should be sent as soon as 
possible to work with the Americans in the main theatre of operations 
against Japan. Yet as has been mentioned above the Admiralty had 
considered the development of Australia as a major fleet base in late 1941. 
In reality, however, it was with the surrender of the Italian Fleet and the 
crippling of the Tirpitz, during and after September 1943 that a degree of 
choice entered British calculations with regard the war against Japan. 
Prior to this, the UK had been forced simply to respond to Japanese 
strategy, fighting where it could rather than where it would. After this 
time, the freeing of naval units in the Mediterranean and the easing of 
pressure involved in keeping watch on Germany's last remaining 
significant surface threat, allowed consideration of how, where and in 
what form the country could participate in the war in the Far East. At the 
SEXTANT conference in November 1943, the British high command 
accepted as a basis for examination the deployment of a fleet to the 
Pacific, the establishment of its main base in Australia and its advance 
base in the Solomons and Bismarcks. 
Despite this clear statement of intent the following Spring Churchill 
presented a paper to the Chiefs of Staff arguing that the British effort 
should be focused on an amphibious strategy in the Indian Ocean. 71 This 
70Grand Strategy Volume VI p. 203 
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was in part prompted by the desire to regain Malaya and Singapore 
before the Americans completed the defeat of Japan. The Prime Minister 
sought to ensure that when the war ended Britain would be in possession 
of what, in his view, was rightfully hers and would not be dependent 
upon the Americans for the return of her lost colonies. 
H. P. Willmott's extensive study of British strategic planning with 
regard to the Far East theatre, argues that much of Churchill's reasoning 
behind independent action against the Japanese can be attributed to an 
antagonism toward the adoption of a subsidiary role to the Americans. 72 
For example, Churchill advocated the adoption of Operation Culverin, a 
planned amphibious descent first on Northern Sumatra and then Malaya, 
as Britainýs contribution to the defeat of Japan. This was envisaged as a 
purely British operation; one which would go some way to rectifying the 
humiliation of early British defeats and strengthen the country's hand in 
any post-War settlement with regard to negotiations with the US. 
In contrast to the position taken by the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of 
Staff saw the United States as a power to be supported rather than 
guarded against. Their position envisaged the main British and 
Commonwealth effort intimately bound up with the Americans in the 
primary operations against Japan. As Adn-dral Cunningham, the First Sea 
Lord, recalled, 
For some reason which I never really understood the Prime 
Minister did not at first agree. He seemed to take the view that 
the fleet would be better employed in assisting in the recapture 
of our own possessions, Malaya and Singapore, or it may be he 
was rather daunted, if daunted he ever was, by the huge 
demands made upon shipping by the provision of the fleet 
train. 73 
Churchill was prepared to wait on the defensive until April 1945 if his 
preferred operation could not be mounted before that because of limited 
72H. P. Willmott Grave of a Dozen Schemes Op Cit 
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resources. This was something which the Chiefs of Staff thought would 
further alienate the Americans and actually create more problems for 
their post-War relations. 74 
Resource Allocation 
Resources available were indeed strictly limited. It became clear that 
as the war in Europe dragged on beyond the end of 1944, British 
manpower could not be stretched to accommodate a significant 
conu-nitment in the Indian Ocean or the South West Pacific, which would 
by necessity be amphibious. Even following the conclusion of European 
hostilities, the demands imposed on manpower resources by the 
domestic economy and occupation duties threatened to be so heavy that 
any substantial redeployment of ground forces to the Far East would be 
impracticable. This, ironically, was one of the strongest arguments 
advanced by the Chiefs of Staff in favour of a naval commitment in the 
Pacific; the despatch of a far from insignificant fleet was not dependant 
on the state of the war in Europe. Or so it was argued. This was the case 
with regards availability of the major fighting units - carriers, battleships 
- which were no longer required in European waters, but the logistical 
infrastructure for the Fleet Train that permitted them to function was 
severely handicapped by lack of shipping. What was available was often 
desperately needed to support the land campaign in North West Europe, 
in Italy and supply those parts of the continent that had already been 
liberated. 
Manpower problems were further exacerbated by the desire of the 
government to ameliorate some of the hardships inflicted by the war's 
necessities on the civilian population. This coupled with the need to 
74-CAB 79/69/8, CAB 80/78/11, CAB 119/17/53. See also H. P. Willmott just Being 
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restore as far as possible the nationýs capital equipment, particularly in 
homes and industrial machinery, placed severe restrictions on what was 
available for despatch to the Pacific. There also existed considerable 
pressure to restore export trade even before the conclusion of hostilities 
in the Far East. 
The problems faced over manpower were admitted by Cunningham 
after the war when he wrote: 'We were trying to carry out two tasks 
which were largely incompatible; to reduce our naval manpower, and 
simultaneously to man and supply our Pacific Fleet. '75 Nonetheless very 
few people had any realistic idea of what the Pacific undertaking would 
entail. 
The restrictions placed on the strategic choices available to the British 
by the parlous state of the UK economy not only contrasted starkly with 
the position in which the US found themselves, but clearly set the tone for 
defence deliberations at all levels in the post-war period. American 
industrial and military n-dght allowed the US to begin offensive 
operations in the Pacific at the same time as the Allied effort in Europe 
reached its peak. The British sought to deal with their enemies in turn; in 
truth, they had no other option. The Americans possessed such reserves 
of men and material that were now coming on stream as to make possible 
their shift in strategic posture. The mobilization of the American 
economy to meet the needs of a global conflict permitted the United 
States to wage two wars simultaneously. The Chiefs of Staff knew that 
there was no real alternative to a Pacific naval comi-nitment under 
American command, directed along the shortest route to Japanese 
surrender. This alone offered the prospect of an early end to a war that 
Britain could no longer sustain. 76 
The importance of shipping in virtually all aspects of Anglo-American 
planning underlines the essential fact that it was a maritime alliance. To 
75 A Sailors Odyssey p. 635 
76H. P. WillmoLt Just Being There p. 8 
46 
this alliance the British brought, in 1942, their empire of bases, 
communications networks, resources, their traditional preference for a 
peripheral strategy shaped by their traditional dearth of military 
hardware and men, and Churchill's well known predilections for a 
Mediterranean strategy. 77 
Influencing American Opinion 
It was clear to the Chiefs of Staff that Britain was so dependent upon 
American assistance that any failure to make available what fighting 
strength could be mustered would have serious consequences for the 
flow of American aid, both in the present and future. In addition, it was 
felt that Britain's best hope of securing a voice in the ordering of the post- 
war world was by fighting alongside, even if clearly subordinate to, the 
Americans in the Pacific rather than by indulging herself in a secondary 
theatre. 78 The decision to send a fleet to the Pacific involved Britain's last 
remaining capacity for independent action and the abandonment of the 
Indian Ocean and South East Asia. It meant accepting the junior status of 
Britain within the alliance but, despite the protestations of the Prime 
Minister and uneasiness felt by some members of the Chiefs of Staff, this 
was the only real option available given the timescale and resources 
available. 
This position was supported by the Foreign Office, partly from an 
appreciation of possible post-war advantage when seeking to secure 
loans from the Americans. 79 The Foreign Office was concerned about 
American attitudes. The North American Desk argued that a significant 
and visible Pacific commitment was in Britain's best interest when 
77Milner M. Anglo-American Naval Co-operatim 1939-45 Op Cit. p. 259 
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dealing with the question of war debts, the negotiation of future loans, 
and the ever pressing issue of shipping allocation between the European 
and Pacific theatres. In addition American public opinion needed to be 
assured that Britain would now play its full part in the Japanese war. 80 
The Foreign Office considered that a failure to participate in the final 
attack on the Japanese home islands would be a 'very grave handicap to 
us for years to come in all Anglo-American questions. 181 
This echoed the conclusions drawn by British diplomats in the United 
States. Naval power appeared to offer the Government the most cost 
effective tool for achieving this. The British Ambassador in Washington, 
Lord Halifax, suggested that British forces allocated for service in the 
Pacific should be sent to the Far East via the United States. Port visits on 
both American coasts would attract publicity and be a visual symbol of 
Britain's conu-nitment. 
It was clear, not only to the Foreign Office, but also to the BPF that in 
the 'intensive, efficient and hard striking type of war' that the US Fleet 
was fighting, nothing but the inclusion of a 'big British force would be 
noticeable and nothing but the best would be tolerated. '82 In order to 
derive any political benefit from the dispatch of military forces to the Far 
East such forces would have to be of a significant scale, capable of 
participating in the most advanced operations against Japan. The 
diversion of effort into what was considered secondary theatres in the 
war against Japan, the Indian Ocean or South East Asia for example, 
would not suffice in achieving the grand strategic aim. 
There is some evidence that similar thoughts occupied American 
minds. On 1 September 1944 the US Ambassador in London, Winant, 
signalled Hopkins, Roosevelt's closest confident, that: 
80 Grave of a Dozen Schemes p. 103. 
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if we allow the British to limit their active participation to 
recapturing areas that are to their selfish interest alone and not 
participate in smashing Japan ... we will create in the 
United 
States a hatred for Great Britain that will make for schism in the 
post-war years. 83 
Hopkins replied on the 4 September that'we simply must find a way 
to have Great Britain take her full and proper place in the war against 
Japan. 184 On the same subject Cordell Hull, US Secretary of State, sent the 
President a memorandum on the eighth arguing that; 
one of the most important objectives of US policy must be to 
bring the British into the war ... in the Far 
East to the greatest 
possible extent. The advantages of such a course are obvious ... 
The disadvantages of the failure of the British to participate to 
the full [are an] immediate and hostile public reaction in the 
United States. 85 
The significance of British participation in the war against Japan on 
American public opinion had long been clear to some within Britain's 
political leadership. Whilst visiting Annapolis during the spring of 1943 
the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, delivered a speech that attracted 
'exceptionally favourable nationwide attention and discussion. '86 Eden's 
speech was important because of a growing uneasiness that had 
developed in the United States concerning Britain's intentions in the Far 
East. Some of this uneasiness had been brought about by remarks the 
Prime Minister had made. Churchill had recently failed to include China 
in his list of great powers, an ornission which infuriated the China 
Lobby. 87 To compound this oversight he had also discussed the 
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possibility of a partial demobilization of Commonwealth troops after 
Germany's surrender. The Foreign Secretary had been at pains to express 
Britainýs, and the Commonwealth's, determination to fight to the end 
against Japan and his recognition of China was met with, 'universal 
expressions of relief. '88 
This continuing effort to generate maximum publicity for Britain's 
declared intention of fighting in the Pacific side by side with the 
Americans and its subsequent realisation was to become a major feature 
of British grand strategy and one of the primary objectives of the BPF. 
The American administration was also under the pressure of domestic 
opinion. It was important for the executive- to avoid any hint that they 
were intent on propping up Britain's failing empire in the east. During 
the first half of 1944, fears grew in the United States that Russia and, in 
particular, Britain had abandoned the Atlantic Charter and returned to 
the 'old discredited policies of expediency, national interest and balance 
of power. 89 The British believed that this public concern was the result of 
'the vagueness of American foreign policy in particular and the Allied 
war aims in general. '90 Under such circumstances, it was not surprising 
that the State Department looked unkindly upon ideas such as those of 
Churchill when he seemed to want to deploy British forces in operations 
designed to regain imperial possessions. Again in April 1944, the British 
Government received reports of public and Republican disquiet over the 
direction of American foreign policy. This disquiet, even outright 
hostility, became focused around the perception that 'secret deals' had 
been made to restore British possessions at the expense of American 
lives. 91 Or more subtly, that Britain would allow the Untied States to 
defeat Japan and use the opportunity to re-impose imperial rule behind 
period of recriminations following what it described as the loss of Cldua, with Mao's 
accession to power in 1949. See for example 
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the shield of American dead at little cost to herself. If Britain's primary 
effort in the Far East, however, was combined with the United States' 
main attack through the Pacific rather than focused upon lost colonies, it 
would go someway to allying these fears. 
The perception that the British had failed to participate fully in the 
war against Japan since the successful invasion of Europe in June 1944 
continued to produce criticism in the United States. However, at the end 
of September the Embassy in Washington was able, with a degree of 
satisfaction, to wire that, '. although we do not obtain the full credit we 
deserve, there are signs that the fact that it was we who demanded a 
greater share in the Far Eastern campaign and the Americans who sought 
to lin-dt it, has proved a shock to our sincere but misinformed critics. '92 
Whereas during 1942 and 1943 the US military had been overstretched in 
the Pacific to such a degree that the Royal Navy had provided a carrier, 
HMS Victorious, to work with the USN, by the middle of 1944 the USN, 
particularly in the shape of Admiral Ernest J King, were becoming more 
reluctant to accept British assistance as it was considered unnecessary in 
light of their vastly increased resources. This theme will be developed 
further below. The effort of British diplomats to raise the profile of the 
Commonwealth's participation, however, was beginning to bear fruit. 
'British participation in the Pacific is no longer discussed or brought into 
question. At is taken for granted that we will participate as fully as 
circumstances allow, but it is popularly anticipated that our role will be 
secondary. '93 
Despite such optimistic reports from the Washington Embassy a more 
realistic assessment of the effect that the British would have was 
delivered after the BPF strikes on Surnatran oil production facilitates, 
92Telegram from UK Embassy 25/9/44 Washington Despatches p. 424. 
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ironically described in the Royal Navy's Official History as the BPF's 
'greatest contribution to final victory over Japan. 194 
That our war effort in the Pacific is likely to be regarded as 
purely nominal if known at all to the great majority of 
Americans is brought out once more by the sparse news 
coverage given this week to British task forces' attack on oil 
refineries in the Dutch East Indies. This example once more 
underlines the lesson that, whatever our actual participation in 
the Pacific war may be, the general emotional attitude in the 
United States towards Britain after Germany's downfall will 
greatly affect the amount of credit we get for our effort. 95 
This placed a premium on the campaign being waged to influence 
American opinion. The distribution of Government posters and other 
propaganda material, often bearing the quote from Churchill that'Britain 
will pursue the war against Japan to the very end', was not only intended 
to reorientate the British public toward the Far East as the end in Europe 
drew nearer, but was also directed at the Allies across the Atlantic. 96 
There is some evidence that this and other activities, speeches, 
broadcasts and press briefings were having an effect. As the Embassy in 
Washington reported back to the Foreign Office in March 1945, 
Reactions to Prime Minister's latest reiteration of our intention 
to make full contribution against Japanese, as revealed in 
President's report of his Mediterranean talks, show that our 
policy on this matter has been having its effect. A number of 
papers not only commend declaration but for the first time add, 
in the words of Nezv Orleatis Titize-Picaytine: "It is welcome but 
unnecessary. One British pledge is enough and realities speak 
for themselves. " ... 
At the same time, there is no n-tistaking 
prevailing conception that the Pacific war is in a special sense 
America's business and that our role will be decidedly a 
subsidiary one. 97 
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Although the fact of British participation was becoming more widely 
appreciated there still remained a degree of suspicion with regard to the 
form and nature of any contribution. In. the spring of 1945 General 
Marshall and Adn-drals Halsey and Nimitz, while in Washington, 
privately briefed journalists on the broad themes of Allied strategy 
following the end of the war in Europe. 
The broad outlines of Pacific strategy now provide for 
American forces to tackle Japan direct while other Allied forces 
will be used for such specialised tasks as removing the Japanese 
from their conquered overseas territories. The rationale for this 
division of responsibilities was offered in a succession of plainly 
inspired broadcasts by Gram Swing98 in which he declared, 
"we are not going to spend American lives and treasure in 
freeing imperial possessions from the Japanese and then turn 
them back to their pre-war owners. It is for the British to clear 
the Japanese out of Malaya and for the Dutch to clear them out 
of the Netherlands Indies. If the Dutch do not have the strength 
to do it they must ask the British to help them. We are not going 
to do it. ... We see it as our assignment to 
bear the responsibility 
of defeating Japan and that we are prepared to do by 
ourselves. "99 
These were undoubtedly not reassuring sentiments for the majority of 
the British higher command. As has been mentioned, Churchill favoured 
the use of amphibious operations in South-East Asia, operating 
independently from the Americans. At the same time, the Americans 
were urging them to press forward through Burma with the intention of 
opening up the route to China which could eventually be used to support 
an air campaign against Japanese forces there and ultimately at the Home 
Islands themselves. Designs for these operations were made irrelevant by 
the quickening pace of American progress in the Pacific theatre before 
anything of substance came of them. The pressure brought to bear on the 
98S-, ving, Raymond Gram (1887-1968) Newspaperman and radio broadcaster, 
commentator for ABC 194248 
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UK to carry out these operations reveals that it was not only the British 
who suffered from confusion in the higher command echelons. 
American planning was beset by issues of inter-service rivalry as well 
as the complications of alliance relations. The balance had to be struck 
between the competing claims for priority of General Douglas 
MacArthur's essentially army command and Admiral Chester Nimitz's 
naval Pacific command. There was also major uncertainty in American 
strategic thinking concerning how an independently minded Army Air 
Forces [AAF1 bombing campaign fitted into the strategy and how this 
interacted with both Britain and China. King and Nimitz agreed that 
Japan could and should be defeated by blockade, bombing, and 
submarine warfare. 100 In contrast to this naval view, the US Army held to 
the view that the Imperial Japanese Army had to be defeated in battle 
and this would necessitate a land campaign in China. 
In the autumn of 1943 American planners, working on the Twelve- 
month Plan that set a target date of October 1945 for the defeat of Japan 
came to the conclusion that a British naval presence in the central Pacific 
was necessary to meet such a timetablel0l, not least since all carrier battles 
to date had resulted in significant losses. On 2 November 1943, the Joint 
Staff Mission noted that 'whilst admitting the need for British naval 
assistance in the Pacific 1944-1945 the U. S. still hope against hope that 
they might be able to bring off decisive fleet action alone. 1102 Despite this 
recognition that the US might require assistance in the Pacific there were 
some serious practical concerns which cast doubt on the idea of a British 
contribution. The US planners did not consider that even the small 
proportion of the British fleet and amphibious forces available in 1944 
could actually be logistically supported in the Central and North Pacific 
100E, B. Potter Nimitz Naval Institute Press, Annapolis1976 p. 327 [Hereafter Nimitz] 
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areas. For this reason it was argued that the greatest contribution of a 
British naval and amphibious force to the overall defeat of japan'would 
be to undertake continuing offensive operations in the south-east Asian 
areas. 1103 The issue of the logistic curtailment to British ambitions was 
taken up and exploited by Admiral King in Washington. 
Although American naval planners were conceding a role for the 
Royal Navy in the Pacific, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King 
himself was wholly opposed. In practice, this created one of the most 
unlikely alliances to emerge from the story of Anglo-American grand 
strategy in the Far East, that of King and Churchill seeking the same 
policy in opposition to the British Chiefs of Staff and the American State 
Department. Admiral Vian, described King in the following terms, 
Admiral King's attitude has sometimes been ascribed to 
Anglophobia. This is not altogether true. Certainly the 
Admiral's loyalty was given whole heartedly to the Navy he 
served. It was a feeling which led him to look upon even the 
United States Army and Air Force as doubtful allies. It was 
perhaps engendered in some degree by jealousy of the Royal 
Navy, which for so long had dominated the oceans of the 
world. 104 
At the end of June the President approved the US Army's plan for 
invading Kyushu on 1st November, conveying this and other decisions to 
the British in a memorandum the following day. 105 The fact that this 
decision was conveyed to, rather than discussed with, the British gives 
some indication of their decline in relative power since America had 
entered the war. The tentative plans envisaged an invasion of some five 
million men covered and supported by a fleet and air force larger than 
had been used in Overlord. 106 Almost all the forces would be American 
103CAB 105/71/392 and CAB 122.1075: Signal Joint Staff Mission to War Cabinet Office 
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and of such scale as to absorb almost all of their available strength. It 
seemed to the joint Chiefs of Staff therefore that at this stage their allies 
could best help by complementary action elsewhere, the British in the 
south-west Pacific and the Russians, when they entered the war, on the 
mainland of Asia. Although this looked remarkably akin to what 
Churchill had been advocating to the Chiefs of Staff, political and 
econon-dc reasons as well as a shortage of manpower cast grave doubts 
over their practicality. 
If the Japanese Home Islands were to be invaded over the next 
ten months, it was important for political reasons that the 
British should play a part in the operations. Naval and air 
support of the invasion, accompanied by 'mopping up' 
operations far away, were not considered enough. Land forces 
must participate, on whatever scale, in the invasion itsel 
- 
f. 
Unfortunately, it was unlikely that more than two or three 
British and Commonwealth divisions could take part, and even 
then only in the invasion of Honshu (operation 'Coronet') in the 
spring of 1946.107 
British proposals for the use of the BPF and a VLR bomber force of 
initially ten squadrons (later expanding to twenty) in Coronet were 
accepted by the joint Chiefs of Staff, but the later clearly had some 
reservations concerning the employment of ground troops. Whilst 
agreeing in principle to the use of a Commonwealth land force in the 
final phase in the war against Japan, the JCS were worried about a 
number of key issues. First, the unspecified nature of the conunitment 
made it impossible to draw up detailed plans. Second, as the British 
hoped to make up for their manpower inadequacies by utilising colonial 
troops, it was felt that there would be difficulty incorporating Indian 
troops into American operations (for reasons of language and 
acclimatisation). Finally, the British plans were predicated upon the 
agreement of the other Dominions concerned and this had not yet been 
obtained. 
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In truth the manpower overstretch brought about by occupation 
duties in Europe, the falling intake of service personnel and exhausted 
state of the war economy meant that British plans were exceptionally 
optimistic to say the least. japanýs surrender saved the embarrassment of 
being unable to realise them in practice. The only realistic contribution 
that the British had to offer was a naval one. The question remained 
whether it would be accepted by the Americans and where it was to 
operate. 
The Octagon Conference and the Birth of the BPF 
As mentioned above, it was at the Octagon Conference, Quebec, in 
September 1944, that the major decisions concerning British participation 
were taken. During the meetings not only was Admiral King forced to 
accept a British presence but Churchill also performed an about face over 
the substance and form of the contribution. Willmott has produced the 
most. convincing explanation for the Prime Minister's change of heart. 
The available evidence supports the conclusion that the Chiefs of Staff 
opposed Churchill's advocacy for operations in the South West Pacific 
Area or Indian Ocean simply because resources made them 
impracticable. 108 The Chiefs of Staff had been pressing their case with 
Churchill for most of the preceding summer. Arguing that Britain could 
not mount an amphibious operation because of manpower overstretch. 
Churchill eventually agreed that planning for a British commitment 
would have to be focused around a naval force but he continued to be 
vague concerning where exactly it would operate. 
Admiral King recalled after the war that the PM urged that the RAF 
and the Royal Navy be permitted to join the effort against the Japanese as 
108 See Willmott Grave of a Dozen Schemes p. 111-134 
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soon as possible. 109 Roosevelt asked King whether 'he needed any help 
from the Royal Navy', which King declined, arguing that the best 
occupation for any available British troops, planes, and ships would be 
the recovery of Singapore. He went on to argue that UK forces should be 
employed to assist the Dutch in the recovery of the chain of islands from 
Sumatra through Java to Borneo. Having changed his mind such 
arguments clearly did not please the Prime Minister 
Nimitz also noticed that the Prime Minister was clearly agitated by a 
Combined Chiefs' proposal that the Royal Navy would not operate north 
or east of the Philippines. 110 The Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Area 
recognised that the British, with many political and economic interests in 
the Far East, 'needed a victory in that part of the world to erase from the 
minds of the Orientals the effect of the crushing defeats of 1941 and 1942. ' 
He believed that Churchill would not be content with the prospect of 
minor successes in some out-of-the-way corner of the Pacific theatre. The 
Prime Minister by now wanted British forces clearly and visibly involved 
in the final defeat of the Japanese homeland. King, too, was aware of the 
political motivations behind the British position. In his autobiography 
King makes it clear that he was suspicious of the offer of British 
assistance, precisely because he feared that any combined effort would 
have political strings attached. In particular he was concerned that it 
would oblige the USN to reciprocate with help clearing the Japanese out 
of the Malay States and the Netherlands East Indies, in effect a distraction 
from the main task before the US. 
Attempting to deflect the issue, King reported that a paper was being 
prepared for the Combined Chiefs of Staffs on possible employment of 
British forces in the Pacific. 111 Churchill raised the question of whether it 
would not be better to employ the new British ships in place of the 'battle 
109 Fleet Admiral Mng p. 360 
110 Nimitz p. 323-324. 
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worn' vessels of the USN. King could only respond by saying the matter 
was under active consideration but Churchill continued to press the 
issue. Nimitz recounts that Roosevelt eventually conceded saying that, 'I 
should like to see the British fleet wherever and whenever possible. ' At 
which point Admiral King was visibly shaken. Nimitz also described the 
Prime Minister's reaction. 
Churchill was offended. To him it was inconceivable that an offer 
of the fleet of Drake and Hawke and St. Vincent and Nelson 
should not be instantly and gratefully embraced. "The offer of the 
British Fleet has been made, " growled Churchill. "Is it accepted? " 
"Yes, " said Roosevelt. 112 
This new found enthusiasm on the part of the Prime Minister for the 
British Pacific Fleet operating as part of the main campaign against Japan 
came as something of a surprise to the Chiefs of Staff, though no less 
welcome for it. Admiral Cunningham described how 
Remembering the Prime Minister's strongly expressed desire that 
our fleet should be used for the more limited purpose of assisting 
to regain Singapore, Malaya, North Borneo and other possessions 
from the Japanese, I was naturally delighted. I was always 
convinced that, whatever the difficulties of supply and of 
providing the ships for the fleet train, the proper place for our 
battleships and aircraft carriers was in the central Pacific working 
in close concert with the Americans. Our final stake in that ocean 
was fully the equal of theirs. At the same time, I was well aware 
of Admiral Earnest King's rooted aversion to our fleet operating 
with the American in its drive towards Japan proper. And now 
the die was cast. Mr Churchill had offered our fleet, and the offer 
had been accepted. 113 
Samuel Morrison, the official historian for the USN in World War 
Two, described the decision on the BPF by writing, 'Mr Churchill, as 
usual, got what he wanted; although Admiral King almost upset the 
apple cart at the OCTAGON conference at Quebec in September 1944 by 
112Nimitz p. 323-324. 
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letting it be known that he wanted no part of the British Navy in the 
Central Pacific. '114 This was something that would come back to haunt 
the alliance when it became more widely known and more widely 
reported still whilst the BPF were actually engaged in operations with the 
USN. 
The following day the UK Chiefs of Staff met their United States 
counterparts without either the Prime Minister or President and again 
raised the question of the British Navy in the Pacific. Admiral King, still 
adamant, hotly refused to have anything to do with it, and argued that 
the President's acceptance of the offer did not mean what the British 
thought it had meant. He accepted that it was of course essential to have 
sufficient forces for the war against Japan but that he was not prepared to 
accept a British Fleet which he could not employ or support. 'In principle 
he wished to accept the British Fleet in the Pacific, but it would be 
entirely unacceptable to him for the British main fleet to be employed for 
political reasons in the Pacific, and thus necessitate the withdrawal of 
some of the United States Fleet. '115 
The discussion began to get more and more heated with the Chief of 
Naval Operations berating not only his supposed allies but his fellow 
members of the Joint Chiefs. King, having turned his guns on General 
Marshall, was finally called to order by Admiral Leahy, the Presidents 
Chief of Staff, with the remark: "I don't think we should wash our linen in 
public". King, with the other American Chiefs of Staff against him, 
eventually gave way; but with very bad grace. 116 The following 
afternoon the British and American Chiefs of Staff reconvened and 
although it was apparent that King was now resigned to the use of a 
British fleet in the Pacific he made it quite clear that it must expect no 
assistance from the Americans. 
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Two months later at the end of November King met with Admiral 
Nimitz in San Francisco to discuss the situation in the Pacific following 
the Japanese defeat at the Battle of Leyte. The subject of British 
participation was again debated. There was some scepticism expressed 
concerning whether the BPF would appear at all. 117 King's memoirs claim 
that these doubts were not the result of any 'lack of good will' on the part 
of the Royal Navy but rather the question was one of actual capability. 
King's view was that although Royal Navy 
ships had operated throughout the seven seas, they had never in 
modern times operated for long periods at such distance from 
any permanent established base, and so had not had the 
experience of replenishment at sea or of dealing with fleet 
material and supply so far from home. All kinds of supplies were 
short, and the whole world lacked sufficient cargo ships. In 
addition, the Royal Navy was not familiar with that 
administration of carriers in large numbers that had been 
developed by the United States Navy in the war years. 118 
King emphasised that the British C-in-C would be an adn-tinistrative 
and not operational designation; that the officer would report to King, 
who would in turn give him specific directives. King held to the view that 
the British should operate as separately from the USN as possible. He 
intended that the BPF be given certain tasks to carry out independently, 
rather than for ships of the two navies to be manoeuvred together. This 
issue recurred when Halsey assumed command of Task Force 38 [TF381 
for what turned out to be the final operations against Japan but for the 
time being the matter was left to the interpretation of individual parties. 
Returning from the Octagon conference, the Admiralty now believed 
that they knew what was required; a main fleet of balanced arms the 
117 Fleet Admiral King p. 372 
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primary offensive power of which would be carrier borne aircraft, 
supported by a Fleet Train and capable of operating alongside the USN in 
the most advanced operations against the Japanese. Writing after the war 
Admiral Cunningham explained that, 
it was a very different matter to make the necessary 
arrangements to get that policy implemented. To begin with, we 
had against us the intense feeling of Admiral King and the Navy 
Department in Washington that the British Fleet was not wanted 
in the Pacific, and that in that area we must depend entirely upon 
our own efforts. We could expect no help from the American 
organization. 119 
There is an undoubted tendency when publishing memoirs after the 
event to portray events in a manner consistent with what has 
subsequently been learned. This is not to underrate King"s opposition to 
the BPF for there was certainly a major problem, but, as will be discussed 
in Chapter Four, there was also a degree of naivety in London about what 
a Pacific naval conu-nitment entailed. The 'agreements' of the Octagon 
conference and earlier finally bore fruit on the 19 November 1944 when 
the Far East Fleet was dissolved and replaced by the BPF and the Eastern 
Fleet. Admiral Nimitz had requested that before com ing into the Pacific 
the fleet's aircraft should attack Palembang, the centre of Japanese 
petroleum production in the south of Sumatra. Cunningham appears to 
have thought that this move by the Americans was designed to delay the 
arrival of the fleet. Though conceding it may have been for logistical 
reasons he hints at possible political motives. 120 
[W]e had the constant strain of striving against the firm desire of 
the United States Naval Authorities in Washington to keep our 
fleet away from the fighting in the Pacific. Some rather 
injudicious statements on our side and perhaps some calculated 
119A Sailors Odyssey p. 613-614. In actual fact American assistance was more than 
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assertions on the part , of certain 
American officers raised rather a 
storm in the British press about the implication that our fleet was 
incapable of operating in the Pacific on terms of comparative 
equality with the American, particularly in the matter of 
SUpply. 121 
The storm in the British press was also reflected across the Atlantic in 
America. 
During recent months a great deal has been said and written 
about the British Fleet in the Pacific. Most of it is 
erroneous ... Concurrent with the arrival of the British Pacific Fleet 
in Australia, a great deal of unfavourable publicity regarding it 
was unloosed in the United States. Some said that the British 
Pacific Fleet was inferior to our own in speed, armament, etc. 
Others said that it was unwanted in the Pacific - that it should 
confine its activities to the area around Malaya, the Dutch East 
Indies, etc. 122 
The row over the employment of the BPF again threatened to spill 
over and become an issue in American domestic politics and although the 
Embassy in Washington reported in May that there had yet to be any 
specific speculation as to exact part which Britain would play in future 
operations members of the legation were still very much alive to the 
difficulties of presenting the British case to the American public. 
The problem of British participation has of course been discussed 
intensively on and off since Pearl Harbor and despite reiterated 
statements to the contrary of Prime Minister and all other 
responsible British statement and newspapers, it is still generally 
assumed that we may not carry too much of a burden. We must 
naturally be prepared for criticism from some quarters whatever 
we do: if we prosecute Eastern War with might and main, we 
shall be told by some people that we are really fighting for our 
colonial possessions the better to exploit them and that American 
blood is being shed to better purpose than to help ourselves and 
Dutch and French to perpetuate our unregenerate colonial 
empires; while if we are judged not to have gone all out, that is 
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because we are letting America fight her own war with little aid 
after having let her pull our chestnuts out of European fire. There 
are probably elements throughout the Navy Department likely to 
be prey to both these lines simultaneous thought, torn as they are 
by desires to make Pacific victory as purely an American victory 
as possible and not to let us off too great a share of the heat and 
burden of the day. These fears may turn out to be exaggerated 
and the great part we are likely to play in second phase of war 
may obtain its due meed of recognition, but it will need 
unrelaxing emphasis by us on our role to see to it that it does. '123 
Adn-dral Fraser made fairly extensive use of his American liaison 
officer in an effort to publicise and promote the British point of view and 
counter act what amounted to the whispering campaign alluded to 
above. Capt. Wheeler, USN, wrote a number of contemporary articles 
that essentially followed the British line, one of which was reprinted after 
the war. In it, he declared that the British desire to have their fleet 
participate in the final assault on Japan was indeed a result of their wish 
to have a strong voice in the post-war settlement in the Far East, 'but 
before condemning them for this very natural aspiration, let us ask 
ourselves the question whether we would not do the same thing under 
similar circumstances. Actually, before the war, British interests in the Far 
East were far greater than ours. '124 
The article went further, tackling the thorny question of how the BPF 
should be employed. Again Wheeler took a position sympathetic to the 
British, though one supported by arguments more likely to appeal to an 
American audience. 
It was obvious that in order to win this war as soon as possible, 
every ship, plane, gun, and man that was available had to be 
brought to bear against the heart of Japan in the shortest possible 
time. Any other course of action was unthinkable, because to 
prolong this war, whether it were to further our-post position in 
the Far East, or for any other reason, would result in more 
Americans being killed. It follows, therefore, that anyone who 
123Telegram from UK Embassy 13/5/45Washington Despatches p. 559. 
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suggested employing the British Pacific Fleet at this stage of the 
war against Malaya and the Dutch East Indies was not only 
advocating the wastage of offensive power but indirectly the 
killing of more Americans by diverting as powerful a fleet from 
its more important role of striking Japan in its most vital spot. 125 
The BPF was eventually utilised in conjunction with the United States 
Fifth Fleet in its main operation to capture Okinawa but only after 
considerable lobbying on the part of Adn-dral Fraser. When the signal 
from Adn-dral King detailing the British to participate in Operation 
ICEBERG finally arrived at the BPF's headquarters on the evening of 14 
March it marked something of turning point in the RN's history. For the 
first time a principal, if not the principal, British Fleet passed under direct 
orders of an Allied Commander-in-Chief. For an organisation with the 
Royal Navy's traditions and history it was a momentous development 
but one that does not appear to have caused any official resentment. As 
the fleers war diary records, 'the decision that the Fleet was to be under 
Fleet Admiral Nimitz and was to take part in Operation ICEBERG gave 
immense and universal satisfaction not only to ourselves but to every 
American Naval Officer and man whom we met. '126 The reality of which 
nation now wore the mantle of global seapower was far more evident to 
those in the vessels being tossed about in Manus's open anchorage than 
perhaps was acknowledged after the war. 
The recognition of Britain's changing international position and the 
part the Royal Navy played in it was something that the Pacific 
experience brought home to all but the most blinkered xenophobe. The 
significance of this for Britain post-war, and its post-war fleet, was 
perhaps clearest to those who served in the BPF alongside the Americans. 
It was apparent that this, rather than the damage inflicted upon Japan, 
was to be of immense importance in the coming years of peace. As 
1251bid. p. 1585 
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Rawlings wrote in his official report to the Admiralty after the end of 
hostilities, 
something has been forged here between our two fleets.. looking 
back on all that has happened, I begin to see that which matters 
is not the size of the British contribution, or what we were able to 
do, but that it is our being a part of that forging which 
overshadows everything else. 127 
To a degree Rawlings was right. It was not the size that mattered but 
the fact that the British were there at all. However, the limited scale in 
relative terms of the British conunitment made them susceptible to 
allegations of shirking, in addition it made their voice in the planning of 
operations a quiet one and also made it difficult to counter the rumours 
that they were unwanted. 
The controversy over whether or not the BPF was actually wanted as 
opposed to needed was eventually stifled, largely because of a statement 
by Admiral Nimitz, intimating that the active co-operation of our fleet 
had indeed been welcome. Nimitz visited the BPF after their participation 
in Operation Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa, where he told the 
assembled officers and men that their, 
most efficiently performed aid in the war against Japan is 
welcomed by American forces in the Pacific. He denied reports, 
which he said were circulated in the allied press and verbally, to 
the effect the United States' Pacific Fleet didn't want the British 
Fleet to come into the Pacific. Speaking extemporaneously to 
officers and men of the Kitig George V, flagship of a British carrier 
task force, he asserted: "I assure you that those statements are 
without foundation. " 128 
The statement received substantial coverage in the American press, 
much to the relief of the British. Admiral Spruance was also quoted 
commending the work of the British ships in supporting the Okinawa 
invasion, saying the performance 'was typical of the great traditions of 
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the Royal Navy. ' Admiral Nin-dtz declared he wanted to say 'in most 
emphatic terms' that the work of the British Fleet during the Okinawa 
operation 'is not only most efficiently performed but of the most valuable 
service. 1129 It is revealing to note that coverage of the statements by 
Spruance and Nimitz was republished for British and American service 
personnel. It was not just American domestic opinion that the Royal 
Navy was trying to influence but also that of the respective services. 
The final military operations undertaken by the BPF as part of the 
American Third Fleet consisted of coastal bombardment and carrier air 
strikes of the Japanese homeland. The British Embassy made use of these 
operations to support Foreign Office policy which emPhasised Anglo- 
American solidarity. 'The part played by British naval forces in the 
continuing bombardment of Japan receives fair notice in the press and 
Mountbatten's presence at Potsdam has also served to underline our 
growing interest and participation in the Pacific war. 1130 
The BPF and Australia 
Although much of this study focuses upon the role played by the 
BPF in alliance building between the UK and the USA, it should not be 
overlooked that a similar need arose vis-A-vis Australia. The fall in 
prestige that accompanied the loss of imperial possessions in the Far East 
affected not only the actual territory occupied by the Japanese, but also 
the Dominions. The threat to Australia from the Japanese advance 
southwards certainly appeared real enough in early 1942. Although the 
bombing raid on Darwin did not presage a Japanese invasion as believed 
by its fleeing citizens, the motherland's defensive shield was certainly not 
as steadfast as those in the southern hemisphere had been led to believe. 
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131 As a result, Australia had increasingly looked toward the United 
States for support against the Japanese. The depth of this mood is difficult 
to gauge, as were its effects upon the B. P. F. Admiral Fraser did, however, 
comment that little work was undertaken on the Admiralty's schemes 
due to the arrival of vast forces from the U. S. and consequently Royal 
Navy projects being given low priority. 132 
The importance for relations between the UK and Australia of a 
significant military commitment to the war against Japan that would also 
be visible was recognised as much by the Americans as the British. Capt. 
C. j. Wheeler, had clearly come to understand the British position when 
he wrote after the war: 
[T]he British had no alternative but to use Australia as a base. From 
a political standpoint, nothing could have been more fortunate, as 
up to this time, on account of being thoroughly occupied at home, 
British forces in Australia since the beginning of World War II were 
conspicuous by their absence. 133 
The story behind the BPF's basing in Australia is, not surprisingly, 
as complex as that of its allocation to Nimitz's command in the Central 
Pacific. It involved disputes with Australia wtio felt excluded from the 
key decisions being taken by the USA and UK. 134 There was also 
significant resentment when Rear Admiral Daniel [later Vice Admiral, 
Administration, BPF] was dispatched to Australia via Washington in 
February 1944 to discuss whether Australia could support the proposed 
Royal Navy forces. The Australians only became aware of this some 
131P. Dull A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Nayy (1941-19451 Naval Institute 
Press [Annapolis] 1978 p. 58. 
132ADM 199/1457 
133 We Had Me Btitish Mere We Needed Vieni, Op Cit. p. 1583 
134 For a fuller examination of Britain's relationship with Australia from the Dominion 
perspective see David Horner High Command: Australia's Struggle for an Independent 
War Strategy, 1939-1945 Allen & Unwin 1992 
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month and half later, much to their displeasure. 135 This was one among 
many examples of 'Churchill's disdain for Australia. " 
Daniel presented detailed UK requirements to the Australians at the 
end of June 1944 having arrived at the end of April after extensive 
discussion in America. British plans assumed the defeat of Germany in 
October and the arrival of naval, air and army units, which with 
Australian and other forces, would comprise a British Commonwealth 
Force ready for operations between August and October 1945. In order to 
develop these proposals a Joint Planning Staff was established in 
Australia consisting of two committees, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff 
Committee and a Base Planning Committee. 
The Australians had undertaken to support the BPF to the fullest of 
their abilities but like the British were under the severe manpower 
constraints. Prime Minister Curtin had informed Churchill in September 
that the UK could rely on Australia's complete co-operation in regard to 
the provision of facilities in order to enable the main British fleet to 
operate against Japan. 136 However it is clear that Australian support was 
only made possible by the cancellation of a number of American service 
demands. 
Whilst the Australians never sought nor wished any control over the 
employment of the BPF because of its basing in the dominion, restrictions 
upon its activities were imposed by virtue of this and the chain of 
command for support matters wl-dch resulted. The following extract from 
a signal sent by Fraser to Admiral Cunningham during March illustrates 
how frustrating the chain could become. 
Many of the facilities in Australia come under General 
MacArthur, with whom I am not allowed to communicate 
direct. For example, we asked the RAAF for the use of an 
airfield at Brisbane for the transport service to Manus. They 
135 lbid p. 306-7 
136 Quoted in Horner High Command p. 378 
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were quite agreeable but said we must apply to the Americans. 
So to obtain an airfield at Brisbane, which is agreed to 
unofficially by the RAAF, I have to ask CINCPAC, who signals 
General MacArthur, who refers to Brisbane, and then the 
answer comes back by the same route. 137 
Much of the Commander in Chief's time was spent in negotiations 
with the Australian and New Zealand Governments attempting to speed 
along the vital shore based support work, not always smoothly. Fraser 
became embroiled in a row with the Australian Government over what 
he saw as delays over the docking of Royal Navy shipS138. Industrial 
labour disputes lay at the heart of the problem but the row was stoked by 
Fraser raising the matter with Australian press, much to the chagrin of 
the Government who came under criticism as a result. 
The matter was eventually settled but lingering Australian 
resentment of what was thought to be British highhandedness continued. 
The end of the war ultimately ended the debates but the new British 
Prime Minister, Attlee, felt bound to try to remove any lingering bad 
feeling, telegramming that if the UK had 'unwittingly given cause for 
misunderstanding we are first to regret it and I trust that this telegram 
will remove it. '139 It is of course debatable whether a simple telegram 
could produce the desired effect. 
The foregoing might give the impression that Australia was 
opposed to the British presence. The visit of King George V to Melbourne 
during autumn 1945 demonstrated that clearly this was not the case as 
by. Out of a population of some 1,100,000, over 30,000 attempted to surge 
through the gate when KGV accepted visitors. The rush presented a 
danger to public safety and the open day was cancelled. The following 
afternoon 80,000 watched the ship perform manoeuvres. 140 
137Signal to Cunningham 14/3/45 Fraser Papers MS 83/158 File 23 
138 Ibid p. 378-380 
139 Quoted ibid p. 380. 




The Japanese capitulation provoked a wave of relief and euphoria, 
nowhere more keenly felt than amongst the service personnel in the Far 
East. It also curtailed the more ambitious plans of the BPF to utilise their 
newly increased forces which might have continued to make inroads into 
American public perception. It would be unthinkable to suggest that this 
was a disappointment - the war was over and many lives had just been 
reprieved. The defeat of Japan had been accomplished by American 
resources and forces assisted in small measure by the BPF. Reporting on 
the celebrations in the United States, the Washington Embassy wrote, 
The more sober expressions of victory have been characterized 
by one central theme - America is now the most powerful nation 
in the world. Every newspaper has echoed the thought, but 
Admiral Leahy gave it official sanction in a broadcast in which 
he said: 
"Today we have the biggest and most powerful navy in the 
world, more powerful than any other two navies in existence. We 
have the best equipped and most completely mechanized ground 
force in the world. The Army and Navy together have the 
world's largest and most efficient airforce. We possess, with our 
British Allies, the secret of the world's most fearsome 
weapon. 11141 
The Pacific was always peripheral to overall British grand strategy 
during the Second World War. Britainýs strategic priorities lay elsewhere. 
Germany was Me threat, but once that danger was mastered the UK 
recognised the importance of providing what it could to the Far East. 
While it is true that the United States Navy's assessment of the British 
contribution in the Pacific in operational terms is correct - 'The Royal 
Navy detachment, placed under Admiral Nimitz, was indeed a great help 
l4lTelegram from UK Embassy 18/8/45 Washington Despatches p. 602 
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at Okinawa, but the United States Pacific Fleet could have got along 
without it. '142. - it ignores the larger significance of the BPF for both the 
British and Americans at the grand strategic level. The commitment to the 
Pacific represented the UK's con-anitment to the alliance. What military 
capability as could be dispatched, had to be. The BPF was used to 
reassure American domestic opinion and influence American political 
decision makers. 
As the Cizicago Daily Tfibitne reported in June 1945 'Co-operation in the 
Pacific between British and American forces is forging a new link toward 
permanent peace' Admiral Rawlings was quoted at a news conference 
saying 'At the bottom of everybody's heart is the feeling that if the 
Americans and us stick together our children and grandchildren will not 
face another war like this. When you learn to be good fleet mates the 
stage is set for peace. 1143 
The BPF was at the heart of British grand strategy. Its experience at 
this level demonstrates the utility of naval power in alliance building. The 
commitment of the fleet to the central pacific illustrates the ability of the 
BPF to influence and mould opinion at the highest level of American 
decision making. This conu-nitment was exploited by the Admiralty, the 
Foreign Office and the Prime Minister to provide leverage on the now 
don-dnant ally. Anticipation of possible future benefit, coupled with the 
fear of the consequences of not providing this commitment, drove British 
policy. In truth the BPF was almost the only military tool available. Given 
the constraints of manpower and the economy a naval commitment was 
all that could be provided within the timescale dictated. Plans for a 
British air contribution could not be realised before spring 1946 and even 
then it was doubtful that the RAF could meet the manpower 
requirements. Likewise any land contribution would not be possible until 
the same time and would be limited to two or three Commonwealth 
142Morison HistoEy of the USN in WWII, Vol. Op CiL p. 257. 
143Nimitz Visits British Pacific Fleet USNIP Vol. 71, No. 7, July 1945, p. 866. 
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divisions available only for the invasion of Honshu. The war ended 
before any of these plans were put into action, all that could be used was 
Royal Navy in the shape of the BPF. The British were there at the end of 
the war, they participated in the final, most advanced actions against the 
Japanese. It was an Admiral that signed the document of Japanese 
surrender on behalf of the British Government in Tokyo Bay watched by 
the battleships Duke of York and King George V, the fleet carrier 
Indefatigable, the escort carriers Ruler and Speaker, the light cruisers 
Gambia and Newfoundland, nine destroyers, four sloops, one frigate, 
four corvettes and six units of the fleet train. Britain had made good on 




The BPF & BRITISH GRAND STRATEGY 1945-50 
The news of Japan's surrender was broadcast at midnight on the 
15th August, 1945, by the new Labour Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. 
Many people missed the announcement and thousands turned up for 
work only to learn of a two day holiday. Politically it was a new era both 
domestically and internationally. Of the major belligerents' leaders only 
Stalin remained in power. Roosevelt, Hitler and Mussolini were all dead. 
Churchill, who had replaced Chamberlain, had himself been replaced in 
the previous May's general election. Japan's military leaders were under 
arrest and the Emperor subject to MacArthur's occupation forces. The 
landscape of international relations had changed almost immeasurably. 
The United Kingdom economy and infrastructure was in ruin; Europe lay 
in tatters; the United States had emerged as an industrial colossus while 
the Soviet Union's military power stretched from the heart of Europe to 
the Pacific Ocean. A new world organization promised a new world 
order, the great pre-war powers had been challenged, and in many 
instances found wanting. Their empires no longer looked to be sources of 
strength and pride but costly burdens that many quickly sought to divest 
themselves of. 
The BPF experience had important consequences for British grand 
strategy in the period following the end of Second World War. It is 
crucial to understand that this legacy was both unintentional as well as 
planned. The BPF had been utilised at the highest level of government 
policy as a tool of alliance building with Britain's most important ally, the 
United States. This process was replicated in the years following the end 
of hostilities and culminated with the dispatch of a naval force for 
participation in the Korean War. 
Grand strategy, as we have seen in Chapter Two, sets the 
parameters of military activity, it defines the context In which decisions 
concerning military forces are made. It is the level at which the 
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relationship between the defence services and the rest of government 
policy is articulated. The setting of foreign policy objectives identifies the 
goals toward which all services work as well as the balance between 
them. Although this suggests that policy flows from grand strategy down 
to the other levels of military decision making, it is important to 
appreciate that in this process the flow goes the other way as well. 
The Government attempted to identify the major themes of post-war 
British grand strategy as they affected the military in its introduction to 
the Statement Relating to Defence in 1948. This statement was published 
in February of that year and stated that, 
Defence policy is conditioned by the balance and inter- 
relationship of factors such as the economic position of the 
country, international and national obligations, the lessons of 
the last war, in particular the influence of new weapons, and 
an estimate of the form of a future war should it come. 144 
It should be borne in n-dnd that there was no unanimous agreement 
over the make-up of these various factors, neither within government 
circles nor within or between the various services. Indeed the major task 
of government was to balance the competing factors in a manner capable 
of achieving grand strategic goals. 
At the grand strategic level two issues had been demonstrated by 
the experience of the BPF, first, that the relationship with the USA 
overshadowed everything else about British participation in the Far East, 
and second, that Britain was no longer a first rank power. While the BPF 
was not, of course, solely responsible for the emergence of the special 
relatiotisizip, and while the development of grand strategy has probably 
far more to do with internal domestic factors and changes in the 
international sphere than it does with previous experience, the 
relationship between the United States and Britain in the post-war period 
continued to be effected by the role of the BPF in 1.945. This chapter 
144Cmd. 7327 Statement Relating to Defence, 1948, February 1948 
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therefore explores how the BPF's legacy, domestic factors and 
international changes interacted at the level of grand strategy between 
the end of hostilities and the outbreak of the Korean War. This provides 
the circumstances under which decisions at the lower levels of policy and 
planning took place. In addition it will illustrate how those factors which 
determined that BritaWs contribution to closing stages of the war in the 
Far East also continued to shape and constrain British policy. It will 
demonstrate once again that the lines of demarcation between grand and 
military strategy are blurred to say the least. 
As we have seen, the major contribution of the British Pacific Fleet at 
the grand strategic level, was its use in supporting and developing the 
Anglo-American alliance. Its conception and execution was proof of 
Britainýs conu-nitment to continue the fight against Japan after the final 
defeat of Germany. It was viewed by the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of 
Staff as an essential tool for influencing American attitudes toward the 
United Kingdom. In the immediate aftermath of the war, however, it 
appeared that it had failed. The United States initially sought to maintain 
a degree of distance between the two countries. Both the Truman 
administration in Washington and the new Labour government in 
London initially saw negative consequences for international co- 
operation if the two countries formed too close an alliance. Lingering 
suspicion in the US with regard to Britain's imperial designs also 
continued to affect relations between them, as did British worries about 
the shape and direction of American foreign policy. It was to take a 
worsening econon-dc situation in Britain and a realisation that the west 
was facing a new type of opponent in the international sphere to draw 
the two countries together again. 
Planning for the defence of the United. Kingdom, the 
Commonwealth and possibly Western Europe was no easy matter. In an 
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ideal world, decisions at the grand strategic level would have provided a 
framework for the military around which they could construct their 
plans. Knowing what was required would make it far easier to develop a 
coherent set of policies that could deliver what the Government wanted. 
Much of this badly needed direction was unfortunately missing in the 
immediate aftermath of the war. Britain's grand strategy was in a state of 
turmoil. Beset by domestic problems, curtailed by fiscal inadequacies and 
outclassed by the might of the new super powers the new majority 
Labour Goverm-nent approached their first Statement on the Defence 
Estimates with unsurprising caution. They argued that, 'this is not the 
time to come to decision about the eventual shape of our armed forces. '145 
This problem continued into the following year. The government 
admitted in early 1947 that it was virtually impossible to determine the 
future pattern of defence needs because the lines along which the post- 
war world would progress were themselves anything but clear. In the 
Governments view the situation was '.. essentially transitional [in] 
nature, 146 
As the lines of the post-war world became clearer and the threat 
from the Soviet Union came to dominate security thinking on both sides 
of the Atlantic, the two countries moved to close the rift between them. 
Importantly, this had been pre-empted to a degree by the military in both 
countries, especially with regards the two navies. The experience of 
intimate co-operation in the Pacific had laid the foundations for this 
Cold-War collaboration. As Britain's economic position made any other 
policy unrealistic, and since Britain and continental Europe could only 
recover with American help to and have any prospect of resisting Soviet 
pressure, it is hard to exaggerate the importance of this revived 
relationship. 
145Cm. d. 6743 Statenzent Relating to Defence February 1946 
146DEFE 6/1 Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Planning Staff Reports, Defence White 
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Economic Constraints and British Commitments 
It is no surprise that the Government should have identified the 
economic position of the country as the first factor to be considered when 
drawing up their defence policy. Economic issues dominated the 1945-50 
period. As they had dictated that Britain's contribution to the Pacific 
campaign should be restricted to a naval component so they continued to 
underpin all decisions in the post-war world. Britain's position in the 
autumn of 1945 as a victor contrasted starkly with the precarious state of 
its economy. Whilst forces were deployed throughout the world to 
reoccupy the Empire and accept the surrender of Axis forces, Britain was 
virtually bankrupt. Export industries had decayed to almost nothing, 
overseas markets had all but disappeared, machinery was worn out, 
production plant and property had been devastated by bombing, 
invisible earnings had dropped off sharply and the nationýs debt 
increased dramatically. The manpower shortages that had helped frame 
British strategy in Far East also continued to restrict strategic and 
economic possibilities. 
The first significant feature of Anglo-American relations after the 
war also concerned the precarious situation of the UK's economy. The 
ending of the lend-lease arrangements came only eight days after the 
surrender of Japan and although there had been an interruption of the 
arrangement the previous May, its cancellation by Truman was a 
devastating shock to the new Government and the whole country. At the 
beginning of September Prime Minister Attlee had written to Truman 
setting out how serious the country's economic situation was and how 
dependent on American aid the UK had become. 
You are aware that in the immediate future the 
maintenance of the physical flow of supplies from the United 
States, both of food and of certain essential raw materials, is 
78 
necessary for the maintenance of the living conditions of this 
country. 147 
He went on to explain that the Government believed that Britain's 
dire economic straits were the result of her exertions not for any selfish 
reasons but were sacrifices for the common good. 
You have probably also been informed by Mr. Clayton 
[Assistant Secretary of State]of the general financial position in 
which we find ourselves because our war effort took a certain 
shape as part of combined war plans. 148 
As such, the feeling of being made to pay twice for saving the world 
permeated both political and public opinion. John Maynard Keynes, the 
country's leading economist, had been assigned the delicate task of 
negotiating with the Americans over the issue of lend-lease and further 
American financial aid. The Foreign Office had been an ardent supporter 
of the BPF in the hope that it would influence American political and 
domestic opinion so that economic aid for recovery would subsequently 
be forthcoming. US attitudes were clearly more sympathetic to the UK 
than in the pre-war period but a sense of betrayal remained. Britain had 
been forced to sell all her American holdings; she was now bankrupt. 
America had supplied some $27 billion in Lend-Lease items of food and 
munitions, in return Britain had provided the US with some $6 billion of 
reverse goods. Under the final arrangements Britain had to pay another 
$650 million in cash to settle the account. In order to be able to meet that 
payment and meet the cost of importing food while its economy was still 
structured for war, Britain needed a loan of $3.75 billion. Without US aid 
there was little prospect of the UK economy even providing the standard 
of living that had been managed during the war years. Such a loan was 
agreed, but only at the very unfriendly interest rate of 2% per year over 
147Attlee to Truman 1/9/45, FRUS, 1945: Vol. VI., The British Commonwealth, The Far 
East p. 115. 
148 Ibid. 
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fifty years. While to quote an American intelligence report; '[e]veryone in 
England is aware that the American loan is the crux of British economic 
planning, 1149 it certainly didn't mean that the arrangement was popular 
with Britain's Government and people. 
Politically this put a tremendous strain on Anglo-American 
relations, Vie Ecoiioiizist, normally pro-American, wrote in December 
1945; 'It is aggravating to find that the reward for losing a quarter of our 
national wealth in the common cause is to pay tribute for half a century 
to those who have been enriched by the war. 1150 The potential for this 
issue to cause serious antagonism between the two countries was well 
understood by Washington. The US Ambassador informing the Secretary 
of State in early January 1946 that, 
the British people, from Cabinet Minster to man-in-the- 
street are convinced that the reason why UK came out of the 
war with unfavourable external financial position, is that, 
apart from help from Dominions, she alone held off the enemy 
for more than a year, and in equity should be paid by rather 
than have to pay her creditors for this service. 151 
The consequences of this dire economic situation for the military 
were spelt out all too clearly by the Prime Minister at a meeting of the 
Cabinet Defence Committee in October 1945. The Prime Minister argued 
that as the armed forces of Germany and Japan had been defeated and 
the policy of the Government was to seek security in unison with other 
great powers, Britain would not, therefore, require armed forces of a pre- 
war scale. 152 In addition it was becoming obvious that the country simply 
could not financially sustain high levels of expenditure on armed forces 
in the face of competing demands for government money. The armed 
149As Others See Us [abridged version of article in USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary 
No. 351 in MIR April 1946 No. 4 p. 51 
15OThe Economist, 15/12/45, quoted in Martin Walker, The Cold War, Vintage 
[London], 1994, p. 23. 
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services were no longer simply in competition with each other over 
resource allocation, they were now faced with a massively expanding 
range of government responsibilities all with urgent demands on 
funding. Severe cuts in the natiorýs armed forces, both in men and 
material, were once more in prospect. 
The winter of 1946/47 produced something of a crisis for the UK, 
harsh weather, compounded coal shortages, and unemployment 
temporarily soared causing more concerns about the prospects for 
economic recovery. Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
circulated a paper amongst the Cabinet in July 1947 explaining that the 
prospects for the economy were very bleak indeed. 153 As a result the 
Goverru-nent announced a new austerity programme over the summer in 
order to cut imports. Rationing became more severe and the workforce 
was asked to produce more for no extra pay. Although output the 
following year, 1948, reached a level 36% higher than pre-war, the 
majority of this was directed to supporting an export drive in the hope of 
restoring the country's dollar reserves. 
Dalton argued that the balance of payments was such that there was 
a drastic need to cut expenditure on defence, increase exports, reduce 
imports and re-examine all overseas commitments. The Treasury pointed 
out that pounds spent maintaining British military forces abroad were the 
equivalent of imports. Concomitantly the Treasury sought to put 
pressure on the Foreign Office to cut back on Britain's overseas 
responsibilities, all of which were draining scarce monetary resources 
away from economic reconstruction. 
There was however, no easy answer to this problem of a mismatch 
between the resources the country could make available and the 
commitments it had entered into as a result of victory. As the 
Government explained in February 1946, 
153CAB 129/20 Paper CP(47)991 30/7/47 
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His Majesty's government were confronted with a direct 
conflict of requirements. On the one hand, we could not 
abandon our responsibilities in many parts of the world. To 
do so would have been to throw away the fruits of Victory, 
and betray those who had fought and died in the common 
cause. On the other hand, the necessity for our economic 
rehabilitation was imperative. 154 
The Government was faced with a bewildering range of 
commitments many of which showed no sign of being short term. 
Immediate commitments stretched from Western Europe - the 
occupation of Germany and Austria, which was necessary to support 
international agreements; through the Mediterranean, the Middle East, 
the Indian Ocean to the Far East where garrisons for colonies would be 
required to protect British interests and provide a small strategic reserve 
available to meet other requirements which might arise in that part of the 
world. 155 Disorder in Greece, and fear of a communist take-over there, 
tied down more British troops. Occupation forces were needed in the ex- 
Italian colonies in Africa, and many parts of the East lately occupied by 
the Japanese. Apart from former British territories, such as Burma, 
Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong, Anglo-Indian forces assisted in the 
reoccupation of the former French and Dutch colonies in Indo-China and 
the East Indies far into 1946. India and Palestine were also weighty 
responsibilities with their mounting political unrest. The historic strong- 
points of the empire had to be garrisoned, from Gibraltar, Malta and Suez 
to Aden, not to mention air force contingents in Iraq. Suspicion of Soviet 
intentions in Iran in 1946 necessitated some precautionary moves, so that 
by the beginning of 1947 the extra-European responsibilities alone 
absorbed some 300,000 service personnel. 156 This figure was in addition 
154Cmd. 6743 Statenient Relating to Defence, 1946 February 1946. 
155DEFE 6/1 Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Planning Staff Reports, Defence White 
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to the 247,000 service personnel stationed on European soil, a total which 
outnumbered the Americans by some 45,000.157 
The overstretch that all these commitments produced made 
reductions imperative. It was hoped that the signing of the Italian Peace 
treaty would allow the withdrawal of forces from Venezia Giulia. At the 
same time there would be a reduction of forces in Greece though 'illegal 
immigration to Palestine require[d] the presence of substantial forces 
from all three services. ' The Services also had to provide men material 
and money 'in the Mediterranean and the Middle East to safeguard our 
interests there. We must also continue to provide small garrisons for the 
Sudan and British Colonies. '158 
The following year nothing much had improved, indeed as was 
mentioned above, the added burden imposed on the economy by the 
winter of 1946/47, created more financial difficulties which had to be 
resolved before addressing the issue of defence policy. The Government 
was adamant that '.. a successful. defence policy must find its roots in 
healthy social and economic conditions. '159 It was recognised that, 
The need to restore the economic position of the United 
Kingdom has imposed even greater limitation upon the 
production of equipment and stores for the Services in 1948-49 
than it did in 1947-48. It has been impossible to provide for little 
more than the minimum requirements of maintenance. 160 
So bleak were the economic prospects of the country that even four 
years after the end of the war the Minister of Defence was circulating a 
memorandum that encapsulated the problem, 'It is in brief the problem 
whether, after the economic exhaustion of the war years, we have the 
power and resources to maintain the armed forces equipped to modern 
157Staff Study prepared by US War Department, Mbib? nmi Streiigtli of USjorces in Europe 
FRUS., 1947. Vol. 1., General; The United Nations Government Printing Office 1973, 
[Washington] p. 718 
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standards required to pern-dt us to play the role of a great power. '161 The 
long term decline on the power of the United Kingdom was by now not 
only being hinted at, but openly discussed. 
As British participation in the closing stages of the Pacific had been 
restricted to naval forces because nothing else could be resourced so 
again, with the outbreak of the Korean War, the Royal Navy was the 
most cost effective method of demonstrating support for Britain's most 
important ally. 
The Manpower Crisis 
The question of manpower lay at the heart of Britain's overstretch 
problem. It was the same problem that had required Britain's 
contribution to the war in the Far East to be primarily naval, and the 
situation had worsened with the coming of peace. The issue had several 
facets to it. The end of the war naturally produced a desire amongst 
servicemen to return as quickly as possible to civilian life. Political 
pressure domestically added to this so that by the end of 1945,1.5 million 
personnel had been demobilised. 162 Although this process was handled 
with considerable skill, demonstrating effective prior planning, problems 
with the speed of the process did lead to mutiny among service personnel 
and in 1948 Britain still had over 900,000 men in the forces. 163 
Demobilised servicemen were crucial to the Treasury's plans for 
rebuilding the economy. Whilst in service they had to be paid for and 
were not producing goods and services for the domestic and 
161DEFE 7/592 Harwood Report On Shape And Size Of Armed Forces Memorandum 
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international market. Not only were they required to reinvigorate 
industry, but the Government's housing programme was in desperate 
need of skilled craftsmen. Electricians and other technical specialists were 
in particularly short supply. 
These manpower shortages had important consequences for the 
Royal Navy and were exacerbated by the changing structure of the Fleet. 
The growth in quantity and complexity of equipment in ships, sensors, 
communications and engineering, now required a much higher 
proportion of maintenance and specialist ratings than pre-war. 164 
Although it was hoped that the introduction of greater automation in 
post-war designed ships would reduce the overall numbers needed, this 
too demanded skilled personnel from a rapidly shrinking pool. 
Pressure on scarce manpower resources was not confined to those 
who served at sea. The Chancellor had been pressuring the Adn-dralty to 
reduce the number of dockyard workers since the first days of peace. 
Dalton wanted to release labour, especially the much needed electricians 
and joiners, to support the regeneration of the economy and implement 
the Government's house building program. By 1947 the number of 
workers building warships in the Royal Dockyards had been reduced to 
only 10,000 -a reduction of 90 per cent from its wartime peak. There had 
also been a reduction of 25 per cent in the manpower devoted to building 
merchantmen. 
Manpower shortages were also causing delays in those projects to 
which the Goverm-nent assigned top priority. As the 1948 Statement 
Relating to Defence made clear, research and developm ent continued to 
receive the highest priority in the defence field, both in the allocation of 
man-power and materials and in the provision of finance. Nevertheless 
the general shortage of qualified scientific and technical staff, in addition 
164ADM 167/124 Admiralty Board Minutes Menzoraizdw? i by the Second Sea Lord, 
Manpower Situation, 1st January 1945 
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to trouble with the supply of labour and materials, had 'an adverse effect 
on certain new works projects. '165 
The Foreign Office was concerned about the consequences of these 
crewing difficulties, being worried that Britain's prestige and her 
credibility to fulfil her international liabilities would be undermined if it 
became widely recognised how tight the restrictions caused by shortages 
were. Though one of the primary motivating factors behind the placing of 
the King George V class battleships into reserve and HMS Vanguard into 
the training squadron was manpower shortages the Foreign Office 
sought to play down this aspect of the decision. 166 
The Chiefs accepted that 'in order to fulfil her obligations, [the UK] 
must achieve a strong and sound economy'167 and that this required the 
transfer of men from the armed services to domestic industry. Moreover 
there was little prospect that the squeeze on numbers would ease any 
time soon. As the Government informed the House of Commons, '1947 
will still be governed by these two main factors [overseas comrnitments 
and demobilisation], and must, therefore, be regarded as yet another 
transitional year in the ordered development of defence poliCy. 168 
The financial crisis that confronted the Goverrunent at the end of the 
war, the need to rebuild the economy and the manpower crisis that was 
both a cause and consequence of this, framed the country's foreign policy. 
This domestic context was to have far reaching consequences for the 
Navy, as it did all the services, and will be talken up in the next chapter 
on military strategic issues. 
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UK Foreign Policy 
The guiding principle underpinning all British grand strategy was 
the avoidance of war. As the Joint Planning Staff made clear in April 
1947, '[t]he supreme object of British policy is to prevent war, provided 
that this can be done without prejudicing our vital interests. '169A period 
of peace was essential if there was to be any prospect for economic 
reconstruction. British industry and trade needed access to raw materials 
from overseas as well as solvent overseas economies capable of buying 
finished British products. This necessitated not only the rebuilding of 
Europe's shattered infrastructure but also the recreation of a stable world 
trade system. The health of the economy, the Goverm-nent's prime 
objective, depended upon its ability to export. About half the country's 
food was imported and exports were largely produced from imported 
raw materials. Exports had to meet the costs of these imports as well as 
those retained for domestic consumption. This total dependence on 
foreign trade made Britain highly vulnerable to the vagaries of the 
international market and to fluctuations in economic activity abroad. In 
addition to this it was essential that overseas markets continued to be 
accessible to British trade and did not become party to a world grouping 
inin-dcal to Britain's economic and political culture. 
Britain's traditional policy of seeking to prevent any single country 
don-dnating Europe continued to influence Foreign Office thinking. 
During the war the Foreign Office had based its post-war planning on 
'great power co-operation within a world organisation directed against a 
resurgent Germany, a continuation of the Anglo-Soviet Alliance of 1942 
and the formation of a Western European group within the World 
169DEFE 6/2 Ministry of Defence, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Planning Staff 
Memoranda, Future Defence Policy 24/4/47 
87 
Organisation to reinforce Britain's capacity to hold its own on a footing of 
equality with the United States and the Soviet Union. 1170 
Although there had been a change of government and a new 
Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin's ideas concerning foreign policy in the 
immediate post-war period reflected the above quote fairly closely. Both 
the political leadership of the Labour party and the Foreign Office were 
of the opinion that the best policy course for Britain was not simply to 
adhere to the special relationship but to follow instead a middle path 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. 171 Such a policy was 
considered the most likely to maxin-dse Britain's influence and power. 
The new Government was also under considerable internal pressure from 
an ideological standpoint not to side with capitalist America against 
socialist Russia. Indeed the new Government had used a campaign 
slogan arguing that 'with a Labour government, we should have much 
better relations with Russia. '172 The Foreign Secretary, reiterated this idea 
when he told the 1945 Labour Party Conference that 'Left could speak to 
Left. '173 Ironically, the Truman administration was beset by similar 
difficulties, public opinion appeared to support a policy of even 
handedness in relations between the US and the other two of the Big 
77iree. The fear in both London and Washington was that if either was 
seen to be more favourable to the other than toward the USSR then a self 
fulfilling prophecy would be created and any chance of continued co- 
operation between the three principle wartime allies would be lost. As M 
Palmer concluded in his study of American naval strategy in the years 
after World War Two: 
For the majority of the American people and the 
administration of President Harry S. Truman, the United 
Nations would be the centrepiece for a post-war system of 
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international peace and stability. The special Anglo-American 
relationship would be terminated; Britain and the Soviet Union 
would be treated equally, lest the latter's fear of a capitalist 
cabal threaten post-war harmony and Soviet-American 
conciliation. '174 
Britain and the United Nations Organisation 
In the long term the Government placed great store in the 
development of the United Nations175 as a means of settling international 
disputes, British support for which was seen as crucial. The goverranent, 
for reasons of practical necessity as well as ideological leaning, repeatedly 
expressedtheir intention of giving the utmost support to the UN in all its 
activities. In particular, the UK's position as one of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council produced a responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 176 TI-ds in turn created a 
requirement for forces that would be suitable for a world wide policing 
role. 
Faith in the UN as a vehicle for the peaceful settlement of disputes 
was seen as a long term goal achievable if supported by Britain and the 
other great powers. 177 The Government announced a willingness to 
contribute British forces to the UN in 1946 and reiterated this the 
following year when it stated that, 'The UK, as the senior member of the 
British Commonwealth and a Great power must be prepared at all times 
to contribute to the United Nations a share adequate to her world wide 
responsibilities as a first class Power. '178 
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However, despite this professed faith in international cooperation 
for the avoidance of war, a note of pragmatic caution began to enter 
government statements during 1947. The Statement Relating to Defence, 
which was laid before the House of Commons in February 1947, 
emphasised that meeting the objectives of the UN, of 'establish[ing] a 
stable system for the maintenance of peace', depended upon the 'full co- 
operation of all its members. '179 This was something which was 
beginning to look less and less likely as the divisions of the Cold War 
began to take shape. It is also evident that the Chiefs of Staff were 
pushing for this more tentative approach to the UN. As a Joint Planning 
Staff memoranda commented in April 1947, 
As at present established, the UNO provides no security 
against war between the Great Powers. In this situation, we 
believe that the only effective deterrent to a potential 
aggressor is tangible evidence of our intention and ability to 
withstand attack and to hit back immediately. 180 
This position, indeed even the language, subsequently appeared in 
the Government's Defence Statement the following year. 
In the present situation, where the United Nations 
Organisation is not yet able to enforce peace, the best deterrent 
to war is tangible evidence of our intention and ability to 
withstand attack. Whether it is a question of self-defence or of 
support of the United Nations, it is necessary to maintain 
British forces in peace-time to deter aggression which might 
lead to war. 181 
Scepticism concerning the effectiveness of the UN continued to 
develop and influence Service thinking. In March 1949 the Admiralty 
concluded that there was little prospect of international negotiation 
containing the aspirations of expansionist powers. 
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Great hopes were entertained from the constitution of the 
United Nations Organization to promote both the channel of 
arbitration and the power of support to keep peace and 
prevent war: in the event these hopes appear to be as 
unfounded as those which were reposed in the League of 
Nations. 182 
Despite these doubts concerning the UN's effectiveness, when called 
upon to support the organisation the Government displayed little 
hesitation or disagreement in doing so. 
European Co-Operation 
At the same time as the Government was attempting to promote the 
UNO, and in part because it was seen as a long term goal, a policy of 
European co-operation was pursued. Ernest Bevin, an internationalist by 
political ideology, saw Western European co-operation as fundamental to 
maintaining Britain's position in world affairs. Soon after entering office 
Bevin set about creating 'extensive political, econon-dc and military co- 
operation throughout Europe, with an Anglo-French alliance as a 
cornerstone. '183 By the following year, however, after a reassessment by 
the Foreign Office, France played a diminished role in the Government's 
European poliCy. 184 Negotiations were undertaken between the two 
countries at the end of the year which led to the signing of the Dunkirk 
Treaty in March 1947 [the terms of which were designed to meet the 
danger of renewed German aggression]. The German question was 
clearly of more concern to the French than the British and the two 
countries had clashed over the proposal from Paris that the Ruhr be 
detached from Germany. 
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As it became more obvious that the prospects for European 
recovery, still less a credible European defence grouping, were extremely 
slim without American aid, Bevin increasingly turned his attention 
toward achieving it. After the collapse of the London meeting of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1947, Bevin met the American 
General Marshall and underlined the need for a western democratic 
grouping which he saw as comprising America, Britain, France Italy and 
the Dominions. The Foreign Secretary suggested that this would not be a 
formal alliance but an understanding backed by 'power, money and 
resolution. '185 
The Foreign Office had been somewhat sceptical of Bevin's push for 
a regional Western European pact, in part because of a concern that it 
might arouse isolationist tendencies in the US. 'We do not wish by 
concluding a regional pact of this character to encourage the American 
school of thought which believes that Western security can be sufficiently 
assured by a Western regional pact without American participation. 1186 
Ironically this is precisely what Bevin was trying to avoid by creating a 
European grouping. He believed that a demonstration of European 
willingness to resist Soviet encroachment was an essential first step on 
the road to securing American assistance. As such in March 1948 a five 
power treaty was signed by Britain, France and the Benelux countries in 
Brussels. Known as the Brussels treaty, it provided for the co-operation 
between the five signatory powers in the economic, social and cultural 
spheres. Although the treaty committed its signatories to, 'assist each 
other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organization, 
in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any 
renewal of a policy of aggression'187, on the day it was signed Bevin told 
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the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, that'the object should be to 
ensure that if there was a war, the US should be in from the first day and 
that we should not have to wait for another Pearl Harbor. we must 
bring the US to face up to their responsibilities. '188 
The Adn-dralty expressed the same attitude a month later when it 
reported that, 
The Western Union will be strengthened by the degree to 
which it is backed - in defence no less than in economic terms - 
by the United States. The American Administration has made 
it clear that they wish to see a strong system of security in 
being before considering how best the United States can be 
associated with it. 189 
The Navy was used to demonstrate the country's conu-nitment to the 
Western Union. Exercise Verity, mounted in the spring of 1949, by the 
UK, France, the Netherlands and Belgium saw over 100 warships taking 
part in a WU exercise. 190 In September 1950 a combined WU 
n-dnesweeping exercise was held under French command with British 
and Dutch participation. 191 Although the Admiralty were guardedly 
critical of the French in terms of their operational plan and capabilities, 
excellent relations were maintained with the two partners. This was more 
than could be said for those between France and the Netherlands. The 
Dutch openly their voicing their disquiet concerning French command. In 
such circumstance the RN saw itself as having a crucial role as a mediator 
between its European counterparts. 
The Adn-dralty considered that '[t]he Dunkirk Treaty with France 
and the Brussels Five-Power Treaty are the most significant departures 
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from British Foreign policy, which has always been most reluctant to 
promise to undertake military intervention on the continent. '192 In fact the 
Governments policy had a pedigree stretching back to 'Elizabeth I, 
William 111, Marlborough, Chatham, Grey and others, [who] argued the 
need for the British people to balance their natural wish for a "maritime" 
way of life and strategy with a watchful concern for Europe and a 
determination to ensure that developments on that continent did not 
deleteriously affect their country's interests. '193 
Developing Conceptions of the USSR 
Conceptions of the Soviet Union, particularly at the interface 
between grand strategic and military strategic issues, were obviously 
influenced by ideas about the nature of the next war. Having so recently 
emerged from a global conflict it is understandable that the idea of 
general war should dominate British military thinking. The history of the 
United Kingdom's relations with the Soviet Union in the years following 
World War Two were clearly bound up with, and closely paralleled, if 
inversely, the development of the country's attitude toward the United 
States. 
It was difficult for policy makers at the grand strategic level to come 
to terms with the new political realities of the international situation. 
Although in certain respects British grand strategy was not much 
different from what it had long been. This centred on the basic idea that 
the emergence and existence of a large continental power was a threat to 
British interests to be countered by various alliances. The sheer scale and 
nature of the Soviet threat necessitated the creation of firm tangible 
alliance structures that would however inhibit Britain's freedom of 
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diplomatic activity elsewhere. It was becoming necessary to balance 
alliance commitments with the freedom of national action. 
The earlier idea that Britain should maintain a degree of distance 
from both the Soviet Union and the United States of America in order to 
wield influence between them seemed increasingly optimistic as events 
through 1946,1947 and 1948 played out. In both Washington and 
London, attitudes toward their erstwhile Soviet ally hardened and 
provided a clearer context for the setting of military strategic objectives. 
While it was clear to many in the Admiralty that any future threat to 
British interests would most likely emanate from the Soviet Union, there 
also existed a body of opinion that sought to maintain and build on the 
wartime co-operation with Moscow. The Admiralty, commenting on the 
world situation during the first month of 1946, was on the whole, positive 
toward the USSR. It noted that Soviet reactions to the results of the 
Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers were in many ways indicative 
of the official Soviet attitude to international affairs in general. 
The considerable measure of agreement achieved on 
questions ranging from peace treaties with ex-enemy countries 
to Allied administration in the Far East and control of aton-dc 
energy was welcomed as furthering the decisions reached at 
Potsdam in July 1945. The conference was seen as further 
demonstration of the "Big Three" unity on major questions194 
At the same time, however, there were concerns emerging over the 
course of Soviet international intentions and indeed the very nature of the 
Soviet Union. Whereas Britain initially viewed the Soviet Union in terms 
of just another great power, defending its interests with am ixture of force 
and diplomacy in the classic manner of international affairs, there was a 
growing perception of Stalin's Russia as something much more menacing. 
A new and implacable enemy, based on an ideology that threatened to 
expand and eclipse not only Britain and her interests but the whole of 
194MIR January 1946 No. 1 p. 76. 
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western liberal democratic civilisation seemed to be emerging. As Martin 
Walker has explained, 
[TIhe west's view of the Soviet Union changed from an 
assumption that the Russian bear was up to its old tricks of 
dominating Eastern Europe and thrusting to the Dardanelles, 
into a conviction that the West was being conscripted into a 
new crusade. The syntax and vocabulary switched from the 
traditional lexicon of the balance of power to a language 
altogether messianic. 195 
Over the winter of 1946/47 it was becon-dng evident that the Soviet 
Union was steadily establishing its influence over the areas of Germany it 
occupied. Although the Admiralty were reporting rumours of a 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany in January 1946, it also noted 
the control now exerted on land and industrial reform. 196 This was not 
simply one state seeking to create favourable, if skewed conditions, for 
coexistence, but the construction of another state in its own image, likely 
to prove inherently subservient. 
It was of course not just in central Europe that anxieties were being 
expressed about a possible clash of interests with the Soviet Union. What 
was to become Nato's northern flank also became an area of concern. The 
Americans reported in the spring of 1946 that, 'The Soviet Union has been 
watching with considerable suspicion the extension of British moral and 
material influence throughout Denmark and Norway. 1197 It was assessed 
that Soviet naval strategists would view this influence as a means by 
which Britain could control the exit of the Baltic as effectively as she 
controlled egress from the Mediterranean via Gibraltar. It was concluded 
that "Jutland may in fact soon become as important as the Rock. '198 At the 
same time the Soviet Union appeared to be 'showing an increasing 
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interest in the strategic potentialities of Iceland, situated as it is on the 
flank of the Atlantic trade routes and British communications with the 
United States. '199 This was to become the major concern for the Navy in 
the post-war period. 
The Kremlin was attempting to profit from disagreements over 
fishing. The Soviet Union offered Reykjavik a number of fishery 
protection ships with Russian crews. For the British, this was indeed a 
most disturbing development. The prospect of Soviet influence over an 
area that had been vital to the Battle of the Atlantic not only had to be 
taken very seriously it also helped confirm the Royal Navy's fears that it 
could be facing a re-run of the German submarine campaign that had 
come so close to strangling the British war effort. 
Europe's maritime flanks appeared to be coming under considerable 
Soviet pressure. Although the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia 
during 1948 focused attention on Soviet activities in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the Greek Civil War, which had forced British withdrawal of 
support in the previous years, and political pressure from Moscow on 
Norway and Finland demonstrated the importance of the maritime 
dimension of European defence. Without the ability to ensure control of 
the Atlantic which separated Europe from its most obvious and powerful 
protector, domination by the Soviet Union appeared almost inevitable. 
Bevin was apparently particularly concerned about the possibility that 
Scandinavia n-dght fall under Soviet influence. This would not only 
extend Moscow's sphere of influence all the way to the Atlantic but could 
also undermine efforts to build up the recently established Western 
Union Defence Organisation. 200 The Navy was extensively deployed as a 
tool of the Government's foreign policy in this region. HMS Implacable 
visited Norway in June 1949 and conducted joint exercises with the Royal 
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Norwegian Air Force. Other RN vessels visited Sweden and Denmark, 
including a two month MTB cruise to northern Norway between January 
and March of the same year. 201 
Europe was not the only area in which the Soviet Union began to 
exert itself and to probe for areas of weakness that could be exploited. 
The Levant, an area of traditional concern for British foreign policy came 
under pressure. The end of 1945 had seen pro-Soviet forces seize control 
in northern Iran and declared a new national government of Azerbaijan, 
which promptly granted oil-drilling rights to Moscow. The two leading 
Soviet newspapers, Pravda and Izvestia, also announced claims on Turkish 
territory by Soviet Georgia. Coupled with this there was an alarming 
build up of Soviet forces in the region, with 200,000 troops in Bulgaria 
and twelve divisions on Turkey's eastern frontier. Considering such 
developments it is unsurprising that Turkey was somewhat nervous. 
'Under the pressure of Russian war of nerves Turkey has remained firm 
but has on the whole refrained from provocation. [ ... ] They feel that they 
are encircled by the Red Army from the Bulgarian to the Persian 
frontier. 1202 
Soviet propaganda policy in the region also appeared to confirm 
that the Soviet Union had expansionist intentions. 'Anti-British comment 
is still sustained both in this field [Greece] and on all questions involving 
the Middle East; all the states from Egypt to Iraq are shown as suffering 
under British political, economic and military pressure. 1203 
At this early stage in the development of Anglo-American post-war 
relations there was a degree of uncertainty as to the extent of America's 
conunitment to resisting Soviet pressure. 'It is feared that the United 
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States desire to reach a settlement with the USSR in the Far East may 
make Turkey the victim of another Munich, and that in such a case Great 
Britain might give up her role in the Near East. 1204 
The continuing concern over Soviet initiatives in Turkey and Iran 
led to the US joint Chiefs of Staff drawing up Nicizer, a series of studies 
by the Joint War Plans Committee. 205 Contained within the study was a 
concept of Soviet operations suggesting that while 'desiring to avoid a 
major conflict for the next several years, Ithe USSR] will commit an act or 
series of aggressions vitally affecting the security of the British Empire or 
the United States or both, leading to war between the United 
States/Britain and the USSR. 1206 Although more definite in its prognosis 
of how relations would develop than similar British sentiments, this 
concept of operations did echo perspective Churchill laid out in his 
famous Iron Curtaiii speech at Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946. The 
British press reported the speech thus, 
Churchill: Secure peace now- the time is short. Britain's ex-Premier 
tells the world that security lies in Anglo-US alliance. "I do not 
believe Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and 
indefinite expansion of their power and doctrine. " 207 
The idea was slowly but surely beginning to take hold that while the 
gravest threat to western societies lay in the outbreak of another world 
war, they were also faced with the danger of an aggressive expansionist 
power that could seek to achieve its goals by a series of actions that in 
themselves would not provoke open conflict. 
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We cannot yet be sure that all the Great Powers are 
determined to keep the peace. Until the general political 
atmosphere improves, we cannot rule out the possibility of 
war with Russia, either by actual aggression on her part or by 
a miscalculation of the extent to which she can pursue a policy 
of ideological and territorial expansion short of war with the 
Democratic Powers. We by no means regard such a war as 
inevitable, but the issue which cannot be avoided is that our 
Defence Policy must be directed against the possibility of war 
with Russia. 208 
Despite the problems with the Soviet Union that had emerged 
during the first eighteen months of peace there still existed a desire for at 
least cordial relations between the former allies. In this regard the navy 
was utilised in the familiar role of courtesy visits. Adm iral Fraser took the 
carrier HMS Trizonph escorted by HMS Rapid into Soviet northern waters 
for Red Fleet Day at the end of July 1946. Tfiuniph docked at Kronstadt, 
the first RN ship to do so since it was bombarded and raided by units 
under Vice Admiral Sir W. Cowan's command in September 1919.209 The 
trip came about as the result of an invitation that Fraser had been able to 
secure from the Russian Military Attach6 in Nanking whilst on a visit 
there as C-in-C BPF. 210 Fraser addressed a gathering of senior naval 
officers in Leningrad on the lessons from the Pacific campaign and on the 
need to maintain friendly relations in peacetime. 211 The Admiral's 
impressions were generally of cordial and proper relations rather than 
warm. Fraser had, of course, something of a history with the Russians. He 
had been imprisoned by Bolsheviks during the ill-fated attempts by 
Western powers to intervene in the civil war. In contrast, his next visit to 
the Soviet Union was under altogether different circumstances, receiving 
as he did the Order of Suvorov for the sinking of the Scliarnliorst in 
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December 1943. One of the privileges of this allowed him to travel on the 
Moscow underground free of charge, a concession he greatly enjoyed 
exercising. 
However, when the Admiralty received repoits of the Court 
Martials of Adn-dral of the Fleet Kuznetzov, Adn-dral Galler and Admiral 
Alafuzov and Vice-Admiral Stephanov it became hard to ignore the 
growing antagonism directed at the west. The Admirals were accused of 
collaboration with Allied Missions during WWII - showing certain maps 
of the Pacific, allowing British and American officers to have information 
on a German electric torpedo recovered in the Baltic in 1943. All the 
Soviet admirals had reputations for co-operating to various degrees with 
the British during the war and this was thought to be an important 
political signal to both the Russian Navy and the West. Speculation also 
revolved around the possibility that there were political motivations 
behind these court martials in that they re-established control over the 
navy since its incorporation into the Ministry of Armed Forces. 212 
In March 1947 when a further international conference opened in 
Moscow expectations for co-operation were not high. 213 It was also 
becoming clear that opinion in the United States had shifted and was 
becoming increasingly anti-Soviet. 214 This was certainly encouraging for 
the British indicating as it did that the Commonwealth n-dght not have to 
hold the ring alone for quite as long as was anticipated a year ago. 
The second half of 1947 witnessed a growing recognition by the 
United States that their initial assumption concerning great power 
collaboration in order to promote world economic and social prosperity 
was no longer valid. In its place was the realisation that the world now 
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consisted of two opposed camps. 'There are, in short, two worlds instead 
of one. 1215 
During April, American press reports 'discuss [ed]with much 
candour the possibility of war with Russia, though generally with the 
proviso that they do not think there will be a war. '216 This theme was not 
simply idle press speculation, indeed the feeling that a major clash was 
imminent permeated the State Department. 
On a short term basis, all indications point towards a major 
political showdown crisis between the Soviet and non-Soviet 
world, which as a present correlation of forces means between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. [ ... 
I From present 
indications, this crisis will mature considerably earlier than has 
been expected. It is not a matter of several years in the future. It 
is more likely a question of months. No one can in confidence 
predict that this crisis, when it arises, will remain confined to 
the political field. 217 
In similar vein, and in stark contrast to the United States' initial 
attitude toward the Soviet Union, the National Security Council had 
formed the view that, '[t]he ultimate objective of Soviet-directed world 
communism is the domination of the world. '218 It was now openly 
thought that the US and her allies were facing something different from 
the competition traditional to international relations. 
In fact the seminal crisis arose in central Europe the following year. 
The question of what should be done with a defeated Germany, initially 
an area of agreement, soon came to divide the war time allies. The three 
principal belligerents had agreed that Germany should be disarmed, 
denazified, divided into administrative zones, but treated as a whole 
economically and operated as a single unit. The Russian desire to keep 
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the country constrained was at odds with the pressing need of the British 
to see Germany functioning as an economic unit that could pay its own 
way and not make demands on the British Treasury. As the Cold War 
began to freeze into a permafrost during 194748 Britain, America and a 
reluctant France219 began to take steps toward the establishment of an 
independent West German state. These moves threatened Russian hopes 
of keeping Germany united and turning it communist. It also raised the 
spectre of a resurgent, independent Germany as a power in international 
relations, something that Moscow was bound to view with considerable 
alarm. The Soviet Union decided to make a stand over this issue by 
isolating the western sectors of Berlin. The Russians cut all road, rail and 
water communications between the city and the other western zones. 
They stopped food, electricity, gas and other necessities flowing from the 
east and were. clearly prepared to use force if the West attempted to force 
passage. This legal right to deny access through the Russian sector was 
extremely vague, and in the circumstances of a trial of strength, 
essentially irrelevant. The blockade had been gradually tightened since 
the beginning of 1948 and by June was complete. This left the Western 
powers in an extremely difficult situation as the Admiralty explained to 
the Navy, 
The alternatives facing the governments of the United 
Kingdom, the United States and France appear, therefore to be 
as follows: - 
i) Evacuation of their sectors of Berlin, or, what would be 
worse, the abandonment of the Berliners in their sectors to 
Soviet administration of the whole city, and the retention of 
some small face-saving representation in Berlin. 
ii) Raising of the blockade of the Western sectors by the 
Russians 
219France had initially sought a form of German federation with a weak central 
government. France herself, was incapable of imposing any control over Germany and 
was fearful that the US and UK would not do so for long. A disarmed and internally 
politically fragmented state appeared to be the answer. Recognition of Soviet/Western 
hostility eventually persuaded France to allow her zone of occupation to be absorbed 
into the new state. 
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iii) War with USSR. 220 
It is interesting to note that the Admiralty did not consider the 
option eventually chosen, that of supply from the air, perhaps reflecting 
the entrenched naval view that air transport could not replace other bulk 
carriers. Indeed the operation was economically extremely expensive. 
The western allies could not accept any of the three options outlined 
above and so, as a demonstration of political will, decided to pierce the 
Soviet siege from the air, placing the onus on the Soviet Union to fire the 
first shot. Between July 1948 and May 1949, when the blockade was lifted, 
American and British air forces delivered over 1.5 million tons of food, 
fuel and other goods to the city. 
Although the crisis lasted until May 1949, the Adn-dralty was able to 
comment with some assurance in august 1948 that a wider outbreak of 
hostilities was unlikely. 'There was no evidence of unusual USSR or 
satellite military activity during August, and as the autumn approaches 
the possibility of war lessens. ' 221 
It should not be assumed that the British Government's shift toward 
opposition of the Soviet Union was either smooth or universally 
supported. A strong, intellectually vigorous group of Labour backbench 
M. P. 's coalesced around a manifesto written by Michael Foot, Richard 
Crossman, and Ian Mikardo, entitled Keep Left, in 1947. They argued that 
the anti-Soviet policy of collective security being pursued by Ernest 
Bevin, assumed an unbridgeable gulf between the USSR and the West. 
This, they argued was not the case but did pose the danger of becoming a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. 222 
This attempt to map out and pursue an independent course through 
the increasing intensity of the early days of the Cold War continued to 
exert an influence on the Government until the liquidation of the 
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remaining non-Stalinist parties in Eastern Europe during 1947-48 and the 
establishment of Nato led to the splitting of this group in the Labour 
Party. Michael Foot now argued that the democratic path made an 
alliance with the United States unavoidable and necessary. 223 
Back to the Special Relationship with the United States 
The United Kingdom had long entered into treaties and alliances 
with other nations, but the relationship with the United States that 
developed in the years following peace was substantially novel. Britain 
had traditionally utilised allies on the continent to oppose any likely 
hegemonic power. Elizabeth I supported the Dutch and the French 
against the Spanish, the long running series of wars with France were 
augmented by payments to Austria and the various German states, and 
at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, agreements were reached 
with the French to offset the growth of German power, to cite just three of 
many possible examples. Although there was certainly elements of this 
traditional policy in the design of Ernest Bevin's foreign policy, as the 
second half of the decade progressed it became clear that something 
significantly different was being established. Where the UK had sought to 
maximise freedom of action in order to counter-balance the emergence of 
any hegemonic power, Britain now sought its own permanent grouping 
to offset Soviet domination of the continent. 
At the grand strategic level, relations between the Britain and the 
United States underwent some fundamental changes during the period 
1945 to 1950. These were in part a response to emerging world politics 
and part the result of domestic circumstances in both countries. The 
development of the special relationsizip was neither smooth nor 
guaranteed. It is tempting to look back at the close co-operation that 
223M Foot Tfibune 20/5/49 
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existed during the wartime years of alliance and see a purposeful 
continuum reaching through the Cold War expressed in the intimate 
relationship of Nato. The reality was far from this. Whilst both countries 
shared a vision of the post war world, it was one that initially sought to 
keep the other at arms length. Both countries envisaged a danger to 
international stability and their relations with other powers if they 
became too closely associated. The United States also had a significant 
legacy of anti-British feeling in its domestic politics. Roosevelt had felt it 
necessary strongly to deny that the Pacific War was being fought simply 
to re-establish British Imperial possessions. There were fears that the 
obvious antagonism between Britain and the Soviet Union, embodied by 
Churchill, would drag America and the world into yet another crisis 
leading to war. There also existed some concern, prior to the conclusion 
of World War Two, amongst Roosevelt's staff that Russia and Britain 
might clash with one another as they sought to re-establish and enhance 
their strategic position. 224 Indeed during 1945 Russian propaganda 
emphasised the more antagonistic stance taken by the British towards the 
Soviet Union than that of the United States. 'Americans were sometimes 
warned by the Russians not to be dragged into advenhirous policies by 
following the British lead. 'M 
Equally the new Labour Government was concerned not to 
prejudice the possibilities of continuing co-operation with the Soviet 
Union by being seen as creating another anti-Soviet western front. What 
is clear, however, is that within three years of the end of the war both 
countries had reversed their positions completely. 
At the end of the war, the United States clearly intended to 
limit its European involvement to occupation duties; by n-iid- 
1948 the American Government was inextricably involved in 
224S. T. Ross American War Plans 1945-1950 Garland Publishing Inc. [New Yrok] 1988 p. 
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collective defence arrangements designed to deter Soviet 
aggression and adventurisM. 226 
The British objective was to secure the participation of the US in 
some regional arrangement for collective self-defence. 227 Nearly eighteen 
months before the end of the Second World War the Foreign Office 
produced a report detailing what they saw as the basis of American 
foreign policy and the way in which it would develop after the war. At its 
heart was a conception that relations between the two countries were 
Isin-dlar to those which exist within one national community; they are, 
that is to say, "domestic" rather than "external" in character. '228 However, 
this intimacy of interaction was not seen as a guarantee of immediate 
unity or solidarity between two the nations; on the contrary, the 
complexity and all-pervading quality of the relationship could very well 
become 'a source of endless irritation. ' 
The Foreign Office recognised that, despite this, there was a 
compulsion to make the relationship work 'no matter what friction may 
occur. ' Britain's policy, the report continued, should be one that avoided 
confronting or simply acquiescing to American power, rather it should 
use all capacity and opportunity to influence the direction of American 
policy. Britain was seen as being in a unique position to accomplish this 
by virtue of the wartime relationship and what was seen as America's 
relative inexperience in world affairs. This perceived naivety was thought 
to have produced an 'increasing conscious[ness] of the need for alliance 
and support', which the British Empire and Commonwealth should 
provide. Their hope was that American power could be manipulated in 
Britainýs favour. 
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The process of calling in the new world to redress the 
balance of the old is still incomplete, and the ability to evoke 
the new world's immense resources is stronger in these islands 
than elsewhere. We should be throwing away one of our 
greatest assets if we failed to evoke it, or if we were to credit 
the people of the United States with having developed their 
own ideas of the world"s future to such a point of clarity that 
they were uninfluenced by ours. If we go about our business 
in the right way we can help to steer this great unwieldy 
barge, the United States of America, into the right harbour. If 
we don't, it is likely to continue to wallow in the ocean, an 
isolated menace to navigation. 229 
The changes in Britain's position with regard to how it envisaged 
the relationship with the United States developing after the war were 
apparent even while the BPF was actively supporting American 
operations. A junior minister in the Foreign Office informed the head of 
the Western European division in the State Department thatwe do not 
want you to go back to isolationism. On the other hand, we do not seem 
to want you to have independent policies of your own ... so many of our 
people would like to have your influence and prestige and material 
strength utilised to support British policies. '230 Sin-dlarly Roosevelt had 
been informed the previous January by his Secretary of State, Edward 
Stettinius, of the 'emotional difficulty which ... any Englishman has in 
adjusting himself to a secondary role, after having always accepted a 
leading one as his natural right. The British have an unhappy sense of 
unprecedented and unrepayable obligation to us. '231 
In September 1945, just days after Japanýs surrender, the American 
joint Chiefs of Staff agreed on a memorandum which articulated their 
conception of how the new peace should be upheld. 'In the last analysis 
the maintenance of such a world peace will depend upon mutual 
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cooperation among Britain, Russia and the United States. 1232 The 
prospects for this international co-operation were not, however taken for 
granted. The joint Chiefs recognised that the possibility of a breakdown 
in the relation between these major powers and the resulting necessity to 
exercise individual or collective self-defence required the maintenance of 
forces capable of ensuring American security without immediate or 
substantial assistance from other nations. 
Despite the caution expressed by the American military, the State 
Department was adamant that with proper diplomatic handling the 
wartime relationship could be preserved and that it was in both 
countries' interests to do so. Setting out the fundamental ideas of post- 
war foreign policy, the State Department wrote in December 1945 that, 
'our policy toward the Soviet Union should be to continue our efforts to 
convince the Soviet authorities that it is in our mutual advantage to 
collaborate in all decisions in the international relations field. '233 It was 
recognised that this was no easy task and relations were of a different 
character than those with other countries, whom the United States shared 
a degree of common economic and political culture. 
In the conduct of our relations with the Soviet Government 
we must always bear in mind that ... the conduct of our 
relations requires more patience and diligence than with other 
countries. We should be 'prepared to overlook n-dnor 
grievances, explain carefully and in detail our reasons for all 
our actions or requests, and if it is deemed advisable to take a 
firm position regarding the Soviet Union, we should always 
be as careful as possible to assure that our facts are correct. 234 
Although to some extent this echoed the stance taken by the 
American military, commenting on the above paper the joint Chiefs of 
Staff pointed out that 'the "adoption of a firm and friendly attitude in our 
232Memorandum Prepared by the joint Chiefs of Staff 19/9/45 FRUS., 1946, Vol 1 Op 
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dealings with the Soviet Government" is strongly endorsed with, 
however, the emphasis upon "firmness". 235 The joint Chiefs of Staff 
believed that, 
From a military point of view, the consolidation and 
development of the power of Russia is the greatest threat to 
the United States in the foreseeable future. While clashes of 
vital interest are unlikely to occur immediately, the expansion 
of Russia in the Far East may ultimately bring about serious 
conflict with United States policies directly, and its expansion 
to the west and south may involve clashes with Great Britain 
into which we might well be drawn. 236 
The debate within American foreign policy circles regarding the best 
way to deal with the Soviet Union continued to develop through 1946. 
Whilst there remained hopes that international agreements could be 
maintained between them there was a growing realisation that, 
As long as present Soviet policies and attitude in regard to 
other countries continue unchanged, the US must accept the 
fact that it is confronted with the threat of an expanding 
totalitarian state which continues to believe and act on the 
belief that the world is divided into two irreconcilably hostile 
camps. 237 
In such a case, and if Soviet Russia was to be denied the hegemony 
of Europe, the conclusion was reached that 'the United Kingdom must 
continue in existence as the principal power in Western Europe 
economically and military. '238 The United States, it was argued, should, 
therefore, explore its relationship with Great Britain and give all feasible 
political, economic, and if necessary military support within the 
framework of the United Nations, Britain and to the communications of 
the British Commonwealth. 'This does not imply a blank check of 
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American support throughout the world for every interest of the British 
Empire, but only in respect of areas and interests which are in the opinion 
of the US vital to the maintenance of the United Kingdom and the British 
Commonwealth as a great power. '239 
The concern in London appears to have been that while it 
recognised the dangers of Soviet expansion a similar sense of urgency 
was not perceived as emanating from Washington. The British were in a 
significantly more perilous state than the United States and were far more 
susceptible to Moscow's pressure. In Turkey, in Greece, in Palestine, on 
the North West Frontier, and across the Far East, the stresses and strains 
on the Empire and Commonwealth were beginning to produce tangible 
worries. 
The British realise that American public opinion at present 
is not aware of what they consider to be the seriousness of 
Russia's intentions and that, therefore, the United States will 
not easily become a partner in a British alliance. 240 
There was certainly a great deal of suspicion concerning the message 
emanating from the Foreign Office with regard to the dangers of Russian 
encroachment and Britain's inability to counter it. As the an American 
intelligence summary reported, 
those in Great Britain who are less willing to make concessions 
to the Soviet Union have turned to the United States in an 
attempt to enlist American aid. While it is perfectly true that 
Britain paid a huge price for the winning of the war 
(proportionately a greater price by far than the United States), it 
is possible that the Foreign Office is at presently deliberately 
exaggerating the weakness of the British Empire in an effort to 
enlist American sympathy, as well as direct American aid. For if 
the United States understands that there is no effective British 
"barrier" between herself and the Soviet Union, many 
2391bid. p. 1170. 
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Englishmen believe that she will be forced to strengthen 
Britain's hand vis-A-vis any Russian expansion. 241 
It was clearly thought that Britain's best hope for convincing the 
United States to support the Commonwealth was by adopting and 
publicising her growing opposition to the USSR. 'Moreover Great 
Britain's strong stand against Russian aggressive moves all over the 
world is believed to have won general American approval and also to 
have placated many isolationists in America who hate Britain, but hate 
Russia more. '242 
By the spring of 1947 it was becon-dng evident that however strong 
the isolationist feeling in American domestic politics was, there would be 
no rerun of the United States washing its hands of European affairs as it 
did through the failure to ratify the League of Nations. Washington 
recognised that it now had little choice but to involve itself in the affairs 
of the Old World however much it found such things distasteful. 'Actions 
of the Soviet Government in the field of Foreign Affairs leave us no 
alternative other than to assume that the USSR has aggressive intentions. ' 
Accepting such an assumption led to the belief that, 
If the right of free men to live out their lives under 
institutions of their free choice is to be preserved, there must 
be a vigilant determination on the part of peoples and 
governments of the USA and the UK to resist Soviet 
aggression, by force of arms if necessary. 243 
There was as yet, however, no concrete desire to formalise this 
Anglo-American opposition to the Soviet Union. The importance of the 
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UN was still being emphasised in Washington, as much for its effect on 
domestic public opinion as for its practical efficiency. 
The United Kingdom sin-dlarly has been built around the 
fullest support of the United Nations. I am convinced that any 
departure from that policy on the part of the UK would not 
only be a serious mistake in itself but would have far-reaching 
and disastrous consequences on public opinion in the United 
States. I am convinced that the people of the United States are 
prepared to back up support of the United Nations, by force of 
arms if necessary, so long as the United Kingdom and the 
other peace loving democracies are similarly minded. [ ... ]I believe that the strong pull toward political isolation can be 
successfully resisted. I am, however, certain that . any 
arrangements between the UK and the USSR which could be 
interpreted as appeasement or which did not fall fully and 
completely within the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations would touch off an upsurge of isolation sentiment in 
the United States which would be irresistible. In other words, 
the American people would say, "To hell with all of them". 
This change of attitude was acknowledged and welcomed, the 
Admiralty reporting in early 1947 that; 
America's attitude toward this country is probably more 
friendly than it has ever been, largely because illusions about 
Britain's wealth and Machiavellian cunning in diplomacy 
(founded upon school-book versions of past disputes) have 
been expelled. Britain is seen as Europe's bulwark against 
communism, but there are doubts as to whether Britain can 
continue to carry out her world-wide commitments. 244 
Upon his retirement in April 1947, as head of the British Army Staff 
in Washington, Henry Wilson, echoed these sentiments. Wilson 
considered that significant progress had been made toward greater co- 
operation. He wrote, 
During the war years we had got to appreciate each other's 
value and to understand our different ways and customs; after 
two years of post-war experience there existed a genuine feeling 
244MIR February 1947 No. 14 Pt. III Economic and Political: USA p. 63 
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that by standing together we formed a bulwark for the 
maintenance of peace and that our two nations, having the same 
interests and ideals, should carry forward that co-operation 
which in times of stress had allowed our respective combat 
services to work as one team; it would be of inestimable value in 
facing problems that lie ahead. 245 
Echoing the experience of the BPF in the Pacific, the Navy was 
utilised to cement this relationship. Indeed the warmth of reception given 
to RN observers during a USN Atlantic Fleet exercise in February 1947 
was undoubtedly rooted in the close co-operation developed in the 
Pacific. One observer commenting that the general atmosphere was 'we 
are still one fleet, ' the only regret was that Britain did not have a task 
force taking part in the exercises. There appeared to be a level of trust 
which had yet to be firmly implanted in the respective capitals. "Absolute 
sharing of all information with the observers was taken for granted and 
the stay with the US Fleet was made most enjoyable throughout. '246 
As the United States attitude toward the Soviet Union continued to 
harden during early 1947 the Joint Strategic Survey Conunittee produced 
a report identifying those areas of the world and countries, in order of 
their urgency and their importance, to which the United States should, if 
possible, give assistance. 247 The conclusion reached was that the area of 
primary strategic importance to the United States in the event of 
ideological warfare was Western Europe, including Great Britain. 248 
While the report believed that the UK only ranked ninth in a list of 
countries needing American assistance, when considering both 
importance and need it was decided that Great Britain should be the 
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primary recipient of aid. 249 This was of course exactly what the Foreign 
Office had been working toward with their earlier support for the BPF. 
It was now almost being taken for granted that the defence of the 
continental United States was intimately bound up with the fate of the 
western European democracies. 
Rjwo World wars in the past thirty years have 
demonstrated the interdependence of France, Great Britain 
and the United States in case of war with central or eastern 
European powers. In war these nations not only need one 
another but are in mortal peril if they do not combine their 
forces. In the past it was demonstrated that France could not 
stand alone without Great Britain and that when France fell 
the British isles were in mortal peril. If Britain had fallen the 
United States have had to defend itself in the Atlantic before it 
could have thought of resisting the Japanese conquest of 
China, the East Indies, the Philippines and the Far Pacific. 
That the defense of the United States and Canada in North 
America and of Great Britain and France in Western Europe is 
inseparable from the combined defense of them all is not a 
question of what men think now, but is something that has 
been demonstrated by what we have had to do, though 
tardily, and therefore at greater risk and cost, in actual warfare 
in the past. 250 
On the whole the British appear to have understood the Americans 
and their intentions quite well, and the confluence of interests certainly 
underpinning this process. As the State Department explained in a policy 
statement in 1948. The basic objectives 'of US policy toward Britain are to 
obtain maximum British co-operation in the establishment and 
maintenance of a just and lasting peace and in the protection of our 
national interest. '251 The State Department believed that Britain was the 
'outstanding example' of 'like-minded nations' with whom the US would 
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China, and Turkey. 
250FRUS., 1947. Vol. 1 Op Cit. p. 739-740 
251Department of State policy statement, Washington, 11 July 1948 FRUS 1948, Vol. III 
pp. 1091-2 
115 
work in the United Nations. The role that the military played in 
cementing these ties was recognised, and informal working arrangements 
between the two armed forces were to be fostered. The paper even went 
further, arguing that 'British friendship and co-operation' were 'necessary 
for American defence. ' Although a clearly inferior in numerical terms, the 
military strength of Britain and the Commonwealth provided 'a network 
of strategically located territories of great military value, which have 
served as defensive out posts and as bridgeheads for operations. ' 
The question of how the United States should deal with the 
Commonwealth's Dominions, Colonies and dependencies, given the US's 
professed policy of national self determination, was effectively side 
stepped in favour of geo-strategic necessity. '[11t is our objective that the 
integrity of this area be maintained; that the United Kingdom retain 
control of her outlying possessions; that any retrenchment which she may 
have to make shall take place in an orderly manner; and that territory 
over which she may relinquish control shall not fall into less friendly 
hands. ' 
By the second half of 1949 the Foreign Office felt confident enough 
to state that, 
Because of their victorious wartime alliance, collaboration 
between the USA and the United Kingdom since the war has 
been closer than ever before and closer than the relations 
maintained by the USA with any other country. [ ... 
] In the 
military field, the continued existence of the combined Chiefs 
of Staff organisation has hitherto kept alive an effective United 
Kingdom-United States partnership. The USA has in fact 
hitherto assumed that the principal partner and ally on which, 
from the military point of view, she may rely is the United 
KingdoM. 252 
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The vital collaboration between the BPF and the USN Fifth/Third 
Fleet during the last months of the Second World War had been 
maintained in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Pacific with bi- 
lateral naval exercises. In the Far East the RN undertook a startlingly 
prescient combined exercise with the US Navy in the China Sea less than 
four months before the outbreak of the Korean War. 253 The Light Carrier 
[CVL] HMS Triumph had participated in aircraft cross-decking, 
including replenishment, with the USS Boxer. In addition combined 
strike and convoy protection exercises were carried out. The foundations 
of interoperablity laid under Nimitz and Fraser five years before were to 
prove invaluable experience as USN procedures were emulated again. 
The Admiralty taking particular satisfaction from the ease in which this 
was done. 
Grand Strategy and the Outbreak of the Korean War 
The United Kingdom's response to the North Korean invasion of the 
South displayed many of the hallmarks of the country's contribution to 
the Pacific campaign five and a half years previously. Like the Pacific 
campaign of 1945 the Korean War was a conflict the economy could not 
pay for and one which stretched already tight military resources even 
further. Ultimately it was undertaken for political rather than strategic 
reasons. 
When the Cabinet came to discuss the British response to the crisis 
on the Korean peninsula the issue was ranked number four behind what 
was considered more important business; the perennial problem of 
economic recovery as always took precedence. 254 Indeed not all cabinet 
ministers were able to locate the divided country beyond its existence in 
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the Far East. 255 This illustrates something of the importance attached to 
the conflict in the early days of its outbreak. It is clear from the available 
source material that the Government in London considered the war as 
something that would have been best left to others to solve. Although the 
United Kingdom had been involved in discussions over the status of the 
country since the end of the Second World War, the issue was not seen as 
having any real significance. Immediately after the war the Prime 
Minister had made it clear that he wished to restrict involvement of the 
country's limited resources only to those areas where major British 
territorial, economic, and strategic interests lay. 256 Bevin had even 
responded to an American suggestion of a four power trusteeship by 
raising the possibility that Australia be the Commonwealth 
representative rather than the UK. 257 The primary task for the Navy in 
support of the Government's foreign policy in the Far East was seen as 
sliowing the flag in order to assist in the promotion of exports. Hong Kong 
was viewed as an important gateway into China for trade rather than a 
military outpost. Malaya was considered to be the one important area, a 
vital communication link to Australia and New Zealand as well as a 
source of much needed rubber and tin. I 
There had been worries that because 'Soviet and American interests 
are likely to clash in the Far East, '258 the United Kingdom might also be 
drawn in, an obligation the country could well do without. As the 
American Ambassador explained in a memorandum to the Secretary of 
State in June 1947, 
Britain deplore[s] the current American-Soviet impasse 
over Korea, and would like to see a settlement effected that 
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would leave Korea free and independent. But the essence of 
present British policy toward Korea - wholly negative in 
character - is an abiding desire to avoid embroilment in the 
American-Soviet controversy. Clearly, Britain hope that the 
US and the Soviet Union will be able to resolve the Korean 
deadlock between themselves. 259 
Despite this divergence of views between London and Washington, 
and a growing split over the issue of how to treat China, the Ambassador 
was confident enough of Britain's conunitment to the developing alliance 
that'if the issue were taken to the UN or some other international forum, 
Britain would undoubtedly support the US. ' However, it was recognised 
that the UK could do little to assist materially. 'Britain is neither able nor 
willing to bring more than moral pressure to bear. 1260 
By the middle of 1948 the prospect for a peaceful resolution to the 
Korean question was clearly beginning to concern the Admiralty, if not 
the Gover=ent. 
Press correspondents regard civil war in Korea as 
inevitable. A most difficult situation will be created if the 
Russian troops leave Korea before American troops and then 
the North Korean Army makes an attack against the south, 
involving American troops responsible for good order in the 
south. 261 
Unrest in Korea continued to grow the following year, 1949, with 
'[flarge bands of Communist rebels ... roving the country attacking towns 
and villages and fighting pitched battles with the police. '262 It was 
becoming increasingly obvious that President Rhee and his Government, 
elected to power under the supervision of the United Nations Temporary 
Commission, were attempting 'to govern (and to keep themselves in 
power) by rigid suppression of public opinion. 'The regime survived only 
259The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 11/6/47 
FRUS., 1947. Vol. 1 Op Cit, p. 751-758. 
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because of the active support of the United States. Latter that year whilst 
travelling to the Columbo Conference on HMS Kenya, the Foreign 
Secretary addressed the ship's company. He departed from a prepared 
script and exclaimed that he was 'very worried about the precarious 
situation in Korea ... If you ask me where we might all 
be in for further 
trouble, I believe Korea is the place. '263 This came as something of a 
surprise to the accompanying members of his staff because, for reasons 
outlined above, Britain's prime focus was seen to be Western Europe. 
Ironically, it was precisely because of this European focus that the 
Government committed British forces to the Korean War. The Foreign 
Office believed that it was 'virtually certain that the Soviet Government 
had connived at, if they have not instigated, the aggression by the 
Communists of North Korea. 264 It was further assumed that the action 
was a probe to test the response and resolve of the West. Unless this 
action was effectively resisted it could lead to further moves in Europe. 
Britain was also under obligation as a member of the Permanent Five in 
the UN Security Council. Having placed so much hope in the UN, Britain 
could not refuse forces for its first major test. In addition, and crucially, it 
was seen as imperative to support the United States. 
When North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel on 25 June 1950 
the Government found itself in an awkward position. Not wanting to be 
diverted from what was considered the main issue, the Cold War in 
Europe, but unable to refuse American requests for support, and 
overstretched by existing conunitments the Cabinet Defence Conuriittee 
was informed that the Chiefs of Staff position was that although action by 
sea and air forces alone would not be enough, no land forces or indeed 
RAF units were available. 265 As the main aim was to show solidarity with 
the US, naval units would have to suffice for the time being. 
263 
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At a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on 27/28 June 1950 a 
memorandum was produced favouring naval assistance to Korea but 
opposing the transfer of ground forces from Hong Kong or Malaya. This 
suggestion was taken up by the Cabinet Defence Comn-tittee meeting of 
28 June, where it was agreed that Royal Navy forces in Japanese waters 
should be put under American command. 266 
What was crucial was the speed of response. Support and visible 
support had to be forthcoming from the British as soon as possible. The 
British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Oliver Franks, wrote to the Prime 
Minister on this subject in the middle of JUly. 267 He argued that it was 
important to generate maximum publicity for what British contribution 
as could be managed in order to avoid adverse criticism of in the 
American press. Although the British contribution to Korea would 
eventually included ground forces all that could be mustered 
immediately was the Royal Navy forces under Admiral Brind. 
The speed of response, instigated by the US and made possible 
because of the Soviet Union's absence from the Security Council, was 
viewed as decisive in preventing any subsequent communist actions of a 
similar nature. 
The Soviet-inspired invasion of South Korea may well 
have been a miscalculation, in that the promptness of the 
United States reaction, and the solid backing given to it by the 
vast majority of the United Nations, may not have been 
anticipated. Whatever happens in this area, there can be no 
doubt in the Kren-din that swift action is likely to be taken by 
the West against any further Communist adventures. 268 
Indeed part of the Chiefs of Staff case for supporting American 
action was that in doing so an important signal would be delivered which 
266 PREM 8/1405 Part 1, DO(50), 11th Meeting, 28 June 1950 
267 FO 371/84089 letter from Sir Oliver Franks to Prime Minister dated 15/7/50 
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would materially assist the situation in Hong Kong and Malaya. 269TI-iiS 
response was viewed as both a signal of intent to the Soviet Union and a 
warning to public and political opinion at home. 'Events in Korea have 
served to awaken public opinion in the countries of the West to the 
dangers of a repetition nearer home, for example in Germany, and to the 
urgent necessity of establishing an effective system of defence in Western 
Europe. 1270 
Admiral Brind, CinC Far East Station, was at sea, en route to Hong 
Kong from Japan, when news reached him of the developing situation in 
Korea. On his own initiative he sent the following signal to Vice Admiral 
C Turner Joy, United States Naval commander, Far East, (COMNAVFE); 
'Should like my ships to take part in any humanitarian mission you may 
desire and I hope you will tell [my] Flag Officer Second in Command, Far 
East Station if there is anything else they can do to help yoU. '271 
Following this he informed his second-in-command, Rear Admiral 
Andrewes, that the greater part of his forces would sail to be in position 
in case they were needed for more active operations. His signal also 
included the proviso that Malayan and Hong Kong forces were to be kept 
at their present strength. It is pertinent to note that this move was taken 
in advance of orders from the Admiralty. These arrived on the 28th June 
instructing Brind to 'place the RN at present in Japanese waters at the 
disposal of the United States Naval Commander for Korean Operation 
[Admiral Joy] in support of Security Council Resolutions. 1272 
By early July the 'token' Commonwealth naval force consisted of; the 
light fleet carrier HMS Triwiipli, the cruisers HMS Belfast and jaiiiaica, the 
269 CAB 131/8 Defence Committee: Meetings & Memorandum DO(50) 11th Meeting. 
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destroyers HMS Consort and Cossack, the frigates HMS Alacrihj, Black 
Swan and Hart, supported by the Royal Fleet Auxiliaries Fort ClIarlotte 
and Green Ranger, with the hospital Ship Maine. These were joined by the 
Australian destroyer HMAS Bataan and the frigate HMAS Slioalliaven, 
with the New Zealand frigates HMNZS Aikaki and Tutira, conu-nitted to 
joining. 
As the Korean War dragged on the Royal Navy found it more and 
more difficult to sustain its limited carrier comn-dtment. In May 1952, 
Plans Division reported on a study into the availability of naval aircraft 
for war in 1952 and estimated that the maximum number of jet aircraft 
that could be deployed in a short war was 27, out of a front line total 
establishment of 254.273 The complete withdrawal of the carrier was 
considered during the Radical Review of 1953,274 however the Chiefs of 
Staff and the Adn-dralty both concluded that political implications 
outweighed the fact that the military benefit of operating the carrier 'was 
in no way commensurate with the premium. It was believed that to 
withdraw the carrier would be perceived as a breach of faith with 
Britain's allies, 'reflecting unfavourably on our manners, morals and 
courage. '275 The effect such a move would have on Britain's prestige in 
American eyes was particularly worrying and could permanently 
undermine the UK's efforts to influence US defence policy in the Far East. 
Things of course did not always go smoothly. The Americans were 
perceived in London to be occasionally high-handed and to be running 
the war in secret. While the British government found reason to complain 
that they were not being adequately consulted over the nature of the US- 
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led United Nations operations in Korea, 276 the extent of co-operation and 
the conduct of joint operations by British and American forces was 
praised by General MacArthur as a 'a picture of complete unification, 
both professional and national. '277 The coordination of Anglo-American 
naval strength was singled out in particular for praise, perhaps a little 
exaggerated the General described it as 'unparalleled in history'. 278 
The Korean War again demonstrated that the Britain could use her 
fleet to underpin her commitment to the relationship with the Americans. 
The intervening five years had seen the Royal Navy exercising in the 
Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Pacific with the USN. These 
experiences and the role that the BPF"s legacy played in this process will 
be taken up in Chapter Five. 
Grand strategy is concerned with the direction of resources to 
achieve national policy. Chapter Two demonstrated how the econon-dc 
situation the country faced, its manpower shortages and its limited 
resources restricted its options with regard a Pacific commitment. These 
major themes continued to influence policy. When eventually a naval 
force could be assembled and dispatched it was used extensively as a tool 
of alliance building. It was also put to this use by those Americans who 
recognised the potential importance that an alliance with the UK could 
have post-war. TI-ds was not achieved easily. Following the conclusion of 
hostilities the Navy built upon the success of the BPF and was again used 
as a diplomatic tool for strengthening alliances. The major themes of this 
chapter, the country's econon-dc difficulties, the manpower crisis., the 
changing conception of the Soviet Union, and the re-establishment of the 
276See Lowe, P. Vie Fnistrations ofAlliatice, Britabi, tile Ullited States alld Hie Korean War, 
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UK-US alliance after a period attempting to create a third force in world 
politics, all appear to undermine the thesis that the British Pacific Fleet 
was important to the development of grand strategy between 1945 and 
1950. Only in the role that the navies of both countries had in 
underpinning the developing relationship does the evidence suggest that 
the BPF were instrumental. This is not surprising, when the complex 
story of the UK's grand strategy is explored it is obvious that other issues, 




The Military Strategic Level of War 
The application of military resources to help achieve grand strategic 
objectives. It is the military component of grand strategy and is 
formulated from political direction. It is concerned with determining the 
military strategic objectives and desired end state required to achieve 
grand strategic aims, the military action needed to achieve these 
objectives, the resources to be allocated and the constraints to be applied. 
It is the responsibility of the Chief of the Defence Staff to provide military 
strategic direction to operational commanders. 279 
279 jWp 0-01 British Defence Doctrine HMSO [London] 1996 p. 1.8 
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Chapter Four 
THE BPF EXPERIENCE AND THE MILITARY STRATEGIC 
LEVEL OF WAR 
Alliance grand strategy set the parameters under which the war 
against Japan was fought. The deliberations over the relative priority of 
the war in the west versus the war in the east, the constantly shifting 
threat assessments made, the constraints imposed by econon-dc and 
manpower factors, the political pressures exerted, all combined to shape 
the available options of the respective alliance partners. Though these 
issues set the context under which British participation in the final 
operations against Japan were conducted, how different national 
objectives were to be translated into concrete military plans was the 
subject of continued debate. It is clear moreover from the material 
available that there was no clear-cut distinction between grand and 
military strategy. Decisions, compromises and agreements in each of 
these areas affected behaviour both up and down these levels of warfare. 
In addition the key decision makers often had responsibilities at both of 
these levels. 
Section One outlined how the BPF was utilised as a tool of alliance 
building by both the UK and the USA. It argued that the British saw it as 
a means of influencing the Americans and achieving possible post-war 
benefit. In turn the US Government recognized that domestic opinion 
needed to be assured of Britain's commitment to its ally. What Britain 
could offer, however, was tightly constrained by its weak economic 
position, its manpower crisis and its forces overstretch. These themes 
continued to influence naval and defence policy after the war. This 
chapter will demonstrate that in order for the RN, more specifically the 
BPF, to be effective as an instrument of alliance politics it would need to 
participate in the most advanced operations against Japan. This policy, 
advocated by Adn-dral Fraser and supported on the whole by the Chiefs 
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of Staff, was not always appreciated at the time, nor since. Correlli Barnet 
has argued that Churchill's 
[PIreference for concentrating the British effort in South-East 
Asia alone makes by far the better politico-strategic sense. It 
would have enabled Britain to win her own, if peripheral, 
victory against Japan in her own theatre; to play a n-dddle-sized 
fish in a middle-sized pond. Logistically and economically too it 
would have made good sense. Brooke and his colleagues' 
solution, which meant playing the sprat in the largest pond in 
the world could only expose Britain's shrunken relative stature 
as a power and above all as a naval power. 280 
Pacific operations did indeed expose the relative decline in Britain's 
naval power; something which was symptomatic of the county's 
weakened position. That, however, would have happened wherever the 
RN had operated. Barnett misses the essential purpose of the BPF at the 
grand and military strategic level. The best use of limited resources was a 
central Pacific naval conunitment. It was the only one that offered any 
real prospect of advantage with the one ally upon whom so much would 
depend after the war. In order to participate in the forward operations 
against Japan agreement needed to be reached with the USN. Although 
Churchill's change of heart had secured Roosevelt's agreement at the 
grand strategic level at a meeting attended by Admiral King, his support 
at the military strategic level was less forthcoming. This chapter is 
concerned with the question of where and how exactly the British 
conunitment to the Pacific would operate. It examines the command 
arrangements that came to be established in order to facilitate these 
decisions. Firstly, however, the strategic conceptions and assumptions of 
both navies are explored. The military strategic level is concerned with 
the translation of political objectives into military priorities. It allocates 
military resources to achieve these ends. The understanding of and 
appreciation of warfare is fundamental to the way in which armed forces 
28OBamett, C. Engage the Enemy More Closely [London] Penguin Books 2000 [first 
published 19911 p. 877 
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do this. Sin-dlarities in outlook were to assist the BPF greatly in its task of 
operating integrally with the USN to achieve the British grand strategic 
goal of diplomatic leverage with the USA. 
Strategic Conceptions 
The war against Japan was qualitatively different from that waged 
against Germany. Simple geography accounted for much of the 
difference but no less important were the ways in which the two main 
Allied powers interpreted the threat posed by the two main Axis powers. 
These various interpretations, plus the constraints imposed by respective 
econon-des and the conceptions of seapower, determined the character, 
nature and progress of the war at sea in the Pacific. 
Japan was a maritime nation in the same sense that Britain was but 
the United States was not. Like Britain, Japan was reliant upon the use of 
the sea for her national life. Without the ability to import raw materials 
and foodstuffs neither country could sustain the war. The US in contrast 
needed the use of the sea to project her power but could, if necessary 
feed, and equip herself from her own resources. Britain and Japan's utter 
dependence upon maritime imports and therefore the need to make their 
defence a military strategic priority was recognised in London, Berlin281, 
Washington but, perhaps crucially, not in Tokyo. In 1941 Japan went to 
war with countries that provided 35 per cent of her merchant fleet 
requirements, some 3,250,000 tons of shipping. 282 In addition, the 
Japanese Navy failed to take appropriate measures to defend its 
merchant traffic. The RN's Naval Staff History of the War with Japan was 
quite adamant that it was the success of the Allied interdiction of her Sea 
Lines of Communication [SLoC1 that brought about Japan's defeat. 
281 Perhaps more accurately within the Kreigsmarine 
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Japan's economy and her ability to fight a war were basically 
dependent upon possession of sufficient shipping to bring home 
the imports she needed. Maritime power, by destroying her 
merchant marine and interdicting her sea routes was 
overwhelmingly responsible for reducing food below 
subsistence level and depriving the country of the necessary 
materials for continuance of resistance. 283 
Therefore, from the outset the nature of Japan's reliance upon sea 
communications shaped the nature of allied strategy for the defeat of 
Japan. As the US Strategic Bombing Survey made explicit; 
The Pacific war was unique in many respects. [ ... ] Japanýs 
geographical situation determined that the Pacific war should in 
large measure be a war for control of the sea, and to insure 
control of the sea, for control of the air over it. As a result, 
attacks against warships and merchant ships and amphibious 
operations for possession of island positions on which forward 
bases could be located were close to the heart of the struggle. 
Carrier task forces, surface ships to provide logistic support, and 
submarines therefore assumed roles of unusual importance. 284 
Rather more succinctly the Naval Review informed its readership, 
'An attack on Japan ... must 
be a sea affair; there is no road except by the 
sea1285 
Strategic thinking within the USN and the RN concerning the 
underlying principles of war at sea was remarkably similar. Both navies 
saw the importance of gaining command of the sea as a precursor to 
other operations. This was to be obtained by offensive action and ideally 
through a decisive battle which would eliminate the threat from the 
enemy"s navy, at worst a series of actions which would gradually attrit 
Japanese naval strength. As an amendment to the RN's 1925 Naval War 
Manual makes plain, "the military aim of the Navy is to destroy in battle, 
283 Naval Staff History War with Tapan Vol VI The Advance to Japan HMSO public 
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or to neutralise and to weaken the opposing navy. [ ... I Offensive action is 
the necessary forerunner of victory. '286 
The Royal Navy had entered the Second World War with a strategic 
conception that saw the use of naval power as a means of winning 
command of the sea. This would pern-dt the defence of sea lines of 
communication, so crucial to Britairýs survival, and allow the strangling 
of an opponent's SLoCs. Such a situation required the defeat or 
containment of an enemy's heavy naval forces and the direct defence of 
convoys. Again the Naval War Manual, updated in 1940, makes thinking 
within the Navy abundantly clear. 
In every maritime war the control of sea communications and 
tradeway's has hitherto been exercised by that power which, in 
addition to possessing sufficient vessels to exercise this control, 
has been able to concentrate a battlefleet sufficient to destroy or 
neutralise similar enemy forces. 287 
Andrew Field has demonstrated that the RN's interwar strategy for 
dealing with the Imperial Japanese Navy was focused upon an attack 
upon her sea communication with cruiser operating under cover of the 
battlefleet. 288 This would compel the IJN to offer battle in order defend 
her shipping whereupon it could be destroyed. If the IJN refused battle 
then the strangling of her sea communications would exert decisive 
pressure upon her economy. Similarly, the USN had a general concept of 
warfare that envisaged victory through seapower. The US Pacific Fleet 
would neutralise and destroy the Japanese Fleet. Amphibious assaults 
would be carried on enemy outposts and naval blockade instituted. The 
American effort to gain command of the sea led to the battles of Midway 
and Guadalcanal and those in the Solomons. The Navy planned to regain 
key islands in the Central and South Pacific as a prelude to air and sea 
286 ADM 186/66 Naval War Manual 1925, amendment 1940, p. 1-2. 
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blockade of the Japanese homeland. Its Marines would assault these 
islands while the Fleet eliminated Japanese air and surface interference. 
Geography ensured that the Navy assumed control over the Central 
Pacific offensive, which would consequently result in a contest between 
the United States Pacific Fleet and the Imperial Japanese Navy for 
command of the sea. To achieve this end, the USN had three major 
objectives: to sink or immobilise the Japanese Fleet, to neutralise or 
capture and develop enemy naval and air bases in the Central Pacific, 
and to seal off the Japanese home islands with an air-sea blockade. 289 
Writing in July 1945 the Historical Section of the Tactical, Torpedo 
and Staff Duties Division, argued that the achievement of command of 
the sea would permit the allies to defeat Japan through the power of 
blockade. It compared Japanýs position to that of Britain at the nadir of 
the Battle of the Atlantic, without the hope of rescue by American 
resources. 
Dapan] cannot evade one inexorable factor in the strategical 
situation, already amply confirmed by the course of events in 
the Pacific. The maintenance of a "Co-prosperity Sphere"' 
held together by such far flung lines of communication has 
called for the employment of a vast amount of shipping. 
Armies of occupation may be able to live on the countries 
they are occupying, but their heavy war material must come 
by sea. In two colossal wars, the most serious danger to the 
United Kingdom has lain in large scale attacks launched 
against her shipping, the defeat of which demanded the most 
strenuous effort, even though the resources of the United 
States of America have been available in support. Japan has 
no such reserves at her disposal, and, in addition to other 
forms of offensive action, must reckon on confronting entirely 
alone an ever growing attack of this nature. Already heavy 
losses have been inflicted on her shipping. 290 
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Throughout the Second World War the British Naval Staff produced 
a number of pamphlets for distribution within the Navy. These 
pamphlets were analytical pieces both about individual actions and 
larger naval campaigns. They were intended to disseminate considered 
opinion on aspects of modern naval warfare. The Naval Staff informed 
the RN that American strategy was built around amphibious capture of 
key bases and the by passing of enemy strongholds. This system of "leap- 
frogging, " provided either bases for the defence of sea communications or 
further offensive operations. Leaving Japanese strongholds to wither on 
the vine was only possible for an antagonist who possessed sea-air control. 
The emergence of this concept of sea-air control was to be of immense 
significance in the post-war debates on maritime strategy. The navy 
explained that this control was 'fought for and gained by combining 
surface, submarine and air attacks on hostile sea routes, and by the 
strategic employment of naval bombardment and long range air bombing 
of the enemy's staging and supply bases. '291 
The implementation of this offensive strategy by the USN was made 
possible by the industrial and manpower resources of the United States. 
In the autumn of 1942 USS Saratoga, USS Enterprise and the USS Ranger 
were the only ships of the American carrier fleet remaining afloat. Little 
more than a year later, by the end of 1943, more than 50 carriers of all 
types were in service in the United States Fleet; and it was the rapidity 
with which aircraft carriers were built after Pearl Harbor that enabled the 
US to launch an offensive in the Central Pacific before the end of 1943. In 
contrast the British had no option other that to stand on the defensive 
with regard to the naval war in the East while recognising the gathering 
pace of the American offensive. As the Naval Review's commentary in 
early 1944 makes clear, the British were constrained in the degree to 
which they could participate by other calls upon their naval resources. In 
291ADM 234/357 Battle Summary No 34 Naval Strategy in the Pacific Feb 1943- Aug 
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discussing when a naval contribution to the defeat of the IJN would be 
available it echoed Admiralty policy by arguing that the timing was 
dependent upon the elimination of the last remaining German surface 
threat. Only then would the freeing of the Home Fleet's battleships 
permit the dispatch of a balanced naval force to the Pacific. 292 
Command Arrangements 
When, in 1944, Britain and the United States came to discuss British 
participation in the fight against Japan the relative balance of power 
between the two allies had changed dramatically from the opening 
months of the war when the UK had been in a position to dominate the 
military planning process thus assuring that a conunitment to the defeat 
of Germany took priority. The changing relationship between the two 
alliance partners was reflected by the evolving command relations. 
Equally important the RN needed to operate in the most advanced 
operations against Japan in order to accrue the desired political leverage 
demanded at the grand strategic level. 
The promotion of effective command arrangements was 
complicated by the personality of the US Chief of Naval Operations, 
Admiral Ernest J. King. In no way could the CNO have been described as 
an anglophile. General Eisenhower is reputed to have said that the course 
of the war would have gone much more smoothly if someone had shot 
King. Churchill's Chief of Staff, General Ismay described him as 
Tough as old nails and carried himself as stiffly as a poker. 
He was stiff and stand-offish, almost to the point of rudeness. 
At the start, he was intolerant of all things British, especially 
the Royal Navy; but he was equally intolerant and suspicious 
of the American Army. War against Japan was the problem to 
wl-dch he had devoted the study of a lifetime, and he resented 
292 Fauteuil Op. Cit, p. 6 
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the idea of American resources being used for any other 
purpose than to destroy Japanese. 293 
Considering his perspective it is of no surprise that King dispatched 
the latest of a series of signals expressing his unhappiness about the 
appointment of a commander in chief for the RN in the Pacific before 
Admiral Fraser had even raised his flag294. King was concerned that 
Fraser would be senior to all other commanders if he went to sea. 
Although he conceded that Fraser was acceptable as a commander he 
sought to place the BPF under the command of Vice Admiral Kinkaid in 
the South West Pacific Area295. The Admiralty responded by reiterating 
their view of the Octagon Conference that the best employment of the 
Fleet would be achieved under Nimitz in the Central Pacific. The 
compromise settled upon by the two navies was that Fraser should be 
Commander in Chief of the BPF, but exercise that command from shore, 
with Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings commanding the fleet at sea. 
Admiral Somerville, who was now running the British Admiralty 
Delegation (BAD) in Washington, was engaged in a struggle with 
Admiral King over the extent to which Fraser should have any say in 
planning and executing operations in which British Naval Task forces 
were to participate. 296 In mid November Somerville requested 
clarification from the Admiralty as to the position to be adopted in 
negotiations with the USN. The Admiralty replied by restating their view 
of what had been agreed at the Octagon conference: that the BPF should 
be employed under Nimitz in the central Pacific. A high degree of 
involvement in the formulation of those plans was not foreseen, it was 
2931smay, General Lord The Memoirs of LordjanqX [London] Heinemarm 1960 p. 253. 
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obvious that the USN would run the show. However the Admiralty did 
anticipate that 
In order that Fraser may accept his responsibility to the 
Admiralty and to the British and Don-drdon Governments for 
the operations of British ships I should expect him to be kept 
fully informed of plans and operations in which his ships will 
take part. Only so could he express his opinion that a British 
ship should or should not be employed on a particular 
service. 297 
Fraser was well aware of the negotiations taking place between 
London and Washington, having been recalled to the Adn-dralty the 
previous October to discuss the formation of the BPF and receiving 
regular updates from Somerville in Washington on their progress. He can 
not have failed to be conversant with Admiral King's disquiet regarding 
the Royal Navy. One of Fraser's most valuable achievements, therefore, 
must be the relationship he fostered between the USN and the RN despite 
this. Admiral Vian credited Fraser's diplomatic skills with changing 
Nimitz's mind concerning the employment of the BPF in the main 
operations of the central Pacific. 298 Despite all of these difficulties the 
early doubts that many in the BPF entertained as to the warmth of the 
reception that they would receive on arrival in the Pacific were 
unfounded. Fraser wrote that, from his observation, Nimitz had no 
political objection to the participation of the BPF, '.. in fact he was 
delighted at the prospect of our co-operation. '299 No general or admiral 
would turn away forces that added to his ability to fight, and so it was 
with the American operational commanders. Fraser wrote to 
Cunningham in London thatthe operational commanders [Spruance and 
297 Signal from Admiralty to BAD Fraser Papers NIS 83/158 File 20' 
298 Vian Op Cit p159 
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Halsey] have been even more delighted at the addition to their forces 
provided by the BPRI 300 
In November 1944 Nimitz met with Adn-dral King in San Francisco 
where the decision was taken that the BPF would utilise the American 
advanced base at Manus but also Leyte and Ulithi. King also reiterated 
his insistence that in all other respects they be self supporting. In addition 
the British were to adopt American tactical and communication 
procedures but, 'because they were not experienced in handling large 
carrier forces, King suggested that they should operate independently 
rather than in manoeuvres with American ships. 1301 It is significant that 
these decisions, essentially the shape and structure of British 
participation in the Pacific, were made by the Americans alone and not 
the result of direct negotiation. This is not to argue that the British had no 
say in the manner and nature of their participation rather that the balance 
of power between the two partners had shifted fundamentally. It had 
changed to such an extent as to leave the RN dependent upon American 
acquiescence to participation in the main operations against Japan, 
American support to carry out that participation and American 
techniques for doing so. 
Having established his headquarters at Sydney, Fraser sent a flurry 
of dispatches to Pearl Harbor requesting a meeting with Nin-dtz. Nimitz 
eventually wrote to King that 'I do not need Paul Revere (with his three 
lanterns) to tell me that the British are coming. The attached paraphrase 
of six Top Secret dispatches reads like an operation order for an 
occupation force. Perhaps it is intended to be an occupation force. -'302 
300 Ibid. paragraph 63 
301 Nimitz Op Cit p. 347 
3021bid. p. 347-348 
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Although the reference was tongue in cheek it does reveal something of 
the suspicion that existed in the USN about British participation in the 
Pacific. Probably the most important of Admiral Fraser's tasks was to 
secure a working relationship with the USN in the shape of Admiral 
Nimitz at his Headquarters in Pearl Harbor. 
Fraser eventually arrived at Pearl Harbor with his staff on 16 
December where he and Nimitz were able to renew their acquaintance. 
They had first met ten years previously when both were captains. The 
brief drawn up by Fraser's staff concerning the subjects for discussion at 
the meeting reveals much of the arguments that were being explored at 
his headquarters. The fundamental issue regarded where and how the 
BPF would operate. The first proposal was for entirely separate US and 
British strategic areas. The staff paper advanced two reasons in support 
of this idea; first, full operational control would be exercised by CinCBPF, 
and secondly, as a consequence of this, it was felt that the BPF would be 
easier to administer and operate. Against this three important points 
were highlighted. It was thought firstly that the BPF were unlikely to be 
allocated anything but an insignificant area of operations. This would 
clearly have been in conflict with Fraser's ideas of participating in the 
most advanced Pacific operations and would have failed to deliver the 
grand strategic objective of political leverage with the Americans. 
Secondly, the practicalities of a separate strategic area gave some concern. 
The BPF was not self sufficient in either shore facilities or harbour 
defence capabilities. Though reluctant to admit it at the military strategic 
level of command the Royal Navy was conscious of their likely 
dependence upon the assistance of the USN at the operational and 
tactical levels. 
The final argument against a separate strategic area was the 
recognition that any such arrangement would be uneconomical in over- 
all naval power. The war in the Far East was highlighting the increasing 
inability of the British to sustain the war. Their best hope was to bring 
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about as rapid a conclusion to hostilities as possible. Any diversion of 
military capability into subsidiary activities would therefore be counter- 
productive. 
The alternative proposal under consideration from the British side 
was to establish combined US and UK strategic areas. The idea was that 
the BPF would operate as a strategic unit on specific 'missions as 
designated by the American High Command". Fraser's staff suggested 
the example of operating from Manila to cut Japanese North-South 
supply routes in the South China Sea. This it was felt could be combined 
with other 'specific operations- for example, a Highball or XE attack on 
Japanese Fleet. 303' Fraser's own his thoughts on these proposals were, 
I favour alternative (2) and it is particularly desired that the 
British Fleet should operate as near the heart of the enemy as 
possible. At the same time I want to emphasize that it is 
unreservedly at the disposal of the American Command for the 
purpose of bringing the war to a conclusion at the earliest 
possible moment. 304 
In essence this is what took place during the invasion of Okinawa, 
operation Iceberg. The BPF, operating under Spruance and the Fifth Fleet 
participating in the main campaign, were allocated the task of 
neutralising the Japanese air threat to the invasion that could be staged 
through Sakishima Gunto. However, this arrangement was not confirmed 
at the time. Nimitz refused to make any commitments to the British 
concerning operations. He suggested that they raid the Japanese-held oil 
installations on Sumatra and implied that, for the time being, the British 
Pacific Fleet could make its best contribution by attaching itself to 
303 HighbaH- a variant of the'bouncing bomb' bomb, designed for use against shipping. 
No 618 Squadron RAF, flying Mosquito's, began trials in April 1943, finally reaching the 
Far East in January 1945. Highball was never employed and the squadron disbanded in 
July 1945. 
XE craft were a type of midget submarine, 33 tons submerged displacement, underwater 
endurance of 80 nffles and a crew of five. 
304 Brief for CinCBPF. Subjects for Discussion at Pearl Harbour Fraser Papers MS 
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Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet for operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. This 
was distinctly not what the British had in mind. When they objected, 
Admiral Nimitz said that he n-dght be able to make use of their fleet in 
connection with the scheduled assault on Okinawa. He then turned them 
over to Admiral Spruance so that he and his staff could consider that 
possibility. 305 
It is clear that the British made a very different interpretation of 
these talks than the Americans. Fraser took them to mean agreement had 
been reached that the BPF would operate either under Spruance and the 
Fifth Fleet or Halsey, when the Fleet became the Third, in the main 
operations against Japan. He reported reaching agreement to London, 
signalling 'I intend to operate the British Pacific Fleet to the best possible 
effect in the most advanced operations in the Pacific and Fleet Admiral 
NIMITZ has agreed that I should do SO. 1306 The Americans, however, 
continued to explore the possibility of transferring the BPF to 
MacArthur's South West Pacific command. This reassignment remained a 
distinct likelihood until August 1945, particularly, as King retained the 
right to enact such a transfer at seven days notice. 
The staff talks continued with discussions returning again to the 
tricky issue of basing requirements. At this stage of the BPF's build up, 
the aim was to operate, a fully self-supporting balanced fleet, from an 
advanced base as soon as possible and not to call upon the Americans for 
any support. However, due to the late arrival of some units, particularly 
shore based facilities, the British felt it would probably be necessary to 
call upon American assistance. This was something that Fraser wished to 
avoid if at all possible. He did feel, however, that it would be convenient 
if the BPFs first advanced base was also one used by USN. Adn-dral 
Cunningham in London disagreed with Fraser. He responded to Fraser's 
305 NimiLz Op. Cit., p. 347,348-9. 
306CinCBPF to Admiralty following N/171 Pearl Harbor Agreement Fraser Papers NIS 
83/158 File 20 
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letter of 2 July, arguing that Fraser only had a short term policy of 
bringing the greatest force to bear on the enemy as soon as possible. 
Cunningham's own view was, 
[w]here we differ, as far as I can see, is in our conception of 
what the course of the war in the Pacific will be... we are 
strongly of the opinion that we must continue to press for some 
sort of forward base. The great difficulty that we are 
experiencing in getting our demands for the fleet train 
conceded also makes a forward base with some storage and 
aircraft facilities essential. 307 
Everything Fraser attempted was constrained by the limited 
logistics available. He argued with Cunningham's concept of an 
independent forward base because the BPF simply did not possess the 
resources to construct or man it. 308 The outcome of this debate left the 
BPF with rear bases in Eastern Australia and an intermediate base at 
Manus, a location Fraser described as '. a dismal place'309 
It was arranged for an experienced American carrier captain and 
several American communications teams to be assigned to the British 
fleet, which would be considered equivalent of a "Fast Carrier Task 
Force" and that CinCBPF had the same status under CinCPAC as 3rd or 
5th Fleet Commanders. 
Command arrangements between the US and UK became embroiled 
in not just inter-allied relations but also those between MacArthur [CinC 
SWPA] and Nimitz. At the end of December 1944 Fraser received a report 
via the Admiralty in London concerning comments made by General 
MacArthur to his British liaison officer, General Lumsden. 310 Lumsden 
had written to Lord Ismay, Chief of Staff, Minister of Defence and Deputy 
307 Letter from First Sea Lord to Admiral Fraser 5/7/45. Fraser Papers MS 83/158 File 
23 
308 Letter From CinCBPF to First Sea Lord17/7/45 Fraser Papers MS 83/158 File 23 
309 Letter from CinCBPF to First Sea Lord 14/3/45. Fraser Papers MS 83/158 File 23 
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Military Secretary to the War Cabinet, informing him that MacArthur 
now wished the BPF to operate in the South-West Pacific Area. This 
would provide him with a naval capability that was virtually 
independent of Nimitz. In his somewhat expressive style MacArthur told 
Lumsden, "Were the British Fleet here now I could give them ample 
opportunities of gaining great renown for themselves and great credit to 
the British Empire. '311 The Admiralty advised Fraser in the report that 
though such arrangements might be "considered convenient in the future' 
at the present the fear was that they would exclude the BPF from 
participating in the major operations planned for the Pacific. Fraser was 
instructed to discourage discussion of any such ideas, should they be 
brought up in discussions in Australia, or with Admiral Nimitz. If the 
Americans or the dominion brought the prospect up Fraser was to be non 
conu-nittal and refer the exact terms of any proposal made back to 
Admiralty. 312 
By mid-February 1945, the BPF having arrived in Sydney following 
their strikes on Palembang, Fraser wrote to Nimitz concerned apparently 
about the future employment of his Fleet. The issues of command 
arrangements had not been settled completely and the BPF found 
themselves caught again in the middle of a jurisdictional dispute between 
Nimitz and MacArthur. Fraser found it difficult to plan the BPF's 
forthcoming operations because of the residual uncertainty over where, 
and under whose command, it would actually operate. He wrote to 
Nimitz in the middle of February concerned that the BPF had not yet 
been allocated to any command. The BPF's Commander in Chief was 
proceeding on the assumption that the fleet would operate with the US 
Fifth Fleet in Operation Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa. Fraser 
evidently believed that in so doing he was following Nimitz's 
311 PREM 3/164/4 Lumsden to Ismay 30/12/44 
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instructions. Fraser also had concerns about the availability of his fleet if 
it was diverted to the South-West Pacific Area. Admiral King in 
Washington had implied that Fraser should have no direct 
communication with Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid Com7th Fleet. Fraser 
denied having any discussions about future operations with Kinkaid and 
so was left somewhat in the dark. Fraser's sense of frustration was 
obvious when he wrote to Nimitz clearly seeking a sympathetic ear. 
My only object is to try and bring the BPF into action on the 
dates you desired, but am beginning to feel a little frustrated. 
Time is getting short, the Fleet is in SYDNEY, and I have no 
airstrip allocations at MANUS. Can you help and advise me if 
we are doing wrong. It hardly seems to me to be practicable to 
be based in the command of CinCSWPA without having 
communication on local matters. 313 
Fraser followed this up with three further signals. He informed 
Nimitz that his intention was to dispatch the BPF for Manus, 
MacArthur's command, in the first week of March. From there they 
would sail for the forward base of Ulithi. The BPF`s Commander in Chief 
believed that even if there were alterations to the planned British 
involvement in Iceberg the fleet would be more suitably deployed at 
Manus, though he would wait for confirmation before moving on. His 
other concern was that the delay in bringing his Fleet into action was 
having a negative effect upon its morale. Fraser told Nin-dtz stating that 
he was sure the Admiral would realise how important it was not to keep 
the Fleet inactive at Sydney for a prolonged period. The few British 
facilities at Manus would not ease the difficult situation to any great 
degree. Ideally Fraser hoped to see the Fleet actively employed as soon as 
possible. 314 
313 Nimitz Papers Serial 1 Command Summary Book 6, Washington Navy Yard, 
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Fraser went on to explain that he regarded Nimitz as his effective 
Commander in Chief although the complicated state of assignment did 
not make their relative positions quite clear at this time. Fraser's 
relationship with Nimitz was undoubtedly much better than that with 
King in Washington and it is probable that by treating Nimitz in this 
manner he was again seeking out a sympathetic ear to intercede with 
King on his behalf. Fraser was insistent in his desire that 'we might be 
assigned to your area at least for the start of ICEBERG if this is likely to 
take place before any operation for which we n-dght be required in the 
South West Pacific Area. 315 
Nimitz did indeed take the matter up with Admiral King in 
Washington. He wrote to King stating that in the absence of direct 
instructions or any other information concerning future operations of the 
BPF he proposed to support Fraser's move North to Manus. 316 CinCPAC 
was in a difficult situation. Admiral King retained the right to reallocate 
the British to MacArthur at seven days notice and had not yet authorised 
their participation in operations to take the Ryukyus. King's opposition to 
British involvement in the Pacific War was well known to Nimitz. 
Without clear authorisation and with Fraser pressing the issue it is to 
Nimitz's credit that he managed very successfully to balance the complex 
interaction of political and operational matters. 
Both Nimitz and Fraser needed to develop their planning and 
preparations. Without a clear idea of where and when they might be 
committed, this was proving to be something of a problem. King, a little 
surprised at Nin-dtz's need for clarification, informed CinCPAC 
"I am at a loss to understand why there should be confusion as to 
status of British Pacific Fleet. All arrangements for basing British Pacific 
Fleet are in the hands of CINCPOA including CinCSWPA concurrence 
315 Ibid. 
316Nimitz Papers Serial 1, signal 192306 CINCPAC ADV HQ to Cominch 19/2/45 
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where appropriate and always bearing in mind that said Fleet is to be self 
supporting'317 King continued by reiterating that it was his authority to 
commit the BPF to action; 'Allocation of units of British Pacific Fleet for 
operations remains in my hands. ' The COMINCH explained the delay in 
reaching a decision as a consequence of a failure by the JCS to agree on 
any other future operations. 'I cannot commit units of British Pacific Fleet 
to ICEBERG (involving 2 to 3 months) or any other operation until joint 
Chiefs of Staff decide what operations are due to be carried out other 
than those already approved. Prospects now are that such decision will 
be reached by middle of March. 1318 
By the time the Fleet left Australia for its intermediate base of 
Manus, however, a final decision as to where it would operate had still 
not been taken. This was only partially a result of American reluctance to 
sanction British participation in the main operations against Japan. It had 
almost as much to do with inter American disputes. The attempts to unite 
these two independent Area Commanders without appointing a supreme 
commander were doomed from the start. It is debatable, moreover, 
whether MacArthur would have co-operated fully with a commander 
other than himself. 319 The tension between MacArthur and Nimitz was to 
cause difficulties for the BPF. The British were in the unenviable position 
of operating under Nin-dtz in the central Pacific, basing in MacArthur's 
area in Leyte and Manus and under the Australian Goverm-nent in 
Australia. Disagreements between Nimitz and MacArthur extended to 
the complicated issue of base facilities. The problems of basing 
arrangements were extremely delicate issues in which operational and 
political considerations became inextricably linked. Despite initially 
317 Nimitz Papers Serial 1,211635 COMINCH to CINCPOA info CINCBPF, CINCSWPA 
(Nimitz Only) 
3181bid. 
319Douglas MacArthur's insistence that President Truman should visit him rather than 
he reporting to Washington perhaps gives some indication of how the General would 
have responded. 
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advocating the establishment of their own separate base, Fraser 
demonstrated a flexibility of mind and eventually came to the conclusion 
a joint basing system was in the best operational interests of the Fleet. 320 
The C-in-C argued no operational intermediate base could be constructed 
in under a year that would make the Fleet any less dependant on 
Australia. 321 The Admiral had agreed the use of Manus as an advanced 
base with Nimitz but CINCPAC's fear that control of the island might 
pass to MacArthur if the BPF were reassigned continued to make 
operations, if not difficult, then less smooth than they could have been. 322 
British basing requests were not welcomed by the USN who believed that 
they n-dght result in a permanent post war occupation - something that 
the PM certainly had in mind with his proposals for operations in South 
East Asia. These suspicions resulted in Admiral Somerville who headed 
the British Admiralty Delegation [BAD] in Washington receiving a less 
than sympathetic hearing from King when he tried to resolve this issue323 
320ADM 199/118 Op. Cit., paragraph 3248, in particular paragraph 41 details Fraser's 
change of mind over basing arrangements. 
321 Letter from CinCBPF to Admiral Cunningham 2/6/45, Fraser Papers MS 83/158 File 
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323The foHowing extract from one of many letters sent to Fraser by Somerville gives 
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Somerville 25/4/45 
'I had a heR of an argument on Saturday with Ernie King touching the matter of a base 
for the B. P. F. Ernie started off by flying into a rage and saying that the B. P. F. had failed 
to implement the agreement that it should be self-supporting. I asked in what respect 
the Fleet had not been self supporting, and he barked in reply "Food". I told him I -was 
surprised to hear this in view of the large quantities of food which Australia is 
supplying to the American Fleet, and I should have thought the B. P. F. would not have 
had much difficulty in obtaining what they wanted from one of our own dominions. 
Ernie then became hotter than ever and asked if I wished an itemised list of deficiencies; 
I said yes, and went on to add that his general demeanour and violence seemed to 
suggest that he regarded the B. P. F. as a pain in the neck to him, and that possibly he felt 
quite satisfied he complete the war against Japan quickly and effectively without any 
assistance from the British. ff he thought so he had better say so. 
Ernie then asked me if I expected him to give an answer to this, and I said "No", he 
wouldn't have the guts to do it. By this time the temperature having reached boiling 
point, I told Ernie it was a little odd that we should be fighting like this and suggested 
we might discuss this matter reasonably and with the heat turned off.. ' 
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The BPF was eventually allocated to the US Fifth Fleet under Admiral 
Spruance. On the 17 March 1945 the BPF was designated Task Force 57 
and sailed for its forward operating base of Ulithi for participation in 
Operation Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa. The U. S. had begun 
preliminary air strikes against the Ryukyu's and on 26 March British 
carrier borne aircraft attacked in the Pacific for the first time. Their 
allotted task was to neutralise the airfields of Sakishimo Gunto, to 
prevent interference with the landings at Okinawa from China and 
Formosa. 324 This was a significant moment; it marked the point when a 
principal, if not the principal, British Fleet came under the command of a 
foreign navy. Although remarked upon at the time it appears to have 
been smooth and good natured transition on both sides at sea. 325 
At the end of May 1945 Nimitz again discussed proposals for the 
future employment of the BPF with Admiral King. Nimitz saw two 
options. First that the RN would continue to utilise Australia as a main 
base with an advance base at Manus and operate against Japan with the 
3rd Fleet sharing anchorages (but with no British shore installations) at 
Ulithi and Eniwetok. In the second category they would operate to 
reopen Malacca Strait and liberate the enemy held areas in the British 
command area. This latter plan had been proposed by the joint Chiefs of 
Staff. It was recognised that for this purpose they would need a base in 
the South China Sea for which Brunei Bay appeared the most 
appropriate326. Although the British had been arguing for basing facilities 
in the PhilippineS327, Nimitz disagreed 
324 ADM. 199/1457 British Pacific Fleet Brief Account of Activities paragraph 14. 
325ADM 199/555 BPF Actions in Operation Meridian & Iceberg. Report from Office of 
Vice Admiral Second in Command BPF 9/5/45 covering initial stages of ICEBERG 
26/3/45-20/4/45 
326 Nimitz Papers Serial 1,30 May 300526 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH & CNO 
327 ADM 199/118 Op. Cit., paragraph 40 
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I see no need for a base in the PHILIPPINES for either category 
of operations. If it later develops that the British ships operate 
against JAPAN with a line of supply through MALACCA 
STRAIT, ULITHI and LEYTE can be used as advanced 
anchorages. In the foregoing I do not regard temporary 
augmentation of United States carrier aircraft pools et cetera as 
constituting British shore installations. 328 
Although not privy to all these deliberations, the RN's liaison officer 
at Nimitzs headquarters was able to signal Fraser, with CINCPOAs 
approval, that the American timetable entailed TF38 [Halsey] 
commencing strikes on targets in Honshu, Hokkaido and Kuriles as early 
in June as possible after rest and replenishment at Leyte. Subject to their 
continued availability, which was not necessarily guaranteed, CinCPAC 
planned to include TF37 [BPF] in strikes when fleet returned from 
replenishment and battle damage repairs. It was anticipated that these 
offensive operations would be continued up to and including Operation 
Olympic [the invasion of Japanese home islands]. 329 The situation had 
changed dramatically from that which existed before participation in 
Iceberg when Fraser had to appeal to Nin-dtz for information. 
The issue of basing, however, continued to dog co-operation and 
forward planning. As did the possibility of reallocation of the BPF, hence 
Nimitz's caveat regarding continued availability. Although plans were 
being prepared regarding the use of Eniwetok in the Marshall Islands as 
an anchorage from October, until such time the Fleet would continue to 
use Leyte in MacArthur's command as an advanced base. 
Nimitz informed Fraser directly a few days later when he signalled 
that, repairs to damage sustained during Iceberg permitting, the BPF 
should anticipate sortieing Manus in early July for operations with 
Halsey against the Japanese home islands. 330 By this time it appears that 
328 Nimitz Papers Serial 1,30 May 300526 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH & CNO 
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the decision as to whether or not the British would participate in the 
Third Fleet's operations had been taken almost by default. Although 
Nimitz was less sure of the timetable of involvement the momentum of a 
British contribution seems to have carried the day. 
The decision having been made that the BPF, designated Task Force 
37, would operate in conjunction with the American Third Fleet under 
Admiral Halsey, Rawlings reported for duty at 0645 on 16th July and took 
station astern TG38.4. British participation in Iceberg had avoided many 
of the issues of how closely the two navies should integrate and how this 
would affect command arrangements, as the BPF operated as a separate 
Task Force in support of the American landings on Okinawa. Matters 
now came to a head, however, when the BPF joined the TF38 for 
operations off Japan. Rawlings and Vian joined Halsey aboard USS 
Missouri for a conference on the forthcoming operations. The Americans 
were fuelling and Halsey used the opportunity to hold a staff conference 
and become acquainted with both Rawlings and Vian. Halsey describes 
the meeting in his memoirs, 
[ ... I reluctantly I opened the conference. I say "reluctantly" because I dreaded it. When I was informed at Pearl Habor that 
the British Pacific Fleet would report to me, I naturally assumed 
that I would have full operational control, but when I reread the 
plan at Leyte, I discovered that tactical control had been 
reserved. 331 
Halsey had raised this matter with Nimitz in a signal on the 6th June 
and then again ten days later, 16th June a few weeks before sortieing from 
Leyte with the Third Fleet for operations off the Japanese coast. In his 
first signal Halsey wrote 'I tentatively plan to employ British group as 
tactical unit of TF38.1332 He acknowledged that because of a difference in 
speed and technique the British Service Group would operate separately 
331 Fleet Admiral WF Halsey &J Bryan 111, Admiral Hatse3ýs StojY [New York] 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1947 p. 261. 
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from their USN counterparts but in the same general vicinity. Halsey had 
concluding that 'British forces [could] be incorporated into our combat 
and service operation scheme at any time. ' The idea in his n-dnd was to 
operate TF 37 in the same manner as a USN Task Group with the normal 
inter group interval. The British in TF37 would conform to the 
manoeuvres of CTF38. This would permit the RN to make a contribution 
to and benefit from the USN's defensive umbrella. Halsey argued that 
this made the most military sense and 'does not infringe on British 
position guaranteed by Nin-litz-Fraser Agreement. '333 The agreement 
reached had included the text 'to the maximum practicable extent the 
British ships will constitute a separate task force with no more direct 
tactical co-ordination with the US TF's than the situation requires! 
334COmmenting upon this in his dispatches to the Admiralty, Fraser 
explained that he did not 'mean this to preclude the possibility of a 
British TG operating in an American Task force, but CinC Pacific appears 
to have taken it to mean that'335 Nimitz certainly did not concur with 
Fraser's interpretation. Caught between Halsey's desire for tactical unity 
and King's insistence upon separation he rejected Commander Third 
Fleet's proposal. Instructing him to Jo]perate TF37 separately from TF38 
in fact as well as in name under arrangements which assign to Rawlings 
tasks to be performed but leave him free to decide upon his own 
movements and maneuvers. '336 
This situation was obvious concern to Halsey. The addition to 
fighting power that the BPF represented could easily be negated if co- 
ordination could not be agreed upon. At their first meeting Halsey 
presented Rawlings with three alternatives. First, the British in the shape 
of TF37 would operate close aboard, as another task group in TF 38. It 
would not receive direct orders from Halsey, but it would be privy to the 
333Nimitz Papers Seriall, 16/6/45 160007 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADV 
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orders issued to TF 38. These it would consider as a "suggestion" to be 
followed to mutual advantage, thereby assuring a concentrated force 
with concentrated weapons. Halsey's second proposal envisaged TF 37 
operating sen-d-independently, some 60 or 70 miles away from the Third 
Fleet, thereby preserving its technical identity at the cost of a divided 
force. Halsey let it be known that he would consent to this choice only if 
the request were put in writing. The third option saw TF 37 operating 
completely independently, against soft spots in Japan which the USN 
would recommend if so desired. 1337 
Whereas Operation Iceberg had sidestepped these important issues 
as to how closely the two navies would integrate because of the detached 
nature of the BPF"s task, matters had now come to a head. Rawlings had 
already expressed what he saw as the key role the BPF would play in 
forging Anglo-American naval relations when back in March he had 
signalled Fraser; 
My own feeling, for what it is worth, is that the really important 
side of what we do here is to end up with the White Ensign still 
looked up to by the Americans. I can not help feeling that in the 
long run it will do more for us than anything else. 338 
Indeed, mindful of Fraser's oft repeated intentions that the BPF were 
to operate in the most advanced operations against Japan, Rawlings had 
little time for Halsey's second or third option. Rawlings reported to 
Fraser that '[t]he principal points which were settled forthwith were the 
desire of the British Task Force to work in close tactical co-operation with 
TF38, conforming to their movements, and that we should take part in 
Battleship and Cruiser bombardments as well as surface sweeps. '339 As 
Halsey recalled after the war; 'Bert Rawlings did not hesitate. He said, 
"Of course I'll accept Number 1. " My admiration for him began at that 
337 Admiral HalseZs Story Op Cit p. 261-262. 
338 28/4/45 From V. Adm, 2CinC to CinCBPF Fraser Paper's MS83/158 File 23 CinC 
Operational Correspondence with Flag Officers 
339ADM 199/1478 Report to CinCBPF from Rawlings 1/10/45 
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moment. I saw him constantly thereafter, and a finer officer and firmer 
friend I have never known. '340 
Ultimately Halsey directed all his forces, British and American, as 
one mutually supporting striking unit and although TF37 was weaker 
than one of the Third Fleets Task Groups Fraser was able to report to 
London that: 'Task Force 37, of the BPF, operated in conjunction with the 
American Task Force 38 under orders of the Commander, United States 
Third Fleet, with the object of inflicting maximum destruction on 
Japanese airfields, aircraft and shipping, together with certain other 
important targets. 341 The Fleet was formed into four groups in the order 
from North to South TF37, TG38.1, TG38.4, TG38.3. This integration 
within the Third Fleet was something of an occasion and Rawlings noted 
that: 'It may well be that 4pm on 16 July 1945, will prove a not 
unimportant milestone on the long road of the world's history. ' 
The fact that Halsey operated TF37 as a tactical unit of TF38 in the 
same way as he did TF38's component Task Groups despite Nimitz's 
instructions does not appear to have caused the Admiral any serious 
concern. Fraser found such behaviour puzzling writing that; 
It is an interesting sidelight on the American way of thought - in 
particular on their rigid acceptance of the written word - that 
CinC Pacific considers it necessary to enforce this small 
restriction [integration of TF37 into TF38's defensive umbrella]. 
It is also interesting to note that CornThird Fleet, while 
accepting the restriction in its normal sense, in fact disregards it 
completely and continues to operate the British Task Group as a 
group as part of his own Task Force. Provided he obeys the 
letter of the law, even if he completely disregards its spirit, 
every American is quite happy that the right and sensible action 
has been taken. 342 
340 Admiral Halse3ýs Stoly Op Cit 1947 p. 262. 
341ADM. 199/118 CinC BPF 31/10/45 
342ADM 199/118 paragraph 96 
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Such insights into the collective psychology of this most powerful of 
allies were to stand Fraser and many of his colleagues in good stead in 
the post war environment. 
At the end of July Fraser wrote to Admiral Nimitz outlining his 
proposals for the employment of a second British Task Force. 343 This 
force was to be built around the fleet carrier Indomitable344, three light 
fleet carriers, two battleships, two or three cruisers and nine destroyers. 
Fraser was anticipating being able to deploy this force from Manus for 
operations by mid August. This the RN only just managed, raising TG 
111.2 at Sydney on 12 August, sailing for Manus three days later. The 
TG"s designation had been used previously when Vice Admiral Rawlings 
had detached the fleet carrier Implacable, the escort carrier Ruler, four 
light cruisers and five destroyers while the main force of the BPF 
returned to Australia following participation in Iceberg. Operation 
Inmate was an air and surface bombardment of Truk. The scale of 
operations this second task force could undertake was limited by two 
considerations. The first was time. In order for TG 111.2 to be 
incorporated into the main BPF to strengthen the British contribution to 
OLYMPIC it would be necessary for it to return to Manus no latter than 
the middle of September. The second constraint upon its activities was 
the perennial British problem of logistic support, particularly with regard 
to tanker availability. 
CinC BPF felt that these two problems precluded TG 111.2's 
incorporation into TF38 for operations against the Japanese mainland. 
The British were finding it difficult to sustain TF37 in its action alongside 
TF38 and any expansion of this con-u-nitment would be unsustainable. 
343 Nimitz Papers Serial 1,30/6/45 300735 CINCBPF to CINCPAC ADV 
344 INDOMITABLE had been assigned to Force Z, the ill fated Prince of Wales and 
Repulse sunk by Japanese aircraft 10/12/41, but grounding off Kingston Jamaica had 
prevented her dispatch. 
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Fraser's alternative proposal for the second task force's employment was 
for it to mount an operation against Malaya. He believed that an attack 
on Malaya was within TG 111.2's capability even though it could not be a 
prolonged one. Fraser's idea was that such an attack would complement 
Mountbattenýs envisaged assault on Malaya. 345 Fraser was at pains to 
point out to Nimitz that he had not communicated his thoughts 
regarding these tentative proposals to Mountbatten for fear of further 
complicating the already delicate command arrangements. 
Fraser was returning to a familiar theme of wishing to bring the 
RN's assets into action as soon as possible. The newly arrived light fleet 
carriers, Colossus, Venerable and Vengeance, would need a period of 
work up to acclimatise to Pacific conditions. Like the previous 
incarnation of TG111.2 operations against Truk were considered 
including its capture. Though this would depend upon the availability of 
Australian or New Zealand troops and n-dght therefore not prove 
practicable. As it was these, proposals came to nothing due to the 
Japanese surrender. 
By the beginning of August Admiral Nimitz had taken the position, 
with regard to the BPFs participation in projected operations against the 
Japanese mainland, that the RN would be at his disposal for preparatory 
phase operations as well as the main assault. He signalled his 
assumptions to Admiral King in Washington along with his proposal that 
the new components of the BPF undertake a number of working up raids 
against Truk, Wake and Ponape. 346 The end of the War prevented all but 
the raid on Truk taking place but the significant issue here is Nimitz's 
attitude toward the BPF. Rather than an irritating distraction the British, 
whilst definitely not central, were at least considered to be a valuable 
asset. 
345 Admiral Mountbatten's South East Asian Command planned to clear Malaya of 
Japanese forces but the planwas overtaken by the end of the war. 
346 Nimitz Papers Serial 1,6,2/8/45 021429 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH 
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The BPF & the Public Face of the UICs Commitment 
Publicity concerning the BPF's activities was vital. If the UKýs 
commitment to the war in the Far East was to achieve its purpose then it 
could not hide its light under a bushel. The Fleees activities spoke to 
several different audiences and the oxygen of press coverage was an 
important means of reaching many of them. Whilst the Naval Review 
was probably speaking for many within the Silent Service when it 
expressed a distaste for dealings with journalists, their importance was 
tacitly acknowledged. 
In one of those Press interviews which now seem to have been 
accepted as an inevitable horror of total war, Sir Bruce Fraser 
stated that he would fly his flag in the Howe and would have a 
strong fleet under his command, operating under the control of 
Adn-dral Nimitz. '347 
Fraser may well have not enjoyed the experience but he certainly 
recognised the value of journalists in addressing public opinion, 
informing them of the BPFs existence and emphasising the relationship 
with the United States. His intended audiences were not just domestic 
opinion but those in the United States and the Dominions also. When, in 
November 1945, the Admiral came to compose his report to the 
Adn-dralty covering the BPFs activities between November 1944 and July 
1945 he included a revised paragraph outlining his public relations 
strategy. He was at Pains to stress the central role that achieving 
maximum publicity played in his overall concept of operations. "I have 
regarded public relations with the Fleet as of the utmost importance. ' 348 
Fraser's immediate concern was ensuring that his fleet was adequately 
supported and he was adamant that "no amount of skill, daring or 
347Naval Review Vol. XXXIII 1945 Notes on the War - 77ie Japanese War p. 9 
348ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov 19444uly 1945 para. 68 
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persistency on the part of the operational forces will avail if their 
resources are cut from behind them and these resources are in the hands 
of the public of Great Britain and Australia! The BPF's Commander in 
Chief went so far in his courtship of the press that he was even prepared 
to bend the rules slightly. 'I have encouraged the local press to publish 
articles and pictures showing the BPF in action even when strict 
adherence to the security and censorship regulations would have ruled 
them oUt. '349 
Adn-dral Somerville in Washington wrote to Fraser in April 
expressing his pleasure that the American press were carrying stories 
about British participation in the Pacific. 'The news of the Fleet's 
participation in ICEBERG was very welcome, and has at last put a stop to 
all the stupid stories that we could not operate alongside the Americans! 
350 Somerville went on to ask for more publicity photographs and stories 
that he could use in briefings to the press. Though he was well aware that 
caution and a degree of skill was needed when dealing with journalists if 
the BPF were to be seen in the best possible light. 
In this connection, however, I note that one of the papers, in 
reporting an interview with Rawlings, quotes him as saying "We 
have to go back to school again". I can of course quite appreciate 
the circumstances under which this remark was made, and that 
in itself it was only intended to suggest that we have to gain 
experience of the special conditions which apply to operations 
in the Pacific. I feel, however, it n-dght be desirable to pass the 
word round that care should be taken to avoid any suggestion 
that our ships are green or that any experience they require for 
operating in the Pacific cannot be acquired in a very short space 
of time. 351 
349 Ibid. 




Although the shortcomings of the BPF, in operational and tactical 
matters, were readily acknowledged by Fraser, his senior officers and 
indeed amongst almost all within the Fleet, such issues were for internal 
consumption only. There appeared plenty of stories suspicious of the 
British in the Pacific without the RN adding to their ammunition. In this 
regard, Fraser would have been most pleased with the Chicago Daily 
Tfibitne article in June 1945 on Adn-dral Nin-dtz's visit to the BPF, referred 
to in Chapter Two. Whilst the speech Nimitz gave was delivered to RN 
personnel its significance was as much for American domestic 
consumption. 
The Admiral described as "a device of the axis" reports that 
"tend to drive a wedge between the United Nations. " [ ... 
I He 
told the assembled ship's company that there "is no violation of 
security" in saying that when the British had to leave the 
Sakishima group for refuelling during the Okinawa invasion the 
American carrier forces were spread thin to replace the British 
in keeping down Japanese plane activity there. As a result, he 
said, losses of American forces increased during the period the 
British task force was absent. "You kept the Jap suiciders off the 
necks of our ships. Your services have been very valuable in 
saving lives and saving ships. "352 
It was just the sort of coverage Fraser and the Foreign Office would 
have hoped for; the Fleets existence and positive contribution to aiding 
the USN from the mouth of Cincpac himself. 
Professional opinion within the USN was also a target audience and 
one which continued to be addressed once the war was over. Articles 
such as We had the British Mere We Needed Diem in the United States 
Naval Institute Proceedings published again at the end of 1946 re- 
emphasised to the USN officer class the role that the BPF had played in 
the PacifiC353 Written by Capt. C. J. Wheeler USN, Senior Liaison Officer 
352Nimitz Visits Bfitish Pacific Fleet [Chicago Daily Tribune, June 1] USNIP Vol. 71, No. 7, 
July 1945, p. 866. 
353 We Had the British Miere We Needed 77zem, Op Cit p. 1583 
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to Admiral Fraser's Staff, the article paints a picture of British pluckiness 
and spirit: 
For nearly a year it was my pleasure to serve on the staff of 
Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, the Commander in Cl-def of the British 
Pacific Fleet, who typifies the "bulldog" tenacity of every officer 
and man in his fleet, and having served with men like Vice 
Admiral Rawlings, Philip Vian, "Daddy" Brind, Charles Lamb, 
who commanded the IMistriotts, and scores of others, it is easy 
to understand how their country stood off the Axis powers for 
more than a year alone. ... Fighting is their business and they 
were particularly anxious to get at the japanese. 354 
The subtext of this important article was most undoubtedly that 
Britain was a trustworthy and a fully capable ally. 
As was discussed in Chapter Two, Fraser did on occasion find 
himself in trouble for his use of the press but on the whole he found it an 
invaluable tool in the execution of his aim. 
Since the outbreak of war the RN had placed naval officers with 
USN to act as liaison. In October 1943 Commander Harold S Hopkins 
relieved Captain MB Laing as the RN's liaison officer on Admiral 
Nimitz's staff355, though he was not admitted to Cincpac meetings or 
allowed to see secret documents until January 1944. Personal relations 
were obviously of considerable importance in developing the relationship 
with the Americans. This point was nicely illustrated by an incident while 
Fraser was meeting with Nimitz at Pearl Harbor356. The Admiralty had 
decided that with the arrival of the BPF the current Liaison Officer at 
Cincpac HQ, Cdr Hopkins, was too junior and proposed that a Vice - 
Admiral should take his place. Nimitz apparently flatly refused to 
entertain the idea of another flag officer on his staff and told Fraser so 
3541bid. p. 1585 
355 Capt. HS Hopkins Nice to Have You Aboard [London] George Allen & Unwin 
[London] 1964 
356 Material for this episode is based upon Capt. HS Hopkins Ibid. p. 198-200. 
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quite bluntly. Fraser responded saying that the Admiralty thought it 
appropriate for a more senior officer to represent the RN in theatre, an 
admiral was of more consequence than a commander and that the First 
Sea Lord had made a personal recommendation. Whereupon Nimitz 
suggested that if the British insisted on an appointment at that rank then 
Hopkins should be promoted. Hopkins had clearly made a very strong 
impression on Nimitz and was someone with whom Cincpac felt 
business could be done. In the end Hopkins was promoted to captain and 
continued in post until July 8th. 
The exchange of officers was vital if Fraser"s intention of achieving 
the closest possible working relationship with the USN was to be 
realized. Cdr Michael Le Fanu, BPF Liaison Officer onboard Admiral 
Spruance's flagship, Indianapolis, was a crucial link during the early 
stages of Operation Iceberg as Spruance and Rawlings had not had the 
opportunity for a face to face meeting. Their knowledge of each other to a 
great extent depended upon Le Fanu's reports and the impressions he 
conveyed in both directions. 357 
Le Fanu, like Fraser and Rawlings, recognized how important it was 
to make the greatest impression on the Americans despite the relative 
weakness of the British contribution to the Pacific Campaign. During 
operations against the Japanese home islands, under Admiral Halsey's 
Third Fleet Command, Le Fanu suggested that Rawlings" next visit to 
discuss forthcoming action should be made in the flagship, King George V, 
instead of a destroyer as would have been usual. The suggestion resulted 
in an enduring image of inter-allied naval co-operation; the USS Missonri 
and HMS King George V oiling either side of the tanker Sabine358 As has 
been mentioned Rawlings had made an extremely good first impression 
upon Halsey, to such an extent that Rawlings was asked by the US Navy 
Department to be a pall-bearer at the Admiral's funeral. 
357 pr 
_y 
Gin r Op Cit p. 73 
358 Ibid., p. 77 
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These personal relations were fostered in the Pacific and were to be 
of major importance in the post war period. The close working 
relationships established during the BPF time in the Pacific gave an 
important insight into each others collective psychology, both good and 
bad. 'There were also, of course, less important differences, of the kind 
which must affect any dealings between nations, and which assume the 
greater prominence the closer the association. They should not be 
overrated; but they existed, and at times could be significant. 
Administrative habits and ideas, customs and modes of thought, shaped 
the work of the Alliance and the attitudes of the partners to it. 1359 
Sir Bruce Fraser had already established himself something of a 
reputation as a commanding officer who cared very deeply about the 
health and well being of all ranks who served under him. It was most 
likely this which prompted him to hold a party for junior officers of the 
American fleet shortly after the surrender ceremony. As le Fanu describes 
it , 'what shook them was there being a party at all. Though the 
Americans are excellent on mass production items such as ice cream and 
movies, they do not make a habit of dealing with their juniors as 
individuals. 1360 
Personal contact clearly aided the overcoming of these difficulties. 
Operating side by side gave each national service the opportunity to 
understand more fully the quirks and idiosyncrasies of the other. The 
American attitude, personified by King, that the British were not 
welcome in the Pacific was undermined by the hard work and good will 
demonstrated by sailors of all ranks. Nimitzs caution before meeting 
Fraser in November 1944 had been replaced by an attitude "that "we 
359 
- 
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would make it [the combined operations of the US and British Fleets] 
work regardless of anything. " '361 
In a letter to his daughter, Kate, on the day before the surrender 
ceremony, Admiral Nimitz described the scene in Tokyo Bay, with 
hundreds of US ships and 'a few British ships', adding 'In a few minutes I 
will go to call on Admiral Fraser, RN, on the Duke of York, anchored close 
by - partly on official business, partly because I like him, and mostly to 
get a Scotch and soda before dinner because our ships are dry. '362 
It is obvious from the foregoing chapter that the RN's experience in 
the Pacific during the final stages of the Second World War did indeed 
expose Britain! s decline as a naval power when compared with the scale 
of forces that the USN could deploy. Fraser and the BPF were 
subordinate to Nimitz and the USN; he was more often informed rather 
than consulted over plans. But the central task of the RN's commitment to 
the Pacific at the Military and Grand Strategic level was political. It 
wedded together the two navies despite the problems of an extremely 
complex command arrangement. The USN and the RN shared a sim ilar 
conception of war at sea at the military strategic level. This not only 
greatly eased their integration but it also assisted the RN in absorbing the 
new developments which the Americans had evolved in the Pacific [a 
subject examined in more detail in Section Three]. The consequences of 
the British not participating in the final stages of the war against Japan, in 
the most advanced operations, would have been severe and long lasting 
in the minds of those who were to become their most important ally. It is 
rather ironic that it was not the damage that the BPF inflicted upon the 
Japanese that was their greatest contribution to the Alliance; rather it was 
the damage it received. If the BPF had not participated in the operations 
361Capt C. J. Wheeler Op. Cit., p. 1584 
362 Nimitz Op. Cit., p. 393 
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that the USN was conducting in the Pacific, if it had been assigned other 
less demanding tasks, it would not have accrued the political leverage it 
did. As Rawlings summed up in a letter that reveals something of the 
exhaustion caused by the struggle to deliver only 140 carrier strike days, 
I know that I've been inexcusably rude & brusque. But you 
know more of human nature than I do & so you will realise that 
for quite longish periods I have had but one anxiety -& that was 
that never under any circumstance must we fail to keep our 
undertakings & appointments with the Americans. For me that 
mattered far more than who won any battle or whether ships 
got hit... I felt that if we did not emerge with the poor old White 
Ensign looked up to, respected and admired, that if we gave any 
part of the Americans any opportunity to say "the British have 
quit" or "can't take it" - then something might be lost that could 
perhaps never be regained. 363 
363. Undated letter From V. Adm 2CinC. BPF in KGV to CinC BPF Fraser Papers 
MS83/158 File 23 CinC Operational Correspondence Nvith Flag Officers 
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Chapter Five 
The BPF & the Post-War RN at the Military Strategic Level 1945-50 
The big question addressed by this chapter is how the Navy's 
thinking at the military strategic level developed after the war and how 
the experience of the British Pacific Fleet continued to inform that 
thinking. In particular it demonstrates how the Royal Navy sought to 
map out a role consistent with the constraints imposed by issues at the 
grand strategic level. It should be borne in n-dnd that there was no fixed 
policy at the grand strategic level during the period considered, as has 
been detailed in Chapter Three. Instead, the direction of British policy 
changed and evolved over time. From an initial starting point of 
maintaining distance between both major wartime allies, the Britiah 
gradually came to perceive a significant threat emanating from Moscow. 
This process, when coupled with the restrictions imposed by a bankrupt 
economy, produced a period of difficult transition. 
In exploring the developing nature of the Royal Navy's thinking at 
the military strategic level three important strands emerge. First there 
was the understanding of the nature of any future conflict, including the 
role that naval forces would play and the influence of atomic weapons. 
Second there was the perception of the Soviet Union and the threat that it 
posed at sea. Thirdly, there was the enduring relationship with America. 
A relationship partly fostered by the naval cooperation in the Pacific and 
determinedly kept alive by the Royal Navy after the war. This chapter 
begins by examining the impact of nuclear weapons upon thinking at the 
military strategic level. The period under discussion saw all three services 
attempting to come to terms with the lessons of the previous six years of 
warfare. It investigates how the nature of warfare had changed as a result 
of this and the consequences of this for their strategic conceptions. 
The nature of the Soviet threat was obviously of major importance in 
the framing of the Navy's plans. Conceptions of the threat provided both 
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opportunities and constraints for the Admiralty in planning the future 
shape of the post-war Navy. The Navy attempted to map out a clear and 
distinct role for itself in the light of this perceived threat. Its analysis 
confirmed the belief that an arrangement with the USN was vital to the 
defence of Great Britain and the Commonwealth. The previous chapter 
argued that the RNs ability to participate in the final stages of Japanýs 
defeat underpinned the government's foreign policy objectives. This had 
not been accomplished without some serious difficulties and in the face 
of some significant opposition from the USN itself. This experience 
greatly influenced the Navy's thinking concerning the nature of any 
future conflict, which in turn had ramifications for grand strategy. 
It is important to note that the Navy's ideas were often in advance of 
the Government's. This is particularly true with respect their appreciation 
of the Soviet Union and the requirement for American assistance to 
counter it. Rather than seeing the post war world as one where the 
United States and the USSR were balanced at a mutual distance from 
Britain, much of the Admiralty's planning was predicated upon a 
continuing close relationship with the USN. 
The Development of the RNs Milit! lKy Strategic Concept 
The Navy's response to the experience of the Second World War did 
not begin on the 3rd of September 1945. Indeed throughout the war the 
RN took great pains to incorporate analysis of the war at sea into their 
operations. Further, the armed forces had been planning for the post-war 
period concurrent to fighting the war since at least February 1942.364 One 
of the clearest statements concerning what the Navy considered its roles 
and requirements in any post-war world was Captain Godfrey French's 
364 See for example J Lewis Chanqing Dirt! ction: British Militaly Planning for Post-war 
Stratezic Defence, 1942-47 Sherwood Press [London] 1988 
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memorandum of May 1945 entitled 'Designing the Post War Navy. '365 
French was Deputy Director of Plans within the Admiralty and was 
obviously writing whilst the BPF were participating in the second part of 
Operation Iceberg. Whilst he would most certainly been aware of the 
Fleet's activities his memorandum was written without the benefit of 
Fraser's full dispatches. Nonetheless the memorandum does give a good 
insight into thinking within the Navy. French declared in the most 
unambiguous terms that 'the basis of Imperial Defence is the control of 
sea communications'. 366 This control would weld the Empire together 
into a whole stronger than its parts. This strategy focused on 'passage at 
sea to be secured for our own and allied shipping and to be denied to 
enemy vessels. '367 Although naval forces were still vital to the 'defence of 
the United Kingdom base' neither of these tasks could any longer be 
depicted as the exclusive responsibility of the Admiralty. 368 Although 
French used the term sea power to refer to the means by which sea 
communications were controlled he envisaged this power being 
comprised of the "proper proportion of surface forces, carrier-borne and 
shore based air forces supported by submarines, auxiliary units, 
strategically placed bases and sound administration. " He argued that 
naval forces alone could not control sea communications; they required 
the co-operation of air forces. Indeed it was acknowledged that the Navy 
had to rely on the Army and Air Force for the holding or gaining of base 
areas necessary for the conduct of sea operations. The inter-dependence 
of the three fighting services was the basis of this strategy and a correct 
balance between the Services had therefore to be established. 369 
365ADM 167/124 Admiralty Board Minutes 77he Post War Naznj and the Policy Govenling 
its Coniposition Memorandum by Capt Godfrey French, Deputy Director of Plans 
29/5/45 
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The Navy and the Bomb 
Nowhere, perhaps, has the confusion of thought brought 
about by the atomic bomb been more conspicuous or more 
widespread than in respect to the future role of sea power. 370 
The dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and 
Japan's surrender only days latter marked the start of a new era in 
warfare. While it was not -uncommon 
for the Navy to find itself 
constrained and curtailed after the end of hostilities, the existence of 
nuclear weapons appeared to challenge the very idea of possessing a 
navy at all. Aton-dc power appeared to have created a decisive, ultimate 
war winning weapon, which made all other forms of military power 
obsolete. Significantly this would include the conduct of the kind of 
campaign recently conducted by the BPF, suggesting of course that its 
experiences were already irrelevant. 
The question was being poised in newspapers, journals (academic, 
service and popular), in defence ministries around the world and at the 
highest levels of politics; with the advent of atomic power was there any 
need for traditional armed forces? Aton-dc weapons threatened to change 
the whole relationship between warfare and the states or societies that 
waged it; what would now more than likely be termed a revolution in 
n-dlitary affairs [RMA]. If the advocates of strategic bombing had finally 
acquired the technology to fulfil their interwar pron-dses what future 
existed for the Royal Navy? The First Lord of the Admiralty, AV 
Alexander, expressed the fear of many witl-dn the Senior Service when, 
introducing the Naval Estimates for 1946, he said: 
There are some who may say that the release of atomic energy 
has destroyed the need for navies in the future; that any future 
370H. Rosinski The Role of Scapower itt Global Warfare of the Future, Brassey's Annual 1947 
p. 102. 
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war would be so rapidly decided by this new and terrible 
weapon that a navy could have no part to play. 371 
Alexander however cautioned against such thinking. He reasoned 
that the circumstances under which the weapon had been used gave little 
indication of its applicability to sea warfare. "So far we have only seen the 
atomic bomb used against land targets, in conditions of complete 
surprise, virtually without any opposition to its conveyor. [ ... ] We do not 
know the limits of effectiveness of the atomic bomb against ships. 372 In 
addition the development of '[plossible means of defence obviously yet 
to be devised and applied' held out the prospect of countering this 'new 
and terrifying weapon. " Though he did concede that '[t]his new weapon 
will tax the resources of defence obviously more than any other weapon 
previously known! The First Sea Lord, commenting on Alexander's 
concluded with what would become one of the Navy's key arguments for 
continuing relevance in the nuclear world. That any potential enemy had 
more attractive options for bringing the country to her knees. 'Sea 
communications are so vital to Britain that an enemy would have no need 
of recourse to the hazards of atomic weapons if these were severed. ' 373 
It is no surprise that the Admiralty and the armed forces in general, 
approached their future planning on the basis that the next war would be 
one of total war, akin to that which had just ended. As we saw in Chapter 
Three, BritaWs post-War grand strategy initially concentrated on the 
prospects of all out conflict with the Soviet Union. Such a conflict would 
undoubtedly pit the entire resources and capabilities of each side against 
the other. By the end of the 1940's, however, the possibility that the 
existence of nuclear weapons would constrain belligerent actions and that 
371Speech by the First Lord of the Admiralty when introducing the Naval Estimates for 
1946 - House of Commons 7/3/46 First Lords Survey of the Naval War Naval Review Vol 
XXXIV 1946 p. 116-123 
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war would therefore be limited rather total had entered into force 
structure planning. 
Though the impact of nuclear technology was examined primarily in 
terms of total war, concerns were expressed that this had ceased to be a 
viable political tool. Although the prospects of achieving victory, 
breaking the enemy's will to win by military force, had increased, 
paradoxically it had also diminished with the threat that the will of both 
protagonists would collapse simultaneously. Admiral H. G. Thursfield 
summed up the position in an article entitled Vie Infltience of Sea Pozver 
Today published in Brassey's Naval Annual 1949. He wrote: 'A war 
conducted by atomic bombs on either side could result in nothing but 
stalemate after an orgy of indiscriminate destruction which left both sides 
exhausted. '374Under such a scenario the utility of nuclear weapons 
appeared somewhat limited. 'There are very few circumstances in war in 
which the atomic bomb can be used at all. Destruction of an enemy or of 
the country in wl-dch he lives has never been the aim of an aggressor in 
declaring war. '375Thursfield concluded that a consequence of this was 
that "atomic weapons have not rendered sea power to the confines of 
history. 1376 
The non-use of poison gas in WWII was cited by some as precedent 
for restraint even during total war. 377 As early as November 1945 no less 
a figure than the Foreign Secretary explained to the House of Commons 
that he saw a role for military power in situations far removed from all 
out war. 'It has been argued by many people that the con-ting of the 
atomic bomb would wipe out the need for armies, navies, or air forces. I 
374H. G. Thursfield Vic hifluence of Sea Pozver Today Brassey's Naval Annual 1949 p. 3 
3751bid. p. 1 
376 lbid. p. 2 
377LL Cdr. R. C. P. Wainwright Changes in Naval Warfare Owing to New and Modified 
Weapons. Eardley-Wilmot Gold Medal Essay 1947. journal Royal United Services 
Institution Vol. 93,1948. p. 188 
168 
think that is quite a misconception. 1378 He went on to argue that one of 
the major roles of armed forces is 'world policing' [limited war? ] and that 
the atomic bomb was clearly not appropriate in such circumstances. 
The atomic bomb threatened to make any lessons drawn from the 
war irrelevant. 'There can be no doubt that the successful production of 
this kind of bomb casts doubt upon most of the direct inferences that can 
be drawn from the war. '379 Speculation, in the unknown environment of 
the nuclear world, ranged from the wildly extreme, through the 
en-dnently reasonable, to the uncannily prophetic, often in the same 
article. To take but one example: it was argued that rocket propelled 
atomic missiles, envisaged as available just around the corner, would 
make the bomber obsolete and therefore also the need for defensive 
fighters. 'At first glance it looks as if the aircraft, which dominated the 
war just over, will now be in the decline. And it is most doubtful if it will 
ever dominate another war. 1380 However the author developed his 
argument, going on to explain that while the combat role of aircraft 
would decline, the transportation of forces remained crucial for aircraft 
[and ships], as it is only by occupation that 'victory' was achieved. 
Although the issue of how occupation would proceed in an atomically 
contan-dnated environment was not addressed explicitly, the scale of 
devastation which could lead to there being nothing left to occupy was 
raised as a possible hindrance to the bombs use. The use of atomic 
weaponry was also not considered appropriate for 'smaller kinds of wars 
punitive expeditions, [ ... or] where there is an element of police work 
For these smaller operations there is still the need for the weapon that 
378JIlteniational Situation; Die Atonzic Bonib and Policing tize World Speech by the Foreign 
Secretary, Mr Ernest Bevin, House of Commons 7/11/45 quoted Journal Royal United 
Services institution Vol. 90 1945 p. 523-524 
3790liver Stewart 77ie Air War at Sea, Brassey's Naval Annual 1946, p. 82. 
3801bid. p. 85. 
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can strike relatively small blows with great accuracy and for the carrier of 
small size which has a high degree of flexibility. 381 
The Royal Navy's initial response to the nuclear age was both more 
cautious and more wide ranging. In September 1945 the Director of Naval 
Operational Research produced a report entitled Effect of the Atondc Bonib 
on Naval Warfare382. This document built upon a previous paper written 
by the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral R. D. Oliver, Vie 
Inflitence of Me Atondc Bonib, 1945,383 which was circulated for comments 
less than a week after the dropping of the Nagasaki bomb. Both Papers 
recognised that the primary influence would be at the higher levels of 
warfare, that the effect upon a nationýs foreign policy and the role of its 
armed forces would be profound. As the DNOR paper explained; 
The influence of the Atomic bomb on war is primarily 
strategic. It is hoped that its existence will force on the world 
some kind of international control of armaments which will 
effectively prevent the outbreak of war. If this happens armed 
forces would become primarily police forces, either national or 
international. ... We may say that the nature of war will 
be 
altered, and the attack on economic targets will be decisive. 
[ ... ] The main effect of the atomic bomb is to be sought not in 
any change of tactics, disposition of forces or new types of 
ship building but in the broad overall effects. 384 
There were those who urged caution in drawing hasty conclusions 
about the obsolescence or otherwise of particular units of military power. 
'There is unfortunately at the present time a popular tendency to 
conclude that enough has already been learned about the new weapon to 
justify revolutionary changes in Empire strategy, to abolish navies and 
armies, and to concentrate the whole defence effort on the provision of 
rockets and aircraft. 1385 The difficulty for the Navy was that 'with its 
3811bid. p. 86. 
382ADM 219/218 Effect of the Atwizic Boiiib oiz Naval Warfare September 1945 
383ADM 1/9044 Vic Itifluetice of the Atwitic Boyiib, 1945,15/8/45 
384ADM 219/218 op. cit. 
385'Volage'Brassey's Annual 1947 Chapter VI Vie Future of Naval Aviatim p. 71-72. 
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responsibility for the protection of the sea routes the Admiralty cannot 
afford to indulge in speculation or hasty conclusions; false conceptions 
about the atom bomb might well prove more dangerous to Great Britain 
than the bomb itself. ' As a consequence it was argued that no unit of 
naval strength should be abandoned on the ground of its effectiveness or 
obsolescence until it can be replaced by another of at least equal and 
proved effectiveness for the known tasks in the fields of Admiralty 
responsibility. 
One of the prime attributes of seapower had always been the 
influence that it could have on an opponent's economic life, realising this 
through the use of naval blockade took time to produce results. What the 
aton-dc bomb offered was a much speedier method of disrupting or 
destroying a nation's war making potential. In this respect it appeared to 
fulfil what strategic bombing theorists had pron-dsed; a way of defeating 
an opponent without having to vanquish its military forces. 
In 1947 the naval analyst H. Rosinski argued that two schools of 
thought emerged concerning the atomic bomb and seapower. On the one 
hand there existed a train of thought that treated the bomb as just another 
weapon, 'asserting that it had failed to affect the traditional task of the 
navies', at the opposite extreme, 'others make no bones of their belief that 
in a conflict to be decided within weeks if not within days by long-range 
exchange of atomic missiles, there is no longer any place for the slow 
influence of sea power. 1386 
The corner stone of the Navy's case for a continued relevance in the 
post-war world was the country's vulnerability to disruption of its sea 
communications. The difficulty that now faced the Adn-dralty was that if 
it was, 
easier to attack sea-borne trade by attacking the ports with 
bombs, rockets or missiles from submarines, carrying atomic 
explosives, than by attacking trade while it is seaborne. In fact, 
386Rosinski 7he Role of Seapower in Global Warfare of the Future, Op Cit. p. 102. 
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the traditional function of the Navy of defending our lines of 
communication may be pointless, if these lines are better 
attacked at their end points. Even more broadly, it is possible 
that the whole war n-dght be decided by an attack on civilian, 
morale or industry before the Navy had time to mobilise. 387 
Opinion within the Navy appears to have considered the use of 
atomic weapons at sea unlikely, at least in the short to medium term. 
Considering the high cost, complexity and time needed to construct a 
bomb, it was felt that it would most likely be used against high value 
targets which were easier to find or remained in a fixed location. This 
reasoning provided both comfort and concern to the Admiralty as it was 
acknowledged that the Navy relied upon the fixed installations of 
dockyard facilities which would no doubt be targeted. 38S 
Speculation on the effects of a nuclear explosion upon surface 
vessels was widespread and varied. An article in the Naval Review in 
1946 seemed sure that there would be little change. '[I]t does not appear 
that the atomic bomber will produce more destruction against ships at 
sea than more fan-dliar methods of attack by aircraft and submarine. '389 
Arguing rather that their principal use would be against ports. This 
theme was taken up again the following year as part of an ongoing 
professional debate amongst naval officers. 
From the naval point of view, our bases are our most vulnerable 
point and, in the event of war with another European Power, 
our home bases are particularly vulnerable. A concentration of 
warships or of merchant ships is in greater danger when in port 
than at any other time. A very few atomic bombs could to-day, 
in a few minutes, deprive us of the whole of our home refitting 
and repair facilities, besides destroying our manning depots, 
placed so conveniently - yet now so unfortunately - adjacent to 
the Royal dockyards. 390 
3871bid. 
388Wainwright Changes in Naval Warfare Op Cit. p. 188 
389Shape of things to Come Naval Review Vol. XXXIV 1946 p. 327 
390Bases and the Bomb'S. W. R. ', Naval Review Vol. XXXV, 1947. p. 17 
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The answer therefore appeared to be disperse the navy around the 
country, particularly to the north, and the Commonwealth, relying on 
mobile bases and dispersion. The Admiralty itself were a little more 
cautious in making predictions and though gloomier argued that there 
was insufficient evidence to reach a definite conclusion. 391 
The main immediate hope was the limited number of bombs likely 
to be available, their complexity and expense would render them 
unsuitable for difficult moving targets at sea. 392 In June 1945 the US 
possessed two implosion bombs, a year later it increased this number to 
nine. The bombs were mostly MK III models that weighed 10,300lbs and 
had a 20KT yield. It took a specially trained 39 man team two days to 
assemble a bomb which could remain in its ready state for only 48 hours, 
after which time it had to be partially disassembled to recharge the 
batteries that powered the fusing and monitoring systems. 393 
This thinking called into question the idea of concentrating the 
Navy's main strength in a battlefleet capable of overwhelming anything 
the enemy could put to seas. Instead, it was argued, the Navy should 
'build a large number of small ships, which due to their dispersion will 
be much more difficult to attack. 1394 Dispersion had its problems. 
Operations during WWII demonstrated that a larger group could defend 
itself much better than a number of smaller groups given the constraints 
of escort size. The effect of the bomb was thought likely to have the 
reverse effect. War at sea in a nuclear environment would contain large 
number of small ships forming smaller groups upon which it would be 
unprofitable to expend one of a much smaller number of atomic bombs. 
The idea was also advanced that, in the face of such destructive weapons, 
the only vessel that had the necessary bulk and armour to survive in a 
nuclear environment was a large battleship. On the other hand the 
391 ADM 219/218 Effect of the Atomic Bomb on Naval Warfare September 1945 
392 Ibid. 
393Ross American War Plans Op Cit p. 12 
394 ADM 219/218 Effect of the Atomic Bomb on Naval Warfare September 1945 
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Director of Plans Division, Captain G. Grantham, commenting on the 
ACNS paper cast doubt on the practicalities of dispersion as a means of 
countering the UK's vulnerability. The scheme would only work if the 
state took such absolute control that it was able to move whole industries 
and populations, a very dubious undertaking for a society supposedly 
defending freedom. DoP was also extremely concerned about the 
country"s lack of defence in depth when confronted with an aerial aton-dc 
threat. Indeed Adn-dral Vian had written to Fraser whilst both were still 
with the BPF arguing that with insufficient defensive depth, small 
carriers could be used to provide platforms from which the interception 
of atomic bombers would be achieved before they were able to launch. 'In 
this case the advantage would lie with the small carriers that were able 
for a given tonnage cover a greater area of ocean. 395 
The American atomic bomb tests held at Bikini Atoll were of 
obvious interest to the RN and it received extensive coverage in the 
professional journals. The Naval Review carried transcripts of the joint 
Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Boards report into the tests. These detailed the 
effect that the explosion had on various vessels stationed at differing 
distances from the burst. In addition it discussed the radiation 
consequences on animals exposed in the test ships, the probable length of 
time to complete damage repairs and the protection offered by the ships' 
armour. 396 
The Admiralty drew a number of conclusions from these reports 
and its investigations into the effect of nuclear weapons. It was believed 
that the existence of such weapons gave the offensive an overwhelming 
advantage not just in the military sphere but because war could be 
effectively waged against econon-dc targets and civilian morale. Britain 
was particularly vulnerable because of its reliance upon imports and high 
395ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov. 1944-july 1945 Appendix II. The effect of 
fleet defensive requirements on carriers and fighter design 
396joint Chiefs of Staffs' Evaluation Board: Second Preliminary Report of the Atomic 
Bomb Tests held at Bikini Atoll. Reprinted in Naval Review Vol. XXXV, 1947. p. 23. 
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population. The traditional function of sea-power, the defence of the 
country's lines of communication, might need radical revision, if these 
lines of communication were most easily attacked at their end points. As 
a result the main function of the British military armed forces should be 
the prevention of a major war, rather than the "ability to fight it on purely 
military grounds after the war has already been decided either by the 
collapse of civilian morale, or the destruction of ports and industrial 
installations. '397 Considering such conclusions it was also recommended 
that an investigation into the causes of war should be undertaken. 
American thinking concerning the possible Russian use of atomic 
weapons was remarkably similar to that of the British. CinC US Naval 
Forces Eastern Atlantic & Mediterranean wrote in July 1948 that, 'I think 
we can assume that the main target of a Russian air attack would be 
Britain, in the hope of neutralising her industry and preventing her being 
used as a base by the US. '398 He went on to explain that current 
assessments saw the possibility that Britain could be neutralized by about 
40 atomic bombs. As a result, he concluded, 'I believe it imperative that 
Marshall Aid be used to move and disperse as much as practicable the 
UK's heavy industry to more disparate parts of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations. ' 
The following year the Americans were even gloomier concerning 
British prospects in a nuclear exchange. A memo concerning JCS 1920/1, 
a long range plans for war with the USSR, the development of a joint 
Outline Plan for use in the event of war in 1957, cast doubts as to the UK 
397 ADM 219/218 Effect of Hie Atondc Bonib on Naval Warfare September 1945 
398USN Operational Archives Strategic Plans Division Records OP-30s/-60s Subject and 
Serial Files (Series XVI) 1948 Box 244 A16-3(5) War Plans: CinC US Naval Forces Eastern 
Atlantic & Mediterranean CINCELm 6/7/48 Study of Nattire of Warfare witizin the next ten 
years atid Navy Cott tributions in sitpport of National Strategy. 
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ability to survive. 399 "a determined Soviet effort against the vulnerable 
and over loaded British ports, utilizing A-bombs, tactical aircraft, 
submarines, and mines, could well reduce our logistic support 
capabilities to the point where the United Kingdom could not be supplied 
as a major base for operations. ' 
The USN's response to the advent of nuclear weapons was as 
complex as that of the Royal Navy. A concise summary is provided by 
Admiral Nimitz's paper on Eitiployiiient of Naval Forces bi tlw Fithire, 
which was sent to the Secretary of the Navy on his retirement as CNO. 
In addition to the weapons of WWII the Navy of the future will 
be capable of launching missiles from surface vessels and 
submarines, and delivering atomic bombs from carrier based 
planes. Vigilant naval administration and research is constantly 
developing and adding to these means. In the event of war 
within the foreseeable future it is probable that there will be 
little need to destroy combatant ships other than submarines. 
Consequently, in the fulfilment of a long accepted naval 
functions and in conformity with the well known principles of 
warfare, the Navy should be used in the initial stages of such a 
war to project its weapons against vital enemy targets on land, 
the reduction of which is the basic objective of warfare. 400 
American emphasis was definitely focused on the application of 
nuclear weaponry to its carrier power projection capabilities. The 
American military strategic conception saw the inevitable use of nuclear 
weapons in a conflict with the Soviet Union. When discussing its 
Fleetivood plan, the Navy concluded that; 'Our only hope of staving off 
defeat, or of avoiding a long, exhausting war, lies in a quick offensive, 
399USN Operational Archives Strategic Plans Division Records Box 250: Memo 
concerning JCS 1920/1,4/4/49 Long range plans for war with the USSR - development 
of a joint Outline Plan for use in the event of war in 1957. 
400MIRMarch 1948 No. 27 Admiral Nimitz, The Future Use of Naval Forces [Reprint of a 
paper written by Nimitz on his departure from the Navy and forwarded to Secretary of 
the Navy] p. 29-30 
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mainly atomic, designed to cripple the Russian war capacity to a degree 
sufficient to provide us with the time to mobilize our war potential. 401 
Whilst it is obvious that the Royal Navy sought to down play the 
influence of aton-dc weapons for fear of undermining its traditional roles, 
this should not be taken as meaning that it was ignored. During a major 
tri-service exercise, for example, held at the Army Staff College, 
Camberley during May 1947, 'entail[ing] the study of the whole field of 
modern warfare'402 the full range of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD), atomic bombs, biological missiles and chemical weapons were 
examined. Whilst it does not amount to conclusive evidence that the 
Admiralty were intent upon developing a war winning concept of atomic 
warfare, it is interesting to note that when reporting on the American 
nuclear tests at Bikini the emphasis was laid on the data provided for 
redesigning vessels. 403 There were also signs in professional press that 
the debate had moved on to how nuclear weapons might be used to 
enhance the Navy's offensive power. 
Reference has already been made to the advent of the atomic 
weapon. This again may well cause an increase in the demand 
for efficiency in air interceptions, and a geographical extension 
of the areas in which they could be made. Here again the 
carrier-borne fighter could be called upon to fulfil a new role, 
lying outside the usual fields of naval strategy. This in fact 
seems to be one of the first most likely results of the new 
weapon's appearance. A second possible demand might be that 
arising from the advantages which the carrier-borne aircraft 
could offer for the actual delivery of such missiles [ ... I The safe 
flight of an "atomic" bomber to its objective over very long 
distances might well provide fewer difficult problems were it 
launched from a highly mobile base. [ ... ] Moreover in the long- 
range war which we must expect next time, the "fixed address" 
401USN Operational Archives Strategic Plans Division Records OP-30s/-60s Subject and 
Serial Files (Series XVI) 1948 Box 244 A16-3(5) War Plans 
402MIRMay 1947 No. 17 Exercise Spearliead p. 36 
403MIRjuly 1946 No. 7 p. 29-33 
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of an airfield known to be a potential atomic launching site 
would be likely to provide embarrassments more easily avoided 
by the carrier. 404 
The Naval establishment also expressed concern over whether the 
initial nuclear exchange expected would be decisive. Britain's 
vulnerability to air attack in an aton-dc war emphasised the need for 
defensive aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. This was acknowledged to 
some extent by the debate within the Navy about the possibility of 
fighters operating from a number of small dispersed carriers intercepting 
nuclear bombers. If the nuclear exchange, however, was not decisive then 
the Navy could present arguments concerning her significant role in any 
prolonged war following the atomic bombardment. Something that came 
to be known as Broken backed warfare. 
The Chiefs of Staff Committee reached some broad conclusions as to 
the effect of atomic weapons on British defence policy when they 
considered a Joint Planning Staff Memorandum in April 1947.405 The 
possibility existed of achieving rapid and decisive results by the use of 
mass destruction weapons against econon-dc key targets and civil 
population. There appeared little likelihood that any effective defensive 
measure could be achieved within the next ten years. The nature of 
atomic weaponry put a premium on their offensive use but this was 
constrained by a recognition that political control would probably restrict 
their use. 'There are greater possibilities than before of surprise attack, 
since the preparations required to deliver decisive attacks with new 
weapons could be on a smaller scale than with conventional weapons. 
Militarily, we must be prepared to exploit any such opportunity, 
although politically we are always likely to be handicapped. " 
404'Volage'Brassey's Annual 1947 Chapter VI 7he Future of Naval Aviatioiz p. 71. 
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It was believed that the Western Allies would be unable to prevent 
the USSR overrunning North West Europe. The Soviet Union would then 
becapable of launching long range rocket and missile attacks on UK that 
could be decisive. This again was viewed as a reason for early, aggressive 
action to forestall such a collapse. 'The vulnerability of this country to 
modern weapons would bring the war to its climax much earlier than in 
the past. It is essential therefore that this initiative should be assumed 
from the outset. ' This entailed a campaign to destroy the enemy's means 
of making war. 'Thus to achieve victory or avoid defeat, it may be 
essential for us to use weapons of mass destruction. ' The country 
therefore needed bases in Britain, the Middle East and North West India 
from which to launch a nuclear attack on the USSR. The defence of 
communications to and from these nuclear bases was seen as a prime 
naval task. 
Besides the actual defence of these islands, we must also defend 
the resources on which the Commonwealth must draw to 
prosecute a major war, and preserve the means by which the 
Dominions and our allies can come to our aid, so that with our 
united strength we can develop an eventual all-out offensive. 
The control of sea communications is essential to the 
achievement of these aims. 406 
The implications of this reasoning were that the country required; 
first, strong air defences including strong up-to-date anti aircraft and civil 
defences; second, an effective bomber force; sufficient land forces for 
defence against invasion on a limited scale and against raids; and for the 
Navy, the ability to exertnaval control and air superiority over, on and 
under the waters, surrounding these islands, and along our sea 
communicationS. 1407 
The differing responses to the atomic bomb by the USN and the RN 




sought to develop the capabilities of delivering the bomb from carriers in 
order to influence events ashore, the RN was primarily concerned with 
how it would affect their traditional role of defending the sea 
communications upon which the country was so dependent. In the 
period following the end of World War Two the only country that 
appeared to present a threat to the country's sea communications was the 
Soviet Union. 
The RN's Developing Conception of the Soviet Threat at Sea 
The Royal Navy's thinking at the military strategic level was 
obviously closely bound up with its appreciation of the threats posed by 
the Soviet Union, a threat that was percievecd to rise significantly during 
the second half of the 1940's. Conceptions of the USSWs naval capabilities 
gave both cause for optimism and concern to the Royal Navy. On the one 
hand the Navy appeared to have distinct advantages over the Soviet 
Navy, whilst at the same time being severely hampered in bringing its 
power to bear against its new opponent. The Soviet Navy was 
handicapped by the USSWs geography, the subordinate role it played to 
the Red Army and its limited experience in open ocean warfare. However 
because the Soviet Union was not dependent upon the sea for its survival, 
the Royal-Navy had difficulty designing a war winning strategy. This had 
implications for the Admiralty in dealing with inter-service relations and 
its political masters. 
This developing conception as to the nature of any potential conflict 
with the Soviet Union, the threat environment within which the Navy 
would have to operate and its anticipated tasks, created both 
opportunities for, and obstacles to, the Royal Navy and its use of 
maritime power. 
It was recognised that Soviet naval forces had played a subordinate 
role to that of the Red Army; simple geography dictated that the USSR 
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was more vulnerable to attack through its land borders. During World 
War Two the Soviet Navy was primarily a coastal defence force whose 
n-dssions were to protect the seaward flanks of the Red Army and 
transport its supplies on internal waterways. This historical legacy was 
seen as significantly constraining the potential of the Navy. The absence 
of dramatic victories during The Great Patriotic War was seen as a 
handicap for the Soviet Navy in trying to establish its post-war position 
with regards other branches of the armed forces. 408 Under such 
circumstances it was believed that the Soviet Navy would continue to be 
viewed by the Kren-din as an adjunct to operations that would be 
predominantly land focused. 
For the Royal Navy, however, it was almost inconceivable that a 
great power would not develop a comparable navy. Though the USSR 
was understood to be fundamentally a land power, its success during the 
war had created a situation whereby it was no longer threatened in that 
environment. Now, instead, it was believed to be faced with the 
opportunity of turning its resources to the sea and out across the world's 
oceans. 
The issue of the war has placed the Soviet Union, which despite 
its access to the Arctic and Pacific Oceans, was essentially a 
land power, in such a position that it can now develop as a sea 
power. It is clear that the Soviet High Command will for this 
reason use all possible methods to develop its Navy, which in 
its present condition is in no way compatible with the Soviet 
Union's position as a great power. 409 
Despite such thinking concerning Soviet potential at sea it was 
recognised that 'naval forces still come a very bad second to the land 
forceS'410. At the same time however, the RN noted that since the end of 
the war the Soviet press had stressed the need for the building of, a 
408MTXebruary 1948 No. 26 7he Soviet Navy p. 48 
409MIRjanuary 1947 No. 13 p. 48 
410MIRFebruary 1947 No. 14 p. 38 
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powerful ocean-going fleet. Acquisition of such advanced bases as 
Konigsberg to the west and Port Arthur in the Far East, and by a growing 
concern about Bear Island and Spitzbergen, the Great Belt, the Kiel Canal 
and the Dardanelles were perceived as evidence of growing naval 
ambitions. 411 The Soviet Union's possession of ice-free ports also 
appeared to herald the emergence of a significant challenge at sea. 412 
However in February 1946, the Soviet Army and Navy, with their 
respective Air Forces, were incorporated into a single Ministry of the 
Armed Forces of the USSR. General Bulganin became Minister of the 
Armed Forces, and under him were five Deputy Ministers, of whom the 
Third was Adn-dral of the Fleet I. S. Yumashev. Yumashev combined the 
post of Deputy Minister with that of Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet 
Navy. This move was seen as evidence that, 'the Soviet Navy ha[d] once 
more been subordinated to the Army. '413 The position of the Soviet Navy 
appeared to be declining within the Soviet Military. The Admiralty 
interpreted this move as 'dampening the ardour of some senior naval 
officers. '414 This control lasted until February 1950 when Moscow radio 
announced 'that the Soviet Government had decided to create a Navy 
Ministry, to be separate from the Ministry of the Armed Forces. This 
reorganisation suggests that it has been recognised that the Russian Navy 
now requires a greater degree of independence from Army control. 415 
Conceptions of the likely threat to be offered by the Soviet Navy 
were therefore focused around potential. There was a belief that due to 
the experience of the Soviet Navy during the war the immediate threat 
would be one dimensional. 'Only in the submarine forces, and to a 
limited extent in Far Northern waters, did the Russian sailors obtain any 
4111bid. 
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practical experience in the operations of an ocean going fleet, and then 
through their close association with British Naval forces. ' 416 
The constraints placed upon Soviet maritime ambition by the 
political branch of the Navy which the RN believed never understood the 
ocean-going functions of a modern fleet, were felt to be a major handicap. 
In spite of the experience of the war, Red Fleet propaganda, which, was 
produced by the Political Department, emphasized the Soviet Navy's role 
as the sea-going auxiliary of the Red Army. Little mention was made of 
convoy escort work, and practically none of operations other than ones 
conducted purely in coastal waters by surface vessels. The main 
exceptions were minelaying and minesweeping, the work of Russian 
submarines, though not fully understood, was praised, and was the only 
arm in which the RN believed a real 'ocean-going sea-sense ha[d] been 
developed. 417 
The recognition that the Soviet Navy. faced major problems in 
developing a significant challenge at sea was widespread within the 
upper reaches of the Royal Navy by the close of 1946. The Director of 
Naval Intelligence argued that Soviet experience at sea, the predominant 
position of the Red Army and its geography, all combined to hinder the 
realization of the Soviet Navy"s aspirations. Commenting on this 
assessment the Director of Plans wrote 'that there are great and, perhaps 
to the Russians, inherently insurmountable obstacles to be overcome 
before conception becomes reality. '418 
As a consequence of this it was felt that the most profitable method 
by which the Soviets could bring 'sea power to bear against either of their 
potential major enemies is by the use of submarines against seaborne 
416MIRMarch 1946 No. 3 p. 20. 
417MIRMarch 1946 No. 3 p. 20. 
418 ADM 1/20030 Russian Naval Tactics 1946-1947 DTSD paper October 1946; marginal 
note DoP 10/11/46 
183 
trade. '419 The fear was of Soviet intentions of reviving a commerce war 
similar to that undertaken by the German Kriegsmarine during the war 
just ended. In addition and probably at least as significant, it was 
believed that this was also recognised in the USSR. The development of 
this capability was however, not without similar problems. 
Although during the last war they showed little aptitude for this 
type of warfare, their possibilities in the future will depend on 
how far they assimilate the lessons of the past and how much 
they benefit from the tutelage of their German employees, both 
technically and operationally. 420 
In this respect the reports of Operation CABAL, the handover of 10 U- 
boats to the Russians in December 1945 including a Type XXI (U. 3515) 
and a Type XXIII (U. 2353)421 were of particular concern. In addition it 
was also suspected that the Russians [ ... ] have removed from Germany a 
plant used for making turbines for warships [ ... I is reported on good 
authority to have been transferred complete to Leningrad where it is 
being re-erected. '422 
Though as will be discussed later there were doubts as to the Soviet 
ability to convert this increasing capacity into a major surface challenge. 
The Navy's primary concern was the threat posed by Russian 
submarines. Reports were circulated throughout the RN which appeared 
to confirm a growing sub-surface menace almost globally. 
There is good reason to believe that Russian submarines are 
making long-distance voyages. Reports have been received of a 
Russian submarine off the Solomon Islands, and others 150 
n-dles south-west of San Francisco, near Pearl Harbour, in the 
Caribbean Sea, off New Orleans and near the Pacific approaches 
to the Panama Canal. During April what are believed to have 
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been Russian submarines were sighted near Bougie off the 
north-west African coast, and in the neighbourhood of Corfu. 423 
Observation of Soviet naval exercises off Murmansk observed by 
British trawlers which appeared to concentrate on submarines attacking 
surface ships simply added weight to this impression. 424 
By early 1948 the RN was firmly of the opinion that 'the strongest 
single arm of the Russian Navy is, undoubtedly, submarines, of which it 
possessesw approximately 258 at present, a few of which are reaching the 
age of ten years. ' 425 Interpretations of Soviet capability appeared to 
corroborate the belief that the threat posed would no longer be confined 
to coastal waters. 'The Russians have excellent ocean-going submarines mi 
the 1,700-ton "K" class, of which they possess about 14, and an efficient 
medium submarine, comparable to the German type VII U-boat in the 
S. H. C. H. class, of which they have about 70. They also have about 112 of 
the coastal "M" class of sub. As their share of the German Fleet the 
Russians have been allocated 10 U-boats and have acquired up to 40 
more. 1426 
Here again, however, the fear was of growing Soviet potential. 'It is 
unlikely that successful sea trials of a re-designed German type XXVI 
Walter submarine can be completed before the end of 1951 and it is not 
expected that any will be in service before 19542427 
It is interesting that despite the perceived focus of Soviet naval 
development on waging a guerre de coitrse, the Admiralty believed that 
the USSR had not made similar strides to perfect defensive techniques for 
its own, albeit limited, sea communications. 'The Russians had 
considerable opportunities of observing British convoy technique and 
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British Naval control organization, but it was evident that the Russian 
staff never absorbed the lessons of convoy work. -*428 
There had been some difficulty accepting the Soviets as a significant 
naval threat when it was clear that their capacity to build and maintain a 
fleet was so obviously limited in the immediate aftermath of the war. To 
take but one example of many; the Admiralty informed the Navy in 
August 1946 that five Soviet ice breakers were to be refitted in UK yards. 
This it was argued "shows that Russian shipyards are not yet capable of 
carrying out major work. An additional pointer in the same direction is 
that Russian submarines are refitting in Finnish yards. '429 It is debatable 
whether or not the RN was engaging in a form of mirror imaging of its 
identified enemy, but it is clear that intelligence, press and diplomatic 
reports were scoured for any indication that the Soviets were turning 
their attention to maritime matters and intent upon increasing the power 
and capability of its navy. 
It should not be taken from this that the Royal Navy anticipated the 
Soviet threat at sea to be purely sub surface. In January 1947 the 
Admiralty reported that the Soviets had enquired about the possibility of 
obtaining an aircraft carrier from the British. 'An unofficial approach has 
been made to the Admiralty recently by Moscow which indicates the 
Russian's desire to acquire a British carrier, either built or building. 1430 
Two things emerge from this; first, that some sixteen months after the 
end of the war, at a time when the RN had already identified the Soviet 
Union as its major threat, relations between the UK and the USSR were 
perceived to be good enough for the report to be true; second, it indicates 
the importance the RN attached to an organic naval aviation capability in 
the development of sea power. 
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This theme was taken up later in the same Monthly Intelligence 
Report. 431 It was noted that although the "Naval Air Force' was 
essentially a coastal 'air army', Soviet aspirations for a navy compatible 
with its position as a great power would require a dramatic increase in its 
capability. 'There is no doubt that the development of the Naval Air Force 
will go hand in hand with the build up of the Navy. ' The basis of this 
expansion was again considered to be knowledge acquired from German 
aircraft, radar equipment, bombs, explosives and 'other material' which 
would greatly 'speed up and assist this development. '432 Though the RN 
did not expect the threat to be realized for some years to come, it 
recognized that the possibilities for developing the Soviet Naval Air 
Force were such that, in it, the Soviet High Command would 'eventually 
possess a formidable weapon. f433 
It was acknowledged that as a consequence of the war the 
developing Soviet naval aviation capability had altered direction. In pre- 
war years seaplanes and ship borne aircraft were the principal equipment 
of the Soviet Naval Air Force. When the Germans advanced into Russia 
however the Naval Air Force was re-equipped with fighter and ground 
attack aircraft, and was used almost exclusively in the air defence of 
naval bases. Despite the German retreat which 'increased the operational 
scope of the Naval Air Force, and the Soviet High Command was forced 
to devote more attention to the expansion and development of the Naval 
Air ForceS'434, such forces were still configured primarily for defence. 
Here again the relative priority accorded the Army and the Navy 
was evident. The Adn-dralty believed that the Soviet Naval Air Force had 
always taken second place to the Army Air Force in the supply of the 
latest aircraft types and equipment. This would continue and leave the 
Soviet Navy technologically inferioý to the navies of the West. Although 
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since the war the Soviet efforts concentrated on exploiting German 
research and development in an attempt to bridge the gap in technology 
between herself and the West the results of this would be devoted to the 
Army at the expense of the Navy. 435 
Not withstanding this appreciation, there were indications that by 
the end of the decade the RN would have to face a Naval Air Force 
equipped with the latest aircraft types. It was being reported that swept- 
wing jet fighters were used in defence of the port of Sevastopol during an 
air-exercise in October 1949. Defence of naval ports and dockyards was 
usually the responsibility of the Soviet Naval Air Force and this report 
was taken to indicate that jet fighters were now being supplied to Naval 
Air Force units. 436 
The Soviet Naval Air Force was seen as an integral part of the Soviet 
Navy and entirely independent of Soviet Air Force control, although the 
two forces were believed to be capable of co-operation in spheres where 
their responsibilities overlapped. 'The Naval Air Force was understood to 
be responsible for maritime reconnaissance, anti-shipping strikes, convoy 
escorts, air defence of naval bases, and support of land forces in 
amphibious operations or where the army flank touch[ed] the sea. '437 
In October 1950 the Adn-dralty were again citing reports that the 
Soviet Union had acquired a carrier capability, 'Information has been 
received of the sighting of a ship which, it is insisted, was an aircraft 
carrier of approximately 15,000 tons with 12 aircraft on deck aft. '438 
The issue of the Soviet Unionýs capacity to deploy a surface 
challenge to the Royal Navy was, not unsurprisingly, of major interest to 
the Navy. Great interest was taken in work carried out on a new shipyard 
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at Molotovsk, 20 miles west of Archangel, which it was felt was capable 
of building heavy ships. 439 The Navy reported this under the heading 
Molotovsk: The Soviet Williebiisliaveiz, 440with all the connotations for a 
challenge to British naval power that such a by-line entailed. The 
Admiralty concluded that by 1950 'at the latest' Molotovsk would 
provide the Soviet Northern Fleet with a dockyard comparable in size 
and facilities with the main dockyards of the United Kingdom. In 
addition Molotovsk could be kept open for the use as a fleet base 
throughout the year. Ironically such development was aided by the UK. 
'We are at the present time bound by the terms of the Potsdam 
Agreement to assist the Russians in the removal from Wilhelmshaven of 
heavy German machinery and equipment for installation at 
Molotovsk. '441 
Despite this there continued to be a recognition within the Navy that 
the Soviets had other plans which took precedence over those of the Red 
Fleet. 'In spite of official declarations, and a directive to speed up 
shipbuilding, it seems that the building of an ocean-going fleet will not 
get a high priority in the present Five Year Plan, The submarine arm 
seems to be in the process of expansion, but the surface fleet is unlikely in 
the immediate future to "catch Stalin's eye. " 1442 
The surface forces available to the Soviet Navy were extremely 
limited. In 1948 they possessed only four old battleships. The main 
surface force was comprised of cruisers. 'The Russians possess seven 
Russian-built cruisers of modern type, of which two each are present in 
the Baltic, Black Sea, and three in the Pacific Fleets. With 7.1" guns and a 
high speed, these ships are the most formidable units possessed by the 
Russian Navy. In addition, the Russians have the ex-German NUrnberg 
and the ex-American Milwaukee, and they have been allocated the Duca 
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d'Aosta as their share of the Italian Fleet. The endurance of Russian built 
cruiser is less than that of corresponding British types. 443 
By the beginning of the next decade however it appeared that the 
Navy had been prophetic in its estimation of Soviet shipbuilding. 1950 
saw a 'new cruiser at the Baltic Yard, Leningrad. Believed to be of the 
Cliapaev class". 444 That years Navy Day address was given by Vice 
Admiral Vinogradov. He explained Russian priorities. 'To our country 
belongs priority in the building of submarines, torpedo boats, n-dnes, 
electrical equipment for ships and other technical weapons. '445 
Throughout the summer and into the autumn the Admiralty were 
receiving intelligence concerning a rise in Soviet Naval capabilities. The 
RN appeared particularly impressed with the speed at which the 
Sverdlov was brought into service. 'It is estimated that Sverdlov was laid 
down in April or May 1949 and launched sometime before 12/6/50. The 
speed of construction with all the launching complications is considered 
fast. '446 Information such as this was supported by reports that flashes of 
welding observed at night the Baltic Yard, Leningrad. 'The conclusion is 
that all large shipyards capable of building cruisers are being used at full 
pressure with night shifts being worked, for the construction of cruisers. ' 
-447 
The emergence of a surface capability appeared to be a new and 
growing dimension to the threat that the Soviet Navy could pose to 
Britain's sea lines of communication. Even if these new vessels were not 
employed as commerce raiders they could still threaten these vital 
oceanic links as all Russian-built cruisers and destroyers were fitted as 
minelayers. As the Navy recognised 'The Russians have always been 
particularly addicted to n-dne warfare. They have, in addition, a number 
443MIRFebruary 1948 No. 26 77te Soviet Naznj p. 50 
444MIRApril 1950 No. 52 PL III Honze Intelligence Area USSR p. 39 
445MIRjuly 1950 No. 55 Vice Admiral Vinogradov, speech for Navy Day 23/7/50 
quoted p. 42 
446MIRAugust 1950 No. 56 p. 46 
447MIROctober 1950 No. 58 p. 41 
190 
of minelayers disproportionate to the total numbers in their fleet. As far 
as is known the Russians have not evolved any particularly new types of 
mine, but they are believed to be in possession of the German n-dning 
technique. " 448 Mine sweeping was not considered a Russian strong point 
and was used to suggest that Soviet minewarfare doctrine envisaged the 
offensive use of mines. In the Admiralty's n-dnd that meant the UKs 
ports and approaches. It is however equally as likely that the Soviets 
intended to focus on the defensive aspect of minewarfare, utilising them 
to protect their extensive northern coastline. In May 1949 the Adn-dralty 
published an intelligence article which higl-dighted Soviet fears about 
British submarines. 'Operation "Rusty" has aroused angry and suspicious 
comment in the Russian press, which saw in it preparations and training 
for a British submarine campaign in the Arctic. This Red Fleet comments: 
"It has become known that the exercises carried out in the Arctic by a 
special naval detachment were directly connected with the study of the 
area in which British submarines intend to operate in case of war. In the 
Arctic there are no British communications. Special significance is also 
attached to the exercises by American naval circles, and in the Vengeance 
there was an American observer. " '449 
The foregoing has been an exploration of how and in what form the 
Admiralty believed the Soviet Union could threaten the UK at sea. The 
Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff wrote a paper for the Board of 
Admiralty in April 1949 entitled Sizips of the Future Navy. In it he declared 
that 'Russia was the or-dy power who possessed any maritime threat for 
the UK [and] The United Kingdom would only fight if it had the support 
of the United States from the outset. 450 The threat that the Soviet Union 
could mount was primarily one of sea denial. The USSR was not a 
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maritime nation; it was not dependent upon the sea for its national life. 
Its navy though growing appeared constrained to a gelirre de mirse 
strategy, utilising its submarine force, supported by a significant land 
based naval aviation capability and augmented by an increasing surface 
cruiser threat. The perception of the Soviet maritime threat was however 
central to the RN's developing post-war military strategy. 
Defence of Sea Communications 
In spite of scientific developments, the Navy's task remains to- 
day the same as it has always been - namely- the control of sea 
communications so that ocean routes can be available to our 
ships and those of our allies, but denied to the ships of our 
enemies. 451 
For the Admiralty, the war just ended, was held up as the supreme 
justification of sea power. In World War Two, as the war became truly 
global, naval power fused oceans and continents into a single strategic 
theatre. Seapower played the decisive role in overall global strategy. 
Without the fleet, which controlled the 'universal medium' of movement, 
continents would have been isolated. It enabled the Allies to keep the two 
groups of opponents apart whilst concentrating their own efforts against 
first one and then the other. This historical precedent was crucial to the 
Admiralty's case for the continued relevance in the nuclear world. In 
addition it was in accord with what came to be the major focus of the 
Labour Goverru-nent's foreign policy; the linking of the United States to 
the defence of Western Europe. Seapower and the capacity to defend 
Britain's lines of communication across the Atlantic were the only means 
of linking the USA to the scene of the expected clash with the Soviet 
Union; Europe. 
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The primary military strategic function of the Navy, defence of the 
country's sea communications, provoked very little discussion. The 
attempt to sever the United Kingdom's maritime communications had 
produced the longest most difficult campaign of the Second World War, 
and was unlikely to forgotten. Without the ability to ensure the arrival of 
food and raw materials the country would have collapsed; without the 
ability to safeguard the transportation of military resources overseas the 
North African Campaign could not have been waged nor American 
military n-dght assembled for the liberation of Europe. As the Admiralty 
made abundantly clear even before the end of hostilities: "The basis of 
Imperial Defence is the control of sea communications'452. It was 
recognised that Britain was too weak to contemplate fighting a major war 
on its own and that only the British Commonwealth as a whole unit had 
the potential to stand up to a first class power. 453 As a consequence the 
free use of the sea was essential to the strategic coherence of the 
Commonwealth. 
The central position of sea communications to the Royal Navy is 
hard to over emphasise. As an article in the Naval Review explained. 'The 
future of the Royal Navy is bound up with that of our seaborne trade and 
shipping and the great commercial organizations which administer them: 
above all, with the question of whether our people shall continue to play 
their great part in international seaborne commerce. [ ... I If our shipping 
and commerce, the real basis of sea power decline, the Royal Navy will 
become what its critics begin to call it, a purposeless waste of money. f454 
Securing the country's sea lines of communication was a precursor 
to all other operations. The Naval War Manual left the Royal Navy in no 
doubt as to this fact when it said: "The aim of maritime warfare is so to 
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control the sea lanes so that we can use them for our own purposes while 
denying them to the enemy. Once this control is established it can be 
exploited by embarking on under-takings more directly designed to 
break the enemy's will to fight. 455 In the same year, 1947, the Statement 
accompanying the Naval Estimates reaffirmed this point. 'The 
fundamental requirement is to provide a navy sufficiently strong to 
ensure that our vital lines of supply can be kept open. '456 
This policy was accepted by the Chiefs of Staff when they endorsed 
the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff's paper on the requirements for a 
future navy. He wrote that the "Naval policy of the Chiefs of Staff is to 
defend sea communications essential to Britain and defend the Middle 
East! 457 The Chiefs of Staff Conu-nittee had agreed that, 'the potential 
threat to our sea communications will be greater than at any time in the 
last war. 458 The threat appeared to be that the Soviet Union could utilise 
gains made on land to change the strategic geography of any conflict, in 
the same way as the German's capture of French Atlantic submarine 
bases had done during the last war. Added to which it recognised that 
'The threat in Home waters and the N. Atlantic would be immensely 
magnified by an enemy advance to the Channel ports and the Atlantic 
seaboard. 1459 
The ability to exercise control of sea communications would give 
Britain flexibility and mobility for the deployment of its armed forces 
wherever they were required and in so doing deny those advantages to 
the enemy. Control of the Mediterranean was important because of the 
strategic significance of the Middle East and its resources. In order to 
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accomplish this, the Joint Planning Staff recommended that the Britain 
retain its existing strategic possessions there and obtain additional base 
facilities on the North African coast. For this to be viable the country had 
to ensure that Spain did not fall under Russian domination and that the 
French North African dependencies were likewise friendly. To attain the 
necessary level of security and control of sea communications, naval and 
air forces to meet any threat or challenge and bases for their effective 
operation were essential. Though the immediate threat appeared to be 
from fast submarine attack, air attack and n-dnelaying, the threat of 
surface attacks had to be kept in mind and the capacity of the 'potential 
enemy to challenge our control of sea communications must be 
constantly watched and provided against. -460 
Maritime versus Continental strategy 
Weapons have changed as have the tactics of the forces which 
use them, but the Navy's place in the grand strategy of war has 
remained unaltered throughout the centuries. 461 
The issue facing naval planners was not one of the continuing 
relevance of sea communications, that was never in doubt for an island 
nation, rather it was how to utilise that power against an opponent who 
was reliant on the sea for neither security nor prosperity. Seapower 
traditionally allowed greater time for a maritime power to recover from 
defeat, it also took longer to have an effect upon an enemy. Both of these 
features appeared to be undermined by new technologies - atomic 
weapons and air power. Whereas geography had given a distinct 
advantage to the British when it came to exercising sea power it now 
made the country vulnerable to a greatly enhanced air threat. Don-dnating 
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the waters around the Europe no longer guaranteed the United 
Kingdoms survival. 
The emergence of the SoviiA Union as the dominant land power in 
place of competing great powers created a more extreme but not 
unfamiliar strategic situation for the navy. During the long wars against 
Revolutionary France and Napoleon and against Germany, Britain had 
used her maritime power as a counter weight to the land power of a 
European hegemonic state. Whereas Britain had been able to maintain the 
balance between conflicting representatives of land power from outside 
and whereas in the two World Wars the two allied sea powers were 
forced to supplement it by direct intervention in the continental struggle, 
'they are now in a position where they are forced to provide the major 
effort in upholding it against the concentrated weight of land power in 
the hands of Russia. 462 
The emerging war plans of both the USA and the United Kingdom 
appear to have made a maritime, as opposed to continental strategy, 
initially inevitable. If, as the plans envisaged, the Soviet Union were able 
to rapidly overrun Western Europe then there was no alternative other 
than adopting a maritime based strategy. If the British were excluded 
from the European mainland the strategic picture would have looked 
remarkably similar to 1805 or 1940. Effecting a re-entry would have been 
immeasurably more difficult than then, there was also likely to be fewer 
allies who could be subsidised to draw Soviet attention away from any 
invasion. 
A lecture by the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir John 
Cunningham, to the Senior Officers' War Course, at the joint Services 
Staff College and the Naval Staff Course explained the Navy's position 
and outlook. 'The choice may lie between a continental strategy and one 
based on maritime mobility, in which we operate mobile and highly 
trained forces in the most favourable theatre. It is likely, however, that 
462Rosinski The Role of Seapower in Global Warfare of the Future, Op Cit. p. 109. 
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our relatively small population will favour the alternative, at least in the 
early stages of a war. '463 Sir John argued that whilst a limited continental 
commitment might be unavoidable politically the limited resources the 
country possessed meant that its most effective strategy had to be 
maritime. 
It is held that the Western Union cannot be held together 
unless we as a country commit ourselves to send troops to 
Europe. [ ... 
]I feel, however, that no matter how desirable this 
n-dght be, we shall be in no position, financially or 
econon-dcally, to allow ourselves to indulge in the luxury of a 
continental strategy, even if we possessed adequate 
manpower. 464 
Cunningham derived four key roles from his analysis of the UK's 
strategic position; control of sea communication [around the UK, with the 
Commonwealth, North America and the Middle East, allowing the 
delivery of resources to the UK base and the despatch of the RAF and 
Army overseas], denial of the sea to the enemy [prevent invasion as well 
as enemy use of the sea for deployment or maintenance of their forces], 
the provision of tactical air sup port out of range of land based aircraft, 
and finally, to assist the RAF with a strategic air offensive if required. 465 
The First Sea Lord's concern was that, because of constraints derived 
from the country's weak economic position, the Navy would be incapable 
of carrying out these tasks particularly during the opening stages of any 
conflict. However severe these restrictions might be, he argued that the 
Navy must retain sufficient strength to be able to deny the enemy the use 
of the main oceans, the Narrow Seas and the Mediterranean. It must have 
a nucleus strength from which to build up forces to undertake the other 
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roles, and no opportunity should be lost of seizing the initiative and thus 
imposing on the enemy a feeling of insecurity. 
The naval capaign in the Far East undertaken by the British Pacific 
Fleet offered one model for how a small maritime power could be 
deployed to achieve this. A carrier task force supported by an adequate 
Fleet Train could be a force multiplier, operating for extended periods 
away from shore support, providing the heavy cover necessary to 
dominate the strategically significant areas of ocean. 
The relevance of Command of the Sea 
Command of the sea is a vital enabler of victory for a maritime 
power against a continental opponent. The Admiralty were in no doubt 
as to the role of command of the sea for the defence of sea 
communications. The Admiralty's early planning for the post-War period 
crystallized around a paper considered at a Board of Admiralty meeting 
whilst the BPF were working up prior to operations to support the 
invasion of Okinawa. 466 
The fundamental issue for the Navy was to how to maintain a 
balanced fleet. The paper argued that sufficient forces should be kept in 
conu-nission to safeguard British world wide interests, and to maintain 
training and development for war. 'Each component which will form part 
of the Fleet in war will be included so that long service officers and men 
are ready for an immediate expansion of the Fleet when an emergency 
arises. ' This feature of relying upon expansion of the armed forces 
generally and the Navy in particular in response to a crisis would place 
some severe restrictions upon the RN. Most perniciously the retention. of 
significant numbers in the Reserve Fleet would encourage naval thought 
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to consider circumstances where such vessels were appropriate often to 
the detriment of wider thinking. 
The RN's basic assumptions were; first, although Germany and 
Japan would be completely disarmed for a period, it was not certain that 
they could be prevented from becoming a threat to world peace in the 
foreseeable future; second, the Government's faith in the development of 
a 'World Security Organisationý could not be assumed; third, that "War 
against the United States is unthinkable ... In any future war, it is hoped 
that the United States of America will again be allied to the British 
Empire. From past experience it is unlikely that America will take part in 
the early stages of a war, and the Empire may be faced once more with 
"holding the ring" alone! And fourth, as a result of the preceding, 'Owing 
to its strategic mobility, the Navy may be the first arm to be employed in 
many areas of the world, should it be necessary to resort to force or bring 
pressure to bear to keep the peace. 1467 
Support for British Foreign Policy during peacetime would 
concentrate upon deterring other nations from resorting to war as well as 
maintaining British interests throughout the globe. For the Navy this 
required the stationing of ships in all parts of the world. Besides exerting 
British influence and rendering assistance to British nationals, in case of 
civil disorder or other calamities, the Navy had an important role in 
"showing the flag". This latter function, it was hoped, would result in 
greatly expanded exports, without which it was certain that the country's 
finances would be unable to support a large Navy. Supporting the 
government's policy of deterring war required adequate forces being 
kept in commission. In addition it was argued that 'you cannot make 
sailors, much less officers, overnight or in a few months, and you must 
have ships available for training them at sea. Therefore we must keep as 
467 lbid 
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much of the Navy in running conu-nission as is financially possible. '468 
[emphasis in original] 
If war did break out then the RN was unequivocal in what it 
considered its primary role -the destruction of the enemy's armed forces. 
'The early destruction of an enemy's sea and air forces is the most certain 
and economical method of protecting the Empire's sea communications. 
This will also afford freedom of action for the forces of all arms which is 
necessary for ultimate victory. ' 469 The ultimate victory, the Navy, 
graciously conceded was not something the RN could secure on its own. 
'The Navy is required to transport overseas and land the armies in 
assault operations. Besides the provision and manning of specialized 
shipping for this purpose, the Fleet has to protect the assault convoys and 
to cover and support landing operations. It is true to say that no enemy 
can be finally defeated until the armed strength of the Empire has been 
conveyed by sea and brought to bear in the industrial heart of the 
enemy's country! 
Captain Godfrey French's memorandum declared in the most 
unambiguous terms that 'the basis of Imperial Defence is the control of 
sea communications'. 470 This control would weld the strength of the 
Empire together into a whole stronger than its parts. This strate . gy 
focused on 'passage at sea to be secured for our own and allied shipping 
and to be denied to enemy vessels. '471 Although naval forces were still 
vital to the 'defence of the United Kingdom base'472 neither of these tasks 
could any longer be depicted as the exclusive responsibility of the 
Admiralty. 
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A vigorous debate took place in the pages of the Naval Review and 
the Royal Utiffed Services Institutioiz jotirnal as to the effect that 
developments in air power had had on sea power. 473 This argument 
raged for the remaining years of the decade and displayed a remarkable 
similarity to the one concerning naval aviation during the inter-war 
years. The vulnerability of battleships and whether they had any further 
usage, the ability of naval aviation to function in all weathers and climes, 
what its primary task at sea should be, the role and constitution of the 
capital ship, and the relation the Navy should have with the RAF. Despite 
this continuity of concern, the Admiralty had to draw some conclusions 
and provide working guidance to officers at sea. As a result their 
Lordships issued the following in the 1947 Fighting Instructions. 
The advent of sea/air power has rendered the old 
established terms of naval warfare and naval forces obsolete. 
The exercise of sea/air power is now expressed in the terms 
"Maritime Warfare" and "Maritime Forces. " Maritime Warfare 
is the employment in war of all forces working in co-operation 
on, or under and over the sea. Maritime Forces include 
warships, aircraft (both shore-based and carrier borne), fleet 
auxiliaries, transports and other types of ships adapted for 
service with the Fighting Forces. 474 
This was a significant step for the navy, not simply because of the 
recognition it gave to the role of air power generally, but because it came 
a mere two years after the Admiralty had reaffirmed its belief that 
battleships were the final detern-dnant of war at sea. 
During the final months of the war the Adn-dralty conunissioned a 
report by Lord Evershed into the internal organisation of Naval Aviation 
which made it quite clear that whilst there were a number of serious 
deficiencies in the Fleet Air Arm there could be no question of going back 
to the situation of the inter-war years where the Navy's aviation needs 
473For a fuller examination of this debate see J. Robb-Webb British Naval Policy 1945-50, 
Deteniiiiihig New Objectives mid Fleet Compositim unpublished MA dissertation Kings 
College London Sept. 1994 
474ADM 239/382 Confidential Book CB04487 The Fighting Instructions 1947 para. 5. 
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were neglected not so much by non attention as by too much. The 
plethora of reports, articles and opinions on the subject made it more 
difficult to agree a coherent policy both within and without the service. 475 
Admiral Sir Gerald Dickens explained the thinking behind the 
Navy's position when he wrote in the RUSI Joitmal that; 'Sea and air 
power are interrelated. Sea power is to be maintained by the judicious 
use of all three services. '476 He argued that military operations in 
Northern and Eastern Africa, for instance, were undertaken to provide 
'mastery of the Mediterranean and Red seas. ' 
Pre-war ideas about decisive surface engagements leading to control 
of sea communications were still extremely influential, but the 
circumstances now facing the RN required new thinking about how such 
a principle would function in practice in the modern environment. British 
experience during the Second World War appeared to confirm the value 
of achieving command of the sea at the same time as restating the 
problems of gaining it against an enemy unwilling to offer battle. The 
navies of both Germany and Italy had been reluctant to sortie against 
British Fleets. 
The expected form of Soviet aggression at sea was clearly not a 
challenge to the Western Alliance in the conventional Mahanian sense. 
Command of the sea was unquestionably held by the USN and its allies. 
The Soviet Union was believed to be preparing for a strategy of sea 
denial. This was of particular concern to the Royal Navy, who recognised 
how vulnerable the country was to attacks on its sea communications. 
The major problem revolved around how, with limited resources, this 
threat could be overcome. The navy squared this circle by turning to its 
relationship with the USN. 
475ADM 167/124 Admiralty Board Minutes Evershed Report on the internal 
Organisation of Naval Aviation February 1945 
476Admiral Sir Gerald Dickens Sea and Air Power: Sonie Further Considerations Journal 
Royal United Services Institution Vol. 94 1949 p20 
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By 1949 the Soviet Union had been identified as the main threat to 
British interests and 'world peace' with 1957 as the year of 'maximum 
danger'. The Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sir John Edelsten, 
explained Soviet grand strategy by arguing that they would attempt to 
avoid a general war in the foreseeable future until such time as the 
restoration of their economy had reached a point where it would 'rival 
and eventually outstrip that of the United States. '477 This would be 
accompanied by 'a move towards increased strategic security by the 
establishment of a belt of subservient states around her frontiers. ' This 
would provide the secure basis from which the Bolshevik's would pursue 
their overall aim of world communism controlled from Moscow. The 
main thrust of Soviet moves in this direction were expected to come from 
political subversion and the support of nationalist movements in colonial 
territories. 
In spite of the belief that open hostilities were unlikely in the 
immediate future 'or maybe before if the vital interests of either side are 
prejudiced, ' it was thought that 'Russia, having completed her second 
Five-Year Plan, may decide that war is the only means of achieving her 
aim of world domination. 478 When conflict eventually broke out, 
Britain's war winning policy was summarised as being; the defeat of the 
'Russian onslaught into areas and against communications vital to the 
Allies'; the adoption of 'an air strategy aimed primarily at breaking the 
communist control of the Russian people'; the pursuit of 'a political 
strategy aimed at breaking the faith of the Russian people in their rulers'; 
and moves designedto wean the satellites away from Russia. '479 
477Admiral Sir John Edelsten VCNS Lecture: War in 56157, the strategic backgromid with 
particidar reference to the maritime pichire. in ADM 239/489. 
4781bid. para. 24. 
4791bid. para. 25 
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The UK's n-dlitary strategy in support of these objectives revolved 
around three pillars. First, the maintenance of the home islands and their 
development as an offensive base. Second, a firm hold in the Middle East 
as an area from which attacks on the Soviet Union could also be 
launched. Finally, the defence of sea communications which would hold 
the Empire together and ensure points one and two above. 
The Navy also sought control of sea communications in order that 
the Army and the Air Force could be 'moved overseas in accordance with 
our strategy, and once there that they can be maintained and, if 
necessary, withdrawn. This task includes the requirement for seaborne 
assault and seaborne flank support when necessary. ' 
Exercise TRIDENT carried out at the Naval College Greenwich in 
April 1949 was designed to illustrate how the developing ideas 
concerning naval warfare would operate in practice. Whilst the exercise 
itself was not a war plan it does demonstrate the lines along which the 
Navy were thinking, indeed it was 'meant to portray a reasonable and 
possible picture'. 480 
Admiral Fraser's foreword to exercise TRIDENT481 explained the 
purpose of the study as being to provide an opportunity to study the 
maritime lessons of the Second World War and apply them to a possible 
war in 1957. Although 1957 had been designated the year of maximum 
danger with regards planning for future hostilities due to the belief that 
the Soviet Union would not possess the atomic bomb until 1952 and 
would require five years to develop sufficient stock piles to undermine 
the Americans nuclear predonýdnance, Fraser recognised that 'no one can 
say how imminent a future war may be. ' Under such circumstances 
TRIDENT was designed to take into account the 'effects of strategic and 
480ADM 239/489 CB 04520 Exercise Trident Part 11 para. 28. 
48lIbid. 
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economic changes and of scientific and technical developments' as well as 
assessing the applicability of 'old weapons' in a period of transition when 
the prevailing climate appeared to be one where 'new weapons are the 
order of the day. ' 
The very nature of this transitional period and the still raging 
debates on weapons systems, the appropriateness of traditional strategic 
concepts, and the changes in tactics created a minefield complete with 
shifting sand bars for the Admiralty's planners to navigate. Fraser 
explained to his Greenwich audience, and the wider service who received 
the two volume synopsis of TRIDENT, that one of the hopes of the 
exercise was to 'inform the Fleets fully of the lines on which the Naval 
Staff in London is working and thereby establish principles which will 
assist in the solution of some of the problems confronting us. ' 
The exercise assumed that the RAF had given sufficient priority to 
aerial mining that the exits from the Baltic had been closed with the 
support of surface craft from Norway. It was further assumed that the 
Russians had been prevented from establishing bases on the Norwegian 
coast by the suitable deployment of the Army (mainly Norwegians, but 
with the backing of Commonwealth forces). There were a number of 
question marks hanging over both of these assumptions, not least the 
ability of the RAF to carry out the Admiralty's desired tasks, but as the 
purpose of the exercise was 'to show how the exits in the Arctic might be 
controlled by the establishment of a zone of maritime control in that 
area'482 and as it was a Navy exercise these doubts were acknowledged 
rather than dealt with. 
The RN & the USN: An Enduring Special Relationship 
4821bid. para. 12 
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The diplomatic goal of a permanent peacetime alliance with the 
United States began to take on an increased momentum during 1947. It is 
therefore worth examining how the military and particularly the 
Admiralty viewed and responded to this. The fundamental premise that 
war with the United States was unthinkable had been accepted before the 
end of hostilities. 483 This was hardly contentious and certainly did not 
contradict the policy being pursued by the Foreign Office and the 
Government at ministerial level. Following on from this further 
assumptions were being made that were more debatable. The Adn-dralty 
initially thought that while the US would, in any future conflict, be allied 
to the British Empire, there was no guarantee that they would participate 
from the start. 'From past experience it is unlikely that America will take 
part in the early stages of a war, and the Empire may be faced once more 
with "holding the ring" alone. 1484 In the circumstances this was not an 
unreasonable assumption. There was evidence that the United States was 
returning to a policy of isolationism, and planning for a worst case 
scenario was part of the Services" job. The difficulty for the Adn-dralty 
and the other two Services was that all realised the weaknesses in 
capability vis-2i-vis the Soviet Union could only be made good by 
American involvement. As the Joint Planning Staff acknowledged, 
It is essential that we should have the active and very early 
support of the United States. The United States alone, on 
account of her man-power, industrial resources and her lead 
in the development of weapons of mass destruction can turn 
the balance in favour of the DemocracieS. 485 
Reqognising the need and being able to do something practical 
about it, however, were two different issues. The JPS assumed that 
American aid to assist in the direct land and air defence of the United 
483ADM 167/124 The Post War Navy 
484ibid. 
485DEFE 6/2 Ministry of Defence, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Planning Staff 
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Kingdom would not be forthcoming in the first instance. They appear to 
have been fairly confident, though, that in light of the moves by the US 
Navy in the Mediterranean during the preceding year American support 
could be counted upon in that theatre. However the Joint Planning Staff 
were concerned that unless it was possible to tie the Americans into some 
form of permanent peace time commitment to the region a significant 
delay might well occur which would grievously weaken Western 
interests. Finally, it was felt that some assistance could be expected in the 
control of sea communications, provided that the Americans maintained 
adequate forces in peace. Even this would only be available in certain 
areas. 
Whilst discussions on these issues were being undertaken the 
Services were coming under increasing pressure from the Treasury to 
curtail the defence budget. This in turn put more pressure on the forces to 
rely upon American assistance as a way out the dilernma of incompatible 
commitments and resources. In order to square the circle of their plans 
and resources the Service Chiefs needed an American commitment which 
had not been achieved by the Foreign Office. The Director of Plans, War 
Office, was clearly arguing from the assumption of greatly increased and 
immediate American aid at the outset of any war, particularly in the air 
and at sea. This implied an agreement between the two countries 
something which was patently desirable but as yet had no official 
existence at the grand strategic level. 
Even if the assumptions discussed above turned out to be solidly 
based they still created problems for planning. The discussion over the 
Futtire Defence Policy paper found that each service, while accepting the 
assumption of increased US military aid at the outbreak of war, produced 
completely different conclusions on the shape and size of British forces as 
actual levels of American assistance were entirely speculative. As the 
records of the meetings shows 'it is clear that if we had to rely to that 
extent on American aid we should first have to discuss with the 
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Americans the type of aid which they could most readily afford before 
we settled the shape and size of our forces. '486 
The Chiefs of Staff were well aware that such planning would be 
running ahead of what the Government had achieved and therefore 
sounded a note of caution. 'We are in any case all agreed that the 
proposal depends on political and military considerations beyond the 
control of this country and that may well, therefore, prove impracticable 
and dangerous. '487 
Their concern was clearly that although from a Service point of view 
it was considered necessary, it might well be politically unacceptable. For 
the CoS in effect this meant the recognition by H. M. G. of the need for a 
military alliance with the United States. It n-dght even involve the 
conclusion of a secret treaty and the holding of continuous staff talks to 
allot tasks and ensure the necessary integration of planning. If it meant 
anything less it would be valueless, "since we should merely have taken 
an assumption without any assurance. 1488 
At this time all the Americans appeared to be willing to sign up to 
was the continuation of informal military contacts. The State Department 
was only prepared to extend wartime co-operation on defence matters 
"on an informal basis, [ ... 
], particularly as they relate to the exchange of 
information, the exchange of officers' training, arms standardization, and 
the informal use of each other's naval and air ports. '489 This was far short 
of what the Chiefs of Staff thought to be essential. 
Further to this problem, there also remained the issue of whether or 
not the Americans, even if agreement was reached at the grand strategic 




489Departinent of State policy statement, Washington, 11 July 1948. FRUS, 1948, Vol. III, 
pp. 1091-2 
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envisaged. The Joint Planning Staff were concerned that the political 
climate in Washington, was subjecting the USN to considerable cuts 
which would curtail their ability to provide forces at sea deemed 
necessary to support the British. 490 
Although the Government had yet to conclude any defence treaty 
with the United States it is clear that by the second half of 1948 many 
within the Admiralty were behaving as if one had been agreed. 
September 1948 saw the Director of Technical Staff Duties writing to the 
First Sea Lord, by this time Lord Fraser, expressing concern over the 
nature of Anglo-American policy with regard future confliCts. 491 He 
argued that much of the planning undertaken by both within the 
Admiralty and within the Fleet with regard to its training exercises did 
not appear to be in harmony with policy agreed with the Arnericans. 492 In 
essence DTSD was working from a premise that the Americans would be 
involved from the start of any conflict and therefore be able to take on 
certain essential naval tasks. 
To a degree this process of assun-dng co-operation at the military 
and operational levels of planning was mirrored in the United States. The 
joint Chiefs of Staff study, Pinclier, of 1946, assumed that the United 
States would be allied to the British Commonwealth from the outset of 
hostilities with the Soviet Union. It went so far as to say that Soviet 
moves which threatened the security of eit1wr the UK or US would result 
in war between themselves and the USSR. 493 Pincher was approved as 
the conceptual basis of American planning on 18 June 1946. The 
following year stronger links between the planning staffs of the UK, the 
US and Canada were forged. Although these contacts started out as a 
490DEFE 6/3 Ministry of Defence, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Planning Staff 
Memoranda, JP(47) 129 (Final) 11/11/47. 
491See chapter on Operational Issues 1945-50 for a full exploration of this argument, 
492ADM 205/69 First Sea Lords Records 1948 Part 1. Policy atid Fleet Tactical Trabibig 
14/7/48 
493jCS' Phicher: Coizcept of Operatioits, 2/3/46, p. 1, in US joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of 
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forum to discuss issues such as the standardisation of equipment they 
gradually moved into areas of strategic concepts, intelligence estimates 
and the development of a logistical system. 494 The resulting 
BroilerlDoublequick plan envisaged the evacuation of British and American 
occupation troops from mainland Europe. There were political difficulties 
with regard to such a concept at a time when Britain was attempting 'to 
bolster up the detern-tination of the Western European powers to oppose 
and eradicate communist influence in their countries ... 1495 It does 
however make clear how far the military in both countries had developed 
a shared vision and how far ahead of the grand strategic political process 
they had become. 
The political mood had also been developing in Washington. In the 
spring of 1946, the Director of the State Department's Office of European 
Affairs, Freeman Mathews, wrote a memorandum for the State-War- 
Navy Co-ordinating Committee in which he argued that the denial of 
Soviet hegemony over Europe required US support for the UK, political, 
economic and if necessary n-dlitary. 496 The memorandum produced no 
seismic shift in American security policy, but it does illustrate a growing 
consensus among foreign policy officials that was mirrored in the 
military if not yet at the Administration level. 
As Britain's overstretch became unbearable the USN was drawn into 
the Mediterranean on a more permanent basis. This accorded with the 
Middle Sea becon-ting increasingly the focus of the US Navy's attention in 
1946 as likely missions in the Pacific appeared to be less important. In 
June the Commander of American naval forces in the Mediterranean, 
Vice Admiral B. H. Bieri, was ordered to move naval units into the 
Adriatic to operate with the Royal Navy in support of Allied. forces in the 
494See S. Maloney Securing Command of the Sea Op Cit. chapter 2. 
495DEFE 6/5 British Chiefs of Staff JPS Subjects for US-UK meetings 6/1/48 
496FRUS, 1946, Vol. 1, p. 1170. 
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Venezia Guilia/Trieste region which was then being contested by 
Yugoslavia. These units in the Adriatic were under the operational 
command of the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, a British 
Admiral. 
In July 1946 Forestal visited London and conferred with AN. 
Alexander, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and senior naval officers. He 
was impressed with the deep concern they felt for the future relations 
with Russia and their desire for close co-operation with the US Navy. The 
British stated the need for a greater American presence in the 
Mediterranean. Upon his return to Washington, Forrestal set out to find a 
way to integrate American diplomacy and military activities. 
By early 1948 the US Navy's presence in the Mediterranean had 
taken on an almost permanent character. There were usually deployed a 
carrier, three to five cruisers and up to a dozen destroyers. The carriers 
would remain for short cruises of two to three months while the cruisers 
and destroyers remained for six months. Attached marine battalions 
stayed for six months. In January 1948 Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman 
became the new Commander, US Naval Forces Mediterranean and in 
June the force was designated the Sixth Task Fleet [it was redesignated 
Sixth Fleet in 1950]. 
The Navy's reorientation from ship-to-ship fighting in the Pacific, to 
ship-to-shore power projection focused around Europe, particularly the 
Eastern Mediterranean, not only helped secure it a role in the 
development of American defence planning but coincided with British 
desires for greater co-operation in the middle sea. An essential element of 
the emerging strategy was the forward deployment of naval forces, and 
particularly carriers, in the eastern Mediterranean. Having carriers on 
station in the area to launch strikes against major Soviet targets obviated 
the need for a long and potentially costly campaign to get into the area 
after hostilities had begun and after the Soviets n-dght have established 
control of the air. Thus Nimitz and Sherman could see the advantages in 
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the precedent set by the deployment of the Roosevelt and its successors 
beginning in 1946.497 
Deployment of significant American naval forces in the 
Mediterranean meant that there was a need to make arrangements for 
fuel, repairs and victuals. Forrestal had already indicated that there 
would be no American bases in the Mediterranean capable of providing 
such succour. The answer to this dilemma was clear enough to Nimitz, 
access to the long established and elaborate support infrastructure 
maintained by the RN. The Chief of Naval Operations indicated that his 
policy was to formulate 
a co-ordinated naval policy with appropriate members of 
the British Commonwealth of Nations to include reciprocal 
use of British naval facilities in the Mediterranean (involving 
no United States establishments on shore), particularly at 
Gibraltar and Malta, in return for similar use of our naval 
facilities in the Western and South Pacific. 498 
Forrestal passed Nimitz's suggestion on to Secretary of State Byrnes 
on 24th July 1946 who discussed the proposal with Bevin while both were 
attending the Paris Peace conference and a tentative agreement was 
reached on 26 September 1946 for the reciprocal use of British and 
American naval facilities. As Richard Best has written, 'Co-operation 
between the countries on naval matters in the Mediterranean strongly 
reinforced and gave strategic substance to other tendencies toward closer 
Anglo-American co-operation that were evolving in 1946-1947.1499 
In this way, the US Navy would encourage allied co-operation 
earlier and in more concrete ways than either of the other Services. The 
US Army's contact with the British was primarily concerned with matters 
497 Best, Approach to Alliance Op Cit, p. 123 
498Nimitz Memorandum, National Archives, Washington DC, Record Group 80, CNO 
Finish File 1946, Box 56, File Folder no. 2. 
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relating to occupational duties and it was not until the second half of 1948 
that serious contingency planning was undertaken. Although there was 
greater contact between the air forces of the respective nations, including 
the American need for British airfields and the example of the RAF as an 
independent service, the US Air Force was oriented toward the defence of 
the North American continent. In contrast the USN was concerned with 
missions involving the projection of power in the defence of the "West's" 
interests around the globe. This increasingly became tied up with co- 
operation with the British and in particular the RN. As Adn-dral Nimitz 
told the House Appropriations Committee in early 1947, 
With the end of the war, and in light of events since the 
end of the war, it has become obvious that our peace and 
security depends on a balance of power in which again 
American and British seapower are arrayed on the same side 
of the balance. 500 
The creation of this attitude was exactly what the Foreign Office and 
the Admiralty had been working toward ever since establishment of the 
BPF. Nimitz went on to argue that it was in America's national interest to 
take up the role in international relations that the RN was no longer in a 
position to fulfil. 'This responsibility now devolves upon the United 
States, not from altruistic or idealistic reasons but from cold self 
interest. 1501 
Conclusion Naval Co-operation in the Korean War 
The Korean War illustrated many of the issues that had inluenced 
the RN since the end of World War Two. Although there was a degree of 
suspiscion lingering between the political establishment in London and 
50OUnited States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, 
Nayy Department Appropriation Bill for 1948, Hearings. 80th Cong., lst sess., 1947. 
501 ibid. 
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Washington the same was certainly not true at the military strategic level. 
The armed services in general and the RN and USN in particular had 
developed and built upon their wartime collaboration. The experience of 
operating together in wartime off the coast of Korea deepend the mutual 
understanding and respect that had been kept alive through joint 
exercises in the intervening five years. 
The British Government committed naval forces to the US led 
United Nations operation as the first tangible demonstration of political 
support. Atlee recognised that if Britain wanted to retain influence with 
the US then it was beholden to provide n-dlitary forces. 502 This was 
exactly what had shaped the BPFs commitment to the Pacific. The 
government did complain that they were not adequately consulted over 
the nature of the operations that the RN was involved in. 503 However this 
attitude certainly did not extend down to the n-dlitary strategic level. 
Indeed Admiral Brind, C-in-C Far East Station, committed the RN forces 
he had available to Vice Admiral C. T. Joy (USN COMNAVFE) for any 
hunmanitarian assistance he n-dght require before he had received any 
authorisation from London. 504 
This level of co-operation and integration of command was to 
continue throughout the war. There were of course difficulties of fully 
integrating the British system of command with that which the 
Americans utilised. For the USN each ship came under three separate 
commands; operational, logistical and type. This system was not 
mirrored in the RN were Operational, Maintenance and Technical 
Branches were united in the staff of the British Flag Officer. The Naval 
Staff History of the Korean War reported that American officers were 
502 Farrar-Hockley Official Histoly, The British Part in the Korean War Vol. 1, p. 103 
503 See Lowe P. The Fnistratims ofAlliatice, flie UWted States mid the Korean War, 1950-53 
in Cotton J. & Neary I. (eds) The Korean War in Histoly Manchester University Press 
[Manchester] 1989, p. 80-99 
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envious of the close co-ordination that this system produced. 505 Perhaps 
more tellingly the Staff History pointed out that though there were 
problems with the operational command as it affected RN ships, were 
solved often due to the personal relations that had been established in 
theatre. 'Missunderstanding and difference of out look were almost 
invariably dissipated by personal discussion. 1506 TNs was exactly the 
experience of the BPF and was in no small measure attributal to the 
relations that were vigorously maintained during the period 1949-50. 
In the field of Naval aviation the two navies were particularly close. 
The first series of strikes carried out by UN naval forces were a combined 
effort by HMS Triumph and USS Valley Forge on the 3rd July 1950.507 
This operation built upon exercises that had been jointly conducted 
earlier that year between the two Far East naval forces. Rear Admiral 
Andrewes, the RN commander in Korea, described them as follows. 
It all seemed so familiar joining up in formation [ ... ] as it was 
just what we had done so often during exercises in March with 
very similar forces. We didnýt feel out of things and were 
already getting back into the easy use of American signal 
books. 508 
Although British and Commonwealth naval forces were 
assigned general responsibility for operations on the west coast of 
Korea, and US forces the east, there was a regular exchange of ships 
and personnel between the two Task Groups. Indeed officers from 
both the USN and RN were frequently interchanged to observe carrier 
air operations and for familiarization and training. This interchange 
was even deeper than had been carried out in the Pacific during the 
BPF's tenure but owed much to the foundations laid by their efforts. 
505 Ibid. p. 280 
506 Ibid. 
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Section Three 
The Operational Level of War 
The direction of military resources to achieve military strategic 
objectives. It is the level at which campaign and major operations are 
planned, sequenced and directed. It is the responsibility of the 
operational level commander, usually identifiable as the joint or 
combined force commander in the theatre of operations, to determine the 
campaign plan and associated objectives required to achieve the desired 
military strategic end state within his designated theatre of operations. 
The operational level provides the crucial link between the setting of 
military strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces. The 
orchestration of military activities at this level is termed Operational Art; 
it is vital to the success of any campaign and is one of the most important 
skills wl-dch military leaders need develop. 509 
509 jWp 0-01 British Defence Dodrine HMSO [London] 1996 p. 1.9 
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Chapter Six 
The BPF and the Operational Level of War 
Writing in the conclusion of their 1990 study Jacobsen and 
Horsfield510 argue that the real significance of the BPF was political not 
operational. The Fleet inflicted minor damage on the Japanese capacity to 
wage war and did not undertake any major roles. The political 
significance was as a gesture of allied solidarity and of British 
determination to see the war oUt. 511 Whilst in terms of the actual conflict 
this analysis is probably justified, such a summation of the BPF misses 
much of the importance of the Pacific experience for the development of 
the RN. It was at the operational level that the changes brought about by 
the Pacific experience are readily identifiable in terms of the subsequent 
development of the RN. If the RN had not participated in the most 
forward operations against the Japanese then it would not have been able 
to learn the lessons necessary for conducting the most modern form of 
naval warfare. Operating intimately alongside the USN gave the RN the 
opportunity of studying first hand what had become a revolutionary type 
of naval warfare; expeditionary power projection operations, sustained at 
great distance, over long periods of time versus a determined and capable 
enemy. The Pacific experience gave the Royal Navy a range of new ways 
of conducting naval warfare that were to be a significant influence on 
post war campaign planning. 
The experience of the BPF at the operational level can be divided up 
into three phases, each corresponding to its major stages of employment: 
Firstly, the period from its formation in November 1944 until its arrival in 
51OMarder Old Friends, New Enemies OpCit p. 568 
511Ibid. Japanese strategy had always assumed that distant enemies would never 
threaten the Japanese homeland because they could not sustain offensives at such great 
distances from home. There is no evidence that the British participation in the final 
stages of the Pacific War had any bearing on the Japanese decision to surrender. 
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Australian waters three months later; secondly, the period covering 
participation in Operation ICEBERG, the invasion of Okinawa; and 
finally the BPFs period of integration with the US Third Fleet for 
operations off the Japanese home islands. Each of these stages reveals 
something of the profound affect that the Pacific experience had on the 
Royal Navy's operational concepts. It is evident from an examination of 
the available source material that the development of these ideas was 
both dependent upon, and responsible for, changes at the military 
strategic and tactical levels. The complex interplay between the various 
levels of warfare is nowhere more obvious than in Pacific operations. 
Modern British military doctrine identifies the operational level of war as 
the crucial link between tactical action and military strategic objectives. It 
is the stage at which the employment of military force in tactical 
engagements is combined in order to secure the objectives articulated at 
the military strategic level. To give but one example from the European 
theatre, the sailing of individual convoys to Russia, tactical actions, 
combined with the provision of heavy cover from the Home Fleet and air 
cover from Coastal Command, also discrete tactical actions, to produce 
the campaign at the operational level which delivered the military 
strategic objdctive of maintaining allied use of the sea way to Northern 
Russia. 
As Chapters Two and Four established, the British sought to utilise 
the BPF as a tool of alliance building with the US. This was dependent 
upon their being able to operate at the cutting edge of action against the 
Japanese. This objective would not have been possible if the RN had been 
unable rapidly to assimilate the new type of warfare that the USN was 
conducting in the vast reaches of the Pacific. The decisions taken at the 
grand strategic and military strategic levels obviously formed the context 
in which the BPF operated. They set out the objectives toward which it 
was to work and the resources with wl-dch they had to. be achieved. The 
constraints imposed on the operational level of the BPF"s activities came 
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from both the higher levels as well as the tactical level below. 
Developments at the operational level were reliant upon tactical advances 
but these were of no use in isolation. Only when they were combined into 
operational level campaigns did they assume a wider significance. 
This chapter examines these developments at the operational level 
through the three phases of the BPF's participation mentioned above. 
These are contrasted with pre BPF practice and it is this aspect that is 
examined first. An exploration of American developments at the 
operational level, focusing on the emergence of the Fast Carrier Task 
Force [CTF], is then undertaken to illustrate the advances the USN had 
made. The three phases of BPF operations are then investigated. The first 
phase demonstrates how the CTF was employed for strategic effect 
against land based economic targets. Operation ICEBERG, the invasion of 
Okinawa, highlights developments in the concept of 'attack at source, 
which was to be a major feature of the RN's thinking post war. Finally, 
the BPF"s integration into the American Third Fleet under Admiral 
Halsey draws together these strands and shows how important actual 
participation in the Pacific was for the JýN. All three of these phases of the 
BPF's experience were dependant upon the development of a capable 
Fleet Train. 
Pre BPF Practice 
While most of this work is directed toward outlining how important 
the Pacific campaign was in the development of the RN and the impact 
that American practice had on this development, it is also necessary to 
examine how much of a conceptual leap this new style of warfare 
actually amounted to, given the fact that the British exercises carried out 
in the Mediterranean from the late twenties onwards. began to see the 
development of the idea of the carrier task group. Though the availability 
219 
of carriers to drive this concept forward was severely restricted, the seed 
of the idea was clearly planted. In the early 1930s the Naval Staff 
commented 'On only one occasion has any officer been called upon to 
operate more than two carriers, whereas in war it is more probable that at 
least four and possibly more aircraft carriers will be required to be 
handled as a unit. '512 A rather prescient comment but one which had to 
wait for the establishment of the BPF to bear fruit due to the limited 
availability of aircraft carriers that could operate together. 
The Naval War Manual with which the RN entered the Second 
World War contained the Admiralty's thinking concerning the nature of 
warfare at sea. 513 It had been published in 1925 but amendments to its 
text continued to be made into the 1940s. It was eventually superseded by 
a new edition in 1947, which published a distillation of wartime 
experience and will be analysed in the next chapter. The Naval War 
Manual was explicit that the first task of RN was the defeat of an enemy's 
capacity to wage war at sea. "The military aim of the Navy is to destroy in 
battle, or to neutralise and to weaken the opposing navy. 1514 In order to 
achieve this, '[.. ]offensive action [was] the necessary forerunner of 
victory" regardless of whether an offensive or defensive strategy was 
adopted at the military strategic level. 515 This would in turn provide the 
country with the command of the sea necessary for the defence of its 
SLoCs. The Manual was unambiguous in its support for the role of the 
battlefleet in this process. 
In every maritime war the control of sea communications and 
tradeways has hitherto been exercised by that power which, in 
addition to possessing sufficient vessels to exercise this control, 
has been able to concentrate a battlefleet sufficient to destroy or 
neutralise similar enemy forces. 516 
512ADM 116/2771 Dir. of Training and Staff Duties Div., 7/7/30 
513ADM 186/66 Naval War Manual 1925 
514 Ibid. amendment 14/11/40 p. 1 
515 Ibid p. 2 
516 Ibid. p. 6 
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Though the Admiralty still considered the battleship the 
fundamental building block of the battlefleet it did recognise that 
airpower had made dramatic progress during the inter-war period. An 
amendment made in 1940 illustrates the Navy's thinking concerning 
aircraft. "Strategic functions of naval aircraft include independent 
operations against the enemy, reconnaissance and the exercise of 
control. 1517 It is interesting to note that this amendment was promulgated 
just three days after the attack on Taranto by Admiral Cunningham and 
the fleet carrier HMS Illustrious. It is clear that the RN, far from being 
ignorant of developments concerning the use of naval aviation in 
independent operations, was not only aware of them but pioneering new 
roles when necessity and resources pern-dtted. The Japanese took 
particular note of the raid on the Italian Fleet at Taranto as it confirmed 
that aircraft could effectively use torpedoes in the shallow waters of a 
harbour. They would use this method of strike to good effect a little over 
a year later at Pearl Harbor. 
Given Britain's wartime strategy, the Royal Navy"s primary role was 
ensuring the security of the UK's sea lines of communication. This in turn 
meant that her naval aviation assets were predominantly employed in 
order to provide air cover for the fleet or convoys. It was not until the UK 
had weathered the storm created by her continental enemies and America 
entered the war that she was able to go over to the strategic offensive. 
This had a profound affect upon RN thinking concerning carrier 
operations prior to the BPF. This does not mean that at the tactical level 
offensive action had lost any of its traditional popularity within the RN, 
rather that even such actions as the strike on Taranto or Operation 
Tungsten [the FAA strike on Tirpitz in April 19441 were designed to 
achieve a defensive effect at the operational and military strategic levels. 
Their primary purpose was to secure sea communications which could 
517 Ibid. p. 10 
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then subsequently be used to deliver military force enabling offensive 
military operations to be undertaken which would ultimately defeat the 
enemy at the strategic level. 
One of the RN's most successful innovations during the Second 
World War was in the field of operational research. First used in 1937 
Operational Research [OR] was the application of organised and 
systernatised analysis to specific situations. By the end of the war there 
was little that the allies had undertaken which was not scrutinised by 
operational research but it is perhaps most widely known for its role in 
the Battle of the Atlantic. To give but one example; it was discovered 
through careful study of action reports that the time between an aircraft 
sighting a U-boat and attacking it averaged about two minutes. The 
aircraft's depth charges were set to explode at a depth of 100 feet. OR 
showed that the U-boat could not have achieved this depth in the two 
minutes allowed. Consequently depth charges were re-set to detonate at 
25 feet with almost immediate results. OR was also extensively used to 
analyse the performance of carrier operations, both British and American. 
In a report covering carrier strikes carried out by the RN between March 
and October 1944 The Director of Naval Operational Research [DNOR] 
produced a picture of pre-BPF practice. 518 Of the 14 operations studied, 
11 of these operations were strikes on shipping and shore objectives, and 
three were minelaying. Of the 11, five were by the Eastern Fleet and six 
by the Home Fleet. On average these strike operations consisted of the 
equivalent of just under three(2.7) Illustrious Class fleet carriers 
supported by one battleship, three cruisers and ten destroyers. The 
operations usually amounted to seven days at sea during which two 
strikes were carried out consisting of 49 fighter and 37 bomber sorties, 
dropping 23.5 tons of bombs. DNOR recognised that these figures were 
well short of what the USN was attaining in the Pacific, particularly in the 
518 ADM 219/262 Director of Naval Operational Research, Analysis of British Carrier 
Strikes, March 1945 
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length of time that the force was at sea. The report actually referred to 
British actions as `tip-and-runý, indicating their limited strike power and 
duration. 
When the RN returned to the Pacific their main task was projecting 
allied sea power over land; there were few opportunities to engage what 
remained of the IJN. This was to be a significant change in focus for the 
Royal Navy although this type of operation had been examined before 
the outbreak of war. In discussing operations against an enemy shore 
installation, in 1939 the Admiralty wrote: 
Although it was found possible in the Combined Operations at 
Singapore in February 1938 for a carrier to attack a shore 
aerodrome and withdraw without having been located by shore 
based aircraft such an operation must be considered ... as an 
extremely hazardous undertaking against any but an 
undefended base. 519 
What is significant about this observation is not that the concept of 
attacking shore installations featured in the RN's pre-war thinking but 
that such operations were thought possible only against a relatively 
undefended target and perhaps more crucially, once command of the sea 
was secure. The balance between land based aircraft and those operating 
from a carrier was very much in the formers favour with regard 
performance. When the BPF were called upon to neutralise Japanese 
airfields during the invasion of Okinawa, the bases on Sakishima Gunto 
were anything but undefended. This defence however, was restricted to 
land based aviation following the USN destruction of the Japanese fleet. 
The full operational implications of these strikes will discussed below. 
519ADM 239/142 Progress in Tactics 1939 Confidential Book CB03016/39 
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Fully exploiting the strengths of organic naval aviation required not 
only technological advances in the performance of organic aircraft so that 
they could compete with land based aviation, but also the revision of the 
concept of the battlefleet. The RN had been investigating the use of a Task 
Force in the Mediterranean. In this embryonic organisation one can see 
the seeds of the force structure that would come to fruition in the Pacific 
where the aircraft delivered projectile replaced that launched from the 
big gun. The Admiralty recognised that developments in airpower and 
their impact at sea would require new forms of tactical disposition. 
Commenting that '... a special cruising disposition was designed with the 
object of providing warning of the approach of hostile aircraft by means 
of a surface warning zone of light craft, with an inner ring of cruisers so 
placed that they should be able to engage aircraft with long range AA 
fire. 1520 Extensive investigation, both at sea and on the table top, by the 
Tactical School, were carried out into the use of carriers, on how best to 
employ the limited fighter protection available and how such would 
affect fleet operations. The above comment makes it clear, however, that 
this type of operation was 'special', or distinct from the norm. 
This conclusion is supported by the chapter in the Admiralty's last 
pre-war tactical instructions, which deal with the battle toward which so 
much was directed. The chapter discusses the employment of cruisers, 
destroyers and submarines as well as anti-submarine operations, but not 
actions involving aircraft carriers. It subsequently says that '... a system 
has been evolved in the Home and Mediterranean Fleets for operating an 
aircraft carrier in a colunm of battleships or cruisers, screened by a 
destroyer flotilla. ' The implication of this is that carrier operations were 
an adjunct to normal or usual Fleet operations. The column of battleships 
was still expected to deploy in line ahead and decide the outcome of an 
engagement -not the carrier's aircraft, despite their recognised 
importance. The pace of change was, however, quickening and impacted 
520ibid. 
224 
upon the RN most obviously when a Fleet was despatched to the Far 
East. 
The US Navy, in contrast to operations in the Atlantic, the North Sea 
and the Mediterranean, was faced from the start of the war with the 
strategic necessity of advancing across the Pacific in the face of hostile 
land based air power from Guam, the Carolines and the Marshall Islands, 
while seeking to engage the IJN in a decisive battle. This required the 
provision of a naval air force that could take on the enemy's sea based 
and land based air power simultaneously rather than in sequence. The 
British on the other hand favoured a sequential approach believing it 
foolhardy to disperse limited naval strength on 'secondary' operations 
until the all important fleet action had been won. 
Force H in the Mediterranean may be viewed as a foretaste of the 
Task Groups that came to dominate the sea in the Far East, when this 
concept of operations reached its mature form. Force H was built around 
whatever ships were available but usually consisted of an aircraft carrier, 
a battlecruiser, a cruiser and accompanying destroyers. 521 In the Pacific, 
the American Carrier Task Group customarily contained three to four 
carriers, up to four battleships, four to six cruisers and twelve to sixteen 
destroyers, with the Group Commander flying his flag in one of the 
carriers. Up to four such groups would operate together as a Task 
Force. 522 A unit of five carriers, of which four might be fleet, was a 
convenient tactical unit to which a night carrier could easily be added. 523 
This balanced all type force had the mobility, combat potential and 
flexibility for independent strategic operations. 
The importance of having a dedicated night carrier had been 
recognised for some time. In November 1943, reports from observers with 
521 The most famous members of Force H were probably the Carrier Ark Royal, the 
Battlecruiser Renown, and the Cruiser Slieffield. 
522ADM 1/18646 United States Naval Methods: Conduct of Carrier Task Forces in the 
Pacific. 
523ADM 199/2376 Section 1- Fleet Operational Lessons (Tactics) 
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the US Pacific Fleet were making a recommendation that within six 
months night carriers would be essential to operations. 524 The 
constraining factor upon the RN's tactical desire would again be ship 
building capacity. Where the USN could respond to Spruance and 
Mitscher's inability to strike at the Japanese fleet after night had fallen 
and ended the Battle of the Philippine Sea by assigning the light carrier 
Independence to night operations immediately, the RN had to wait until 
the end of July 1945 before HMS Ocean was commissioned as its first 
dedicated night carrier. 525 
American and British Procedures Compared 
The wording of the American understanding of the role to be 
played by the BPF was naturally somewhat different from that issued to 
Fraser. In describing the operations expected of the BPF the Americans 
wrote; 
It is planned that the first combat operations of the British 
surface ships after entering the Pacific Ocean Areas will be as a 
fast carrier task force operating in the PHILIPPINE SEA and the 
approaches to the EMPIRE during the Central Pacific operations 
for the occupation of the NANSEI SHOTO. The tasks assigned will 
involve attack on enemy shore based air forces, shore 
installations, and shipping. 526 
The key phrase contained in the above is the reference to the BPF in 
the Pacific acting as a fast carrier task force, for American operations in 
the Pacific were now centred around the fleet carrier, its range, its aircraft 
compliment, its speed and above all its availability. At the operational 
level for the USN and the RN in the Pacific the Fast Carrier Task Force 
524ADM 199/1523 Pacific Naval Operations Observers with US Pacific Fleet report by 
Cmdr. R. M. Smeeton 21/10/43-5/11/43 CV USS Essex 
525ADM 199/1492 Summary of Naval Air Operations - May - August 1945,1st Lord's 
Memoranda to War Cabinet 
526CinC US PAC Fleet to CinCSWPA NF-1 Memorandum of understanding 20/12/44: 
Record of Conference 17-19/12/44 Employment of BPF 
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was the significant military unit since it was capable of independent self 
sustained operations. The development of the fast carrier task force as the 
major strategic and tactical unit of naval warfare had been underway for 
some time before the Pacific campaign. Technological advances had 
provided the USN with the necessary means to exploit the full potential 
of carrier borne aviation. Advanced communications equipment held the 
key to successful carrier task force operations in the Pacific. The debate 
over single versus multi-carrier task force operations was resolved to a 
large extent by developments in radar. This British invention served two 
purposes - tracking ships and tracking aeroplanes. Ship tracking, 
performed by the Position Plan Indicator (PPI), enabled a multi-carrier 
force to maintain a high-speed formation at night or in foul weather. All 
supporting vessels could then provide continuous mutual antiaircraft 
protection. Although many of these inventions were of British origin it 
was the greater material base of the Americans that permitted their 
speedy application to combat. 
In mid 1943 the USN issued a new fleet doctrine. In carrier 
operations it emphasised flexibility and demanded concentration of 
carriers and supporting screens when under air attack. It cited the success 
of the British carriers when concentrated in the Mediterranean and 
critiqued the single carrier formations of the Americans during the battles 
of 1942.527 Despite this compliment it was recognised on both sides of the 
Atlantic that the British had a great deal to learn from the Americans in 
the carrier tactics necessary to achieve the operational objectives of the 
Pacific campaign. Rear Admiral Alva Bernhard, who had commanded an 
American carrier force with the British Home Fleet, wrote in December 
1943 that the British'know less of the proper use of carrier air power than 
when we did when the Langley was our only carrier. '528 This comment is 
certainly an exaggeration and could only be considered valid if one takes 
52710/6/43 PAC 10 Reynolds C. The Fast Carriers Naval Institute Press 1992 pp72 
528QUoted in Reynolds C. The Fast Carriers Naval Institute Press 1992 pp305 
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into account the divergent objectives of carrier airpower in European and 
Pacific theatres. It is more than evident that the British were constrained 
in their development of carrier operations by restrictions at the grand and 
military strategic levels as well as the simple facts of geography. These 
pushed the RN's aviation evolution in a direction that was markedly 
different from that of the USN in the Pacific. 
This is not, of course, to argue that the progress of naval aviation 
within the USN was either smooth or linear. Admiral Spruance, who had 
the outstanding victory of Midway under his belt, was no aviator nor was 
Adn-dral Nimitz. Partly in consequence of this and partly because Ernie 
King wanted him out of Washington529, Vice-Admiral Jack Towers was 
appointed to Nin-dtz's staff as ComAirPac on 1 September 1942. Towers 
was an air enthusiast and had to overcome a degree of personal 
indifference at Pearl Harbour. Though ComAirPac was to advise Cincpac 
on all aviation matters, his major work was to prepare tactical 
instructions and doctrine for naval aviation in the Pacific, to prepare and 
maintain operational air units and carriers prior to their combat service, 
and to analyse the strategic situation in regards to the needs and 
capabilities of naval aviation. In short he was to concentrate on the nuts 
and bolts of carrier aviation but not to exercise operational command. 
On 16 August 1943 Towers held a meeting at Pearl Harbour to 
discuss a new carrier policy. The deliberations of four Com-AirPac staff 
officers, four carrier division commanders, and seven carrier captains 
decided on 36 fighters, 36 dive bombers and 18 torpedo bombers as the 
size of carrier air wings. This was intended to provide a carriers" air wing 
with sufficient self protection and escort capability whilst permitting an 
offensive capability that was still significant. The carrier divisions were 
initially made up of one heavy and one light carrier eventually to be 
increased to two or three heavies with perhaps two light carriers 
according to availability. Towers' formal statement issued five days latter 
529Reynolds C. The Fast Carriers Naval Institute Press 1992 p. 68 
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declared that the carriers were (1) to attack the enemy on land and sea, 
the carriers being the principal offensive element of the fleet, (2) to 
provide direct air support for amphibious operations, and (3) to provide 
air support to task forces in which carriers were not the principal 
element. 530 
The arguments over command of the American fleet continued and 
Nimitz openly disagreed with several of ComAirPac statements but the 
position of the aviators was being continually strengthened by the arrival 
of more carriers and large numbers of accompanying aircraft which were 
being integrated into the Fleet. 
In contrast, the RN entered the war with a higher degree of aviation 
representation in the Admiralty than the USN did in the Department of 
the Navy. The post of Fifth Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Air Services with 
the rank of vice adn-dral was not mirrored on the other side of the 
Atlantic until mid 1943 with the creation of DCNO (Air) 
In May 1945 Fleet Air administration underwent a final wartime 
reorganization. All material functions held by the Fifth Sea Lord-Chief of 
Naval Air Equipment were assumed by the new Vice Controller (Air) - 
Chief of Naval Air Equipment, Rear Admiral MS Slattery. Overall naval 
air policy matters, formerly the responsibility of the Assistant Chief 
Naval Staff (Air), passed up to the new Fifth Sea Lord (Air), now broadly 
responsible for the general direction and coordination of all naval air 
policy. Admiral Vian would fill this appointment in the post war period. 
In February 1945, the Admiralty received a report into the roles and 
future organisation of the Fleet Air Arm. The report argued that the main 
pre-occupations of the RN had denied it the opportunities (which the U. S. 
Navy had enjoyed in the Pacific) to develop and exploit the new 
potentialities and characteristics introduced by aircraft into naval 
5301bid. p. 76 
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warfare. 531 The nature of the naval conflict that the USN was waging 
across the Pacific was very different from that facing the RN half a globe 
away. As one of the Navy's observers in that theatre pointed out, '[t]he 
most striking feature to a new arrival in the Pacific area, is the grand scale 
on which operations are carried out in the Central Pacific theatre. ' The 
scale of American warships present for the Gilberts operation was 'almost 
unbelievable to an officer who has seen most of the war from the Eastern 
Mediterranean. '532 The RN had been involved with an equally 'hard but 
quite different type of warfare" elsewhere. 533 But while the composition 
of the US fleet and the construction of its' ships had been progressing for 
some time under the particular circumstances of the Far East there was a 
danger that the RN would assume that what was right in the 
Mediterranean would apply equally in the Pacific. Geographic distance 
alone would discredit this assumption. 534 
Strides were being made by the Eastern Fleet to reach a level of 
operation approaching the USN. During Operation PEDAL, an air strike 
on Port Blajr, ý35 Mustrims became the first British carrier to operate fifty 
aircraft. Whilst Operation MILLET536 saw the RN employ a two phase 
attack plan with carrier aircraft for the first time. There were, however, as 
many disappointments as achievements. Commenting on operation 
PEDAL the Eastern Fleet's Desk Diary for 23 June 1944 records that '57 
aircraft were embarked in Illustrious for the operation and the range on 
deck was 39 of which the first five were accelerated. At one time there 
531ADM 167/124 Board of Admiralty Minutes: Evershed Report into Naval Aviation 
February 1945 
532ADM 199/1117 Observers with US Pacific Fleet 15/12/43 
533ADM 199/118 para 71 
534ADM 199/1523 Pacific Naval Operations 1944-1945 Report of Naval Observer with 
USN Cdr. R. M. Smeeton following Operation "Galvanic" 14-27/11/43 Attack on Gilbert 
Group, Makin, Tarawa and Aparnama. 
535ADM. 199/340 Operation Pedal, air strikes on Port Blair and Andaman Islands 
21/6/44. Force 60 Renown, Richeliett, Iffitstrious, Nigeria, Phoebe, Kenya, Ceylon and 8 
destroyers. 
536ADM. 199/275 Operation Millet, air strikes Nacowry Islands and bombardment of 
Nicobar Oct-Nov 1944 
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were 51 aircraft in the air and it was most fortunate that landing on was 
not delayed by a crash since otherwise some of the Barracudas would 
most certainly have had to land in the sea. '537 During Operation CocKPIT 
many of the Fleets carrier aircraft missed targets of opportunity at Sabang 
or attempted to engage false radar targetS538. Operation BANQUET 
revealed that Victotiotis was unable to spot more than 22 aircraft in 
readiness for a strike539 whilst during operation LIGHT hidoniffable needed 
over forty minutes and two separate deck loads to launch just eighteen 
aircraft. 540 
The British Admiralty Delegation in Washington (BAD) desk diary 
for the 18 December 1944541 recorded American criticism of R. N. 
operations in the Indian Ocean. Arguing that the British effort was 
confined to 'tip and run' raids instead of remaining on the spot and 
continuing the attacks as they had recently done in the case of raids on 
Formosa. Admiral Somerville pointed out that 'they appear to have 
overlooked the fact that in these operations we only had two carriers and 
furthermore weather conditions made any refuelling at sea hazardous.. ' 
Operation ROBSON and LENTIL had indeed both been 'tip and run' raids 
with no attempt made to remain at sea for a prolonged series of strikes. 
The second half of OUTFLANK, Operation MERIDIAN, would be a departure 
from that in more ways than one. 
Although in the latter half of 1944 RN operations that utilised more 
than one carrier actually doubled, it was appreciated that the experience 
gained would not necessarily be of benefit when it came to operating a 
fleet in the Pacific as the nature of carrier operations in European waters 
was very different to those of the Pacific. The limitations of these types of 
operations were certainly understood at the time. When the Navy"s 
537The Somerville Papers p. 566 
538ADM 199/340 Operation COCKPIT 
539ADM 199/275 Operation BANQUEF 
54()ibid. Operation LIGHT Minute of Director of Air Warfare and Flying Duties, 4/12/44. 
Minute of Director of Airfields and Carrier Requirements 22/12/44. 
541The Somerville Papers Op Cit p. 622 
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Operational Research Department came to analyse British carrier air 
strike operations in March 1945 they clearly expressed their scepticism as 
to their value. 'Since this type of tip-and-run raid is likely to be put out of 
date by the operations of the BPF, it is not proposed to analyse those 
strikes any further. '542 
New Operational Tasks for the RN 
Navies derive their importance from the degree to which they 
influence issues on land. The central place of this in naval strategic 
thinking has long been understood. During the age of sail and that of the 
ironclad dreadnought, this was achieved by means of blockade and the 
landing of amphibious forces. What the Pacific campaign highlighted was 
the way in which carrier air power expanded the ability of a naval force 
to undertake this role. Aircraft from carriers could be used to strike 
deeper into enemy territory. Where a battleship's big guns could make a 
navy's presence felt a few mileS543 inshore air delivered munitions 
extended this by a factor of a hundred. The range of targets were no 
longer confined to the littoral544. 
Pre war thinking concerning the use of naval aviation to attack land 
based targets was primarily concerned with the effect which this would 
have upon the free use of the sea as a means of communication. What 
consideration was given to the possibility that naval aviation could 
compete with land based air power laid an emphasis upon its difficulties. 
Although there had been attempts by the RN to utilise this feature of 
542ADM 219/262 Analysis of British Carrier Strikes March 1945 
543 The maximum range of a battleships main guns depended on their elevation, muzzle 
velocity and the air resistance of the projectile. The US 16in/45 gun had a maximum 
range of 36,900yds at 45 degrees elevation. Obviously a battleship could not sit right up 
against the shore and strike at targets twenty miles inland. See R Gardiner (ed) The 
Eclipse of the Big Gun: The Warship 1906-1945 Conway 1992pp. 172-180. 
544 It would probably be more accurate to say that naval aviation extends the range of 
the littoral. 
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naval aviation in the European theatre it was the BPF that brought this 
capacity to the fore. British naval aviation had been employed for two 
primary purposes; direct defence of SLoCs and indirect defence through 
strike operations on enemy naval strength. 
Land Based Economic Targets 
Operation MERIDIAN545 
The BPF strike on Palembang was to be one of the first RN attempts 
to emulate the Americans in the strategic use of naval aviation. D. Brown 
makes the point that the two attacks on Palembang pioneered the 
successful use of carrier-borne aircraft for military strategic operations 
against economic targets. 546 It has been argued that MERIDIAN was the 
RN's most important contribution to the defeat of Japan. 547 There existed, 
however, powerful opponents to the strike on Palembang. 
Admiral Cunningham was reluctant to sanction the attack; it 
appears he was under pressure from Churchill to fulfil the pledge made 
to the Australian Government that the Fleet would arrive before the end 
of 1944. Fraser argued that as the Fleet Carriers were still exchanging 
their Barracuda aircraft for Avengers, the early dispatch of the Fleet to 
Australia would have found them in a non-operational state. Fraser 
wrote 'I do not think that it can have been appreciated in the Admiralty 
how long it would take to re-equip four large carriers with a new type of 
aircraft on a foreign station.. it certainly came as a surprise to me. '548 
Concerns were also expressed about the potential weight of losses 
and scepticism as to whether any vital damage could be inflicted. 
European experience, it was argued, pointed to the need for mass attacks 
545 Operation Meridian the BPF's two phase strike on Sumatran oil fields. 
54613rown The British Pacific and East Indies Fleets Op Cit. p. 5 
547 Brown D. Carrier Operations in World War II: Vol. 1 The Royal N! 2yy, Ian Allan Ltd. 
[London] 1968p. 258 
548ADM 199/118 para 122 
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by heavy bombers. 549 In a letter to Admiral Cunningham, dated 7 
December, Somerville wrote that 'as matters now stand this [the early 
arrival of RN. in Pacific] will not be the case owing to the operation 
against 'P' [Palembang]; I examined this operation with John Cassady of 
the Saratoga and it seemed to us that it was hardly profitable in view of 
the distances involved, mountains, etc. Our estimate of the possible bomb 
load for all four carriers was 40 tons which does not seem much of a 
strike against so large a target ... 1550 
Palembang was a major road and rail junction in the south east of 
Sumatra. The targets for Operation MERIDIAN were the oil refineries of 
Pladjoe (Royal Dutch Shell) and Soengi Gerong (Standard Oil) both of 
which lay across the Musi river from the town of Palembang itself. Both 
refineries had been in Japanese possession since their capture in 1942 by 
Japanese paratroopers. Pladjoe was the largest and most important 
refinery in the Far East in 1945, with Soengi Gerong not far behind. The 
combined facilities were estimated to provide the IJN with 75% of their 
aviation fuel requirements. The stationing of what remained of the 
Japanese Fleet at Singapore during 1944 did not indicate a move into the 
Indian Ocean, as was thought possible at the time. Rather it was as a 
result of the need to be near its fuel source as transportation was 
becoming increasingly impossible in the face of American submarine 
attacks. The destruction of such facilities would further inhibit the 
activities of the IJN and the Japanese war economy as a whole. 
It was thought that to put the refineries out of action would 
necessitate a full strike on each facility and a follow up third strike to deal 
with any targets untouched by the first two. The attacks were to be made 
by a striking force of Avengers, supported by Corsairs, Hellcats and 
Fireflies, wl-dle Ramrod sweeps conducted by Corsairs on nearby airstrips 
would prevent enemy fighter interference. The remaining Corsair and 
549ibid. para 121 
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Hellcats of Force 63, and all Indefatigable's Seafires would provide the 
necessary CAP over the Fleet. A secondary strike on the coastal airfield of 
Mana was also planned. The heavy losses that had been predicted, based 
upon European experience failed, to materialise. Many believed that 
destroying a target such as Palembang would require saturation bombing 
if any significant results were to be achieved, in part a consequence of 
viewing the operation through the perspective of RAF econon-dc bombing 
in Europe. Fraser, however, was convinced that the '... rapier thrust of 
light but accurate carrier borne aircraft bombing'551 would do more 
damage to a target such as Palembang with its one or two small but vital 
objectives. The results bore this conclusion out; the output of aviation 
gasoline was halted for two months and never reached the levels prior to 
the strike. Fraser also made the point that in consequence of the attack the 
fleet arrived in the Pacific as a fighting unit. If it had arrived any earlier 
the missing Fleet tankers would have still prevented operations with the 
USN. 
Information subsequently obtained from Japanese sources showed 
that as a result of the dropping of 160 of the 500 lb. bombs on the 24th 
January the Pladju refinery's output, which was normally about 200,000 
kilolitres a month and had actually been 191,000 in December, declined to 
165,000 for January and amounted to more than 42,000 in February, as it 
was only after a fortnight that the plant was able to resume partial 
activity. Most of it was again operative 35 days after the raid and 
production for March had recovered to 127,000.552 
Comparing these results with those of the first Allied raid by long 
range bombers on 11th August, when the greater part of the plant had 
been rendered operative within a week, was utilised as evidence that 
carrier strikes could now have strategic effect. The output for August, 
which had been reduced from the average of 200,000 kilolitres to 119,000 
551ADM 199/188 para 124 
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was surpassed by that for September when it rose to 126,000, while that 
for October exceeded the average as it rose to 205,000. 
The effects of the raid on the Sungai Gerong refinery where 180 
5001b. bombs were dropped, were more marked. Seventeen days elapsed 
before the plant began to function and it was seven weeks before the 
greater part of it was working again. The complete cessation of 
production for the last three days of January reduced the total output for 
that month from the normal average of 120,000 kilolitres to 105,000. The 
February production was no more than 25,000, and that for March 78,000. 
Owing to the existence of very large supplies of oil products in Sumatra 
the Japanese Army in that island was able to draw on its reserves until 
plants at Palembang had been brought back into production, but the 
shipment of oil supplies from these refineries was temporarily 
suspended. 
After the details of the operation reached London the importance of 
strikes for the development of the RN became clearer. The Director of 
Operations Division wrote that'[t]his report shows how necessary it was 
to carry out a full scale 4 carrier battle practice, before attempting 
operations in the Pacific on an equal footing with U. S. task groups whose 
experience in this type of action has hitherto been considerably greater 
than our own. '553 The Director of Air Warfare and Flying Training 
supported this point and added that '[flrom [this operation] the Aircraft 
Carrier Squadron as a whole must have learned many valuable lessons 
which will, in turn, have their influence on the whole Naval Air Arm. '554 
In a signal to Admiral Power who was CinC East Indies Fleet, Fraser 
responded to the criticisms levelled at MERIDIAN before its execution by 
arguing that the operation had been of the utmost importance for the 
Fleet. It had succeeded in welding the Carrier Task Force into a fighting 
unit and had practised the force in something approximating the type of 
553ADM 199/555 DOD 22/4/45 
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operations which it would carry out in the Pacific. 555 Palembang was the 
first operation in which the RN had employed four carriers offensively. 
Running all the way through this study is the theme of how crucial 
an influencing factor the Americans were on the activities of the BPF. 
From tactical operation of carriers to major strategic questions, it was the 
now senior partner in the Alliance that was calling the shots. For instance 
the attack on Palembang, code name Operation MERIDIAN, only received 
the go ahead after it became clear that the Americans, in the shape of 
Admiral Nimitz, were particularly keen to see it undertaken. 556 It has 
been suggested that scepticism on the part of the USN as to ability of the 
RN to carry out such an operation lay behind their insistence on 
MERIDIAN. It was to be a form of carrier warfare apprenticeship557. 
Ironically many in the BPF saw it in the same terms, hoping that a 
demonstration of the RN's capacity to conduct prolonged operations off a 
hostile coast would convince the Americans to employ the Fleet in the 
main theatre against the Japanese. Whatever the reason behind the 
American support for the strikes, once it became apparent, the Admiralty 
had little choice but to fall in behind them. As a signal from the 
Admiralty to Adn-dral Fraser in December 1944 reveals. 
On the other hand it is fully realised how much we are 
dependant on America's good will if our Fleet is to take its 
rightful place in the forefront of the battle and it is this 
important factor which leads them [the Board of Admiralty] to 
the decision in para. 3 [Attack no latter than first week in 
January]. 558 
The operations against Palembang were obviously not the first time 
that the RN had been used to attack the economic capability of an enemy. 
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Sea power's influence on the economic activity of a nation has been 
central to its value as a tool of state policy. However the usual method of 
exercising this influence was through the blockade and destruction of an 
opponent's seaborne trade. What Palambang appeared to demonstrate 
was that power could be deployed froiii the sea directly at targets ashore 
through the use of naval aviation. This ability was further developed and 
exploited during Operation ICEBERG when it was utilised as a means of 
influencing the wider campaign. 
CTF Operations: Attack At Source. 
Operation ICEBERG 
Admiral Fraser's instructions from London as to the nature of the 
task facing the BPF though simply phrased reveal something of the state 
of operational thinking within the higher command of the Navy. 
It is intended to deploy in the Pacific the largest practicable 
Battle fleet, balanced in all arms, and supported by a Fleet 
Train ... the British Pacific Fleet should play the maximum 
possible part in operations designed for the defeat of japan. 559 
The concept of the battle fleet to which so much pre-war effort had 
been directed no longer included aircraft carriers as an additional, though 
valuable, extra. Instead the battle fleet was now a balanced all arms force. 
Whereas in 1939 the Naval Staff considered a paper detailing the 
expected role of aircraft which though clearly stressing the importance of 
obtaining local air superiority in naval operations, saw carrier operations 
as ancillary to those of the battlefleet. 560 The language used in the 1939 
copy of the Fighting Instructions is a useful insight into Admiralty 
559MS83/158 File 21 Fraser Papers 
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thinking. 561 In assigning relative priority for screening requirements in a 
situation where available material was insufficient for all needs, the 
"main force" is distinguished from the carrier force. The implication of 
this was that however vital airpower was to operations afloat, the fleet's 
big guns were the main offensive element of naval power. 
The hard fought lessons of action off the littoral of Europe and in 
the expanses of the Pacific had demonstrated that such faith in the 
battleship could no longer be taken for granted. In order to play the 
maximum part in the defeat of Japan, naval aviation was now an essential 
complement to the big gun. The war had ushered in many significant 
developments, which, while many had their genesis before the outbreak 
of hostilities, reached their mature form under the harsh realities of 
combat. Indeed, the supporting infrastructure of the battlefleet was now 
considered part of the force deployed afloat, hence the explicit mention of 
the Fleet Train in Fraser's instructions. 
At Fraser's Pearl Harbor meeting with Nimitz in December 1944, it 
had been recognised that 'With the present eclipse of the Japanese Fleet, 
the principal enemy with which the Fleet will contend is the Japanese 
shore-based air force. '562 Offensively the main objective would be the 
neutralisation of the enemy air forces and air-fields. Defensively, the 
main task was to defeat the suicide bombers. For this purpose the 
Americans were not only equipping their fleet and light fleet carriers 
with a proportion of fighters to strike aircraft of 2 to 1, but also 
developing ideas such as 'attack at source' that were to have a major 
impact on post war thinking. 
Such concepts were not new and their employment in the Pacific 
had been underway for some time. Two years previously, for example, 
British naval observers in the Pacific had been reporting that 'The first 
561ADM 239/261 Fighting Instructions 1939 C. B. (Confidential Book) 04027(39) 
562CinCBPF to Admiralty following N/F1 Pearl Harbor Agreement MS 83/158 File 20 
Fraser Papers Operations Section 
239 
defence against these enemy bombing raids are our own air strikes 
against the enemy base in the vicinity. '563 The impetus of the suicide 
attacks and the availability of the material capable of undertaking such 
missions that propelled such operations to the fore. As Fraser said 
'Suicide attacks give more bang per plane with a less well trained pilot. 
Consequently the best method of defeating the Japanese Air Force is to 
destroy its means of production and training. 564 
When the RN was designing the Illustrious class, the 1935 crisis with 
Italy highlighted the fact that carrier aviation would probably be faced 
with land based opponents. The prospect of Britain's naval aviation 
capability destroying the Italian air force on the ground was a slim one. 
In such circumstances armoured hangars that would allow carriers to 
ride out air attacks seemed a sensible choice. 
Operation MERIDIAN had been an all British operation carried out at 
the request of the USN. The next stage in the BPF's 'learning curve' was a 
series of strikes in support of the American Fifth Fleet during the 
invasion of Okinawa - Operation ICEBERG. Operation ICEBERG was the 
first attempt by the Royal Navy to emulate the USN in sustained Carrier 
Task Force operations off a hostile coast. They were as a significant move 
away from the 'tip'n'run' carrier raids that the RN had conducted in 
European waters and an attempt to emulate the USN in 'attack at source" 
operations. The BPF were tasked with the neutralisation of the airfields 
on Sakishima Gunto in order to prevent the Japanese staging aircraft 
through them to attack the allied landing operations on Okinawa. The 
Sakishima Gunto consisted of two principal islands, Miyako and Ishigaki, 
each with three main airfields, some 200 n-dles South-west of Okinawa, 
about half way to Formosa. 565 The BPF would attempt to deny these 
563ADM 199/1117 Observers with US Pacific Fleet Cdr. H. S. Hopkins 15/12/43 
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airfields to the Japanese by cratering their runways as well as strafing 
installations and aircraft on the ground. 
Participation in ICEBERG began with strikes on the 26 March 1945, 
the BPF having left its forward operating base, Ulithi, on the 23rd. These 
strikes lasted until 20 April when the Fleet retired to Leyte. Vice Admiral 
Sir Philip Vian, Commander First Aircraft Carrier Squadron, described 
the BPF's activity during this time. 'Our routine, during the twenty six 
days during which we remained in the combat area on this occasion, was 
usually two or three days of strike operation, followed by a withdrawal 
for refuelling, which might take anything from one to three days. '566 The 
fleet had managed 12 strike days in total. This was a dramatic increase in 
the average of two per operation analysed by DNOR referred to earlier. 
The Americans, however, managed a ratio of two strike days to one 
replenishment in contrast to the BPF whose usual figures were two 
replenishment days for every two strike days. 567 Time at sea had also 
been dramatically increased, in comparison with the average seven days 
at sea for a carrier operation in the previous year the BPF had been 
continuously at sea for thirty-two, longer than any other fleet since the 
days of sail. Admiral Cunningham in London explicitly brought this fact 
to the attention of the War Cabinet in his regular summary of naval air 
operations, when he referred to Task Force 57 as making 'British naval 
history. '568 
After replenishment at Leyte in the Philippines, the BPF returned 
for the second phase of ICEBERG which lasted from 1st until the 25ffi May. 
Participation in this operation had been achieved at the cost of 
tremendous effort. Fraser commented that the, 
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financial cost to the country to achieve this offensive effort, to 
which should be added the few shore bombardments, was 
colossal, but the machinery for operating a fleet in ocean 
warfare had been tested, faults had been overcome, minimum 
standards had been realised, and the experience gained with 
British material and with the personnel and material of the 
United States Pacific Fleet will have brought everlasting benefit 
to the Royal Navy. 569 
Fraser was looking forward to the effect the BPF's oPerations would 
have on the Navy during the post-war period. However, the First Sea 
Lord, Admiral Cunningham, informed the War Cabinet that one of the 
immediate benefits of participation in ICEBERG was the effect that it had 
on American perceptions of the RN and its abilities. 
The success of this operation [ICEBERG] effectively removed 
any doubt which may have existed in the American mind of the 
ability of a British Carrier Task Force to operate in the Pacific. 
Indeed, the toll taken by the suicide bomber on the more lightly 
armoured American Carriers led to an increase in the 
proportionate effort provided by our carriers, none of which 
was out of action for more than a couple of hours, despite the 
efforts of the kamikaze corps. 570 
Flexibility 
Flexibility was the key feature of CTF operations. The radius at 
which aircraft could operate and the mobility of the whole task force 
provided the commander with opportunity of achieving strategic and 
tactical surprise. The speed of the American fast carriers was crucial in 
this respect. Admiral Vian was rightly concerned about the limitations 
imposed by fuel shortages during Operation MERIDIAN. His cruising 
speed of 13-17 knots was increased to 99 off the Sumatran coast but was 
still 'lower than I have been accustomed to use in similar situations, or 
569 ADM 199/1457 British Pacific Fleet - Brief account of activities Part 1 Historical para 
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would choose to use: even then oil consumption was 24 hours short of 
what was needed. '571 
The difference in focus between the two navies can be seen in other 
ways as well. The USN's Lexington class carriers had a range of 10,000nm 
at 15kts, comparable to that of the British Illustriotis class, 11,000nm at 
14kts, but the former was laid down 16 years before the latter and could 
manage a top speed of 33.25kts as opposed to 30.5kts for the British ship. 
The Essex class fleet carriers managed to increase their range while 
maintaining the cruising speed of the Lexington class. America's vast 
shipbuilding resources permitted those carriers that did not achieve the 
required specifications for the Pacific to be stationed in the Atlantic. 
Ranger (CV-4), for example, could only manage 29kts which led to her 
being used mainly for transporting aircraft to North Africa, attacks on 
Vichy targets in that area and attachment to the British Home Fleet 
during 1943. Britain's Preoccupation with the European theatre was 
understandable but one which became a handicap when the Fleet was 
eventually sent to the. Far East. Although the RN had focused on Japan as 
a potential enemy during the 1930s, its conception of the nature of naval 
warfare was one where the fleet would have operated from a range of 
naval basses provided by the British Empire. The Pacific theatre required 
fast carriers with the range to cope with vast distances, supported by a 
logistics network that proved to be a major force multiplier. Only such 
vessels could provide the necessary air cover for amphibious landings 
and the versatility to be a major strategic weapon. 
It was however not just in material that the USN exploited the 
flexibility of naval aviation. Whilst American air operations were usually 
carefully planned out in advance with the whole sequence of operations 
examined in great detail, circumstances often dictated the mounting of 
571ADM 199/555 BPF Actions in Operation Meridian & ICEBERG. Signal from Flag 
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large operations at short notice. 572 These could also be significantly 
modified even once the operation had begun. In contrast the rigidity of 
the MERIDIAN plan made the fleet vulnerable in both the air and at sea. 
Operation MERIDIAN had been carefully worked out before launch with 
large scale models of targets built and a full rehearsal undertaken off 
Ceylon. As a consequence the RN found it impossible to deviate from the 
plan. This made the Japanese defenders' task easier, permitting them to 
set defensive patrols for the second strike and locating the Force 
afterwards. The surprise that was obviously achieved for the first strike 
demonstrated the value of the carrier's strategic mobility but operational 
inadequacies limited the tactical mobility that was a major feature of 
American practice. These inadequacies were evidently not merely the 
result of a lack of fuel oil but were also found in the material of the fleet 
and its doctrine. 
Lack of operational flexibility caused by technical inadequacies 
The planned strikes against Palembang, Operation MERIDIAN, were 
characterised by problems that beset the Fleet throughout its time in the 
Pacific. The Fleet reached its fuelling point on the morning of 20 January 
and having located its oilers with search aircraft spent the day topping up 
tanks. The weather was bad and the whole process took on a pattern that 
would unfortunately become far too familiar. The slow rate of pumping, 
the damage to gear caused by destroyers, the fact that only one ship 
could be refuelled at a time, and the time lost because of the slow speed 
of the tankers were all problems that continually re-occurred. These 
obstacles to speedy replenishment curtailed the true flexibility of the fast 
carrier task force that the Americans had been able to achieve. 
Careful analysis by the Directorate of Naval Operational Research of 
American action in the Pacific, and material Provided by both the USN 
572ADM 1/18646 United States Naval Methods: Conduct of Carrier Task Forces in the 
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itself and from Liaison Officers, helped explain greater American 
efficiency. The DNOR came to the conclusion that the increasing success 
of the American Naval Forces in the Pacific was due, broadly speaking to 
a number of key factors. 
First, their ability to concentrate superior numbers of ships 
and planes against the enemy. 
Second, the very high exchange rate of American to Japanese 
planes shot down in combat, as well as the high proportion of 
attacking planes shot down by CAP and AA. 
- Third, a technical superiority in gunnery, radar, maintenance 
and logistics. 
Fourth, the effectiveness of the submarine blockade of Japan 
and the cutting of supplies to the outer empire. 
Fifth, the gradual building up of experience and body of 
common doctrine in the USN. 
Finally, the establishment of increasing base facilities as the 
war progressed. 573 
The Fleet Train and Sustained Operations at Sea 
The outstanding feature of the USN's conduct of CTF's was the 
length of time these forces remained in the operational area. Marder et al 
describe a discussion between Fraser and Nin-dtz about how long the BPF 
could remain at sea. Fraser is alleged to have said the fleet could manage 
eight days, but, 'as Nimitz laconically reported, they compromised on 
20'574 There is unfortunately no indication of where or when this 
conversation took place or indeed how Marder et al became aware of it 
since no attribution is given. Somerville however does recount a dinner 
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conversation with Nimitz in March 1945 at which the American admiral 
expressed concern over Fraser's views as to the time the BPF could 
remain at sea575. If, as seems likely, Fraser did hold such a conversation 
with Nimitz the specifics of the actual words exchanged do not concern 
us, rather it is the implications of the conversation. There are a number of 
possible reasons for Fraser offering only eight sea days. The one 
advanced to by Marder et al. is that the RN were ignorant of American 
practice. The meeting between Fraser and Nimitz that resulted in NF1 
took place at Pearl Harbor during the third week of December 1944, at 
this time Fraser was certainly aware of American operating time scales. 
Willmott presents a slightly more sophisticated explanation stating 
'.. British lack of experience of carrier warfare resulted in an unfamiliarity 
with the logistical problems and arrangements that were characteristic of 
this type of warfare. '576 Fraser may well have been informing Nimitz of 
the time that current logistic facilities permitted the fleet to operate and 
not what he hoped for in the future. On New Year's day Somerville had 
received a signal from Fraser expressing his doubts as to whether the fleet 
could remain at sea in the combat area for several weeks, as was 
American practice, given the arrangements made for maintenance577. 
After his meeting with Nimitz, Fraser informed the Admiralty that 
the American practice of Fleet organisation, intermediate and advanced 
bases was 
Designed to enable the fleet to keep the sea in a manner which 
has not previously been attempted since the advent of steam. 
This outlook differs greatly from our existing ideas whereby a 
fleet returns to a shore base for replenishment of stores, 
ammunition etc. 578 
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During Operation ICEBERG, for example, the fleet was required to 
remain in the combat area for about 21 days at a stretch and refuel every 
five or six. As Rawlings wrote at the time, 'It has been unusual, during 
my generation, for a British Fleet of this size to remain at sea for the 
length of time covered by this report and I had beforehand found myself 
wondering at times what shortcomings in personnel and material it 
would uncover. '579 The development of the Fleet Train was absolutely 
central to the development of the Carrier Task Force as an operational 
and strategic asset. This was something which, it was becoming more and 
more apparent, London, and more particularly the Adn-dralty, had 
insufficiently appreciated the full consequences of this aspect of naval 
operations in the Pacific. Vice Admiral (Q) Daniel, responsible for the 
supply of the BPF, complained to London that his ability to meet the 
needs of the fleet had been grossly overestimated in the planning 
stages. 580 Rather more succinctly Fraser simply said that the 'logistic 
support already planned is not adequate. '581 
Fraser's agreement with Nimitz at Pearl Harbor that the BPF should 
operate effect in the most advanced operations in the Pacific meant that 
the development of the Fleet Train was essential. Fraser was concerned 
that without such a capability 'this will not be possible unless the Fleet 
has adequate logistic support. Without such support there is no doubt 
that I cannot carry out prolonged operations and take part in the same 
manner as the Americans. '582 
While the Royal Navy had been operating in, and trained for the 
relatively short range warfare of the Mediterranean, Home Waters and 
the Atlantic, an entirely new form of campaigning had been evolved in 
579ADM 199/555 BPF Actions in Operation Meridian & ICEBERG. Report from Office of 
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the vast spaces of the Pacific. 583 Operating thousands of miles from the 
nearest permanent base, the Americans had developed a logistic system 
and organization of previously unimagined extent and complexity. Their 
Fleet was supplied and replenished at sea, where it would remain, often 
for many weeks, without returning even to temporary, advanced bases 
set up in the island groups. '584 
In 1939 the Fleet Train had been a relatively new organization for 
the RN and consisted of a single repair ship. 585 The development of the 
Fleet Train to the capacity necessary was a tortuous affair. The 
deliberation over where the Fleet was to operate made planning 
extremely difficult. Shipping for the Fleet Train began to be allocated 
during the first half of 1944 but these plans were essentially 'based on 
compromise and guesswork. 586 In January 1945 the War Cabinet decided 
that in view of the acute shortage of shipping and the priority of supply 
the UK and occupied Europe, the BPF would have to be reduced in 
scale. Churchill wrote later that 'the Fleet ... must 
be limited by the Fleet 
Train. It is not a question of making the Fleet Train up to your ideas of the 
Fleet. 1587 
The fundamental problem was that the Royal Navy was essentially a 
shorthaul service. The vast bulk of the RN's auxiliaries were small coastal 
craft used for providing temporary facilities or supplementing existing 
shore bases. The ability to replenish the fleet at sea was central to the type 
of naval warfare the Americans had been pioneering in the Pacific. 
During the two phases of operation ICEBERG replenishment of the BPF 
totalled 180,000 tons of fuel and 2,056 tons of avgas over 13 periods. In 
addition 111 aircraft were also delivered. 588 This was an impressive 
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advance on what the Fleet Train had been capable of prior to Pacific 
operations but was still dwarfed by what the USN was able to achieve. 
The average size of an American Task Group during ICEBERG was 5 
carriers, 3 battleships, 5 cruisers and 20 destroyers which the USN was 
able to supply with 1.3 million tons of fuel oil, 34,000 tons of diesel and 
58,000 tons of avgas over a period of 76 days at sea. 
Following operations in support of the invasion of Okinawa the BPF 
was employed with the American Third Fleet off the Japanese home 
islands. During this period further problems were encountered that 
threatened to curtail British participation. Due to weather and target 
changes the designated fuelling and replenishment areas were moved at 
frequent and irregular intervals. This was a major handicap for the BPF 
which did not possess high speed tankers. Burst hoses and low pumping 
rates excaberated the problem and if the Americans had not liberally 
interpreted Adn-dral King's insistence that the British be self sufficient 
then the fleet n-dght well have had to withdraw from operations. As the 
Navy's history of the Fleet Train makes clear, 'it was only by using every 
contrivance, coupled with a fair amount of good fortune, that the BPF 
was able to take part in every strike. '589 
First and Second Hand Experience 
In January 1946 the Naval Review carried an article about the 
experiences of the Fleet Train. The piece contained a plea that the lessons 
learnt from operating in the Pacific should not be forgotten, concluding 
that it was direct personal exposure to such new methods of operating 
that could prevent this, writing, 'I trust those who formed part of the 
British Pacific Fleet will never allow this to occur. '590 It is evident that the 
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RN's exposure to American practices and the Navy's rapid assimilation 
of operation caoncepts and methods was central to the BPF's eventual 
success. At a post war lecture delivered at RUSI in 1947, Fraser's Chief of 
Staff, Captain Evans-Lombe, discussed the BPF`s final operations off 
Japan. He explained that, 'during these operations our Fleet worked in 
much closer touch with the United States Fleet than had occurred off 
Okinawa. They were in fact under the direct tactical control of Admiral 
Halsey, thus reaching the final stage of integration for which we had been 
ain-dng. 1591 He went on to argue that it was only as result of the earlier 
operations undertaken by the BPF that this integration was possible. 
Despite an awareness of American practice provided in a plethora of 
liason officer reports, it was the acual carrying out of American methods 
that taught the RN the lessons of this new style of naval warfare. 
This was evident in more than simply the logistic field. The 
Evershed report into the FAA argued that in regard to policy and 
planning the Admiralty had to make up a considerable amount of lost 
ground, both (i) in the appreciation and exploitation of the effect of the 
impact of the new art of aviation on naval strategy and tactics; including 
ship construction, and (ii) in the knowledge and experience of the 
potentialities and of the demands, as well as its lin-titations, of aircraft as 
such and design. 592 
This meant that prior to actual operations in the Pacific, the RN only 
had second hand experience of what would be required to utilise as a 
basis of planning and training. If we examine the BPF's General Orders, 
which contain a copy of the General War Orders that were issued earlier, 
we can see how they were influenced by this second hand American 
experience593. It must also be remembered that, as pointed out above, the 
RN had begun to experiment with similar ideas and dispositions until the 
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outbreak of war had presented more pressing problems that needed 
tackling. The instructions for the conduct of the Fleet at sea contain eight 
new circular cruising dispositions conforming in most major respects to 
the American pattern described above. Writing to his shore based 
commander in March 1945 Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings 
commented that: 'Little by little I think the Fleet is beginning to find its 
feet but these circular dispositions are the very devil. '594 This observation 
indicates how new such actual practice, rather than the concept, was to 
the BPF. 
Admiral Fraser explained this by saying that; [t]here can be little 
doubt that the Americans are much quicker than we are at learning the 
lessons of the war and of applying them to their ships and tactics. ' The 
vast ship building capacity possessed by the Americans enabled them to 
build ships with such speed that they could embark on 'daring' 
experiments even before they were shown to have a general application. 
We, on the other hand are more cautious in our ship 
construction and in our tactics and, unlike the Americans, we 
would rather not change anything until the alteration has been 
thoroughly tested and improved. As a result the British Fleet is 
seldom spectacular, never really modern, but always sound. 595 
It was clear that the advances in carrier operations made by the BPF 
since ROBSON had been the result of actual first hand experience. The 
Admiralty had been aware of a divergence between USN and RN 
practice since before the outbreak of war. Since this time it had been 
receiving regular updates from observers with the American Pacific Fleet 
and from the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington as to the 
developing American doctrine. But there was no substitute for actually 
undertaking this type of operation. Fraser wrote after the war that: 
594Letter 9/3/45 From V. Adm 2CinC MS83/158 File 23 Fraser Papers CinCBPF 
Operational Correspondence with Flag Officers 
595ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov. 1944-july 1945 
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it was of the utmost importance that the British Fleet should 
engage in the most modern type of naval warfare yet evolved, 
and to do so by fighting in company with its originators and 
prime exponents. [ ... 
] Had we not operated our major striking 
forces in this manner we should have finished this war with 
only second hand knowledge of this revolutionary form of 
modern naval warfare. 596 
The BPF had made up lost ground on the Americans surprisingly 
quickly but despite the undoubted improvement during ICEBERG there 
remained one or two worrying points. These included difficulties in 
conducting air strikes to the American pattern, as well as the low 
standard of anti-aircraft gunnery and the perennial problem of keeping 
the Fleet fuelled. As a result it was thought necessary for reinforcements 
arriving in the Pacific to undertake a working up operation prior to Fleet 
deployment. 
The learning curve for the RN was becoming steeper, more being 
learnt in a shorter period of time. In April 1945 the Directorate of 
Operational Research had pointed out that one of the reasons for the 
Americans success in the Pacific was the gradual building up of 
experience and body of common doctrine. 597 This had been progressing 
in the USN under the particular conditions of the Pacific for over three 
years. The process within the RN of accumulating up such a doctrine had 
to take place in undera year, although the British benefited from the 
advantages of following a trail already laid. Information and analysis on 
American practice had been studied by the RN both before and during 
the assignment of the BPF to the Pacific. The Directorate of Tactical and 
Staff Duties Division requested that Fraser supply fifty copies of a paper 
his staff had written on US methods for use in briefing personnel prior to 
5961bid. para 4 
597ADM 219/219 Pacificvvar Notes DNOR 11/4/45 
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dispatch to the Far East. 598 All Flag Officers and carrier commanders had 
also been issued with another report into US naval tactics and methods in 
the Pacific. 599 These were but two of a range of material that assisted in 
preparing the RN for the Pacific. It should not be lost sight of, however, 
that regardless of how much could be read concerning the American way 
of operating, it was participating in sustained operations off a hostile 
coast that really allowed the British to interpret such methods in their 
own way. Knowledge of US practice was a major influence but not more 
so than getting first hand practice. In October Rawlings wrote that, 'the 
invaluable experience of participating in naval air operations on this 
grand scale will be of lasting benefit to the British Navy. 1600 The entire 
Pacific experience, both theory and practice, would indeed prove to have 
long reaching consequences for the RN as it faced up to the post war 
world. 
The final operations of Task Force 37 reveal how quickly the BPF 
had 'got up to speed' and were finally able to function alongside their 
more powerful ally. The rapidity at which the RN absorbed and adapted 
American practice was in part the result of similar concepts existing 
within British naval thought. The limiting factor remained, as ever, 
available technology and finance. 
Light Fleet Carriers 
Although the level of interest that the acaden-dc community has 
shown in the activities of the BPF may lead to the conclusion that the Far 
East was of little influence on the RN's development during the years 
following the end of hostilities, this was certainly not the outlook of those 
engaged at the time. The BPF's utilisation of Light Fleet Carriers (CVLs) 
598ADM 1/18646 Conduct of Carrier Task Forces in the Pacific 25/1/45. Docket 
amendment 
599ADM 1/18662 US Naval Tactics and Methods in the Pacific. 
600ADM 199/1478 Report to CinCBPF from Rawlings 1/10/45 para 2 
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illustrates this point. On the 1 March Rear Adn-dral Harcourt, was 
appointed Admiral Commanding 11th Aircraft Carrier Squadron and 
was ordered to assemble four new Colossus class light fleet carriers at 
Sydney to participate in the invasion of Japan. This was to be the second 
Task Group that Fraser had promised Nimitz he would raise as soon as it 
became possible to support one. 601 Keeping his promise to Nimitz was 
not Fraser's only reason however. Outlining his thinking before the 
Japanese surrender, Fraser wrote that he had three chief reasons for 
insisting on the CVL's deployment despite American scepticism; firstly 
the strategic advantage of concentrating the maximum forces against the 
heart of the enemy; secondly the political value of having British forces 
engaged in the Pacific in the greatest possible strength; and 'thirdly the 
importance of trying out this newest class of fighting ship in the most 
modern and advanced type of operations. 1602 
Fraser prophetically remarked that he believed the RN of the future 
would contain such a high proportion of CVLs that it was of the utmost 
importance that their various disabilities should be overcome. A method 
of operating needed to be evolved in the face of the enemy rather than 
allowing them to be relegated entirely to a minor role which could be 
better undertaken by CVEs. This was something of a controversial 
decision. Opinion from sea was sceptical that the tactical inclusion of 
CVLs in a CV group would confer any advantage. Fraser was also taking 
a contrary position to the USN. He wrote that: 'American opinion - in so 
far as it has yet been heard - regards them [CVLs] as too slow to be of 
anything but an embarrassment to the rapid strategic moves of a fast 
carrier task force. 1603 To include or exclude CVLs was therefore a key 
operational question facing the CinC. This problem did not affect the 
Americans since they had the wherewithal to maintain their fleet carriers. 
6011t is doubtful considering the problems of keeping TF37 supplied whether the logistic 
infrastructure and the necessary resources to keep a second TF at sea actually existed. 
602ADM 199/118 para 88 
603ibid. para 90 
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Fraser had seen the future and it was American global sea power, with 
his beloved RN relegated to a second rank navy. A naval aviation 
capability was however essential and if constrained circumstances only 
permitted CVLs then CVLs should perform on the cutting edge of naval 
warfare. The unanticipated end of the war, however, brought his plans to 
nought. The CVLs would have to wait for Korea to demonstrate their 
worth. The Americans on the other hand were faced with a slightly 
different problem post war. The USN were able to maintain the majority 
of their fleet carriers despite the set back of having their proposed "super 
carrier', USS Utzited States cancelled. 
The effect that Pacific experience had upon the Royal Navy can 
readily be seen at the operational level. The poor initial performance of 
the fleet in carrier operations which formed the centre piece of Pacific 
naval activity was rapidly replaced with a growing confidence. Without 
the first hand experience of operating alongside the proponents of this 
revolutionary style of warfare, the British would have never absorbed the 
lessons it had to offer. It was at this level of warfare that the Americans 
had developed what Fraser described as a revolutionary style of warfare. 
It represented the cutting edge of war at sea and was something that the 
RN could not afford to ignore. The ability to operate at long distance, 
over long periods of time, off a hostile coast and project power from the 
sea to achieve military strategic objectives had been demonstrated in the 
Pacific. The Royal Navy would turn its attention to the ways and means 
of replicating such activity in the post war period, modified to the 




The Post War Navy, the BPF and the Operational Level of War 
1945-50 
The experiences of the BPF were to have a significant affect upon the 
Royal Navy's concept of operations. What Admiral Fraser referred to as a 
revolutionary style of warfare was profoundly to influence the Navy's 
thinking in the post-war period. The context in which this development 
of operational ideas took place, as outlined in Chapters Three and Five, 
was an extremely complex one. It was an environment that did not 
appear to be altogether conducive for the absorption of the BPF 
experience into the Royal Navy's thinking. Technology had apparently 
made all previous forms of warfare obsolete, the perceived enemy at sea 
did not look vulnerable to naval power and the nature of the anticipated 
conflict was vastly different to that conducted by the BPF. 
- By the beginning of the next decade, however, things had changed 
dramatically. Korea saw the Navy once again employing organic naval 
aviation to project power in a littoral for extended periods of time at great 
distance from home. Through a processes of adaptation, the experiences 
of the BPF were made relevant to the type of conflict being fought off 
Korea and, more generally, to the type of warfare envisaged being fought 
against the Soviet Union. The new methods and concepts involved in 
naval warfare developed by the USN in the Pacific were modified and 
amended to fit the particular circumstances of Britain and the Royal Navy 
in the post-war period. 
This process of adaptation was accomplished in a variety of 
complementary ways. Perhaps most importantly personnel from the BPF 
carried their experience into all areas of the Navy. Admiral Fraser 
commented that one of the abiding influences that the Pacific experience 
would have on the Navy was the simple fact of direct, personal 
knowledge of the concepts and operating methods the Americans had 
256 
been perfecting. 604 In addition, lectures, discussions through the pages of 
professional journals, and courses at training establishments, carried the 
ideas drawn from the BPF into wider naval thinking. In the Admiralty, 
the CinC's dispatches were circulated round the appropriate 
directorates. 605 
The Director of Plans wrote that, 'These reports are very valuable... It 
is clear that they must be thorougWy examined by all Departments 
concerned and many "lessons learnt" must be digested. 606 
Captain Robertson, Director of Tactical and Staff Duties Division 
[DTSDI commented on another of Fraser's reports saying that, 
.. it is thought that these dispatches are a brilliant dissertation on 
the complexity of naval warfare as a whole and as such are 
worthy of the closest study by the staff college and the IDC 
[Imperial Defence College] in particular. The interaction and 
interdependency of politics (both allied, Home and Dominion), 
strategy, Admiralty Policy, and planning is most clearly 
demonstrated and in particular the difficulties of a commander 
in chief working at a great distance from the Admiralty. Even 
perfect communications could not have solved the many 
difficulties. 607 
DTSD argued that: 
No one can foretell what form the next war will take but if it 
means the operations of the fleet from bases other than U. K. 
then a close study of the requirements outlined by C-in-C BPF is 
essential. 608 
The Deputy Director of Plans was equally emphatic in his support 
for the ideas contained in the reports of BPF experience in the Pacific. 'I 
604 ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov 1944-july 1945 Section 1: Purpose, 
paragraph 4.23/11/45 
605 See for example ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF's Despatches 31/10/45 ADM 199/1478 
Reports of Naval Operations Against Japan 17/7/45-2/9/45 
606 ADM 199/1478 Reports of Naval Operations Againstjapan 17/7/45-2/9/45 Note 
from Director of Plans- 23/5/46 
607ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov 1944-july 1945 cover note from D. T. S. D. 
(Capt. Robertson) [Director of Tactical and Staff Duties Division] 
6081bid 
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feel strongly that this invaluable document must be given the widest 
publicity in the Admiralty and we must ensure that the lessons thereof 
are fully absorbed and implemented. 1609 The Director of Plans recognised 
the advances made in the Pacific and learnt from the Americans was the 
shape of things to come. He urged that; 
The doctrine of modern naval warfare in C-in-C. BPF's despatch 
should be assimilated both in general and in detail by all 
branches of the Navy; it should thereupon be implemented in 
the post war development of our service if the latter is to catch 
up with and thereafter to march with the times. 610 
Not everybody was of course so adamant about the anticipated 
influence of the BPF on the whole Navy. The Director of Naval Air 
Organisation and Training [DNAOT] expressed caution arguing that 
'analysis must be regarded with reserve, due to the conditions in the 
Pacific War at the time... It would appear to be most unwise to base our 
future organisation on a type of warfare which is not likely to recur. /611 
He did however temper his remarks by saying that if too much emphasis 
was placed on the uniqueness of the Pacific experience then valuable 
lessons would be neglected. 
The Admiralty were absolute in their belief that the Navy and 
seapower should remain at the centre of the country's defence policy. The 
development of the nation's war effort had always, and would continue, 
to depend on the ability to ensure the passage of shipping. However this 
now could only be effected by the combined effort of the three Services. 
The Fighting Instructions [FIj make explicit this recognition. 'Ships will 
rarely operate without the co-operation of aircraft, and neither ships nor 
609 Ibid., Note from Deputy Director of Plans [DDoPj 1/01/46 
610 Ibid., Note from Director of Plans 1/01/46 
611 Ibid., Note from Director of Naval Air Organisation and Training 25/03/46. 
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aircraft can operate without bases defended by the Army. "612 As a result 
of this the Navy sought to redefine its understanding of naval warfare. 
A vigorous debate took place in the pages of the Naval Review and 
the Royal United Services Institution joitmal as to the effect that 
developments in air power had had on sea power. This argument raged 
for the remaining years of the decade and displayed a remarkable 
similarity to the one concerning naval aviation during the inter-war 
years. The vulnerability of battleships and whether they had any further 
usage, the ability of naval aviation to function in all weathers and climes, 
what its primary task at sea should be, the role and constitution of the 
capital ship, and the relation the Navy should have with the RAF. Despite 
this continuation the Admiralty had to draw some conclusions and 
provide working guidance to officers at sea. As a result their Lordships 
issued the following in the 1947 Fighting Instructions. 
The advent of sea/air power has rendered the old established 
terms of naval warfare and naval forces obsolete. The exercise 
of sea/air power is now expressed in the terms "Maritime 
Warfare" and "Maritime Forces. " Maritime Warfare is the 
employment in war of all forces working in co-operation on, or 
under and over the sea. Maritime Forces include warships, 
aircraft (both shore-based and carrier borne), fleet auxiliaries, 
transports and other types of ships adapted for service with the 
Fighting Forces. 613 
These issues formed part of a wider debate concerning the 
continued relevance of the traditional concepts of sea power such as the 
role of command of the sea, whether this could be achieved through a 
single decisive battle and, whether the activities of the BPF constituted a 
new set of operational tasks for the Navy. 614 
612 Ibid. para 3 
6131bid.. 
614 See for example: "Valour" The Fleet Train Naval Review Vol. XXXIV 1946 p. 31-36; 
First Lords Survey of the Naval War Naval Review Vol. XXXIV 1946 p. 116-123; R. E. 
Griffiths, Future connnoinvealth Strategy. Naval Review Vol. XXXV, 1947. p. 34-36; The 
Contribution of the British Pacific Fleet to the Assault on Okinawa Naval Review Vol. XXXVI 
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In spite of this debate it was maintained that 'the principles 
governing the employment of our Maritime Forces to secure our sea 
communications will remain unchanged. 61-5 The Navy envisaged the 
employment of its maritime forces as taking the following forms. Striking 
at enemy Maritime Forces at sea and in their bases and dockyards. This 
was to include attacking those centres of industry associated with the 
production of naval resources; harassing the enemy's sea 
communications at the same time as protecting their own sea 
communications through direct defensive measures; and finally 
combining with other services in operations against enemy territory. In 
pursuing this strategy it was hoped that, 'The exploits of our Maritime 
Forces will force the enemy to increase the scale of his efforts to counter 
them. This must lead, inevitably, to decisive battles, or to his surrender of 
the issue involved. '616 
Pre-war ideas about decisive surface engagements yielding to the 
victor the fruits of control of sea communications were still extremely 
influential, but the circumstances now facing the RN required new 
thinking about how such a principle would function in practice in the 
modern environment. British experience during the Second World War 
appeared to confirm the value of achieving command of the sea at the 
same time as restating the problems of gaining it against an enemy 
unwilling to offer battle. Both Germany and Italy had been reluctant to 
sortie against British Fleets. 
At the military strategic level the expected form of Soviet aggression 
at sea was clearly not a challenge to the Western Alliance in the 
conventional Mahanian sense. Command of the sea was unquestionably 
held by the USN and its allies. The Soviet Union was believed to be 
1948 p. 226-230; Adndral Spruance [President of US Naval War College] Victonj ill tile 
Pacific p. 539-558 Journal Royal United Services Institution VoL 911946 
615ADM 239/382 The Fighting Instructions 1947 para. 8 
6161bid. 
260 
preparing for a strategy of sea denial. This was of particular concern to 
the Royal Navy, who recognised how vulnerable the country was to 
attacks on its sea communications. The major problem revolved around 
how, with limited resources, this threat could be overcome. This issue 
would lead to the development of operational concepts first put into 
practice by the BPF As will examined in more detail later, the experience 
of the BPF in providing a modest [by American standards] Carrier Task 
Force, supported by the Fleet Train, able to exploit its inherent strategic 
mobility, was viewed as one means by which offensive action, in the 
shape of power projection ashore, could be employed in defence of the 
country's sea lines of communication. 
Clarity of thought was at a premium when the RN came to examine 
the lessons and effects of the BPF on operational thinking in the post-War 
period. A much more complex background against which decisions had 
to be taken existed at the operational rather than tactical level. Reference 
has already been made to the concerns of the Director of Naval Air 
Organization and Training over whether the experience of the BPF was 
unique and therefore of little relevance in the post-war period. 617 What 
emerges from this study is the way in which the actual experience of the 
new operational concepts developed by the USN in the Pacific, helped 
the post-War Royal Navy amend practice to meet the challenges of the 
n-fflitary strategic circumstances. 
As stated above Andrew Gordon has argued that armed forces turn 
their attention to doctrine during periods of uncertainty when there is 
confusion over roles and MiSSionS. 618 Aspects of this argument certainly 
appear to be borne out by the experience of the RN in the aftermath of 
617 Comment by DNAOT 25/03/46 on ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov 1944- 
July 1945. 
618 A Gordon Vie Doctrine Debate: Having the Last Word, in M Duffy, Farrell &G Sloan 
[eds] Doctrine and MiliLaly Effectiveness, Strategic Policy Studies Group & University of 
Exeter, 1997 
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World War Two. The changing international picture at the grand 
strategic level and the constraints imposed upon the armed forces 
certainly produced a period of reflection for the Navy. The dramatic 
impact that scientific advances seemed to be having on conceptions of 
warfare prompted Admiralty announcements that their effect could be to 
revolutionise war of the future. In spite of this the Navy held to the belief 
that 'the principles of maritime warfare will remain unchanged. 1619 How 
those principles were applied in the changed post-war period and the 
role which the BPF's experience had in it will be the subject of this 
chapter. It is argued that, although severely constrained, the Navy sought 
to develop the operational concepts and practices that had first been 
employed by the BPF in the Pacific. It is contended that the RN, far from 
simply preparing to fight the last war, modified much of this Pacific 
experience to deal with the particular circumstances the country found 
itself in during the first five years of peace. 
Maritime Zone of Control 
The potential scale of the Soviet challenge at sea and the extensive 
range of missions that the RN would be called upon to perform in time of 
war when coupled with developments in technology that appeared to 
offer a viable strategy of sea denial, presented the Adn-dralty with 
perhaps its most complex and intractable problem. 620 Against a 
background of severe financial constraints and limited political direction 
the Navy sought to develop operational concepts that, while conforming 
to traditional 'principles of maritime warfare', adapted them to 
contemporary circumstances. 
619ADM 239/382 The Fighting Instructions 1947 
620Exercise Trident assumed that by 1957 the Soviet Union could deploy 8 cruisers, 25 
destroyers of 4,500 tons, 125 large, fast, ocean going submarines and the same number of 
slow ocean going and coastal submarines in northern waters alone. ADM 239/489 
Section 7 p. 72. 
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Achieving a general command of the sea as a result of a decisive 
battle in the traditional Mahanian sense was no longer a viable option. 
Whereas the RN had entered the First World War with a policy 'that the 
goals of the war at sea could, would, and ought to be settled by a single, 
all destructive clash between massed battlefleets', 621 the position adopted 
by the late forties had changed dramatically. Command of the sea now 
meant control of particular areas of the 'universal medium of movement'. 
This idea of localised control undoubtedly appealed to a navy having to 
operate under vastly reduced circumstances where the cost of 
maintaining the scale of forces needed for achieving general command of 
the sea had become too expensive. This shift in thinking was not solely 
due to the experiences of the BPF, far from it. The campaign in the 
Mediterranean had demonstrated that whilst success in battle was a 
necessary condition for achieving control of the sea it was not a sufficient 
condition. Land based air power could and often did challenge and 
dispute control won in fleet action. Control of the sea had now become a 
more temporary and limited concept. 
The areas which the Navy sought to control were termed Zones of 
Mariffim Coiitrol. This developing concept clearly has its roots in Mahan's 
command of the sea and also owes a significant debt to Corbett's work 
but was an attempt to modernise their ideas in light of the experience of 
the Second World War. The Fighting Instructions defined a maritime 
zone of control as an 'up-to-date conception of the old system of control 
by strength and numbers, involving the full use of sea/air power. 1622 It 
would be an exaggeration to say that the BPF was solely responsible for 
the emergence of the idea of sea/air power; experiences in the 
Mediterranean and the Atlantic had certainly demonstrated how 
dependent upon air power naval operation had become. However the 
BPF was the first principal fleet of the RN to be configured around 
621jan S. Breemer The Biirdeii of Trafalgar. Decisive battle atid iiaval strategic expectatioits oit 
the eve of World War I in G. Till (ed. ) Seapower: TheoEy and Practice p33 
622ADM 239/382 Confidential Book CB04487 The Fighting Instructions 1947 para 10. 
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carriers with naval aviation as the centre piece of its offensive and 
defensive power. 
Pre-war discussions concerning attaining 'command of the sea' and 
its subsequent exploitation was, for the British, predicated on the 
assumption that these were sequential activities. The RN, unlike the 
Americans, were never in a position where resources could be allowed to 
be diverted away from what was considered the sine qtta non of naval 
warfare, achieving a decision at sea from wl-dch all else would flow. 
Despite Corbett's recognition before the First World War that the case 
often arose where the Navy had been called upon to perform tasks 
associated with using the sea before its command could be assured, this 
ideal still persisted. 'In all vital areas a zone of control must be established 
before we can be assured of protecting our sea corrununications in the 
area, or have the ability to exert pressure on the enemy's sea 
communications. 1623 
The Navy recognised that maintaining, as well as establishing, a 
maritime zone of control required heavy forces to provide the cover 
under which lighter forces could operate. "Behind the maritime forces 
employed on reconnaissance, escort and patrol, must be the necessary 
strength element or cover in the form of a major force, whose function is 
to accept at any time the challenge of the enemy's penetration into our 
zone. '624 The USN had demonstrated that this heavy force was now the 
Fast Carrier Task Force. It alone now had the offensive reach, strength 
and flexibility to defeat any challenge at sea. In a further 
acknowledgement of the influence of the Pacific campaign on RN 
thinking the FI's explained the British interpretation of the American 
strategy of "leap-frogging' or bypassing enemy points of concentration 
using the navy's strategic mobility and subsequently amphibiously 
6231bid. para. 4 
624 Ibid. para. 12 
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seizing new base areas from which to exercise control of the sea or launch 
the next phase of attack. 
Perhaps the most enduring of Mahan's concepts of sea power was 
the prominence he gave to the importance of geography. The Royal Navy 
certainly accorded this factor its due significance. Describing the situation 
at the beginning of any conflict, the Admiralty wrote: 'Each opponent at 
the outbreak of war possess zones or areas of geographical advantage, 
and a zone of control is therefore intended to imply, initially, a zone built 
from a zone of geographical advantage. '625 With regards the expected 
conflict with the Soviet Union geography presented the Western Allies 
with both advantages and disadvantages. The Soviet Union had limited 
egress to the worlds open oceans which it was considered possible to 
disrupt but at the same time the continental nature of the USSR made it 
less prone to the classic naval weapon of blockade. Its interior lines of 
communication could also be utilised to avoid interference from allied 
maritime forces. As Rear Admiral E. W. L. Longley-Cook, Director of 
Naval Intelligence, explained to both British and American officers at a 
lecture in 1949 
Reinforcement of a fleet in one area by ships from another is 
difficult for the Russians. Nevertheless, the northern sea route 
and various inland waterways in western Russia provide the 
Russians with a slow but excellent means of moving substantial 
forces from one area to another, secretly. In addition, the 
Russians are adept at moving sections of ships by rail, and 
prefabrication is now a normal technique in Russia for the 
building of destroyers and smaller craft. '626 
The extent of a zone of control was dependent upon the operational 
radius of forces from their base. Increasing the number of forces 
625Ibid. para 11. 
626ADM 239/490 Confidential Book 004521 Exercise Trident Vol. 2'Item 11 Part 1 Tlw 
Forces of the Soviet Republics atid their Satellites Rear Admiral E. W. L. Longley-Cook, 
Director of Naval InteHigence para. 26 
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heightened the degree of control exercised but did not enlarge its 
coverage. The experience of the British Pacific Fleet demonstrated 
however, that a logistic support or replenishment group could artificially 
increase a zones size on a semi-permanent basis. The fleet train, in the 
case of the BPF, allowed a mobile naval force to operate at sea for an 
extended period thereby creating temporary zones beyond the range 
lin-tits imposed by land bases. The role of organic naval aviation was vital 
to these operations. The Pacific experience had demonstrated that a navy 
capable of taking, and sustaining, its own air power, at great distance 
from the nearest base could establish and exercise control of the sea. 
Enlargements to existing zones, or the establishment of new ones on 
a permanent basis, depended upon the acquisition of further base sites 
which would be progressively developed, allowing control to be 
cumulatively extended. In conjunction with this method of expanding 
control over maritime areas, the Navy also recognised the strategic 
potential of the judicious placement of a new zone on all areas controlled 
or disputed. By locating a zone of control in an area which could cut off 
all, or a large proportion, of the enemy's force the scale of attack expected 
on other zones would be significantly reduced. This would increase the 
effectiveness of friendly forces and provide greater freedom of action. 
A strategy that sought to achieve a 'permanent and general' 
command of the sea was not an option, even if one were possible on a 
theoretical level. Clearly there would be areas in which a permanent zone 
could never be established either owing to their remoteness or the size of 
the area to be covered. In such circumstances, small zones of control were 
intended to be located at vital points either by grouping ships into 
convoys creating moving zones protected by escorts suitable to their 
importance and position in relation to the enemy and the Navy's own 
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major forces, or by maintaining a force in an area where shipping was 
compelled to congregate for geograpWcal or hydrographical reasons. 627 
This conception of a temporary moving zone of control was carried 
further and believed to be applicable for a specific purpose in an area 
where control was disputed or possessed by the enemy, the Adn-dralty 
likening the idea to the convoys which were fought through to Malta. 628 
Whilst the activities of the BPF had never been focused around the 
creation of a maritime zone of control in the sense that the Admiralty 
were now using, events in the Pacific had demonstrated that it was 
possible to utilise naval surface forces with a carrier component and 
supported by a fleet train in such a way as to dominate a given region of 
sea and project its power into the littoral. One of Admiral Fraser's last 
dispatches from the wartime BPF laid down a number of 
recommendations concerning lessons learnt from open ocean warfare in 
the Pacific. 629 The operations that the Navy were preparing to undertake 
in defence of sea communications did not exactly match the 
circumstances he described but the influence of the BPF's experience can 
clearly be seen in the debate surrounding the use of temporary zones of 
control to exercise power projection. 
Fraser cautioned against automatically taking the BPF and the 
Pacific experience as the model for operations in Northern European 
waters. He warned that the particular style of warfare exhibited in the 
Pacific might have been the result of its particular climatic conditions. 630 
The man who won the Royal Navy's last battleship encounter in the 
storm tossed waters off the North Cape of northern Norway and sailed 
up the Yangtse knew a thing or two about the verities of weather. The 
627BR 1806 (47) Naval War Manual 1947 [Admiralty Library] Chapter 8 Conduct of 
Maritime Warfare p. 35. 
6281bid. 
629ADM199/2376 Part III Recommendations for a Fleet Conducting'Open Ocean 
Warfare Section I -The Balanced Fleet and its Air Train and Sea Logistic Support Group. 
630ADM 199/2376 Report of Experience of the BPF Jan-Aug 1945 15/3/46 para. 10. 
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search for ways of adapting the operational practices undertaken by the 
BPF nonetheless became a major feature of the Navy's development in 
the post-war period 
Exercise Sunrise carried out during December 1948 by the Home Fleet, 
for example, was an attempt to conduct a long range carrier strike against 
a defended area in Atlantic weather. 631 The exercise report emphasised 
the role such training had on preparing for operations in the Norwegian 
and Barents seas. In the event although the fleet carrier Iffitstriotts 
operated her Barracuda Anti-Submarine aircraft each day and her 
Vampire jet fighters on 10th December, the motion of Light Fleet Carriers 
prevented the operation of their fighters except during the forenoon and 
early afternoon of 10th December. From the late afternoon of the 10th 
December, the weather deteriorated rapidly and by the morning of 11th 
December, a full gale was blowing which prevented any further flying 
from carriers. 632 Indeed the issue of an all weather capability was noted 
in Parliament as being of no little importance. 'Of no less significance 
[than preparations for atomic attack] are the cold weather trials carried 
out in northern waters by an aircraft carrier, destroyers, submarines and 
other vessels, designed to test the latest equipment under the rigorous 
conditions of the Arctic. '633 
Much post-war exercise time at sea was taken up developing the 
techniques necessary to implement such an Arctic maritime zone of 
control. In 1949, for example, the aircraft carrier Vengeance with two 
destroyers, a Loch class frigate, a submarine and an oiler, were assembled 
as an experimental force which was to cruise in the North Atlantic and 
Arctic to study the effects of very cold weather conditions on naval 
personnel and material. A specially equipped air group, including some 
jet-propelled aircraft, was to be embarked in Vengeance. The effects of 
631ADM 116/5779 Exercise Stuirise 
632 ADM 116/5780 Exercise Sunrise Part II para. 4 
633Cmd. 7631 statement on Defence 1949 
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very cold weather on the functioning of weapons were also studied, and 
naval surgeons and psychologists participated in order to monitor the 
reactions of the ships' companies. 634 
Although through the establishment of a zone of control the Navy 
sought to control maritime activities in the area, it was realised that it was 
impracticable to prevent all enemy forces from entering the zone even 
surface ships. 'Infiltration by units of all types is inevitable and must be 
accepted. '635 The intention was that any incursion in force would be 
detected and brought to action by a superior force before it could exit the 
area. Unless its own forces were fortunately favourably placed it was 
recognised however that some temporary success from a determined 
enemy raid would have to be accepted 'provided we ensure that the same 
enemy force will be unable to repeat the operation. '636 In those 
circumstances where an enemy force was able to infiltrate without 
detection, despite the best efforts of the Navy to prevent such a situation, 
the disposition of forces was designed to ensure that adequate strength 
was available 'at the point where they n-dght injure US. 1637 
These two competing and complementary concepts both required 
good reconnaissance and intelligence but whereas strength was the prime 
factor in deciding forces to carry out the former, numbers were essential 
to the latter. The combination of reconnaissance -in its broadest sense- 
and a well disposed striking force provided the cover behind which 
lighter strength escort forces could operate. The Admiralty admitted that 
such a covering force was not necessarily composed of surface ships; it 
'n-tight on occasion consist of shore-based aircraft only. '638 Despite this 
concession, it is evident from the language used in the Naval War Manital 
634Navij Notes R. U. S. I. journal Vol. 94 1949 p126 
635BR 1806 (47) Naval War Manual 1947 [Admiralty Library] Chapter 8 Conduct of 
Maritime Warfare para. 14. 
6361bid. 
6371bid. 
6381bid. para. 18. 
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that surface forces were essential to beat decisively any enemy incursion 
into a zone of control. The Manual commends aircraft for their role in 
reconnaissance, the way in which they could be used to simplify the 
problem of cutting off an enemy raiding force and the 'ability to inflict 
early damage on the enemy'639. This was a strikingly familiar range of 
attributes to those articulated before the war. 
Obviously the covering force could not be of sufficient number or 
deployed ubiquitously enough actually to command the zone of control; 
it could ensure that command, but command itself was wielded by the 
escort forces. The difficulty for the RN was that the Navy might not be 
able, because of economic constraints, to deploy a covering force of 
sufficient strength to ensure control. This placed pressure on decision 
makers at the military strategic level to reach an accord with the 
Americans that would make the Navy's operational ideas feasible. 
Reliance on the Americans for the covering force in a maritime zone 
of control was understandably difficult for the British to accept but 
decisions taken at the military strategic level made this inevitable. 
However, the RN experience of operating under the USN in the Pacific 
had certainly laid the foundations for this approach. It is apparent that, 
on the whole, those who served in the Pacific displayed a remarkable 
capacity to accept the changed balance of power between the two navies. 
This may well have had something to do with the stark contrast in 
capabilities and resources that was on display in the Pacific to a degree 
not matched in European waters. 
Despite the emphasis placed on the establishment of a zone of 
control for the defence of sea communications it was recognised that 
attacks on shipping by aircraft and submarines did not require an 
6391bid. emphasis added. 
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opponent to attempt the establishment of its own control. An enemy with 
no intention of challenging the Navy's maritime forces in battle could still 
attempt to cripple the country by attacking shipping in a classic giierre de 
cmrse campaign. Alternatively it was thought that a strategy directed at 
shipping might be used to force the RN to 'disperse and dissipate' its 
forces until, as a result of attrition, the enemy could 'defeat our major 
maritime forces in detail. '640 It was, however, believed that unless the 
enemy utilised surface raiders the attacks could not be decisive. 'Such 
attacks can do much damage but it is only when surface forces are 
brought into contact with enemy shipping that annihilation can be 
expected. '641 It was in light of this reasoning that the Navy's concern over 
Soviet development of their Sverdlov Class cruisers must be seen. 
Although the defence of the country's sea communications was the 
Navy's prime focus at the military strategic level this certainly did not 
mean any lessening of the RN's offensive posture at the operational level. 
When Admiral Vian came to write a report into Exercise Trident for 
distribution to the rest of the Navy he emphasised 'the importance of 
offensive action by naval forces in defensive maritime strategy. '642 This 
was something which was in great part derived from the strategic 
mobility of the Carrier Task Force in comparison with land and air forces. 
The Navy"s concept of offensive operations to defend sea 
communications involved attacks by naval aircraft from a carrier task 
force on Soviet submarine building and transport arrangements. In the 
same way that, having determined Japanese air power was the principal 
threat in the Pacific, Fraser sought to neutralise it by attacking land based 
targets from carriers; the RN sought to project its firepower onto land 
based targets that supported the Soviet submarine threat. These strikes 
were to be augmented by attacks on submarine bases themselves and the 
640BR 1806 (47) Naval War Manual 1947 [Admiralty Library] Chapter 8 Conduct of 
Maritime Warfare para. 30 
6411bid. para. 29 
642MIRMay 1949 No. 41 p. 30 
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mining of their approaches. These operations required a task force, the 
prime functions of which were to bring mobile air power into constant 
action against the enemy's submarine potential and to provide cover for 
the other forces engaged. 643 
Attack at Source and the Search for an Offensive Strategy 
The influence of the British Pacific Fleet can probably be best seen in 
the developing ideas concerning attack at source. The adaptation of 
techniques learnt in the Pacific to conditions in Arctic waters was one of 
the recurring themes of post-war exercises. The search for an all weather 
capability was almost continuous. Exercises to test out new cold weather 
equipment and operating procedures were carried out intensively in the 
waters of Northern Norway and the approaches to the Barents Sea. The 
Americans also began to take an interest in operating in this region and 
there was much cross over and exchange of personnel and ideas644 
The Navy's evolving ideas about maritime warfare and in particular 
the interaction of sea and air power were firn-fly rooted in the experiences 
of the last war. Technological innovation in the field of carrier aviation 
held out the prospect of emulating the British Pacific Fleets activities in 
the cold waters of northern Europe and tackling one of the enduring 
problems of British naval strategy. How to bring superior naval force to 
bear on a reluctant foe. As the Fighting Instructions make abundantly 
clear, 'aircraft provide the power to strike at the enemy in his bases. 645 
This was not a new concept, the raid on Taranto in November 1940 when 
643MIRMay 1949 No. 41 p. 31 
644MIROctober 1948 No. 34 Report of arrangements made for RN officers and civil staff 
from the Admiralty to attend USN cold weather exercises in the North Atlantic 1- 
23/11/48 
645ADM 239/382 The Fighting Instructions 1947 para. 4 
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21 biplanes from the carrier Illustrious inflicted considerable damage on 
the Italian fleet in harbour had an intellectual heritage stretching back to 
Admiral Beatty's request in September 1917 for 120 Sopwith Cuckoo 
torpedo bombers with which to attack the High Seas Fleet in its bases. 
Nonetheless it was in the Pacific campaign that the actual techniques for 
this type of operation were perfected. 
That both cover and escort forces were essential to Britain's survival 
was almost beyond question, and formed the nearest the Adn-dralty had 
to a touchstone. The problem Their Lordships were faced with was how 
to provide adequate vessels to fulfil both functions. Carriers and their air 
groups were too few for the demands placed upon them. War experience 
had demonstrated that at sea, land based anti-ship bombers could be 
countered effectively only by defensive aircraft controlled by the 
threatened fleet or convoy. Ideally this meant aircraft based at sea on 
carriers or, at the very least, land based but directed by specialised 
vessels afloat. In either of these cases large numbers of units would be 
needed and although the direct defence of shipping received a degree of 
priority it was unlikely to be any where near enough. 
In the introduction to Exercise Trident Admiral Fraser explained the 
position adopted by the Navy when they were planning for an 
anticipated war during the year of 'maximum danger'. 646 
The experience of the First and Second World Wars showed 
that the most fruitful areas for sinking enemy submarines were 
in the vicinity of convoys, the escorts for which were sufficient 
in numbers to allow detachments for killings. In 1957, however, 
the difficulty of locating submarines, particularly from the air, 
brings into greater pron-tinence than ever before, the claims of 
attack at source. 647 
646The RN's assumptions and planning for future conflict at the grand and military 
strategic levels ivere outlined in chapters 3 &5. They Are addressed here only in so far as 
they have a bearing on the development of attack at source ideas. 
647ADM 239/489 CB04520 Exercise Trident 
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Of course it was essential to maintain, and if possible increase, 
measures for the direct defence of shipping but it was believed that they 
in themselves would not suffice because the financial state of the country 
could not allow the building up of escort forces to the level of desired 
strength. Nor was it anticipated that the technical and scientific advance 
of defensive equipment would'run parallel with the progress made in the 
evolution of the submarine. '648 
Attack at Source, described as 'a familiar and self explanatory term', 
included attacks on enemy ports, naval and air bases and installations by; 
carrier borne or shore based aircraft, surface forces, submarines and small 
battle units, raids and assaults by land forces as well as clandestine 
operations. 649 The idea was not a novel one, indeed the Admiralty 
justified it with two historical examples in the Fighting Instructions. 'This 
idea of attacking the enemy on his own home ground rather than waiting 
for him to make his attack on ours, is not new. Drake adopted this idea at 
Cadiz and Admiral Keyes did the same at Zeebrugge, to quote only two 
examples. 1650 
The idea that attack at source was the answer to the Navy's problem 
of defending the country's SLoCs was not met with universal acceptance. 
Eric Grove has demonstrated that a vigorous debate over the concept 
took place as a result of Exercise Trident. 651 The Historical Section of the 
Naval War Staff, that had been compiling the history of the German 
campaign against Allied shipping, were concerned that too much 
emphasis on attack at source would mean that the direct defence of 
convoys would be neglected. 
The emphasis laid on attacking the enemy's infrastructure coincided 




651 E Grove (ed), The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shippin% 1939 - 1945 Navy 
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strategic bombing as the way in which the Soviet Union could be 
defeated. If, as the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff argued, 'Russia [was] a 
vast land power with interior lines of communication and we are 
sufficiently educated by history to know that land offensives into the 
vastness of Russia are unlikely to met with success. '652 then 'Our policy 
for winning the war may be summarised as follows; defeat the Russian 
onslaught into areas and against communications vital to the Allies and 
adopt an air strategy aimed primarily at breaking the communist control 
of the Russian people'. 
In this situation the Navy realised that much of the early offensive 
action undertaken by British armed forces would be concentrated on the 
RAF's strategic bombing force, an unwelcome idea in many dark blue 
quarters. The Navy, however, made the case that it still required a naval 
aviation strike component in order to 'Strike at the enemy's ships, ports, 
bases and war potential... such offensive action will be of particular 
importance in areas where, for instance, the RAF air offensive cannot 
effectively operate. '653 The vast distances of the Pacific had demonstrated 
the way in which the Navy could utilise its strategic mobility to bring air 
power to bear on the enemy beyond the range of land based bombers. 
One of the consistent strands running through British maritime 
doctrine, whether explicit or implicit, has been the desire to take the 
offensive at every opportunity. 'Strategy must always aim at adopting the 
offensive at the earliest possible moment as it is only by pursuing a 
vigorous offensive that wars can ultimately be won. '654 Although Corbett 
had cautioned against pursuing too aggressive a strategy in 
inappropriate circumstances, the period following the Second World War 
revealed the same expectation. 
652ADM 239/490 Exercise Trident Vol. 2 Admiral Sir John Edelsten VCNS 
653ADM 205/69 The Roles of the Navy in War. First Sea Lords Records 1948 
654ADM 239/382 The Fighting Instructions 1947 para. 15 
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It is imperative that we develop offensive operations against the 
enemy's maritime forces in their bases at the earliest propitious 
moment for the following reasons: To reduce the scale of enemy 
attack To reduce the heavy commitments imposed on us by an 
enemy unwilling to face battle who prefers to keep his forces in 
being as a threat to our communications. To release us from 
having to maintain an inactive concentration merely to watch 
and prevent the enemy from interfering with our 
communications. Similar considerations also lead to combined 
operations for the occupation of strategic points, to forestall the 
enemy from establishing a zone of control, or to capture one 
that is already established. 655 
It was anticipated that naval aviation would provide the immediate 
tools with which to strike at the enemy from the sea although due regard 
was given to the possibilities of advances in missile technology which 
could yield the means necessary for deep strikes by unmanned aerial 
vehicles. Until such time as these weapons became available, carrier 
based aviation offered the only means of attacking enemy forces in 
coastal areas were surface forces could not venture. This type of 
operation required the element of surprise, delivered by the carrier task 
force's mobility and held out the possibility of gaining control of the air 
for a period before the enemy could reaCt. 656 The thinking behind these 
carrier strikes envisioned them as being directed at two distinct types of 
target. They would consist of either surprise thrusts of limited duration 
against the enemy's seaborne forces in their harbours, coastal shipping 
and certain important industrial targets, or more prolonged operations 
for the purpose of neutralising the enemy's surface and/or air forces. It 
was in this latter area that the effect of the BPF can be clearly seen. The 
concept of operating for extended periods of time in the combat area had 
been an aspect of the BPF's work. The principle had long been established 
that the inherent strategic mobility of naval forces provided a force 
multiplier against an enemy who would be required to disperse forces in 
6551bid. para. 9 
6561bid. Section I- Air Operations Against Shore Targets para. 981. 
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order to counter them where ever they might appear. The advances made 
in the Pacific concerning logistic support for carrier task forces at sea 
promised to reinforce to this last point. As was made abundantly clear by 
Captain Tupper-Carey, who had served on HMS Howe with the BPF, at a 
lecture at the Royal United Services Institution in 1946, 
The war in the Pacific has shown that a fleet can be kept at sea 
for long periods ready to strike when and where required. To 
our enemies this will be like playing chess against an opponent 
who has an invisible queen which appears at the crucial 
moment of the game in the best position. 657 
He did however go on to lament the lack of interest shown in the 
techniques necessary for maintaining a fleet at sea for long periods and 
how emphasis was instead placed on operations in narrow waters. In 
reflecting on the two types of power projection described above, limited 
duration surprise thrusts and more prolonged operations, it was the 
former that appeared most practicable in European circumstances. This 
was not simply a question of logistic support, though this was a major 
factor, but was also the result of material choices and force levels. 
Whereas the USN's strike doctrine concluded that individual strikes 
should be conducted with a minimum of 200 aircraft (more than the 
entire strength of the Fleet Air Arm), the RN saw the FAA as a cadre for 
an eventual force of 200 aircraft in four carriers. The emphasis in aircraft 
development was placed on high performance fighters for fleet carriers 
and ASW aircraft, supported by low-performance fighters in the light 
fleet units. The immediate priority for naval aviation was not power 
projection but the direct defence of shipping against air and submarine 
attack. Indeed what power projection was contemplated was geared 
directly to the question of ensuring command of the sea, for the 
protection of sea communications. 
657capt P. Tupper Carey RN Fitelling at Sea Journal of the Royal United Services 
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The debate over naval airpower, its proper functions, roles and 
n-dssions, as well as its likely developmental trends, was vigorous and far 
reaching in the post-war period. This debate was conducted in many of 
the Adn-dralty's departments tasked with analysing the effects of the last 
war and preparing guidance for the future. It was also carried in the 
pages of the naval community's professional press. Though with the 
benefit of hindsight the progress of naval aviation appears almost linear, 
what emerged as policy was often the result of the clash of widely 
differing views. In 1947 the Naval Reviezv carried an article on the future 
of naval aviation which argued that, 'the implications of supersonic speed 
and atomic war appear to affect the future of seaborne air power to a 
radical extent, in that they eliminate the value of strike aircraft. '658 Several 
reasons were advanced to support this conclusion. Firstly, that ship borne 
machines were inefficient against shore targets when measured in terms 
of effective weight of attacking power vis-. A-vis their land based 
counterparts. Second, carrier based planes were unlikely to survive an 
attack against the highly organised and concentrated defensive air and 
surface equipment available to a modern fleet. Third, carrier aircraft were 
unable to lift the major weapon of modern war, the atomic bomb. Forth, 
naval aviation was prevented from keeping pace with the technical 
developments of shore aircraft because of the physical limitations of the 
carrier. Finally, seaborne air power was 'handicapped by being borne in a 
slow moving medium in an increasingly fast moving world. '659 
The question of how much of the Navy's limited aviation assets 
should be allocated to the strike role became as much a political issue 
between the RN and the RAF as it was an operational one. The 
Admiralty's airmen were seen as treading on the RAF's toes by 
strengthening their case that offensive strikes on targets ashore would 
make an important contribution to securing command of the sea in the 
65877ze Future of Seabonze Airpower The Naval Review 1947 p. 331-333 
6591bid., p. 333 
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intensive opening phase of a future conflict. The RAF had serious 
reservations about too much penetration by naval aviation into the strike 
role. 660 
The Search for an Offensive Strategy 
Over the summer of 1948 the Director of Plans (Captain TM 
Brownrigg), the VCNS (Vice Admiral Sir John Edelsten), the Fifth Sea 
Lord (Adn-dral Vian) and the First Sea Lord (Admiral Fraser), were 
involved in an internal debate concerning the definition of the Navy's 
role in the event of war. This had been prompted by a request from the 
Chiefs of Staff who were engaged in preparing a new edition of the Shape 
and Size of tile Anned Forces paper. Although all were cornn-dtted to the 
idea that the principal task of Navy would be the defence of sea 
communications, it was how this idea should be elaborated that occupied 
their memoranda. The DoP wanted much more emphasis placed on how 
control of sea communications allowed the development of offensive 
bases (particularly, but not only, Britain), the use of the sea for strategic 
mobility, seaborne tactical air support and assisting the RAF with 'a 
strategic air offensive if required. '661 
The DoP conceded, however, that this range of tasks was beyond the 
capabilities of future RN. 'On the outbreak of war the Navy cannot have 
sufficient mobilized strength to carry out all these roles in their 
entirety'662 He recognised that acl-deving a general command of the sea 
was an impossibility but that the navy should be able to 'deity enemy 
shipping the use of the main oceans, the Narrow Seas and the 
Mediterranean'. 
660DEFE 5/20 & DEFE 8/23 
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DoP also wished to include the a paragraph which explicitly stated 
that the Navy must have sufficient strength not only to be able to deny 
the enemy the use of the main oceans, the Narrow Seas and the 
Mediterranean, in addition it required the strength to be able to control 
these areas. Recognising that this might be a burden the country and the 
Treasury might not wish to bear in peacetime, he argued that at a 
minimum the RN must have a nucleus strength from which to build up 
forces to undertake the other roles, otherwise it will be impossible to go 
over from the defensive to the offensive. 663 
The first reply came from the 5th Sea Lord Admiral Vian. He was 
generally in agreement but disliked the reference to assisting with the 
strategic air campaign. Instead Vian proposed the phrasing 'To strike at 
the enemy's ships, ports, bases and war potential ... Such offensive action 
will be of particular importance in areas where, for whatever reason, the 
RAF air offensive cannot effectively operate. '664 Vian's experience of 
carrier operations in the Pacific had given him direct knowledge of 
utilising sea based airpower as a strategic tool interdicting enemy 
reinforcements. On the issue of the DoP's suggestion of a final paragraph, 
Vian was much more interested in maintaining a more explicit 
commitment to offensive action, arguing for; 
On the out break of war the mobilised strength of the Navy will 
be weak, and if the small forces available are to be used to the 
best advantage it will be essential to maintain an offensive 
element in them. Seizing the initiative and thus imposing upon 
the enemy a feeling of insecurity and uncertainty is the best way 
of obtaining control of the situation, and thus keeping available 
the maximum of forces for the task of the Navy. If we accept an 
exclusively defensive role, our forces will be over dispersed in 
the endeavour to face the enemy's unfettered choice of time and 
place at which to attack. 665 
663 Ibid. 
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In the end the VCNS approved most of the DoP's memoranda and 
accommodated many of Vian's proposals (only deleting Vian's final 
paragraph with a pen at the last minute) and adopting'It (the Navy) must 
have a nucleus strength from which to build up forces to undertake the 
other roles, and no opportunity should be lost of seizing the initiative and 
thus imposing on the enemy a feeling of insecurity. '666 
This question of offensive versus defensive action was one of the 
major policy disputes to occupy the Admiralty during the years 
following the Second World War. In essence the problem stemmed from 
a recognition of how limited the Navy's resources were, especially in 
terms of the clear lead in the offensive use of carrier aviation developed 
by the USN. This suggested that the Navy should restrict itself to the 
direct defence of shipping, whilst at the same time senior officers still 
maintained the institutional ethos of seizing every opportunity to attack 
the enemy with the intention of thus achieving command of the sea. 
Vian's background as on of the Navy's most successful fighting 
Admirals of the Second World War reinforced his concerns about 
maritime policy becon-dng overly defensive - with the apparent 
relinquishing of early offensive action to the Americans. 
Are we right, because our available forces are so small, in 
departing from tradition and defying history in tying ourselves 
to an absolutely defensive policy? Put the other way, can a 
policy under which you are always waiting for the enemy to 
slog you, and never have him guessing about the safety of his 
own guts, succeed? 
The previous year the Fighting Instructions had left its audience in 
no doubt that 'it would be folly to embark on an offensive strategy 
prematurely before the necessary build-up of forces is adequate to 
undertake offensive tasks and the security of lines of communication 
666ADM 205/69 First Sea Lords Records 1948 Part 1. Memo FromVCNS to DoP 23/7/48 
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have been provided for. ' 667 It was argued however that a defensive 
strategy did not preclude offensive operations and "must never be a 
damper to offensive spirit. ' Such a strategy n-dght have to be adopted 
while relative strength was gained by attrition on the enemy, while 
manpower and productive capacity were increased, and while strength 
was gathered for the offensive. 
Emerging concepts such as attack at source were viewed as one of 
the ways in which offensive operations could support a military strategic 
policy of defence of sea communications. Attacking an enemy's maritime 
forces in their bases at the earliest propitious moment would greatly aid 
the Navy's task by reducing the scale of any attack. Attacking a threat at 
its source, seemed to be the answer to the problem of dealing with an 
enemy (like the Kriegsmarine had been in the last war or the Russians 
were expected to be in the next) who preferred to keep his forces in being 
as a threat to those communications, and would ease the burden on 
overstretched British forces. It would release the RN from having to 
maintain an inactive concentration merely to watch and prevent the 
enemy from interfering with our communications. 668 
In July 1948 the Director of Tactical and Staff Duties, Captain RM 
Dick who had commanded HMS Belfast with the BPF, wrote to the Board 
of Admiralty for clarification of policy with regard to Fleet tactical 
training given the apparent contradiction between policy and practice. 
Although the query concerned tactical training undertaken by the Navy 
the issue went right to the heart of the discussion over the RN's 
operational role. Whilst acknowledging that no decision over the Navy's 
role in any future war had actually been taken by the Board, DTSD 
considered that it had taken sufficient shape to draw a number of 
667ADM 239/382 The Fighting Instructions 1947 para. 15 
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conclusions and wonder 'whether the training of the Fleet and planning 
within the Admiralty is proceeding along the right lines. '669 
The DTSD over simplified this policy as'yielding to the Americans all 
responsibility for offensive maritime operations while accepting for the 
British Navy the defensive role of convoy escort. ' This was clearly not 
what the Fl's or the Naval War Manual envisaged. DTSD supported his 
contention that policy appeared to be moving in such a direction with a 
number of pieces of evidence. He pointed to an apparent agreement 
reached between Director of Plans [DoP] and the USN in which the latter 
would provide the carrier task force to attack the Russian arctic bases 
while RN carrier strength was devoted to the protection of convoyS. 670He 
also cited a DoP minute which anticipated the USN CTFs in the 
Mediterranean carrying out offensive operations against the enemy held 
coast. These would contribute towards the safe passage of British 
convoys and would be necessary whilst the RN built up its strength. 671 
All of this appeared to signal that the USN would monopolise offensive 
operations and the RN would restrict itself to the direct defence of 
shipping. 
DTSD's concern was that such a policy was neither understood, 
agreed, nor being acted upon by the commanders in chief. CinC Home 
Fleet's exercises on return from the previous year's autumn cruise had 
been based on the conception of a carrier task force operating against an 
enemy coast outside the range of its own shore based air forces. CinC. 
Mediterranean argued that 'the study of offensive action by Carrier Task 
Forces in the initial stages of a war should be given a high priority. 1672 He 
reasoned that as in any war in the next few years the USA and Britain 
would alone posses aircraft carriers; this advantage should be exploited 
669ADM 205/69 First Sea Lords Records 1948 DTSD Policy and Fleet Tactical Training 
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fully and the RN would be remiss if it did not detern-dne how they could 
be used to 'hit hard the installations and industrial centres of an enemy, if 
possible before he can develop an offensive. [ ... 
I Investigations may show 
that Carrier-borne aircraft can hit targets beyond the range of our 
strategic bombers, and the Navy must be ready to seize such 
opportunities. 1673 
Adding to this offensive orientation the Admiralty's own studies were 
being directed on the assumption that the Navy would be used 
offensively. The Air Defence Working Party made their first primary 
investigation the defence of a task force, relegating defence of convoys to 
secondary consideration. As a result of this DTSD argued that the policy 
which DoP was shaping diverged from training of the Fleet for war, and 
from the study and thought of the Naval Staff. DTSD recommended that 
in consideration of the fact that this policy, if approved, differed 'widely 
from tradition, a personal explanation would go far to alleviate the 
concern with which it will inevitably be received in the Fleet. It is for 
consideration whether TRIDENT would be an appropriate occasion for 
the discussion of policy with the Commanders-in-Chief. '674 
Admiral Vian added his weight to DTSD's concerns, writing to Fraser, 
the new First Sea Lord saying, that if it was policy, as propounded in the 
PDM's, to yield to the Americans in the first years of war, all 
responsibility for offensive maritime operations, while accepting for the 
Navy the defensive role of convoy escort 'the Board should come clean 
and say so: if the Board does not do this, the C-in-Cs who are training the 
Fleet for offensive operations are being led up the garden path. ' 675 
Vian maintained that even if RN forces were relatively small 
compared to the Americans, the Navy would be departing from tradition 
673 Ibid. 
674 ADM 205/69 DTSD Policy and Fleet Tactical Training Memo 14/7/48 
675 ADM 205/69 From Vth Sea Lord to 1st Sea Lord 10/9/48 
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and history in tying itself to an absolutely defensive poliCy676 Vian was 
arguing that no matter how slight the Navy's forces, some proportion 
should be set aside for offensive action. Otherwise he argued, perhaps a 
little dramatically, that "the very foundations of the Navy and all for 
which it stands will be undermined! 
Admiral Fraser had only just been appointed to the pinnacle of the 
RN as First Sea Lord on 6 September 1948 and Vian may well have been 
trying to elicit support for his own position from an old comrade in arms. 
Fraser responded just over a week after his appointment on 14 
September. With half an eye on the political manoeuvrings that were 
needed to secure a role for the Navy dependent to a large degree on a 
threat assessment that could be shown to exist, Fraser responded by 
writing that, 'Planning can only take proceed on something we know we 
must do; escort safely our convoys. The attack can only take place when 
there is something to attack which in the case of Russia one cannot 
foresee. '677 
Vian wrote back to Fraser the following day, 14 September 1948. He 
maintained that there were certain things on which Allied planning had 
to proceed, which though of an offensive nature, would greatly assist the 
defence of sea communications. He pointed to the interdiction of enemy 
airfields on northern Mediterranean shores which would assist the 
passage of Middle Eastern convoys and the interference with the use of 
such ports as Molotovsk and Murmansk, as an anti-submarine measure. 
678 
Vian made direct reference to the BPF in order to drive his argument 
home. He concluded by saying, 
In WW3 we have, as I understand it, conceded the execution of 
such plans to the USN: is this not analogous to what the position 
676 Ibid. 
677ADM 205/69 The Roles of the Navy in War. First Sea Lords Records 1948 Letter to 5th 
Sea Lord, 14/9/48 
678 Ibid. 5th Sea Lord to 1st Sea Lord 15/9/48 
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of the BPF in WW2 would have been, had TF 57 looked after the 
logistic group, whilst TF 58 attacked Japan? Could not a more 
attractive arrangement be made in which, for example, we took 
our share of Med interdiction and played our part in Arctic 
plans? After all we do know more about that region than most. 
This would mean our Allies would have to put a little more 
effort into the defensive side of the set up - but why not? 
The Director of Plans also joined in the discussions, particularly with 
regard to the inference in DTSD's memorandum that Plans Division 
believed that all offensive operations should be undertaken by the 
Americans. 679 He argued that it was policy to look at each possible 
offensive operation and decide whether it was in furtherance of the 
country's war aims and of ies immediate objects. Further, whether the 
Navy possessed adequate forces to carry out the operation successfully, 
without prejudice to any more important operation. DoP pointed out that 
the Adn-dralty Board had approved plans for an offensive mining 
campaign, an offensive submarine campaign and were submitting 
proposals for offensive surface operations in the Black Sea on the 
outbreak of war and for offensive operations off the Norwegian Coast 
should the enemy launch a sea borne assault on Norway. It was argued 
that the difference of opinion, alluded to by the 5th Sea Lord, occurred 
over the air strike policy. The DoP contended that as the RN possessed 
less than 170 first line aircraft, with a plan to expand to some 300 by 1957, 
prioritisation in the use of these assets was essential. The Navy had three 
main tasks to fulfil with this limited asset: fighter defence of fleets and 
convoys; anti-submarine warfare at sea; and the striking at enemy 
shipping and shore installations. Fraser's predecessor, Admiral Sir John 
Cunningham, had taken the decision that the first of these two tasks were 
the most pressing and that understanding informed DoPs planning talks 
with the Americans the previous March. 
679 ibid. 28/9/48 DoP to lst Sea Lord copy VCNS 
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The USN's greater resources and concentration upon naval aviation 
had thus permitted it to deploy some 1100 carrier borne first line aircraft 
as opposed to the RN's 168, with a total planned strength for over 10,000 
aircraft. 680 American opinion was that a strike by less than a carrier task 
group (minimum 200 aircraft) would be too weak to achieve any useful 
result against opposition. With this in mind the RN was faced with three 
alternatives. First, to put the whole naval aviation effort into the strike 
role. Thus fighter defence and anti-submarine warfare tasks would be left 
unfulfilled. Second, to place the RN's small strike component (36 aircraft) 
into a US Task Group. Finally to utilise the strike component as a cadre 
from which to build up a British carrier task group in the event of 
hostilities. This third option would not provide a viable strike capability 
until D+20 months after any war started. 
The first option was ruled out almost immediately. The second, 
though supported by the Americans, was likewise excluded on the basis 
that it would remove the strike capability from any RN CTF. This left the 
third option. DoP argued that as no worthwhile results could be achieved 
by small strike packages, indeed it was felt that they could be totally lost 
if not deployed in sufficient quantity, then the Navy's air policy should 
be to fulfil the minimum fighter and anti-submarine air commitments 
(some 75 day fighters, 20 night fighters, 75 anti-submarine aircraft were 
likely to be available at the outbreak of war). In addition the Navy would 
seek to build up an air striking force of some 200 aircraft embarked in 4 
carriers with one carrier spare. Fraser agreed that DoP's paper should 
guide him in his discussions in Washington681 The RN was proposing 
retaining a capability, albeit limited, in all areas of naval aviation, though 
the focus was most definitely upon how this would be utilised in the 
defence of sea communications. 
680 lbid 
681 ADM 205/69 Memo lst Sea Lord to DoP 29/9/48 
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In contrast to this interpretation, the USN was developing a different 
focus for their organic naval aviation. On his retirement as Chief of Naval 
Operations, Admiral Nimitz wrote a paper outlining his views on the 
subject and the general thrust of American naval poliCy. 682 Nimitz 
compared the current position of the USN to that of the RN during the 
nineteenth century. As the US faced no serious challenge at sea its focus 
shifted to the ability of navies to fight land based enemies and strike 
targets ashore. This change of emphasis can in large part be attributed to 
the influence of the Pacific experience where the majority of the USN's 
effort was expended. Nimitz argued that; 
The main lesson from operations in the Pacific is that air/sea 
task forces demonstrated the ability of the navy to concentrate 
air strength at any point at will and, hence, that naval carrier 
based aviation can make use of the principles of mobility and 
concentration to a degree possessed by no other force. 683 
Nimitz went on to develop this by arguing that the main offensive 
function of the Navy was to carry the war to enemy soil by carrier aircraft 
and guided missile and rocket launching ships. When Nimitz's paper was 
reported in the Naval Review, it was accompanied by a comment piece 
which echoed the concerns of Adn-dral Vian about the loss of an offensive 
role for the RN. The commentary raised the question of whether 'we [the 
RN] not tending, due to our preoccupation with anti-submarine defence 
and the claims of strategic bombing enthusiasts, to fail to give the British 
Navy an offensive task? '684 
Although the BPF experience had demonstrated the value of using 
carrier strikes to augment surface forces in control of the sea, the size of 
British carrier air groups, particularly those of the Light Fleet Carriers, 
cast some doubt on their ability to undertake this role. If for no other 
682 See AirlSea Power in the Future - An American View Naval Review Vol. 36 1948 p. 141- 
144 
6831bid. p. 142 
6841bid. p. 144 
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reason than their air group would be stretched simply to provide air 
defence for the fleet. As Fraser himself wrote before returning from the 
Pacific; 
there is reason to believe that, in new conditions of warfare, the 
defensive effort of Carriers may in future have to be radically 
increased even beyond the high level customary in Pacific 
operations. Offensive Carrier operations against land targets 
would continue to be profitable only if Carrier borne aircraft 
could carry bombs with a factor of effectiveness sufficient to 
compensate for the low overall offensive effort, and the risk to 
the carriers forces involved. 685 
It was anticipated that attacks at source would have an indirect but 
very beneficial effect on the course of land operations. In tones prescient 
of the 1986 US Maritime Strategy, the Admiralty argued that attacks at 
source would compel the Soviet Union to re deploy aircraft to counter 
them from the central front to defensive duties on the northern flank. 686 
The benefits that flowed from such strikes would clearly be indirect, as 
their main purpose was to ease the pressure on escort forces involved in 
the direct defence of shipping. The limited numbers that the Fleet Air 
Arm would be able to field in the early stages of any conflict meant that 
more immediate assistance to ground forces was 'likely to be limited. '687 
Planning for operations in direct support of land forces assumed that a 
sufficient degree of domination over enemy forces had been achieved, 
and was perhaps overly optimistic in arguing that if 'tactical atomic 
weapons are available and can be carried by British Naval Aircraft, and in 
view of the enen-des inexperience in maritime war, this may not be too 
lengthy a process. 1688 
The formation of NATO in 1949 placed added emphasis on forward 
operations in the Norwegian Sea. The political impetus came from the 
685ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov. 1944-july 1945 
686ADM 1/22672 Support of Land Forces by British Fast Carrier Task Forces Director of 
Plans 28/11/51 para. 2. 
6871bid. 
688Ibid. para. 3 
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conu-nitment to defend all members of the alliance. Norway as a founder 
member of the Alliance was entitled to the protection of its co-signatories. 
This necessitated Anglo-American maritime power being capable of 
forward defence of this area as well as the potential for reinforcement 
ashore. As Eric Grove has pointed out 'the United States, with its World 
War Two experience in the Pacific region, was firmly committed to the 
concept of using a striking fleet of aircraft carriers to destroy the enemy 
"at source" in his bases. '689 
The fear for NATO maritime commanders was that the increase in 
quantity and quality of the submarine opposition it was likely to face cast 
serious doubt on their ability to repeat the successful defence of convoys. 
Although it had been amply demonstrated in World War 11 that 
conventional bombing of submarine pens had been all but useless in 
reducing the scale of U-boat attacks, by the early fifties US carrier aircraft 
were being equipped with nuclear weapons that held out the promise of 
infinitely more dramatic results. In addition NATO's striking fleet would 
contain an amphibious component that could be put ashore to reinforce 
local defenders and hopefully forestall any Soviet attempt to emulate the 
Kriegsmarine in establishing advanced submarine bases. 
By 1951 these ideas concerning attack at source had firmly penetrated 
the Navy's thinking. In that year the DoP issued a report concerning the 
roles and missions that a British Carrier Task Force could play in support 
of the anticipated European land war. However, the Navy steadfastly 
held to its belief that the primary function was to safe guard the nation's 
sea lines of communication. Any use of attack at source would first be 
utilised to assist this process. 
The primary object of Naval Forces is to maintain the sea lines of 
communication. Thus the first task of Carrier Task Forces at the 
outbreak of war will be to achieve domination over the enemies 
Air, Surface and Submarine forces in the areas assigned to them. 
689E. Grove Battle of the Fiords: NATO's Fonvard Maritime Strategy in Action Ian Allan 
Ltd 1991 pp8-9 
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This will be done by striking against the enemy's forces at sea, 
and, more particularly, by crippling his power to operate his 
forces by strikes against his shore installations and facilities. 690 
Two years later, with the formal creation of the NATO Striking Fleet, 
Admiralty thinking on forward carrier operations had matured. A late 
1953 paper argued that despite a limited Navy capability to undertake 
strike n-dssions against land targets, such operations had to remain part of 
the Navy's arsenal. This would achieve two related objectives. First, that 
the capability would give the Navy a say in how such operations 
progressed. Second, that during the initial phases of any conflict there 
might well be a delay in USN strike forces reaching European waters. 
Although the Americans provide the greater part of the Striking 
Fleet, we cannot leave to an ally complete responsibility for 
offensive naval warfare. We must continue to provide our share, 
on which the Americans - who also maintain powerful striking 
forces in the Mediterranean and Pacific - are relying, and without 
which we cannot expect a voice in the employment of these 
forces. Furthermore, until the American element of the Striking 
Fleet can reach this side of the Atlantic, the British element will 
need to hold the ring alone. 691 
Korea 
Although the inter-war period was one in which the RN's focus was 
firmly on the Far East, as has been outlined in Chapters Three and Five, 
the Navy's post war attention was definitely European. This is not to say 
that the RN had given up overnight its concept of being a globally 
capable force, it continued to signal British interest around the world; 
operating in Chinese waters during the Civil War and off Malaya during 
the emergency, to give but two examples. However, the expected clash 
with the Soviet Navy was to be in the cold waters of the North Atlantic 
69()ADM 1/22672 Support of Land Forces by British Fast Carrier Task Forces Director of 
Plans 28/11/51 
691ADM. 1/24695 The role of Aircraft Carriers: Memorandum by the First Lord of the 
Admiralty', 9/11/53 
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and Norwegian Sea or the more temperate Mediterranean. As a result the 
outbreak of the Korean War came as a surprise to RN. Despite this the 
RN were able to rapidly integrate themselves within the American led 
UN coalition. This process was greatly assisted by the fact that a British 
task force configured around the Light Carrier HMS Triiiiiipli had recently 
completed exercises with USN in the South China Sea. 692 
Commenting upon the after exercise reports the Director of Staff 
Duties Division [DTSDD] acknowledged the relatively smooth combined 
operation of British and American forces. 'The obvious keenness of both 
fleets to work together and the comparative ease with which the British 
Ships assimilated US doctrine and procedure - though no doubt it 
entailed much hard work - are particularly satisfactory. '693 This ability to 
inter-operate was in large measure a function of experience built up by 
the BPF and maintained by the Navy in the years following the end of 
World War Il. Although British and Commonwealth naval forces were 
assigned general responsibility for operations on the west coast of Korea, 
and US forces operations on the east coast, there was a regular exchange 
of ships and personnel between the two Task Groups. Officers from both 
the United States Navy and the Royal Navy were frequently 
interchanged to observe carrier air operations and for familiarisation and 
training694 A RN Landing Signal Officer from Glory, for example, was 
sent aboard USS Sicily when the two carriers operated together in 
November 1951, while HMS Ocean sent its Operations Officer over to the 
Sicily in September 1952 to assist in the turnover from ship to ship. 695 
Following cross decking, Glory's CO informed the Adn-dralty that the 
692 ADM 1/21868 Combined Exercise with the US Navy 28/2-10/3/50 China Sea 
693ADM 1/21868 Combined Exercise with the US Navy 28/2-10/3/50 China Sea, 
DTSDD 19/4/50 
694Ser 002 Action Report 7A2152-17A2152, memo from CO USS Badeong Strait to CNO 
20/1/53; Ser 004 Action Reportfor period 26A2152 to 5AI53 memo from CO USS Badeong 
Strait to CNO 27/1/53, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Centre, 
Washington. 
695Ser 075 5 001 Action Report 419152 to 1319152 memo from CO USS Sicily to CNO 
13/11/52, OAB 
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experience 'prove[d] the adaptability of a join Anglo-American Carrier 
Force. '696 
Although operations off the Korean coast were not something that 
had been planned for, the nature of the tasks carried out confirmed the 
usefulness of the Pacific experience to the RN. The speed at which 
Admiral Brind placed 'all units of the Far East Fleet in Japanese waters 
under operational control of the Commander, United States Naval Forces, 
Far East, Vice Admiral C. T. Joy (COMNAVFE)' was viewed as a direct 
consequence of the relations that had been maintained between the two 
services in the post war period. 697 
Indeed the Navy's operational role during the Korean War was 
remarkably similar to that undertaken by the BPF - the deployment of a 
carrier centred task force deployed for extended periods of time, 
sustained by its own logistic infrastructure, at considerable distance from 
its nearest base - almost exactly what Fraser had described as a the 
revolutionary style of naval war five years previous. As one officer on 
Brind's staff was to write in an article for the Admiralty's Monthly 
Intelligence Report 
It was therefore with no little pride that Rear Adn-dral 
Andrewes was able to inform COMNAVFE that his ships were 
ready for war, and, although 1,100 n-dles from the nearest British 
base, the force was logistically self-supporting except for 
ammunition. [Change to United States signalling could have 
caused problems of confusion] but the majority of ships present 
had taken part in combined exercises with the US 7th Fleet at 
Subic in the spring [ ... 
] so not only could we report ready to 
COMNAVFE, but we could speak the same tactical language 
from the outset. 698 
Indeed so closely did the Navy's operating pattern conform to that 
carried out by the BPF that the Naval Staff History of the Korean War 
contained an appendix detailing the strike and replenishment pattern of 
both Task Force 57 during March and May 1945 and HMS 7heseiis during 
696ADM 116/5795 
697MIRNovember 1950 No. 59 War at Short Notice p. 33 
6981bid. p. 34 
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October and December 1950699 This comparison showed that the Navy 
had maintained an ability to conduct strike operations on the basis of two 
days strikes followed by one or two days of replenishment, for an 
extended period of time. 
The developments in naval aviation technology during the Second 
World War had allowed the Navy to advance the prospect of emulating 
their Pacific activities in the Norwegian and Barents Seas. However the 
emphasis in aircraft development and procurement laid on high 
performance fighters for fleet carriers and ASW aircraft, supported by 
low-performance fighters in the Light Fleet Carriers, demonstrates the 
divergence between theory and practice. Nonetheless, the RN had 
retained a limited capability to conduct strike missions, projecting naval 
power ashore. Although for the British attack at source became an 
offensive element of an operational concept based around the strategic 
paradigm of defence of sea communications, naval power demonstrated 
its flexibility by utilising this capability for different ends. 
699BR 1736 Naval Staff History British Commonwealth Naval Operations Korea 1950-53 
MoD 1967, Appendix H p. 323-325 
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Section Four 
The Tactical Level of War 
The direction of military resources to achieve operational objectives. It is 
the level at which battles and engagements within a sequence of major 
operations are planned, forces deployed ready for battle and at which 
battles and engagements are fought. 700 
700 jWp 0-01 British Defence Doctrine HMSO [London] 1996 p. 1.10 
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Chapter Eight 
The British Pacific Fleet Experience and the Tactical Level of War 
The tactical level of warfare could be characterized as the business 
end of warfare. It is the level at which contact with the enemy is actually 
made. It concerns the employment of military forces in battle. Clausewitz 
wrote that bloodshed is to war what cash payment was to commerce. It is 
not always present but it underpins everything else that happens in 
war. 701 Without success at this level of warfare, which permitted the BPF 
to actually function in the most advanced operations against the Japanese 
alongside the USN, then BritaWs commitment to her most important ally 
would have been meaningless. The scepticism which the USN held 
concerning the RN's ability to function in the Pacific, exemplified by 
Admiral King, would have persisted post war and undermined any 
attempts at the higher levels of warfare to exploit the BPF's presence. This 
experience was important not just for the influence it had on American 
attitudes toward the Royal Navy but also for the impact it had on the 
tactical conduct of the RN. Admiral Fraser, CinC BPF, wrote shortly after 
the end of the war, that it had been imperative that the BPF operate as 
part of an integrated, American led Task Force. He argued that, "In no 
other way could we have learned the technical lessons which this type of 
warfare teaches. 702 The steep learning curve that the BPF climbed in the 
year between October 1944 and September 1945 is quite astounding. Over 
the course of the three distinct phases of the Fleet's operations, it learned 
and mastered the tactical handling of sustained air operations off a hostile 
coast at great distance from the nearest friendly base. 703 If the Fleet had 
701 Carl Von Clausewitz On War [Ed & translated M Howard &P Paret] Princeton 
University Press [Princeton] 1984 p. 97 
702ADM 199/118 BPF C-in-C's Despatches November 1944 to July 1945 23/11/45. 
703 The three distinct phases of operations identified in this thesis are as follows: TF 63 
independent strike against Palambang oil facilities Operation MERIDIAN January 1945; 
TF 57 independent strike operations against Japanese air facilities in support of Okinawa 
296 
not been able to do so then Admiral Halsey would not have been able to 
fully integrate the British into his forces. As the BPF became proficient in 
the new tactical procedures developed in the Pacific, the Fleet became a 
viable tool of political leverage. For the Navy itself, the campaign 
provided example and experience of what had become the don-dnant 
weapon of war at sea; the fast carrier task force. In addition the actual 
process of learning from the Americans produced an important sea 
change in attitude amongst many who served in the Pacific. There were 
notable exceptions, such as Admiral Vian, but in the main those who had 
dealings with the USN became ardent supporters of this close co- 
operation and subordination. They recognised that the scale of resources 
the Americans could commit to their navy would give them the dominant 
position in any post war relationship. 
In order to illustrate the depth of changes brought about by the RN's 
participation in the Pacific it is important to understand the Navy's 
tactical ideas prior to these operations. At the tactical level British 
thinking had undergone some dramatic changes during the inter-war 
period. In response to the inadequacies identified during the First World 
War, deficiencies in gunnery, divisional fighting and night engagements 
were all significantly improved. The twenty years between 1919 and 1939 
saw the accommodation, acceptance and integration of major new 
weapons systems. The introduction of aircraft added a third dimension to 
the battlespace, extending the expansion begun with the submarine. The 
development of above and subsurface naval warfare cast doubts upon the 
utility of the Navy's capital ship, the battleship. Joe Moretz has 
demonstrated the way in which the Navy responded to these challenges 
in the period prior to the Second World War. 704 His work illustrates the 
landings, Operation ICEBERG, April-May 1945; TF 37 integrated operations with USN 
Third Fleet off Japanese Home Islands, July-September 1945. 
704 J Moretz The R2yal Nývy and the Capital Ship in the Interwar Period. Frank Cass 
[London] 2002. Although this work is primarily concerned with the Battlefleet as an 
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way in which the RN was open to innovation in all three dimensions of 
naval warfare. All of this had to be accomplished during a time of harsh 
fiscal constraint and growing inter-service rivalry. This work is supported 
by that of Andrew Field who has exan-tined the Royal Navy's ideas 
concerning war with Japan during the period 1919-1939.705 
Although the major preoccupation of the RN during the inter-war 
period was the threat posed to British Far East interests by the growth 
and antagonism of Japanese power, when the Navy returned to the 
Pacific the type of conflict it found itself fighting bore little relationship to 
the one envisaged ten years previously. The Fleet would be operating not 
against a powerful opponent challenging for command of the sea but 
rather an enemy attempting to deny use of the littoral and defend terra 
firma by means of land based aviation. As a consequence of these new 
operational requirements, the RN was called upon to learn a whole series 
of new tactics, techniques and procedures [TTP] if they were to match the 
USN. This is not quite the same as arguing that the RN's inter-war tactical 
development, nor the experience of five years of war, was irrelevant in 
the Pacific campaign. Rather that the accomplishments of the BPF at the 
tactical level built upon this expertise and amended USN practice to their 
own needs. 
Force Composition 
The influence of the USN upon the tactics and procedures of the RN 
in the Pacific was to be profound and long lasting. T1-ds influence actually 
began prior to the establishment of the BPF but was directed toward, and 
intensified with, it's creation. The RN had sent naval officers to observe 
operational level asset it does contain a useful chapter on the development of tactical 
ideas; see chapter 7 p. 211-251. 
705 A Field Royal Nayy Strategy in the Far East 1919-1939: Planning for War Against 
JýpaLn, Frank Cass [London] 2004. 
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American operations in the Pacific and their dispatches were carefully 
examined back in Britain. With the formation of the BPF these reports 
became even more important. DTSD, for example, requested fifty copies 
of a report into the conduct of American carrier task forces to be used for 
the briefing of personnel selected for Pacific deployment. 706 These naval 
observers provided crucial information for the RN but their efforts could 
only go so far. As early as 1943, Cdr. H Hopkins wrote to the Admiralty 
that although he could provide commentary on USN operations he felt 
that the role of the British Liaison Officer would be greatly enhanced if he 
were in command of a British ship actually operating alongside the 
Americans. 707 This would have provided the practical first-hand 
experience of the new procedures the Americans were developing and 
formed a body of knowledge of their impact upon all aspects of ship 
operation. Nonetheless the reports Hopkins compiled were of great 
benefit in preparing the RN for service in the Pacific. 
The Admiralty had a significant amount of information concerning 
the type of warfare the Americans were pursuing and the threat 
environment in which it was operating. This material was readily 
provided but what was lacking was a clear indication as to what the 
precise role of the BPF was to be. This was obviously as much a political 
decision as a military one. The discussions and arguments aimed at 
resolving this question were still being conducted when the BPF was 
formed. Consequently the Admiralty"s aim was to provide a balanced 
fleet capable of undertaking a range of tactical tasks. 
It was recognised that the composition of the US fleet and the 
construction of its ships had been primarily focused around the 
conditions encountered in the Pacific, both environmental and 
belligerent. The British Fleet on the other hand, had been mainly 
occupied in an equally arduous but quite different type of warfare 
706ADM 1/18646 United States Naval Methods: Conduct of Carrier Task Forces in the 
Pacific. Note by DTSD 
707 ADM 199/1117 Observers with US Pacific Fleet. Cdr HS Hopkins rpt 26/11/43 
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elsewhere. The consequences of this were obvious to all who served in 
the BPF. The RN was neither equipped nor trained to undertake the 
specialised operations that characterised the Pacific War. Admiral Fraser 
commented, 'the fact that the British Fleet was able to take its place 
alongside the U. S. Fleet and to enter at short notice into their highly 
specialised type of warfare demonstrates the two qualities of 
"adaptability" and "readiness" of which the British Navy is justly 
proud'708 Although this was a compliment to the officers and men of the 
BPF it does highlight the important point that the BPF were attempting to 
utilise vessels and equipment unsuited for the Pacific. 
Admiral Fraser explained this by saying that; [t]here can be little 
doubt that the Americans are much quicker than we are at learning the 
lessons of the war and of applying them to their ships and tactics. ' The 
vast American ship building capacity enabled the US to build ships with 
such speed that they could embark on daring experiments even before 
they were shown to have a general application. In contrast the British 
were so constrained by the overstretch of their economy that the Navy 
had little choice but to make do with what it had. British shipbuilding did 
not have the capacity to turn out vessels specially designed for the Pacific 
even if the country could have afforded it. 
It is clear that the RN had entered the war with the battlefleet 
constructed around the battleship with the aircraft carrier playing an 
important but ancillary role. Experience in the Pacific suggested that this 
position had been reversed. In the report mentioned above, Fraser 
declared that 'the role of the battleship in the Pacific tends more and 
more to become defensive! The battleship was tasked with providing 
defence to the Task Force carriers, both from air attack, by virtue of its 
heavy anti-aircraft armament, and from surface ships, by virtue of its 
main armament. This main armament also provided bombardment 
support for assault forces during landings. This bombardment role was 
708ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov. 1944-july 1945 
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considered to give battleships an independent offensive function in 
certain circumstances, such as a direct attack on enemy installations when 
ground forces were not involved. 709 
This was not a radical conception of the battleship"s role nor was it 
limited to those serving in the Pacific. Indeed the RN's professional 
journal, the Naval Review, carried a number of articles during 1944 that 
envisaged precisely this function of the battleship. To quote but one 
example; 
I will go so far as to say that in the coming all-out Pacific war 
the sole primary function of battleships will be coastal 
bombardment. At all other times they will in effect form the 
aircraft carrier's heavy screen. Japanese sea power will be 
broken by the Anglo-American Naval Air Arm, assisted to a 
greater or lesser extent, again dependent on geographical 
limitations, by shore based aircraft. 710 
The geography of the Pacific, with its vast distances, put a premium 
on aircraft operations as they had the means with which to engage the 
enemy at such great range. It was argued that in the more confined 
waters of the Mediterranean or the North Sea, the battleship stood a 
better chance of coming into her own. Although it was recognised that 
the enemy would be nearer its base, if aircraft, either shore or carrier- 
based, could find and fix him, the battleship could still arrive in time to 
finish the job (as at the Battle of Matapan). However, this eventuality was 
scarcely sufficient justification for the battleship itself, particularly as 
aerial projectiles were expected to become more powerful; for aircraft 
would be perfectly capable of destroying of the enemy themselves. As the 
above article concluded all of the foregoing created a situation where "the 
fleet carrier is at present, and will remain at least in the immediate future, 
the primary offensive unit of the fleet. '711 
709 ADM 1/18662 US Naval Tactics and Methods in Pacific Area Report 25/1/45 issued 
by CinCBPF to Flag and Commanding Officers of BPF, para. 7. 
71ONaval Review Vol. XXXII 1944 1966 And All 7liat'Hangover'p. 29-30 
711Ibid. p. 30 
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The Navy's ideas concerning the role that aircraft and air power 
would play at sea had progressed dramatically from those which existed 
pre-war. The first years of the war at sea, however, developed along lines 
which were enerallv in accord with the Navy"s expectations; despite 9 
changes brought about by the fall of France, whereupon the Kriegsmarine 
was able to utilise the success of the Wermacht on land to alter the 
military strategic situation at sea - gaining access to Atlantic bases for U- 
boats and changing the balance of forces in the Mediterranean. The 
tactical and doctrinal views which the RN possessed at the outbreak of 
hostilities appeared to conform to actual practice. Carriers appeared to be 
exceptionally vulnerable to surface attack in poor flying conditions, the 
loss of HMS Glorious to the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in June 1940 
being a case in point. With regard fleet action, both the sinking of the 
Bismarck and the Battle of Matapan demonstrated the RN's belief that 
aircraft were an invaluable adjunct to the battlefleet, locating and then 
slowing down a fleeing enemy. However, the experience of operating 
alongside the USN in the Pacific demonstrated how far technological 
developments had permitted a greater exploitation of air power's 
potential. 
Strike Procedures 
The first combat operations undertaken by the BPF following its 
formation in November 1944 were the series of strikes on oil refineries in 
Sumatra codenamed Operation OUTFLANK. In brief there were four 
aspects to this operation; Operations ROBSON and UNTIL, attacks on 
targets in northern Sumatra, following which the BPF withdrew to 
Ceylon, and Operation MERIDIAN Part I and II, conducted against 
refineries and airfields in the Palembang area of southern Sumatra, 
carried out while on passage to Australia. These operations are of 
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interest, revealing as they do, the state of tactical air procedure in the BPF 
at the beginning of their Pacific experience. 
Operation OUTFLANK 
The first operation was carried out by two fleet carriers, three 
cruisers and five destroyers, Force 67 under the command of Admiral 
Vian, between 17 and 23 December. Operation ROBSON suffered in 
execution from poor weather which tended to obscure more serious 
underlying concerns about the Fleet's ability to undertake this type of 
mission. In consequence the Fleet began preparations for a second 
attempt on Pangkalan Brandan - Operation LENTIL. An extra carrier, 
Victorious, was added to Admiral Vian's command, now designated 
Force 65. When the strike launched early on 4 January into a brisk wind 
and clear skies it had been preceded by a fighter ramrod and included 
rocket firing Fireflies. The attack was more successful than ROBSON with 
considerable damage inflicted on the oil refinery but there were still areas 
of concern. The fighter escort became over enthusiastically engaged with 
dogfights leaving the Avenger strike exposed during its bombing run and 
subsequent withdrawal. Radio failures also hampered the operation, but 
fortunately the Japanese were not in a position to capitalise on British 
mistakes. 
Operation MERIDIAN 
The second half of Operation OUTFLANK was a two phase strike on 
southern Sumatra undertaken whilst the fleet was on passage to 
Australia. The fleet, designated Force 63, again commanded by Admiral 
Vian, was essentially the BPF as it was first constituted. 712 Force 63 
carried the largest number of aircraft of any RN operation yet 
712 1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron: Indomitable, Illustrious, Victorious, Indefatigable, 
Battleship King George V [Howe had already proceeded to Australi ' 
a]. 4th Cruiser 
Squadron: Argonaut, Black Prince, Euryalus, Ceylon. Destroyers Grenville, Undine, 
Ursa, Undaunted [25th Flotilla], Kempenfelt, Wakeful, Whirlwind, Wager, Wessex, 
Whelp [27 Flotilla]. 
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undertaken, it was an attempt to further emulate the activities of the 
USN. In both the strikes on Palembang the total number of aircraft 
exceeded the number that could be ranged at one time on the carriers' 
decks. Whereas the USN was capable of placing 72 aircraft in the air in 
thirty five n-dnuteS, 713 which cut loiter time during forn-dng up and so 
reduced fuel consumption allowing longer operating range, the British 
continually struggled to reach such a standard. 714 That the BPF came 
anywhere near matching the USN was a remarkable achievement. British 
carriers were not designed for a comparable operating tempo. The deck 
edge lifts and open hangars of the American carriers allowed aircraft to 
be manned and have their engines warmed up below deck. As soon as 
the first four aircraft on deck were dispatched a continuous feed of 
aircraft to -the take off point was achieved by alternatively taxiing one 
from the range, and bringing one up NO. 2 (deck edge) elevator. It was 
therefore possible to have NO. 2 elevator collecting an aircraft from the 
hangar without preventing deck take off from abaft. 715 
The torrential rains encountered on the passage to the launch point 
had affected the serviceability of the large number of aircraft necessarily 
parked on deck. 716 Deck parking was another area of divergence between 
American and British carrier doctrine. Because of the standard British 
practice of placing an aircraft in the carrier's hangar before the next one 
landed, very few aircraft were embarked for tonnage displaced. This in 
turn helped shape the nature of British carrier operations. The slow 
tempo of flight deck launching limited both the number of aeroplanes 
available for a strike and their range. Whilst the USN had been 
developing the idea of mass carrier borne strikes at both land and ship 
713ADM 199/1523 Pacific Naval Operations 1944-1945 para 24 
714ADM 219/262 Analysis of British Carrier Strikes March 1945 
715ADM 199/1523 para 25 
716ADM 199/555 BPF Actions in Operation Meridian & ICEBERG. Signal from Flag 
Officer Commanding First Aircraft Carrier Squadron 10/2/45 
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targets and achieved impressive results in the Pacific, the low numbers of 
aircraft operated by the RN encouraged the production of relatively 
inefficient multi-purpose machines or modified versions of land based 
planes. These tended to produce exercise and operational results that 
confirmed the limitations of air power at sea and were of little value in 
the Pacific. The Seafire, a naval variant of the Spitfire, was found to be 
particularly unsuitable for the Pacific. There low endurance meant that 
they could not be used for escorting strikes -a consequence of a European 
focus. Even when they were only employed for Combat Air Patrols they 
required replacing on station at such short intervals that they seriously 
hampered the movements of the fleet. Prior to the despatch of the BPF to 
the Far East the RN had utilised deck parking primarily when conducting 
operations with the Americans but it was not until the RN combined 
American procedure with American carrier planes that operations 
comparable to those of the USN in the Pacific could be undertaken. Deck 
parking enabled Implacable class carriers (Indefatigable and Implacable) 
to increase the size of their air component from 54 aircraft to 81 by the 
war's end but this caused its own problems. Although the fitting of 
outriggers to the flight deck pern-dtted deck parking and so the 
undertaking of larger strikes in the American fashion, the increase in 
numbers was beyond the designed capacity of the carriers to operate and 
maintain. Rear Adn-dral Denny (Victorious) complained to Vian that the 
extra 17 aircraft carried, 53 as opposed to 36 for the Illustrious Class 
Carrier, were almost beyond its ability to manage. 717 
Despite these problems, and the length of time it took to form up the 
strike, the fleet managed to attack the refinery at Pladjoe and the airfields 
at Lembak, Palembang and Talangtoetoe with 133 aircraft. 718 When the 
main strike force arrived over the target, unexpected barrage balloons 
were encountered, for which no prepared plan existed. It was at this 
717Signal from C. O. HMS Victoriotis to F. O. Commanding Air Craft Carriers BPF 1/2/45 
ADM 199/555 
718ADM 199/555 Operation Meridian Section 1 Narrative paragraph 11 
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point that another innovation borrowed from the USN should have made 
itself felt, the utilisation during operations of an Air Co-ordinator. 
MERIDIAN was the first attempt by the Fleet Air Arm to incorporate such a 
role into its strike plan. His task within the strike was to manage the 
various 'packages' of aircraft and issue new instructions in the light of 
developing events. The Operations directorate of the Admiralty 
commented some months after MERIDIAN that 'This is the first report 
received of an operation in which an air co-ordinator has been used by us 
and the directive issued to him [.. ] is of great interest. It is considered that 
this duty is one which has come to stay and will have to be allowed for in 
all future appointments. '719 The air co-ordinator did issue the 
accompanying Fireflies with an order to go ahead and deal with the 
balloons but no acknowledgement was received. Radio serviceability was 
to be another recurring handicap with some aircraft not being informed 
of changes to the bombing plan. 
The second strike on 29 January, followed the same path as 
MERIDIAN I and came under attack from a Japanese fighter patrol south- 
west of the refineries which was dispersed by the Corsairs from Iffitstrioits 
that were providing top cover. The necessity of repeating the same 
approach as on the 24 January was due to the shortage of fuel and the 
endurance of the aircraft being reduced by the tempo of launching and 
landing on. British experience in the Mediterranean, Norwegian and 
North Sea's had resulted in 70% of strikes taking place at 60 mil6s or less 
from land, whereas the same percentage of Essex Class Carrier Strikes in 
the Pacific Ganuary - June 44) took place between 60 and 120 miles from 
land. 720 The longer range and superior efficiency of US naval aircraft 
allowed a greater tactical flexibility and therefore a fuller exploitation of 
the fleet carrier as a strategic weapon. This restriction to the carrier forces 
mobility was a significant handicap and was surely the reason that the 
719DOD 22/4/45 Pencil note to ADM 199/555 docket. 
720ADM 219/262 Analysis of British Carrier Strikes March 1945 Summary para 1 
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MERIDIAN H strike was intercepted by Japanese aircraft along both legs of 
its attack and the fleet itself became subject to attack. 
In a signal to Admiral Power who was CinC East Indies Fleet, Fraser 
responded to the criticisms levelled at MERIDIAN before its execution by 
arguing that the operation had been of the utmost importance for the 
Fleet. It had It succeeded in wielding the Carrier Task Force into a 
fighting unit and had practised the force in something approximating to 
the type of operation which it would carry out in the Pacific. 721 
Palembang was the first operation in which the RN had employed four 
carriers offensively. It is telling how far the naval war in the European 
and Atlantic theatres had hindered the development of the RN's carrier 
doctrine when one considers that as long ago as 1930 the directors of the 
Naval Air and Tactical Divisions agreed that in a future war it would be 
necessary to operate four or more carriers together as a unit. 722 
The heavy losses that had been predicted based upon European 
experience had failed to materialise. It had also been advanced that 
destroying a target such as Palembang would require saturation bombing 
if any significant results were to be achieved, again a consequence of 
viewing the operation through the perspective of RAF economic bombing 
in Europe. Fraser, however, was convinced that the'.. rapier thrust of light 
but accurate carrier borne aircraft bombing'723 would do more damage to 
a target such as Palembang with its one or two small but vital objectives. 
The results bore out this conclusion, the output of aviation gasoline was 
halted for two months and never reached the levels prior to the strike. 
Fraser also made the point that in consequence of the attack the fleet 
arrived in the Pacific as a fighting unit. If it had arrived any earlier the 
721ADM 199/555 Signal from CinCBPF to CinC East Indies Station 14/3/45 
722ADM 116/2771 Director of Naval Air Division, Naval staff and Director of Tactical 
Division Naval Staff. 7/1/30 Memorandum on the subject of the Appointment of a Rear 
Admiral (Air). para 4. 
723ADM 199/188 para. 124 
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missing Fleet tankers would have still prevented operations with the 
USN. 
After the details of the operation reached London the importance of 
strikes for the development of the RN became clearer. The Director of 
Operations Division wrote that '[t]his report shows how necessary it was 
to carry out a full scale 4 carrier battle practice, before attempting 
operations in the Pacific on an equal footing with U. S. task groups whose 
experience in this type of action has hitherto been considerably greater 
than our own. 724 The Director of Air Warfare and Flying Training 
supported this point and added that '[flrom [this operation] the Aircraft 
Carrier Squadron as a whole must have learned many valuable lessons 
which will, in turn, have their influence on the whole Naval Air Arm. '725 
In marked contrast to British practice, the USN seldom operated a 
squadron as a whole. Each individual strike usually being a composite 
force, made up of aircraft from all carriers of the Group. 726 The first 
launch invariably being a large fighter sweep (about 60 air craft in a Task 
Group) which endeavoured to neutralise opposition in the 
neighbourhood of the target by shooting down airborne enemy fighters 
and by destroying those on the ground. Ground installations (or escorts, 
if the target was at sea) also received strafing attention. The fighter sweep 
would be followed after an interval of a quarter of an hour, by strike one, 
which included fighter, bomber and/or torpedo carrying aircraft. A 
fighter escort accompanied each strike; though it was found that, if the 
fighter sweep was on a large enough scale, escorts for the first strike 
could be kept small. 
The Royal Navy as an institution and individual officers within it in 
particular, were fully aware of the American carrier warfare procedures 
724ADM 199/555 DOD 22/4/45 
725ibid. DAWFT 13/6/45 
726ADM 1/18646 United States Naval Methods: Conduct of Carrier Task Forces in the 
Pacific. 
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outlined above. Fifty copies of the report on which the foregoing was 
based were requested by DTSD for briefing Far East personnel at the end 
of January 1945.727 The geostrategic circumstances in Europe, time, lack 
of material and the absence of senior naval aviators in key positions 
(something the Americans felt was crucial) all conspired to handicap the 
Navy in developing such a doctrine of their own. As the Admiralty's own 
inquiry into naval aviation said in February 1945; '.. the main pre- 
occupations of the British Navy up to the present time have denied them 
the opportunities (which the USN has had in the Pacific theatre of war) to 
develop and exploit the new potentialities and characteristics introduced 
by aircraft into naval warfare. 1728 The report argued that in regard to 
policy and planning the Adn-dralty had to make up a considerable 
amount of lost ground, both in the appreciation and exploitation of the 
effect of aviation on naval strategy and tactics; including ship 
construction, and in the knowledge and experience of the potentialities 
and of the demands, as well as its lin-titations, of aircraft as such and 
design. This meant that prior to actual operations in the Pacific, the R. N. 
only had second hand experience of what would be required to utilise as 
a basis of planning and training. 
New Tactical Dispositions 
The development of new tactical dispositions utilised by the BPF 
during their time in the Pacific were a response to the threat environment 
encountered and the needs of the Fleet's primary offensive weapon 
system. By the time that the BPF arrived on station the USN had achieved 
a degree of command of the sea. Fraser recognised this changed situation 
when he wrote, "the Japanese fleet was soundly beaten by the United 
727 ADM 1/18646 Pencil annotation by DSTD to report, United States Naval Methods: 
Conduct of Carrier Task Forces in the Pacific. Dated 25/l/45. 
728ADM 167/124 Board of Admiralty Minutes: Evershed Report into Naval Aviation 
February 1945 
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States Fleet in the battle of Leyte, and from that date onwards it started to 
decline in importance as a naval objective. '729 This created the need for 
the development of new operational concepts, which in turn required 
developments in tactical dispositions. In place of the IJN"s battlefleet the 
Japanese air forces took over as the principal target of the naval war. In 
particular Fraser was concerned by the prospect of suicide attacks. These 
he described as "giv[ing] more bang per plane with a less well trained 
pilot. '730 Consequently the best method of defeating the Japanese air 
forces was to destroy its means of production and training hence the 
importance of the BPF's strikes on the Sumatran oil refineries and the 
emphasis placed upon power projection ashore. Naval aviation expanded 
the range at which the RN could exploit the command of the sea won by 
defeating the IJN. 
The instructions for the conduct of the Fleet at sea contained eight 
new circular cruising dispositions. These new disposition arrangements 
were intended for cruising by day when enemy air attack was probable. It 
provided mutual gun support, a measure of defence against submarines 
according to the number of destroyers available, and permitted the 
operating of aircraft, which were now the Fleets prime offensive 
weapon731 A cruiser would normally be stationed in the Centre, as the 
guide of the fleet. The carriers were stationed on an outer circle (No. 2) 
and formed the carrier force. The battleships and AA cruisers took 
position four thousand yards from the fleet guide, on a subsequent Circle 
(No. 4). Together with the carriers and the 'KIC' destroyers they 
constituted the main body. The "KW destroyers were stationed close 
astern of each carrier to provide close gun support during an air attack to 
counter suicide planes and perform rescue duties during air operations. 
729ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov 1944-july 1945, Section Two paragraph 8, 
sent23/11/45 
730 Ibid. paragraph 9. 
731ADM 199/1768 BPF General Orders 15/5/45; BPF War Orders 20/2/45 
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The circle furthest out from the guide ship normally consisted of 
destroyers, sometimes supplemented by cruisers, and was referred to as 
the screen. They provided a measure of defence against air attack and 
submarines. Though less regard was given to the Japanese submarine 
hazard due to a lack of offensiveness shown, the Navy's experience in the 
Atlantic and the Mediterranean was not going to be forgotten. Indeed the 
Admiral Fraser noted in a memo to the Admiralty that 'offensive 
submarine activity by the enemy is on the increase'732 
Operation ICEBERG 
A second important part of the Fleet's task was to neutralise the 
Japanese air forces in the area of an amphibious assault. This was the role 
given to the BPF in its attacks on Sakishima Gunto during Operation 
ICEBERG, the invasion of Okinawa. Although these were not especially 
radical tasks for the Royal Navy it was the primacy of them and the new 
techniques employed to carry them out that mark them as different. 
Air Defence 
The attack by Japanese aircraft on Force 63 following the second 
phase of Meridian failed to inflict any damage of the BPF being broken 
up by Seafires from Indefatigable conducting CAP. Casualties however, 
were sustained from friendly fire, a consequence of a large number of 
ships being tightly packed together to provide mutually supporting AA 
fire. 
British anti-aircraft defence procedure had grown out of the RN's 
pre-war experience and their operations in European and Atlantic waters. 
Before the outbreak of war it was doubted whether defensive fighters 
732Memo from C-in-CBPF to Admiralty contained in ADM 1/18646 
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could be directed to successful interception due to the speed at which air 
attacks could develop and this led to little attention being given to this 
role. The development of RDF and its potential to assist the Fleet in 
dealing with air attack was clearly demonstrated in the Combined Fleet 
Exercises of 1939733 and the Fighting InstructionS734 of that year included 
dispositions for its optimum use. However, the aircraft to carry out the 
interception that the new technology offered no longer existed within the 
Fleet. In March 1939 the Air Ministry circulated specifications for a new 
two-seat fighter for use with the Fleet Air Arm. 735 After initial proposals 
had been received from various firms, the Director of Air Material at the 
Admiralty altered the requirements during a meeting in January 1940, 
explaining that even in the light of limited war experience it had become 
clear that a higher performance aircraft was required to intercept enemy 
land based machines. Idea's about Fleet defence against air attack were 
undergoing important changes but would have to wait upon material. 
Until that time the 'passive' defences of ships armour and its AA batteries 
would have to suffice. 
The RN had been developing its methods of defending vessels at sea 
from air attack under the particular circumstances of the Mediterranean 
and against German and Italian fliers. But whereas heavy AA fire from 
20mm guns could interfere sufficiently with a pilots aim as to make his 
chances of hitting with bomb or torpedo more difficult, when faced with 
suicide planes the inability to actually destroy the aircraft was a problem. 
Kamikaze pilots would not veer off or withdraw if damaged. The 
Americans had found that their 40mm guns could break up attacking 
planes in the air, and the British discovered themselves in desperate need 
of such calibre's to replace their under powered 20mrn pieces. 'The 
armament of our ships has been designed primarily from an anti-ship 
733ADM 116/3873 Exercise ZQ, 1/3/39 
734ADM 239/261 The Fighting Instructions 1939 C. B. (Confidential Book) 04027(39) 
735This was the genesis of what later became the Fairey Firefly. Details taken from 
Harrison W. Fairey Firefly: The Operational Record Airlife Publishing Ltd 1992 
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point of view and generally speaking they are, as the Americans would 
say "Not able to look after themselves". '736 Indeed when Fraser came to 
compile his report into the lessons learned by the BPF he commented 
that, 'The standard of AA gunnery was low due to lack of targets and 
training facilities generally. Ideally the whole fleet should, on joining, 
have been put through an extensive AA training programme if it was to 
face Pacific operations with confidence. 737 
It soon became apparent, however, that the British fighter direction 
techniques were superior to those of the Americans. Used to intercepting 
the excellent pilots and aircraft of the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean, 
Commander E Lewis, Vian's experienced fighter direction officer, found 
he needed only a portion of the many defensive fighters to which the 
Americans had become accustomed. Commenting, with obvious pleasure 
at performing well in the face of so much American superiority, Vian 
reported to Fraser during Okinawa operations that; '[oln the plus side our 
armoured decks, & our fighter direction. The latter has been quite 
outstanding, & the American observers recognise it. 1738 
In similar vein, when the BPF were finally integrated into the USN 
for operations with the US Third Fleet off Japan itself, Vian again 
delighted at being-able to show the Americans what the RN was still 
capable of. "The highlight so far has been Indomitable Hellcats getting 
into a squadron of torpedo bombers near the Fleet (and shooting 3 
down), which the Americans wouldn't believe were there, and sent, 
therefore, no night fighters. 739 
Although armoured decks saved the carriers from having to retire, 
as was the case with American wooden decked CV's, it was clear 
736ADM 199/118 para 75 
737ADM 199/2376 Section 1- Fleet Operational Lessons 
738Letter from Admiral Vian to CinCBPF 12/4/45 Fraser Papers MS83/158 File 23 CinC 
Operational Correspondence with Flag Officers 
739From 1AC to CinC BPF 29/7/45 Fraser Papers MS83/158 File 23 CinC Operational 
Correspondence with Flag Officers 
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Kamikaze attacks required a change in tactical thinking. 740 Rawlings 
acknowledged that the kan-dkaze attacks had placed a premium on 
fighter interception being carried out at the maximum possible range741. 
After Formidable and Victorious were hit again on the 9 May Rawlings 
wrote that, '[t]he Japanese seem to have suddenly made up their minds to 
increase the attacks on us. Their tactics are not too easy to deal with 
because we get such very short warnings due to their low approach. '742 
Operations were revealing difficulties in operating a conventional US 
pattern AA screen in two respects. First of all there were difficulties in 
providing useful target indication for the main body and secondly in 
providing fire support for the main body during suicide attacks. A new 
screening disposition was evolved in response with the object of giving 
better protection to the carriers in the face of suicide attacks, but this led 
to a lack of flexibility and to station keeping difficulties. 
Co-ordinating the fleet's air defence relied upon the technological 
innovation of radar. Though the European war had demonstrated how 
advantageous this device could be it is clear that the USN had exploited 
this British invention to a greater degree in some respects. Radar 
equipped ships were utilised as advance warning pickets. These pickets 
with their attendant CAPs were central to the Fleet's air defence. Each 
picket, four destroyers and four fighters, were stationed from forty to 
sixty n-dles from the Fleet guide, to cover an arc of 180 degrees in the most 
likely direction of attack. The destroyers were specially equipped with 
radar and fighter direction equipment, but the BPF's contribution was 
technologically inferior to that of the USN. The Directorate of Air Warfare 
and Flying Training decided during July to fit out cruisers to perform the 
7401n actual fact it was the hangars that were armoured to provide protection for the 
stowed aircraft. hidefatigable's USN Liaison Officer is reported to have said; 'When a 
kamikaze hits a US carrier its six months repair at Pearl In a Limey carrier it's a case of 
11sweepers man your brooms". 'Winton Forgotten Fleet p. 122 
741ADM 199/555 BPF Actions in Operation Meridian & ICEBERG Initial Stages of 
ICEBERG 26/3/45-20/4/45 Office of the Vice Admiral Second in Command BPF 9/5/45 
74211/5/45 Report from V. Adm 2CinC BPF to CinCBPF Fraser Papers MS83/158 File 23 
CinC Operational Correspondence with Flag Officers 
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same function as US destroyer pickets as cruisers were considered better 
able to protect themselves and the existing fleet destroyers" radar was not 
efficient enough. 743 The Director of Radio equipment commented that the 
number of aircraft involved was swamping the Action Information 
Organisation and radar identification. Despite the fact that British Naval 
liaison Officers had helped introduce AIO's (Combat Information Centre 
in American parlance) to the USN at Pearl Harbor, here was another 
example of American resources being able to develop an idea with 
greater rapidity than the RN. 
There still remained problems with regard to Seafires on CAP 
making uncoordinated attacks on intruding aircraft. On one occasion the 
section of Seafires which were put up to intercept a raid did so at about 
15 miles but 'behaved rather stupidly. The Japanese split into three 
parties; all four Seafires sighted on one single Japanese machine and 
chased this leaving the others unmolested. They chased it out for 42 n-tiles 
and shot it down, but that did not help the fleet much. '744 The ships were 
also still very slow opening fire although, when they made visual 
sightings, the gunnery was much improved from the previous year. This 
experience during May led Vian to emulate the American practice of 
stationing radar pickets, each consisting of a cruiser and destroyer, 
further out from the main body of the fleet to provide greater coverage 
and earlier warning of impending attack. When compiling his final report 
on the BPF's experience in the Pacific, Fraser commented that the best 
A. A. screening diagram had possibly not yet been evolved but if this 
were to be investigated the risk of submarine attack should be considered 
first. If the risk was only slight, as in the latter stages of the war, 
insecurity against submarine torpedoes could be accepted and the heavy 
ships be placed on the screen where their greater AA firepower would be 
more effective in protecting the mission essential vessels, the carriers. 




Despite the continuing difficulties the BPF experienced, trying to 
match the level of operations that the USN were conducting, there was 
also clearly some justification for feeling satisfied. Much had been learnt 
in terms of aircraft handling allowing for a greater sortie rate. The actual 
strike procedures had improved dramatically from only a few months 
before. The manoeuvring of ships under new tactical dispositions had 
been accepted. Refuelling and replenishing at sea had been brought to a 
higher standard of efficiency, though still woefully short of American 
practice due to inappropriate and poor equipment. The anti-aircraft 
defence of the task force had also seen important improvements. In mid 
May Admiral Rawlings wrote to Fraser that the Fleet had been devoting 
much of its exercise time to the introduction of new air defence 
technologies with pleasing results. In particular he drew attention to the 
new VT fuse or proximity fuse, an anti-aircraft projectile which detonated 
when a radio emission detected the presence of a nearby object. This 
removed the need for the projectile to actually strike the attacking 
aircraft. 
we do depend so much on this V. T. fuse now. All our recent 
training has been centred around them. The improvement in 
gunnery, radar, fighter direction etc this trip north has brought 
is astounding. We've been doing night trailing etc, AC1 [Admiral 
Vian] using his night Hellcats, for the first time and its been very 
interesting745 
The British had been developing proximity fuses for the use in 
bombs and rockets but had decided that the technical problems in 
making such fuses rugged enough to be fired from a gun were for the 
time insurmountable. 746 The USN pressed ahead with their development 
74515/7/45 From V. Adm 2CinC BPF Lord Fraser of North Cape Paper's National 
Maritime Museum MS83/158 File 23 CinC Operational Correspondence with Flag 
Officers 
746 Details taken from Office of Scientific Research and Development. National Defense 
Research Committee. Swiiniaqj, Photoelectric Fuzes and Miscellaneolls Projects. vol. 3 of 
Sitnniianj Technical Report of Division 4 [Ordnance Accessories] NDRC. (Washington DC: 
1946): and 77ze " VT" or Radio Proxindhj Fuze: Szippleniental Basic Infonnation Prepared Inj 
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solving they many practical problems. What is significant in the 
development of this project, beyond the actual tactical capability it 
provided, was that the program established to develop the VT fuse 
created a list of priorities which placed the needs of the RN second only 
to those of the USN and ahead of the US Army. 
It should not be thought that developments in CAP and deck 
launched interception made possible by radar undermined the role that 
surface vessels had in air defence, operations off Sakishima Gunto clearly 
demonstrated their continuing vital utility. Likewise though naval 
aviation could now strike at the enemy long before a fleet's big guns 
could engage, there were lingering doubts expressed about this weapons 
all weather capability. The BPF's War Diary records an exercise 
conducted by the BPF at the end of February 1945 where the weather 
prevented the carriers flying off any aircraft leaving the only offensive 
power of the fleet resting in its guns. 747 This Problem was to become a 
major feature of the RN's tactical development post-war; the search for an 
all-weather naval aviation capability that would permit Pacific type 
operations to be conducted in northern European latitudes. 
Achieving Sustained Operations at Sea 
The Navy's own history of the war against Japan comments that it 
was the cost of establishing shore bases that provided the principal 
impetus behind the development of the Fleet Train. 748 This, however, is 
only part of the reasoning behind the establishment of the Fleet Train. 
The Fleet Train and the ability to conduct Replenishment at Sea [RAS] 
Applied Physics Laboratonj, the Jolins Hopkins Universihj. (Silver Spring MD: The 
Laboratory, 1945): available online at wwxv. history. mil/faqs/faq96-l. htin accessed 
2/7/2001 
747ADM 199/1457 BPF War diary 27/2/45 
748 Naval Historical Branch War wit1h Japan Vol. VI HMSO [London] p. 14 
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were fundamental to the type of warfare that the Americans had been 
developing in the Pacific. The most remarkable feature of the Pacific war 
was the long periods during which Task Groups operated without 
returning to a Fleet Base. The Admiralty in London were fully aware of 
this point and it obviously pressed heavily on their minds. Commenting 
that; '[a] single operation may occupy as much as 80 days. During this 
period Groups return to the "service area" for fuel and mail, the latter 
being brought out by the destroyer escorts of the Tanker Group and 
passed direct to the ships of the Task Group. '749 At longer intervals, a 
Group would return to an advanced base, usually because of a shortage 
of bombs. During these visits AA ammunition and stores of all kinds 
were embarked. The pace of operations and the consequent short stay in 
harbour also received much attention in London. This high tempo of 
operations was partly possible because of the development of underway 
refuelling. 'As is well known the USN has brought the practice of oiling at 
sea to a fine art. Tankers often fuelling on both sides simultaneously at 
about 10 knots. Great stress is laid on keeping destroyers topped up so 
that the Group is always ready for an emergency. 750 
As a result of Britainýs long history of naval presence throughout the 
world and their possession of base facilities the absence of these in the 
Pacific campaign was a major handicap to operations. The Americans 
managed to overcome these vast distances by the use of a small number 
of permanent bases supplemented by temporary ones. Their progress 
through the Pacific was marked by a series of rapidly constructed bases 
in which all the essential features for conducting naval warfare were 
provided. As the war advanced forward, they were dismantled as rapidly 
as they were constructed, and moved forward to the next selected site. 




The British Pacific Fleet was in no doubt that the Americans were able to 
achieve this due to their Seabees organisation. 751 
The United States fleet had evolved a method of operating its vast 
Fleet more or less contiguously off the enemy coasts. 'This rate of striking 
and the length of time that all units remain in the operating area are 
considerably beyond anything that had previously been contemplated in 
the British Naval Service. '752 In order to do this, they established a large 
logistics organisation, which the BPF's Fleet Train was a poor shadow. In 
reporting these operations to the Admiralty Adn-dral Fraser made the 
distinction between a 'modern Fleet while remaining off the enemy 
coast ... in a continuous state of active operation against the enemy, 
and ... not passively employed in blockade or waiting for the enemy to 
come oUt'753 that characterised fleet behaviour before the advent of 
carriers. This ability to sustain a powerful naval force continuously in 
action against the enemy clearly impressed Adn-dral Vian. Writing in his 
wartime memoirs he described the American logistic capabilities in 
glowing terms. 
Operating thousands of miles from the nearest permanent base, 
the Americans had developed a logistic system and organization 
of previously unimagined extent and complexity. Their Fleet 
was supplied and replenished at sea, where it would remain, 
often for many weeks, without returning even to temporary, 
advanced bases set up in the island group. '754 
Although the British established a makeshift Fleet Train in order to 
operate in the Pacific the techniques initially employed by the BPF were 
markedly inferior to those of the USN. The British procedure for 
refuelling at sea was by means of buoyant hoses trailed astern of a tanker. 
751The name Seabees was derived from the initials of the Construction Battalions that 
built and maintained the American base facilities. 
752ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov. 1944-july 1945 
7531bid. 
754 Vian Action This Day Op CiL p. 155 
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These would be picked up by the following vessel and pumping would 
commence. Vian commented after the war that this was 'an awkward, 
unseaman-like business compared with the American method, in which 
the two ships steamed along abreast of one another a short space apart. 
For some reason we had failed to benefit from American experience and 
fit our tankers and warships with the necessary tackle to employ this 
method. We were to suffer until we did so'755 
On passage to an operation a speed of about 18 knots was usual in 
order to reduce fuel consumption. On the afternoon before the first strike, 
usually dawn, speed was increased to 25 knots until the launching 
position was reached. Flying operations, involving high speed, took place 
continuously during the strike day, finishing at dusk. The group would 
then retire at about 25 knots, turning as required to reach the launching 
position for the following day. A single strike day being a rarity; almost 
invariably two or more consecutive strike days occurred before the Force 
retired to the Service Area. Despite attempts to conserve fuel by a 
relatively sedate approach to the operational area the lin-dts placed upon 
strike operations by this desire for economy were to continually restrict 
the BPF. In addition to this, whereas an American TF usually withdrew to 
the Service Area for a single day between strike periods it was not 
uncommon for the BPF to require two and even three days to refuel and 
replenish. Rawlings complained to Fraser that the British method of 
Replenishment at Sea was inferior to that of the Americans. 'I'm not at 
ease about the oilers. Its just not possible to pump fast enough and when 
it comes to a single hose astern its ludicrous .... I wish they realised at 
home what a margin we are working on. '756 
The creation of the Fleet Train allowed the USN to multiply the 
operating radius of the Fast Carrier Task Force both in time and space. 
7551bid. p. 175 
75615/7/45 From V. Adm 2CinC BPF Fraser Papers MS83/158 File 23 CinC Operational 
Correspondence with Flag Officers 
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The CTF remained at sea for extended periods covering vast distances. As 
long as fuel and ammunition lasted the Task Force would operate off the 
enemy's coast or its own landing beaches, a series of strikes being carried 
out as appropriate. In the prolonged operations undertaken, fatigue of air 
crews, and of pilots in particular, became a factor of major importance 
and gave cause for growing concern in the US Fleet. Normally an air 
group was relieved after six months of operations. By the time the R. N. 
returned to the Pacific in early 1945 however, the pace of operations had 
increased to such an extent that certain groups had to be relived after four 
months with excessive fatigue being reported after lesser periods. 
This strain on personnel was to be of particular worry to Adn-dral 
Fraser (C-in-CBPF) who did not have the manpower to create spare 
airgroups on the scale possessed by the Americans for replacement of 
worn out crews. In discussing this problem within American ships the 
Admiralty's observers reported that; '[plarticular care is taken, in carriers, 
to keep pilots and air crews fit, both physically and mentally. Recreation, 
sun-bathing, a quantity and variety of good books, ice cream and 
medicinal whisky (in otherwise dry ships) are freely used to this end. '757 
Fraser commented that the rapid tempo of operations and scant 
opportunities for leave created hard living conditions which imposed a 
heavy strain on the officers and men. In order to relieve this the 
Americans had concentrated on three things; firstly good food, which 
included, for the Americans, ice creams; secondly, good entertainment, 
which primarily consists of universal cinemas, with a constantly 
changing programme and thirdly a rapid and reliable mail service. 758 The 
attitude of senior officers toward what was considered necessary for the 
maintenance of morale in the Pacific illustrates a wider issue; the varying 
degree of influence of first and second hand experience. Admiral 
757ADM 1/18646 United States Naval Methods: Conduct of Carrier Task Forces in the 
Pacific. 
758ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov. 1944-july 1945 
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Cunningham in London responded to Fraser's repeated attempts to 
improve the conditions of the BPFs personnel with the following letter. 
I hope our people will not get too blinded by American 
lavishness. We cannot compete with them in either personnel or 
material, nor do I think we should train our men to expect the 
same waste as practiced in the American Navy. I am sure that 
soda fountains, etc. are very good things in the right place, but 
we have done without them for some hundreds of years and I 
daresay can for another year or two. 759 
With the principal strain falling on the aircrews, experience showed 
that the aircrews efficiency fell off rapidly after being engaged for a 
certain period of time in this type of operation, and to combat this the 
Americans adopted a system of changing their combat carrier air groups 
at the end of four or six months. It had been found more profitable to 
have on board a relatively untrained air group rather than a highly 
trained one suffering from operational fatigue. As a result of this, one of 
Fraser's first actions was to ask for the establishment of a spare airgroup 
policy, although he realised that this was essentially in conflict with the 
established custom of the Fleet Air Arm and the Royal Navy, which 
relied to a large extent on a close union between air squadrons and the 
ships to which they belonged760 
The Bombardment of Truk: The Role of the Battleship 
The idea that the RN was hidebound to the battleship well after it 
ceased to be the final detern-dnant of war at sea has long been 
demonstrated as false. 761 That naval aviation was an intrinsic part of the 
759 MS83/158 File 23 CinC Operational Correspondence with Flag Officers, Letter First 
Sea Lord to CinC BPF 19/1/45 
76()ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov. 1944-july 1945 
761 G. Till's work on the RN and air power during the interwar period has been 
advanced further in recent years. See for example, Moretz op. cit., Field op. cit. 
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battle fleet upon which seapower was founded was widely accepted 
within the Royal Navy before WWII. This however is not quite the same 
as arguing that its full potential was appreciated. Conceptions of how 
aviation would impact upon naval warfare were as diverse as they were 
abundant. Drawing out just two points of view circulating within the 
Navy during 1944 will help illustrate the uncertainty that existed even 
after five years of conflict. The political head of the service, the First Lord 
of the Admiralty made the following statement during the 1944 debate on 
the Naval Estimates. 
The fight that we face [with Japan] will demonstrate most 
pointedly once more that the ultimate sanction and final arbiter 
of sea-mastery is still the battleship, supported of course, by the 
air element which is now inseparably part and parcel of 
maritime dominion. 762 
This should be compared with the views expressed in the Naval 
Review article quoted above on p. 302, which identified coastal 
bombardment as the prime offensive role of battleships. The position and 
role of the battleship became somewhat anomalous during the BPF's 
tenure in the Pacific. The battleship's function was largely defensive in 
that they acted as floating AA batteries in defence of the carriers. In this 
role they were not wholly successful since, for tactical reasons, they could 
not be stationed near enough to the ships they were defending to provide 
effective close support. 763 The opinion at the Admiralty whilst the BPF 
was undertaking ICEBERG was that the battleship would be at the 
forefront of the battle in the Pacific. Casualties were expected which 
would reduce the overall effectiveness of the Battle Fleet. Whilst 
discussing the planned construction programme for the last year of the 
war the Board of Adn-dralty noted that: 
762Quoted in Naval Review Vol. XXXII 1944 Notes oit the war at Sea'Fautcuil'p94 
763ADM 199/2376 Section 1- Fleet Operational Lessons 
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It is therefore of primary importance that the Lion and Teitleraire 
should be laid down at the earliest date. In view of the age of 
our Battle Fleet their completion should not be delayed beyond 
the end of 1952. We ask for approval to proceed accordingly. 764 
Although the actual evidence from the Pacific suggested that the 
battleship's day had gone this was far from obvious at the time. Indeed, 
despite bombardment becoming the only offensive role of the gun, the 
opinion appears to have been that had the war continued there would 
have been further opportunities for the battleship to prove its worth. 765 
Vian wrote in his memoirs that: 'The fast aircraft carrier had become the 
capital ship of the new navy; the "strike" aircraft they carried delivered 
the blows which the battleships' guns had previously given; the fighters 
provided the principal defence against similar blows by the enemy. '766 
This point of view was put on paper fifteen years after the end of the war 
and the benefit of hindsight can not be excluded. The relative merits of 
the battleship in comparison with the aircraft carrier was to continue 
exciting debate after the war in much the same way as before it broke out. 
Carriers offered flexibility by virtue of the fact that aircraft could be 
changed to meet particular circumstances. In addition the weapons 
carried could also be changed. 'In particular combined operations, where 
the gun ship is confined to artillery support limited to a coastal strip, the 
carrier-borne aircraft can leave the ship to operate ashore, while the 
carrier goes back for more. As often as not the carrier may be the swiftest 
method of bringing air squadrons into action as a complete or going 
concern. The carrier can therefore be a most potent weapon of land power 
as well as contributing to sea power. 1767 
764ADM 167/124 Admiralty Board Minutes New Construction Programme 1945 
23/2/45 
765ADM 199/2376 Section 1- Fleet Operational Lessons 
766Vian Action This Day Op Cit. p. 172 
767Naval Review Vol. XXXII 1944 Carriers Evenj Titiie'Foreshore'p. 47 
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Admiral Fraser has the distinct achievement amongst RN officers as 
having been the only officer to have overseen the design of a ship and her 
weapons [the King George V and her 14" guns while Third Sea Lord and 
Controller of the Navy] and subsequently used them in a major fleet 
action [sinking the Scharnhorst in the Duke of York in December 1943]. 
Fraser was a gunnery man through and through. He had been -an 
instructor at the Navy's gunnery school HMS Excellent during the inter- 
war years. It should be borne in mind, however, that Fraser had also 
commanded a carrier in the Mediterranean between 1935 and 1937. It is a 
measure of the perception of airpower at the time that his second and 
final sea command as a captain was of HMS Glorious. 
Fraser's perception of the position of the battleship with the BPF can 
be gleaned from a report he issued to his Flag and Commanding Officers 
at the end of January 1945.768 In it he noted that in the US Navy the Task 
Force Commander invariably flew his flag in a carrier. This was different 
from the BPF`s practice where, Admiral Rawlings commanded the Task 
Force from the battleship HMS King George V. Fraser thought that the 
American method was "sound, observing that the carriers carry the 
offensive weapons of the force., 769 Although British practice was not 
changed until after the war the BPF effected a compromise position 
whereby tactical command passed to Admiral Vian in one of the carriers 
whilst flying operations were underway, only reverting to Rawlings if a 
surface threat emerged. 
TF 37 and the Tactical Integration of the BPF 
The final operations undertaken by the BPF were conducted as part 
of Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet and consisted of a series of carrier strikes 
and naval gun bombardments on the Japanese home islands. That the 
768 ADM 1/18662 US Naval Tactics and Methods in Pacific Area Re0ort 25/1/45 issued 
by CinCBPF to Flag and Commanding Officers of BPF 
769 Ibid. 
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BPF were integrated into the USN's primary naval force is testament to 
the ability of the RN to master the new techniques and tactics that the 
Americans had developed in the Pacific. During Operation ICEBERG the 
BPF's American Liaison Officer, Captain E. C. Ewen, had sent a report to 
Admiral Nimitz detailing a catalogue of British problems and 
inadequacies with respect to carrier operations. 770 The limited range, low 
performance and tendency toward deck landing accidents of the Seafires 
and Fireflies; the slow launching and deck landing tempo of aircraft 
operations; the poor servicing facilities aboard the carriers; the 
inadequate speed of replenishment; and the under manning of almost all 
aspects of the BPF's structure, from pilots through flight deck crews to 
Fleet Train personnel. Despite these problems the British were able to 
mount a creditable sortie rate. 
On eight days during July and August 1945, Task Force 37 of the 
British Pacific Fleet undertook air operations against Japan 
which proportionally, in effort involved and results achieved, 
compared favourably with the American Task Force 38, with 
which Task Force 37 was in company. For the loss outright of a 
hundred aircraft and 32 aircrews, and without damage to any 
Carriers, 133 enemy aircraft were destroyed [ ... 
] and a large 
number of airfield installations and other important land targets 
destroyed or damaged. 771 
This performance was essential in creating the conditions by which 
the BPF were able to successfully integrate with Adn-dral Halsey's Third 
Fleet for the final operations against Japan. The desire for tactical 
integration with the USN was not shared by all concerned. As detailed in 
Chapter Four Admiral King, and to a lesser extent Adn-dral Cunningham 
but for different reasons, sought to see the BPF operate separately from 
the USN. The separate lines of communication imposed by the rule of 
770 Captain EC Eiven, Senior US Naval Liaison Officer BPF, Report of the British Pacific 
Fleet in Support of the Okinawa Campaign 23/4/45 [author's collection] 
771 ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov 1944-july 1945 appendix I 
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British self-sufficiency resulted in the BPF being able, without any 
difficulty, to operate apart from the US Fleet as in ICEBERG. On the other 
hand, operating together presented some problems that still needed 
addressing. 
The reports received by Admiral Nimitz had convinced him that as 
far as surface tactics were concerned there was little problem but that in 
the realm of air operations certain further steps were required. 
Surface tactics present no problem but in order that British air 
units air warning and fighter direction units may understand 
TF38 techniques I recommend [ ... I that appropriate British 
representatives visit LEYTE for conference prior to TF38 
sortie. 772 
Although the change to American signalling had been underway 
since the BPF returned to the Pacific the British proposal for integration 
required further changes of procedures that could not be achieved 
quickly. Cross decking of aircraft was not possible, for instance, as the 
signal given by a British 'batsman' to a landing aircraft indicating that he 
was to low and should come up meant exactly the opposite when 
delivered on an American carrier. This experience, reinforced during the 
post-war period was to be of major benefit when the USN and RN 
operated together in the opening stages of the Korean War only five years 
later. 
When the BPF joined Halsey's Task Force 38 as TF37, the Americans 
had already begun conducting what would be the final series of strikes 
on Japan. The carrier force arrived in the area on 17th July. On the same 
day the British carriers conducted their first raid on the Japanese 
mainland, whilst Kitzg George V in company with American battleships 
carried out a bombardment. The strikes continued but the flexible 
operations undertaken by Halsey were almost too much for the British to 
keep up with. It was one thing to alter the rendezvous position when 
772 16/6/45 160007 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADV Nimitz Papers Serial 1 Command 
Summary Book 6 Washington Navy Yard. 
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tankers had the necessary speed at their disposal and when they could 
transfer fuel in times that 'have never been witnessed by the British 
combat units. 1773 The situation was overcome by American units being 
placed at the disposal of the British and though this was considered 
somewhat regrettable by Admiral Rawlings he felt it aptly demonstrated 
the value which Halsey placed on the additional fighting power of TF37. 
On 9th August, Russia declared war on Japan, and the second 
atomic bomb was dropped. Halsey decided at once to prolong his 
operations, and asked the BPF whether it had the ability to continue 
operations. The decision was not easy, as the British Carrier Task Force 
was due to withdraw on 10th August to Sydney and the tanker 
operations could not allow prolongation for more than one extra strike 
day. Owing to a typhoon this operation had to be cancelled on 10th 
August, and it became necessary for the major part to TF37 to be 
withdrawn to the South. The Commander-in-Chief, BPF, who was at 
Guam when the Japanese peace feelers were made, had arranged that, 
regardless of lack of British logistic support, a token British force for the 
occupation of Japan would be assigned to TF38. Rawlings, in King 
George V, with Indefatigable, 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers formed this 
force, and proudly kept their place on the right of line. Indefatigable 
carried out two further strikes before the news was received on the 15th 
August that all offensive operations were to cease. 
Conclusion: The Levels of Warfare 
A consideration of the BPF at the tactical level of war illustrates both 
the degree to which the Pacific experience was a step change in naval 
warfare and the dialectic interaction of all levels of war. The USN had 
developed a series of TTP's to exploit a new technology [carrier aviation] 
and adapted these to fit a new set of operational requirements. They had 
created the Fast Carrier Task Force, supported by a fleet train, including 
773 ADM. 199/1457 British Pacific Fleet Brief Account of Activities para. 29 
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the vitally important Construction Battalions, as a means of capitalising 
on the geographic conditions of the Pacific. This open ocean warfare 
delivered manoeuvre space but required specialist means to utilise it. 
Having achieved this, the pay off was the ability to use the reach of 
carrier aviation to influence events ashore from the sea to a range of 
hundreds of miles. The support provided by the Fleet Train delivered 
sustainability to the CTF. This acted as a force multiplies to effect that 
naval forces could now have. The success of the BPF in emulating the 
USN in the TTPs required to conduct this warfare was important not 
or-dy in itself but also as the means of realising the conunitments and 
plans made at the higher levels of war. 
Operation Meridian and ICEBERG demonstrated the BPF's ability to 
conduct carrier strikes on land based military and economic 
infrastructure targets. This had been a sharp learning curve. Planning, 
deck handling procedures, strike co-ordination, tactical disposition, were 
all adapted. It was further complicated by the need to master sustainrnent 
of the fleet at great distance over an extended period of time. In large 
measure this is what Operation ICEBERG proved to the Americans. 
Within the circumscribed limits of the RN the BPF maintained a generally 
effective neutralization of a key island group on the American left flank 
during the invasion of Okinawa. 
The tactical integration of the BPF into the USN's Third Fleet can be 
viewed as the ultimate justification of all the effort and expenditure of the 
RN. It confirmed the RN's ability to operate in the most advanced form of 
naval warfare. Fraser's last report of combat operations makes the point 
that though much had been achieved there remained some areas of 
difficulty. He wrote, 
This final report shows clearly how well the British Pacific Fleet 
had been able to adapt themselves to the Pacific type of 
warfare,.. It must never be thought that we had at the end of the 
war achieved the overall efficiency that was going to be 
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necessary for the final Olympic effort. But we had learned 
exactly what was going to be wanted. 774 
Fraser recognised the enormous effort that had been required to 
achieve his military strategic objective of participating in the most 
advanced operations against Japan. He understood that the ability to 
meet this objective rested upon the capability of the Royal Navy to 
undertake the type of operations that the USN had spent two and half 
years developing. Their greater industrial base provided for more 
appropriately constructed assets and the development of specialised 
equipment, something the British could not match. He also perceived the 
influence that this experience would have on the post-War RN. 
The financial cost to the country to achieve this offensive effort, to 
which should be added the few shore bombardments, was 
colossal, but the machinery for operating a fleet in ocean warfare 
had been tested, faults had been overcome, minimum standards 
had been realised, and the experience gained with British material 
and with the personnel and material of the United States Pacific 
Fleet will have brought everlasting benefit to the Royal Navy. 775 
774ADM 199/1478 Fraser to Admiralty 6/11/45 Reports of Naval Operations Against 
Japan 17/7/45-2/9/45 
775 ADM. 199/1457 British Pacific Fleet Brief Account of Activities para. 33 
330 
Chapter Nine 
The Post War Royal Navy and the Tactical Level of War 1945-1950 
When the Second World War came to an end with the signing of the 
surrender document aboard the USS Missouri in Yokohama Bay only a 
token force from the BPF were there to witness the formal close of 
hostilities. Rawlings had been forced to send the majority of the fleet back 
to Australia because the Fleet Train's tankers were incapable of 
sustaining them. It had been planned for two dozen of Indefatigable's 
aircraft to participate in the fly past but a USN Hellcat crashed into her 
landing barriers only hours before and prevented her contribution. It was 
an ironic incident. After all that had been lent, all that had been learnt 
and all the assistance given to keep the Fleet at sea, it was the American 
Navy that excluded FAA participation in the ceremony. As it was the 
RN's contribution to the occasion probably went unnoticed by virtually 
all participants. Halsey's British liaison officer, Cdr. Michael Le Fanu, had 
arranged for the Missouri's metal chairs to be replaced by wooden ones 
from the King George V. 776 A nice extra but not essential, in some ways a 
highly apt symbol of the BPFs overall contribution to the defeat of Japan. 
This thesis has demonstrated, however, that explaining the significance of 
the BPF purely in terms of the damage it inflicted upon Japan's capacity 
to carry on fighting is no longer sufficient. The Americans and the British 
both utilised it as a tool of alliance building at the grand strategic level. If 
the BPF had been unable to participate in the most advanced operations 
against Japan at the military strategic level then any such aspirations 
would have been dashed. At the operational level the pacific experience 
drove home new concepts of warfare at sea. It was at the tactical level 
that the procedures for undertaking these new concepts were learnt and 
employed. 
776Baker Dly Ginger Op Cit 
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This chapter traces the influence of the BPF at the tactical level 
during the period 1945-50. It is particularly concerned with naval 
aviation, the on going debate about the relative roles and missions of 
carriers and battleships. It demonstrates that at this level the influence of 
the USN was particularly significant, though it was through the BPF that 
this was transn-dtted to a wider RN. The analysis appears to confirm 
Admiral Fraser's belief at the time that if the RN had not participated 
alongside the USN in the final operations against Japan then only 
'second-hand experience' would have been available and this would have 
had a much weaker influence. 
The experiences of the BPF in the Pacific were extensively studied 
by the RN in the years following JapaWs surrender. The myriad reports 
which the fleet produced during its tenure in the Far East were circulated 
first round the Admiralty's various departments. Comments and 
suggestions as to how new Concepts or techniques could be incorporated 
into the Navy were made. Much of the operational and tactical reports 
were compiled into 'Battle Summaries' and published as Confidential 
Books for internal distribution within the Navy. Subsequently the RN's 
own Staff History drew heavily upon this material and circulated it 
throughout the service. Publication of the relevant volume did not, 
however, appear until 1959.777 
Two examples of this process are as follows. First, a note appended 
to one of Fraser's summation reports from Director of Plans, written in 
May 1946 commends the value of the paper for future planning, stating 
that, 'It is clear that they[the reports] must be thoroughly examined by all 
777 BR 1736(50) (6) Naval Staff History Second World War, War with Japan: Volume VI 
The Advance to Japan Historical Section Admiralty 1959. It should also be noted that the 
Naval Staff History The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919-1945 Confidential 
Book 3307(l) [later BR1736(53)] only ran to two volumes. The first dealing with naval 
aviation before the Second World war and the early wartime developments. The second 
volume covered the part played by the FAA in the war on shipping. Neither volume 
addressed the experiences of the BPF which, as this thesis demonstrates, was of such 
significance in the post war development of naval aviation within the RN. 
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Departments concerned and many "lessons learnt" must be digested. 778 
DoP was drawing specific attention to the composition of supporting 
elements that had permitted the BPF to operate alongside the USN. He 
recognised the importance of incorporating these elements into post-war 
planning assumptions if the RN was to continue conducting first class 
naval operations. Second, Fraser's report on the BPF covering the period 
from November 1944 to July 1945, but dispatched at the end of November 
1945, was sent with the following explanatory paragraph. 
Since then Guly 45), however, events have moved swiftly, and 
the enemy has surrendered. Much of the despatch is therefore 
already out of date, but I have thought it best to forward it as it 
stands as it gives, I think, a clear picture of the problems 
inherent in fighting a type of war which was until last March a 
novel one for the British Navy, but for which our future 
planning and training must undoubtedly provide. 779 
Copies of this report were made and sent to Director Naval Staff 
College Greenwich and the Imperial Defence College where they utilised 
in various training courses. Through this process it was intended that the 
experiences of the BPF would permeate the whole Navy. 
This process, however, was not simply a matter of accepting 
everything that the BPF had done as the model for future operations. 
Concerns were expressed as to the applicability of Pacific type operations 
which it was thought n-dght be rendered outdated by changes in 
technology. The Director of Naval Air Organisation and Training 
[DNAOT] added his comments to the above report, writing that, 
Caution appears to be all the more necessary in view of the 
probable development of guided missiles, atomic explosives 
and submarines with schnorkel and high submerged speeds. 780 
778 ADM 199/1478 Reports of Naval Operations Against Japan 17/7/45-2/9/45 
779 ADM 199/118 British Pacific Fleet. C-in-C's Dispatches November 1944 to July 1945 
23/11/45 
780 Ibid. note added Director of Naval Air Organisation and Training 25/03/46. 
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DNAOT also expressed concern that the type of warfare Fraser was 
describing was the product of the particular geographic, climatic and 
strategic conditions which existed in the Far East during the BPFs tenure 
there. 'Analysis must be regarded with reserve, due to the conditions in 
the Pacific War at the time! Though even this note of caution was 
modified by a recognition of how much the BPF's experience had to teach 
the wider Navy. 781 
In addition to this circulation of written reports, the experiences of 
the BPF were disseminated to a wider service audience through personal 
contact and formal lectures. Capt. E. M. Evans-Lombe, Fraser"s Chief of 
Staff, for example, presented a lecture to the Royal United Services 
Institution [RUSI] entitled 7he Royal Navy in t1w Pacific, in March 1947, 
subsequently published in the Institutions journal. 782 He outlined a range 
of innovations that the USN had pioneered which the BPF sought to 
emulate, everything from changes in the means of replenishment at sea to 
modifications in the requirements for photographic reconnaissance. 
Admiral Spruance, who had been appointed President of the US War 
College, visited London specifically to lecture at RUSI on Victonj in the 
Pacific at the end of October 1946.783 Like Evans-Lombe, he drew his 
audience's attention to the specific means by which the USN had 
developed the Fast Carrier Task Force, urging the RN not to allow the 
hard won experience to be lost in the post-war world. His argument also 
achieved a wider audience through publication in the RUSI journal. In 
addition both the Naval Review and the Admiralty"s Monthly 
Intelligence Report carried the experience of the BPF to the wider Navy. 
The most striking feature of the Royal Navy at the tactical level in 
the post-War period was the focus on Anti-Submarine operations. The 
781 Ibid. 
782 Evans-Lombe, 7he RcVal Navy in the Pacific, Lecture 19/3/47 Journal Royal United 
Services Institution Vol. 92,1947, p. 333- 348 
783 Lecture published Tournal Royal United Services Institution Vol. 911946 p. 539-558 
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Japanese had not posed a significant ASW threat to the BPF. The Pacific 
experience was concerned with the development of naval aviation, 
operations in support of land forces, attack at source, power projection 
and the ability to conduct sustained operations at sea. This was very 
much the tactical environment encountered again during the Korean 
War. The impact of the BPF on the Royal Navy at the tactical level has 
been demonstrated in the previous Chapter. What the RN attempted to 
do during the first years of peace was adapt these tactical developments 
to the new threat environment. The Navy's ideas concerning the role that 
aircraft and air power would play at sea had progressed dramatically 
from those which existed pre-war. The methods employed to exploit the 
full potential of this medium had developed in order to accomplish new 
operational tasks. The first years of the war at sea had, however, 
developed along lines which were generally in accord with the Navy's 
pre-war expectations. The tactical and doctrinal views which the RN 
possessed at the outbreak of hostilities appeared to conform to actual 
practice. Carriers appeared to be exceptionally vulnerable to surface 
attack in poor flying conditions, the loss of HMS Glorious to the 
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in June 1940 being a case in point. With 
regard to fleet action, both the sinking of the Bismarck and the Battle of 
Matapan demonstrated the RNs belief that aircraft were an invaluable 
adjunct to the battlefleet, locating and then slowing down a fleeing 
enemy. However, the experience of operating alongside the USN in the 
Pacific demonstrated how far technological developments had permitted 
a greater exploitation of air power's potential. Added to this, the greater 
resource base of the US had pern-dtted experimentation, adaptation and 
the integration of new technologies to proceed at a far greater pace than 
in the Royal Navy. This created a situation, post-war, in which the Navy 
had to accommodate new technology and tactics into its procedures. It 
was not simply a matter of applying everything that the. BPFs experience 
had demonstrated. Rather it was a question of adapting these practices to 
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meet the operational requirements specified by Britainýs grand and 
military strategy. 
This process was made more complicated by factors at the grand and 
military strategic levels. The uncertainty that was created as a 
consequence of the Navy's change from a wartime fleet to a peace time 
compliment, the constraints of a weak economic situation and the 
changing relationship between the three services all made planning 
extremely difficult. The Navy's first post-war Confidential Book on tactics 
made this point explicit in the introduction. 784 These circumstance had 
made it impracticable to undertake the customary large scale Fleet 
exercise to underpin the Adn-dralty's advice. As a result the Confidential 
Book was primarily devoted to 'reviewing some of the developments 
arising from experience gained during the war and to indicating as far as 
possible, the lines upon which future investigation should be 
conducted. '785 
There was ample recognition that the Adn-dralty's concepts about how 
its system of maritime warfare could be applied in reality would 
lundoubtedly, undergo radical changes'786 as a result of advances in 
technology. To take for example, the principle of defence in depth; it was 
feared that as the range of weapons and the speed and endurance of 
submarines and aircraft increased, it would correspondingly become 
more difficult to provide adequate depth because 'the requirements in 
ships and aircraft for this purpose will soon outgrow our resources and 
other means will have to be found to take their place. These means may 
be found in novel methods of long-range submarine detection; similarly, 
fighters and guns may be replaced by rockets and weapons of new 
784 ADM 239/143 Confidential Book CB03016/47 Progress in Tactics 1947 para. 2 
785 Ibid. 
786ADM 239/382 Confidential Book CB04487 The Fighting Instructions 1947 para. 6 
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designs. '787 These concerns would manifest themselves at the tactical 
level in the post war period but had clearly begun to emerge with the BPF 
in the Pacific. 
Admiral Vian was concerned about the issue of sufficient defensive 
depth with regard to interception with fleet fighters. He wrote to Fraser 
whilst they were both still with the BPF arguing that, while in 1939 
aircraft speed and radar coverage allowed some 20 minutes warning, the 
n-dsmatch in development meant that aircraft speeds had risen fivefold 
whereas radar coverage had only doubled cutting warning time to 
perilous levels. 788 He advocated new tactical solutions to the problem at 
the same time as conceding that the pace of technical change was such 
that whatever steps were taken to address problems may well be made 
redundant before they are established in the fleet. 
From the practical operating standpoint, interception from the 
deck is only possible if specialised fighter carriers are available 
for fleet protection. Other carriers must have their decks clear to 
range and prepare strikes. The advent of atomic airborne rocket 
weapons will make it more than ever imperative that the 
interception and destruction of the enemy is conducted some 
distance from the Fleet. This is only possible if radar pickets 
employing their own airborne CAP's are used. There is still no 
indication that the rate of increase in radar coverage is more 
than just keeping pace with aircraft speeds. 789 
The period immediately following the end of the war is littered with 
examples where scientific advances threw operational and tactical 
concepts into turmoil. Ideas were floated, for example, that small carriers 
should be used to provide platforms from which interception of atomic 
bombers could be achieved before they were able to launch. 'In this case 
7871bid. para. 7. 
788ADM 199/1478 Letter from Admiral Vian 21/1/46 to Admiral Fraser 
789 ADM 199/1478 Letter from Admiral Vian 21/1/46 to Admiral Fraser 
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the advantage would lie with the small carriers that were able for a given 
tonnage cover a greater area of ocean. 1790 
The Royal Navy's developing operational concept envisaged 
fighting a series of engagements which would ultimately settle the war at 
sea. These would render to the victor control of the sea permitting 
freedom of movement for merchant shipping and military forces. The 
RN's thinking with regard to how these battles would develop at the 
tactical level illustrates both how much and how little had changed as a 
result of wartime experience. The Fighting Instructions [FI] published in 
1947 reveals that the Navy had recognised the centrality of air power at 
sea but also harboured continuing doubts over its decisiveness. The 
ability of aircraft to search for and attack enemy surface forces, whilst 
friendly surface forces were still widely separated from the enemy, was 
used to demonstrate that aircraft were now considered "as the primary 
offensive weapon. '791 Indeed the Adn-dralty were very explicit on this 
point. "The paramount importance of getting in the first blow cannot be 
emphasised too strongly. ' However, the following sentence reveals a 
vestige of pre-war thinking where action by aircraft was simply a 
precursor to surface action. 'On the result of these preliminary air battles 
the subsequent actions of the opposing surface forces will . 
largely 
depend. 1792 The need to obtain local air superiority and the benefits 
which would flow from this for achieving control of sea communications 
was upper most in the list of the Admiralty's priorities, assigning enemy 
air capability as the most important target. 793 
The RN anticipated launching offensive air operations in one of two 
ways; either air group strikes, which utilised all available aircraft from a 
790ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov. 1944-july 1945 Appendix 11. The effect of 
fleet defensive requirements on carriers and fighter design 
791 ADM 239/382 Confidential Book CB04487 The Fighting Instructions 1947. Chapter 
10 para 801. 
792 Ibid. 
793 Ibid. para. 802 
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carrier, or deck load strikes that used the maximum number of aircraft 
that could be ranged and launched at one time. 794 Both of these methods 
depended upon the performance of the flight deck crews but as 
operations in the Pacific had shown the RN had fallen behind the USN in 
terms of speed of aircraft handling and launching despite having a higher 
number of personnel involved. As the Director of Naval Air Organisation 
and Training wrote when commenting on Fraser's dispatches from the 
Pacific, "There is no doubt, however, that we have much room for 
improvement in our training in carriers drill and procedure. '795 The stark 
contrast between the capabilities of the USN and the RN in the conduct of 
naval air strikes was evident from the BPF's experience. 
A year and a half later the American Office of Naval Intelligence 
(ONI) reported in September 1947 that they had serious misgivings about 
the Royal Navy's ability in the field of naval aviation. 
Recent operations of British carriers disclose a low level of 
combat efficiency. During four days of air operations in 
Australian waters the two carriers of the Pacific Fleet had 25 % of 
their aircraft put out of action by various accidents. Poor 
planning of air operations, unsatisfactory pilot proficiency, and 
poor carrier design contributed to the low operational efficiency, 
although inexperienced personnel appeared to be the major 
factor. AlthoitgIt the British have had aniple experience in observing 
efficient carrier operations, they have been sIo7v in adopting niany 
techniqites zvhich have proved stiperior. The lack of complete 
autonomy in the design of carrier aircraft probably also is 
adversely affecting air operations by the NaVy. 796 
This report of poor performance bears an uncomfortable 
resemblance to Fraser's signals when C-in-C BPF. There was clearly a 
limit to what could be achieved given the constraints identified at the 
794 Ibid. para. 808 
79,5 ADM 199/118 note appended to CinC BPF's Dispatches, Director of Naval Air 
Organisation and Training 25/03/46. 
796RG 313 Flag Files; Records of Naval Operating Forces; CinCLant Secret 
Administrative Files 1941-49, Box 88 Folder A4-3(2), ONI Report Secret, serial 39/47, 
26/9/47. Emphasis in original. 
339 
grand and military strategic levels. That the RN continued to operate 
obsolete aircraft and the criticism of RN carrier design were both the 
result of tight fiscal strictures. More worrying were the comments 
concerning the planning for operations and the failure to adopt American 
techniques. Both of these had been identified as problems in the Pacific 
and efforts made to overcome them. In May 1946 the Admiralty 
announced that HMS Eagle797 had 'the dimensions of the hangars and 
lifts [.. ] arranged to achieve uniformity with US carriers, in order that 
British and United States aircraft can be interchangeable, and to ensure 
that there is an adequate margin for future development. '798 The 
Admiralty's Future Building Conu-nittee had pressed for standardization 
between the two navies as early as 1942.799 
The RN's attitude toward the fighting of surface action had 
similarly been the subject of major revision as a consequence of wartime 
experience. Though it was recognised that, due to the size of any 
potential enemy fleet and the probable effect of preliminary air battles, it 
was unlikely that such action would amount to anything more than 
engagements between comparatively small forces. Nevertheless, the 
study of and training for major surface action continued to occupy a 
central place in the Navy's tactical thinking. The Admiralty informed the 
wider Navy through the pages of the Fighting Instructions that the ability 
to fight and win a major surface action was 'still a fundamental 
requirement of Naval Tactics. 1800 It was argued that the absence of an all 
weather capability for naval aviation meant that particularly in areas 
797 Ex-Audacious, laid down Oct 1942, launched March 1946, commissioned Oct 1951. 
798MHWay 1946 No. 5 p. 25. 
799 N. Friedman British Carrier Aviation: The Evolution of the Ships and their Aircraft. 
Conway [London] 1988, p. 273. 
800 ADM 239/382 Confidential Book CB04487 The Fighting Instructions 1947. Chapter 
10 para. 861. 
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such as the Arctic, where conditions were frequently unsuitable for 
flying, decisions would continue to be reached by surface action alone. 
A far more likely form of surface engagement that the Navy 
planned to fight was that between relatively small forces, what the RN 
referred to as "minor actions. These were expected to be the rule rather 
than the exception in the Navy's new conception of maritime warfare. In 
those areas where sea and air control was contested it was anticipated 
that surface forces would make contact with each other at night in the 
pursuance of a general plan of attrition or the attempt to achieve some 
other local objective. It was anticipated that new technologies in the 
shape of radar, radar counter-measures and aircraft, would allow gun 
and torpedo fire to be used at night or during low visibility under 
conditions approximating to those previously only possible during 
daylight. 801 
As far as naval aviation was concerned it appeared that the war, and 
in particular the experiences in the Pacific, had guaranteed its pre- 
en-dnence in the fleet. As an article in Brassey's Naval Annual explained 
at the end of 1946, 
The Pacific war was notable for the way in which it stimulated 
the employment of aircraft carriers. Aircraft carriers were 
dominant in many of the actions. Progress in their design, 
equipment, and operation was greatly accelerated by 
experience in the Pacific. In fact the lesson of the war in the 
Pacific was that the aircraft carrier, instead of being near the 
end of its useful life, was only at the beginning of it. This lesson 
would have remained firm had it not been for the coming of 
the atomic bomb. 802 
The major task confronting carrier borne air power was its ability to 
compete on equal terms with the latest generation of land based fighters. 
One of the problems that had beset naval aviation during the inter-war 
801 Ibid. para 862 & 946 
8020liver Steivart The Air War at Sea, Brassey's Naval Annual 1946, p. 82. 
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period was the poor performance of carrier borne aircraft in comparison 
to their land based counterparts. This had come about for a whole host of 
reasons; the fact that naval aircraft were often modified versions of land 
planes rather than specially designed for carrier operations, the fact that 
most were multi-role aeroplanes, the limitations of hangar space and 
flight deck length aboard carriers, to mention but a few. 803 The 
introduction of American lend-lease aircraft into the Fleet Air Arm had 
radically changed this position. When the BPF arrived in the Pacific the 
FAA found itself able to compete on equal terms with the Japanese air 
force. This changed circumstance was not solely the result of 
improvements in aircraft performance. It had as much to do with 
advances in aircraft direction brought about by the introduction of 
advanced communications equipment and radar as well as 
improvements in tactical procedure. In addition the quality of Japanese 
pilots had declined markedly. The emergence of jet propelled aircraft in 
the closing months of the war threatened to re-establish the superiority of 
land based aircraft over those based on carriers. The search for ways in 
which jet propelled aircraft could be operated from carriers was one of 
the immediate priorities for naval aviation in the post-war period. 
The RN's first experiments with operating jet aircraft from carriers 
took place in December 1945 when an experimental Vampire took off and 
landed aboard HMS Ocean. 804 This and the USN's experiments showed 
that jet aircraft could operate from carrier decks but there were a number 
of problems which needed overcon-ting before they could become 
operational. Jets required more fuel than propeller driven aircraft, storage 
for which would take up limited space aboard already restricted British 
carriers. jet aircraft also took off and landed at much higher speeds. This 
803 For a fuller discussion of these problems see G Till Airpower and the Royal NaYY 
1914-45 Janes Publishing Co. [London] 1979. 
804 A modified Vampire 1 [navalised version of the RAF's Vampire FB51 flown by Lt 
Cdr EM Brown made the worlds first landing by a purely jet aircraft, 3/12/45. The 
previous November the USN had landed a FA-1 Fireball composite piston and jet 
aircraft on the escort carrier Wake Island. 
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required longer take off and landing runs and because jet engines were 
inefficient at take off speeds, catapult-assisted launch became a necessity. 
With regard landings, the current arrester gear fitted to carriers was not 
always capable of stopping a high speed jet. In addition if an aircraft 
missed the arresting wire then it would crash into the wire barricade 
which protected already landed aircraft. Whereas a propeller aircraft 
doing this would usually only damage the propeller, the shape of jet 
aircraft noses produced a tendency for the barrier to ride up and into the 
cockpit possibly injuring the pilot. The high landing speeds also created 
problems for the interaction between the pilot and the landing officer 
signals officer, significantly reducing the reaction time available. These 
problems were eventually solved by the introduction of the angled flight 
deck, mirror landing aid and the steam catapult. These innovations were 
introduced during the years following those covered in this study, 
however, it is important to note that the RN devoted considerable, time, 
effort and scarce financial resources to addressing these difficulties in the 
period 1945-1950. 
As outlined in Chapter 7, the RN used the experience of carrier 
operations in the Pacific to develop their concept of attack at source. It 
was thought that carrier forces could be employed advantageously to 
attack the enemy in coastal areas not normally under threat of attack by 
surface forces. This would give the Navy an enhanced ability to influence 
events ashore, though their primary concern was how such action would 
affect sea communications. The strategic mobility that aircraft carrier 
possessed would hopefully bestow the element of surprise. This, it was 
reasoned, could make up for a lack of numbers. It appears that the RN 
envisaged such operations as being of only limited duration. The Fighting 
Instructions recommending that 'carrier forces operating against inshore 
objectives should not remain in the strike area for more than two or three 
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days. '805 Whereupon the carrier task force would withdraw for 
replenishment and maintenance of aircraft. Although provision was 
made in the Navy's tactical doctrine for the force to return to the same 
area there were both pro's and cons to this being carried out. 'The 
efficiency of the air striking forces invariably increases as the air crews 
become familiar with the terrain in the target area. Against this 
advantage must be balanced the possible growth of the enemy's 
opposition, fatigue of air crews, and the wastage of aircraft. -'806 
The tactical disposition of a Task Group[TGI came to resemble that 
of a convoy rather than the traditional line of battle. As the main striking 
power of the TG was now the carrier's aircraft as opposed to the 
battleships heavy guns, the need to deploy such that the latter could be 
best brought to bear on the enemy was eliminated. A defensive formation 
of concentric circles with outlying pickets was now adopted. The threats 
from submarines and aircraft were countered with successive rings of 
ASW and AA ships leading to the carriers, the most valuable vessels, 
stationed in the middle. The dispositions which Admiral Rawlings had 
referred to as 'new' and 'the very devil' had become standard. 807 
The impression that the BPF had created in the minds of the USN 
was crucial in the post-war period. The focus of the USN during the war 
was on the vastness of the Pacific and it was from this theatre that the 
post-war Navy's leadership would be drawn. The USN deployed six 
times as many men afloat in the Pacific than they did in the Atlantic. 808 
These relationships, established between the RN and the USN during the 
BPF's tenure in the Pacific, were built upon in the post-war period. In 
805 ADM 239/382 The Fighting Instructions 1947 para. 983 
806 Ibid. para 983 & 984 
807MS83/158 File 23 Fraser Papers CinCBPF Operational Correspondence with Flag 
Officers Letter 9/3/45 From V. Adm 2CinC 
808 Fleet Admiral EJ King, CNO, The US Nayy at War1941-45 Official Reports to the 
Secretaly of the Nayy, United States Navy Dept. [Washington] 1946 p. 218 
344 
addition the USN continued to exercise a tactical influence upon the RN. 
The C-in-C Home Fleet, for example, attended the USN's spring exercises 
in 1948 at the invitation of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 
Denfeld. These were conducted between 19 February and 3 March and 
consisted of the passage of a Task Force, supported by a Hunter-Killer 
Group and shore based aircraft through an area infested by submarines; 
its subsequent passage in the face of air opposition, during which it had 
to be refuelled and replenished. Finally, amphibious operations were 
carried out, landing on the Island of Vieques, between Puerto Rico and 
the Virgin Islands, by the 2nd United States Marine Division and the US 
Army's 65th Regimental Combat Team, which included some Canadian 
troops. The landings were covered by air support and the gunfire of the 
ships in the face of enemy submarine, ground and air opposition. 809 This 
was essentially an identical operation to any number the USN had carried 
out during the Pacific campaign. Although the amphibious landing was 
the culmination of the exercise this was not the aspect which caught the 
RN observers attention. Rather it was the performance of the US aircraft 
carriers and their aircraft. 
The US aircraft carriers were remarkable for their adn-drable 
catapults and cranes, ample parking-spaces, clear decks, small 
high-speed one-man tractors, deck-edge elevators, as was the 
power wing-folding of the US aircraft. As a result aircraft can 
be operated in large numbers with greater ease than in British 
aircraft-carriers and with significant economy in aircraft 
handling parties. 810 
When the Royal Navy conducted an exercise which saw the 
movement of a naval force through a similar high air and submarine 
threat area in May later the same year there were continual aircraft 
handling difficulties. 811 Exercise 'Dawn' saw CAP both land based (high 
809MIRMarch 1949 No. 39 p. 10 
810 Ibid. 
811MIR May 1948 No. 29 p. 3-5 
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level Sea Hornets from Arbroath) and sea, carrier based (low level Sea 
Furies from HMS Miplacable) attempt to co-ordinate activity with varying 
degrees of success. Once again the weather caused carrier operation 
problems. 
It was not just in the area of naval aviation that the weather was 
causing operating difficulties. Early 1948 saw the RN dispatch the 
submarine HMS Ambush, modified to carry a version of the German 
schnorkel, on a snorting cruise in the vicinity of Jan Mayen Island for the 
purpose of testing living conditions in a snorting submarine in cold 
weather - 'a voyage of more than 2,200 miles submerged. '812The 
distributed Monthly Intelligence Report of the cruise informed the Navy 
that 
The weather was not generally suitable for submarine 
operations, and when the wind blew from off the ice barrier the 
snort quickly froze up. Under certain conditions of cold 
atmospheric temperatures steam from the snort exhaust lay for 
miles in a low cloud, often considerably inconveniencing 
periscope watch. 813 
As has been mentioned, much of the RNs post-war exercise 
program was taken up by the search for tactical procedures that could 
replicate the type of operations undertaken by the BPF in Arctic and 
Norwegian waters. One such exercise was carried out during February 
1949 by the light fleet carrier HMS Vengeance. 814 Codenamed Operation 
Rusty, Vengeance was the centre piece of an experimental force that was 
detailed to study the effects of very cold weather upon the functioning of 
weapons, with particular emphasis on the behaviour of aircraft and 
associated gear. HMS Vengeance operated various types of aircraft 
including jet-propelled Sea Vampires and a Westland Sikorsky helicopter. 
812MIR January 1948 No. 25 p. 3 see also No. 27 p. 23 
813MIR March 1948 No. 27 p. 22 
814MIR January 1949 No. 37 p. 3 Vengeance Arctic CoId-weather cruise 5/249 - 7/3/49 
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815 In all the exercise lasted about six weeks but flying operations were 
only conducted on three of the 25 days in operating area. 816 The carrier 
was limited to a speed of 24 knots and therefore needed a 10-15 knot 
wind over the flight deck to launch aircraft. The wind either being too 
weak or too strong Vengeance's air group had a frustrating time. 
Also embarked upon Vengeance, as was becoming typical, was an 
American observer. Despite the disappointment of limited flying, he was 
clearly impressed by the openness of his hosts. 
In conclusion the US observer believes that he has rarely in 
many years of naval service had such an enjoyable cruise at 
sea. The discussions, the interchange of ideas and the 
friendship formed with the British officers and observers have 
given him a much greater understanding in matters of inter- 
service co-operation. 817 
An interesting commentary on the exercise was promulgated round 
the Navy in addition to that provided by the USNs observer. The 
Admiralty included an extract from the Soviet naval publication Red 
Fleet in its Monthly Intelligence Report for May 1949. 
Operation "Rusty" has aroused angry and suspicious comment 
in the Russian press, which saw in it preparations and training 
for a British submarine campaign in the Arctic. This Red Fleet 
comments: "It has become known that the exercises carried out 
in the Arctic by a special naval detachment were directly 
connected with the study of the area in wl-dch British 
submarines intend to operate in case of war. In the Arctic there 
are no British communications. Special significance is also 
attached to the exercises by American naval circles, and in the 
Vetzgeance there was an American observer. " 818 
It was not only in the realm of observer exchange that the USN and 
the RN continued to develop the relationship established during the war, 
815MIR March 1949 No. 39 p. 10-11 
816MIR Aprfl 1949 No. 40 p. 46 
817Ibid. 0 p. 50 
818MIR May 1949 No. 41 Pt. III Intelligence: USSR p. 44 
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joint exercises were also conducted on an increasing scale in the post-war 
period. The integration established in the Pacific continued post war. 
During January 1949 the USN and RN conducted a joint carrier 
operation in the Mediterranean. 819 The light fleet carrier, HMS Triumph, 
initially rendezvoused with the USN fleet carrier USS Philippine Sea off 
Malta. Both carriers were operating propeller driven aircraft. Triumph 
embarked Seafires and Firefly I's whereas Philippine Sea carried F4U 
Corsairs and F8F Bearcats which participated in cross decking exercises. 
Rear Admir, ýl J. J. Clark, commanding the American Task Group, said in 
his welcome speech that he 'considered this to be an historic occasion, 
and hoped it was a prelude to an interchange of squadrons on a much 
bigger scale. 1820 
Other than a minor clipping of one of the Seafire's propellers during 
landing the British had no problems alighting on the larger American 
deck. Neither did the Americans when landing on the smaller British 
deck for the first time. Difficulties, however, did develop when the 
American aircraft repeated this procedure. The wind had dropped and 
the ship could only make 27 knots of wind instead of the 32 knots the 
Americans were used to. 'The first Corsair got on all right, but the second 
had a little trouble and burst a tyre, 1821 so the remainder were directed to 
land ashore and were recovered latter when the wind got up again. 
The following week Triumph joined TG 160.2 for three days of 
combined flying exercises with the USS Midway and the Philippine Sea. 
A force 9 gale, however, restricted flying to only a single day though the 
experience was felt to have been very valuable. 'From our point of view 
this day was very good value in that we operated with a larger number of 
819MI March 1949 No. 39 A joiiit British-United States Carrier Operatim [A personal 
account by an officer in HMS Triumphl p. 41 
8201bid. p. 40 
821 Ibid. 
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aircraft than we will probably see for years; at one point there was no less 
than 184 in the air above the three carries. '822 
The Adn-dralty clearly considered that this exercise was of real 
significance in building upon relations established in the Far East. It was 
not the first time that the two navies had tactically combined on exercise 
reproducing the experience of operating as part of Halsey's Third Fleet 
off Japan. An account of the exercise written by one of Triumph's officers 
was distributed around the Navy through the pages of the Monthly 
Intelligence Report. Sections of which are reproduced here as they give 
an excellent indication of RN feeling toward the USN. 
In recent years co-operation with the United States Services has 
become common place; in the war years the armed forces of 
Great Britain and the United States became co-ordinated to a 
degree which was considered impossible before the emergency 
made it a fact. Our two navies have grown steadily closer since 
the day when American battleships and carriers first appeared 
in Scapa Flow early in the war. The Pacific war sealed this 
friendship and mutual respect and went far towards producing 
a common doctrine. 823 
'Within the smaller sphere of naval aviation the two navies were 
probably closer than any other arm of the three services. When 
the British aircraft industry was concentrating on building for 
the RAF and had not the capacity to produce naval aircraft in 
the numbers required, the Admiralty were forced to acquire 
American aeroplanes, and at one time, Corsairs, Avengers, 
Hellcats and the rest considerably outnumbered British built 
aircraft in front line service. Practically all naval pilots trained 
during the war got a transatlantic outlook, being trained either 
by the RCAF or at the famous United States naval schools 
centred on Pensacola. When Lend-Lease finished there came the 
heartbreaking business of pushing shining new American 
aircraft over the sides of our shipS. 824 
The exercises demonstrated that there were few practical barriers to 
operating RN and USN carriers which could not be overcome. Indeed the 
822Ibid. p. 42 
8231bid. p. 38 
8241bid. p. 38-39 
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adoption of US deck landing technique largely the result of the trials 
carried out by Triumpli and Pidlippim Sea. 825 
These exercises have shown that it is a practical proposition to 
operate together carriers of the two greatest Navies now existent 
and that we could go into action together to-morrow if the need 
arose. This would seem to be a very definite contribution 
towards the state of relations of our two countries which must 
surely exist if world peace is to be secured. '826 
The search for an all weather aviation capability progressed 
alongside that of a night capability. During the BPF`s tenure in the Pacific 
HMS Ocean had been utilised in this role and made a significant 
contribution to the Fleet's defensive capacity. By the beginning of the 
next decade the RN was able to conduct its first night catapult launches 
and deck landings using Vampire jet aircraft. 827 
The Battleship - Carrier Controversy continued 
The arguments over the constitution of the post-war Navy illustrates 
the Admiralty's thinking concerning the type of conflict it would be 
required to fight. It highlights the anticipated threat environment that the 
Navy would be faced with and how it envisaged dealing with it. As such 
the continuing debate over the relationship between the aircraft carrier 
and battleship reveals much about the Navy's developing tactical ideas. 
Intense scrutiny was made of all aspects of the Second World War at sea 
in order to support arguments both for and against the continued 
usefulness of the battleship. The debate that ensued concerning the 
relative usefulness of carriers versus battleships in many ways mirrored 
the one which had taken place during the inter-war period and continued 
825MIRjune 1949 No. 42 p. 15 
826MIRMarch 1949 No. 39 A Joint Britisli-United States Carrier Operation p. 42 
82719/6/50 first night catapult launches and night deck landings MlRjuly 1950 No. 55 p. 
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throughout the war itself. Opinions both for and against the battleship 
were expressed through the pages of professional journals such as the 
Naval Review and the Tournal of the Royal United Services Institute. 
Some officers argued that the war had demonstrated beyond all doubt 
that a first class navy should be constituted around aircraft carriers. 
'What is the principle of the Fighting Instructions? To take the offensive. 
What has proved to be the offensive weapon in the war at sea? The 
carrier borne aircraft. '828 Others argued that though the battleship would 
undoubtedly undergo changes it's central role in naval warfare would 
remain. 
That the battleship of the future will be as different from the 
battleship of the past, as Vangitard is from the Hercides [1868- 
8,680 tons 8x1Oin. muzzleloaders] of fifty years ago, must be 
expected; but there will always be a type of surface ship which 
is the toughest, hardest-hitting of them all, and call her what 
you like, she will, in effect, be a "battleship". 829 
The terms of the debate within the Admiralty itself concerning 
aircraft carriers and battleships were essentially established by a 
memorandum from the Paymaster General to the Board of Admiralty 
entitled Battleships verstis Aircraft, delivered at the end of December 
1944.830 It argued the armour protection of battleships was presently 
restricted to the sides in order to deal with the flat trajectories of other 
gun shells. Attacks from bombs, torpedoes, shells and n-dnes, would 
necessitate all over armour leaving little for machinery, gun spaces etc. 
rendering the vessel impractical. In addition the destructive power of 
modern weapons and ones in development that the battleship would 
have to stand up to during its lifetime called into question its 
8280ffensively Minded Naval Review Vol. XXXIII 1945 p287 
829Fifhj Years of WarsIdps "Navarino" R. U. S. I. Journal Vol. 94 1949 p56 
830 ADM 205/53 BattlesIdps versus Aircraft, Memorandum by Paymaster General 
29/12/44. This paper was written by Churchill's long standing scientific advisor, 
Professor Frederick Alexander Lindeman 11st Viscount Cherwell], an energetic 
proponent of air power. Churchill had appointed him the Governments Chief Scientific 
Officer with the post of Paymaster General as a cabinet position. 
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survivability. Even if the hull did not sink it was expected that damage to 
the upper works would render the battleship inoperable. New weapon 
developments also threatened to undermine the battleships ability to 
defend itself. 'The active defence of the battleship cannot be assumed to 
be 100% effective. Homing/glider bombs mean that attacking aircraft can 
remain outside anti-aircraft range. 1831 The manpower cost of maintaining 
battleships was also a major problem and one that would become 
increasingly severe in the post-war world. Finally the Paymaster General 
argued that there were alternatives to the battleship which appeared to 
be more cost effective. 
It is, I believe, held that the principal reason for maintaining a 
battleship force is to neutralise the capital ships of the enemy. If 
this can be accomplished more certainly or at less cost by any 
other means, then the case for the battle ship becomes largely a 
matter of sentiment. In this war the German capital ships have 
been neutralised in home waters more surely and economically 
by our bombers than by our battleships. 832 
Such arguments appeared to make the case for RAF takeover of the 
Navy's traditional roles. Not surprisingly the response from the 
Admiralty was a vigorous defence of the Navy. It was accepted that 
shipping had to be protected against the threat from the air but this was 
most definitely seen as a task in which the Navy had the lead, even 
though there was a recognition that this might require assistance from 
land based aircraft drawn from the RAF. 
The principal counter to the VLR [very long range] aircraft is 
carrier borne fighters. The carrier herself, however, must be 
protected from direct surface attack from the most powerful 
surface ship which may exist. Thus the aircraft carrier and the 
battleship are complementary to each other and form the 
accepted tactical unit for modern sea warfare and replaces the 
conception of the capital ship which hitherto held sway. 833 
831 Ibid 
832 Ibid. 
833 ADM 205/53 First Sea Lords papers 
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The vulnerability of the aircraft carrier when unable to carry out 
flying operations, its lack of all weather capability, was cited as a reason 
for the battleships retention. It was argued that 'the Heavy Support ship 
may soon give up the 16" gun as new rocket weapons are developed, it 
may become smaller but must retain the ability to deal with the largest 
enemy vessel. '834 This lack of an all-weather capability in carrier aviation 
was considered a major handicap, particularly as British military strategy 
and operational concepts envisaged the Navy deploying to some of the 
worlds most climatically challenging areas of ocean. As such carriers 
would require the support of heavy surface ships. 
Whilst navies are required to fight in all parts of the world, in all 
conditions of climate and weather, by day and night, they will 
continue to comprise units of all these classes. None has yet been 
rendered obsolete by scientific developments, though their 
characteristics and relative numbers will undoubtedly change as 
new weapons and tactics are evolved. 835 
In addition it was reasoned that war experience had demonstrated 
that battleships contained the main anti-aircraft batteries of any battle 
group. That modern shipbuilding methods, watertight subdivision and 
new methods of internal localization of damage would render the 
battleship able to withstand air attack. The Admiralty were dubious 
about the conclusions drawn from Tirpitz, Prince of Wales, and Repulse 
sinkings. Heavy bomber raids, it was argued, did not prevent the 
Scharnhorst or Gneisenau from putting to sea. Finally, the support 
provided by the battleship's big guns for amphibious assaults was cited 
as a reason for their retention, perhaps not in its present form but present 
non the less. 'There will be major changes to the design of the heavy ship 
but it must remain part of a balanced fleet. ' 
834 lbid 
835ADM 167/124 Admiralty Board Minutes Vie Post War Navy and the Policy Govenzing 
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The circumstances created by uncertainty at the grand and military 
strategic levels meant that the RN had difficulty in determining the 
nature of the tactical environment in which it was required to operate. In 
addition without a knowledge of other post-war navies all the Admiralty 
could do was determine what minimum force levels required at the out 
break of war to maintain the country's SLOC. The Navy sought to 
maintain a balanced Fleet composition capable of undertaking a range of 
tactical tasks. There remained a priority for heavy surface forces able to 
establish a maritime zone of control. This would ideally be achieved 
through the destruction of enemy naval forces. The Navy envisaged this 
being accomplished by 'capital ships, aircraft carriers and destroyers. '836 
These would be organised in composite squadrons or groups, capable of 
bringing to action any enemy naval force that threatened the areas the 
Navy sought to exercise control over. Under the cover provided by these 
heavy forces escort squadrons would provide direct protection to 
shipping against enemy surface and sub-surface forces. 
The Navy's developing concept of maritime warfare recognised the 
need for the integration of land based aviation in order to accomplish 
these tasks. As such both the fleet providing cover and escort forces 
would be supported by shore based aircraft. These would provide long 
range reconnaissance, the capacity to strike at enemy surface vessels and 
merchant shipping, defence for naval task forces and convoys. The Navy 
conceded that it was unlikely to be able to meet all of these tasks from its 
own resources and co-operation with the RAF was now essential. 
However the Navy's conception was that for the direct defence of 
convoys in the Atlantic, where the main threat was from long-range 
aircraft either bombers or reconnaissance, a high performance short range 
carrier borne aircraft was the best solution. 
For the Navy the direct defence of merchant shipping in convoys by 
escort units and carrier borne fighters and ASW aircraft. relied upon the 
8361bid 
354 
general cover provided by the battlefleet. As was detailed in Chapter 7, 
the battlefleet provided the freedom of action for convoys to operate 
under. It was this concentration of heavy surface assets that had to be 
capable of overwhelming any potential enemy force in all weathers day 
or night. As the Admiralty recognised before the end of the War the 
strength of forces required to counter an enemy surface fleet depended 
on the number of heavy ships that a potential enemy possessed. 837 The 
same argument was advanced by the Director of Tactical and Staff Duties 
in a memo at the beginning of January 1948. He wrote that as "the Navy 
must be capable of overwheln-dng enemy concentrations [blalanced 
forces are necessary to deal with what ever types of ship that 
concentration might contain. 1838 He concluded by arguing that it was 
therefore necessary for the fleet to contain battleships in order to ensure 
the destruction of enemy heavy vessels. The obvious difficulty with this 
argument for the retention of battleships was the absence of any enemy 
possessing heavy surface units. Consequently it was proposed that the 
Navy's battleships should be retained in Reserve instead of being 
scrapped. It was argued that these heavy units took a significant time to 
build and therefore their existence at the outbreak of any future conflict 
could not be guaranteed by any other means. As Fraser informed the 
Chiefs of Staff in 1949, 'no one can say what heavy ships the enemy may 
have built by 1957 and the battleship must be regarded as an essential 
insurance. '839 Indeed the Admiralty had been closely watching the 
development of Soviet cruisers as they clearly presented the most 
significant surface threat. It was feared that these vessels could combine 
operations with Soviet submarines and make the sailing of British 
convoys untenable. The Admiralty produced a report in February 1948 
8371bid. 
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exploring the potential Soviet surface threat. 840 The Soviet possession of 
four old battlesl-dps was dismissed as presenting a negligible threat but 
the 'seven Russian-built cruisers of modern type, of which two each are 
present in the Baltic, Black Sea, and three in the Pacific Fleets, with 7.1" 
guns and a high speed, these ships are the most formidable units 
possessed by the Russian Navy. '841 The endurance of these Soviet built 
cruisers was considered to be less than that of corresponding British 
types. They were therefore suitable for operations of limited duration and 
range from Soviet bases. Nonetheless the requirement to counter them 
entailed providing heavy surface vessels with the means to remain at sea 
for long periods of time at significant distance from shore bases. 
- For the post-War Royal Navy the aircraft carrier had two primary 
functions. First, the protection of convoys and shipping against 
submarine and air attack. Second, they would form the backbone of the 
Task Group which would protect shipping against surface attack and 
provide the British share of the offensive war against the enemy's 
shipping and bases. 842 As a consequence carriers had to be able to 
operate their aircraft in all but the most inclement weather. To do this 
with modern aircraft required a reasonably steady platform and a good 
turn of speed; something that the Navy's light carriers were deficient in. 
The need for aircraft on the Atlantic trade routes was mainly in the 
ASW role and to drive off reconnaissance aircraft with which submarines 
n-dght be co-operating. It was therefore suggested that Navy should 
investigate whether, for these purposes, it was possible to have aircraft of 
reduced performance which, while capable of fulfilling their functions, 
840MIR February 1948 No. 26 The Soviet Navy p. 50 
841 Ibid. 
842ADM 205/83 Ships of the Future Navy ACNS paper 20/4/49 
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were yet able to operate from small carriers in weathers normally to be 
expected over the oceans. 843 
As a compliment to these 'defensive' carriers high performance 
aircraft to strike at enemy warships and merchant shipping and for other 
offensive purposes were also required. For the operation of these aircraft 
carriers capable of operating large, fast and heavy aircraft and of carrying 
good AA gun armament were needed. 844These would obviously be more 
expensive and the Navy were clearly unsure of their ability to procure 
them in the face of a tight fiscal policy from the Goverrunent. 
Admiral Sir John Cunningham, the First Sea Lord, explained this 
problem in a lecture to the Senior Officers War Course entitled the Role of 
the Navy in a Future War delivered in the spring of 1948.845 In this lecture 
he noted that war experience had demonstrated that naval aviation had 
advanced tremendously since the outbreak. It was therefore certain that 
aircraft carriers would form the main basis of the RN's future Fleet. He 
envisaged the main role of naval aircraft as anti-submarine and air 
defence. This, coupled with the fact that potential enemies had limited 
heavy naval forces, meant that air-strikes against either enemy shore 
targets, warships or merchant ships should be accorded a lower priority. 
Aircraft-carriers will thus form the hard core of our sea-borne 
strength. In support of the carriers we shall need surface ships to 
support them against any enemy surface vessels and air attack. 
To what extent the support will need to be provided by heavy 
ships or cruisers depends to some extent on whether our 
potential enemy builds or uses captured battleships and cruisers. 
Ideally, we would have two such carrier forces, one abroad and 
one at home, but for the moment it seems most unlikely that we 
can afford this for a year or two. 846 
8431bid. 
8441bid. 
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This theme, the fiscal restrictions curtailing naval aviation, was 
taken up again by Captain EH Shattock in a paper entitled Some Aspects 
of the Future of Naval Aviation. 847 Shattock had spent the preceding two 
and a half years as Director of Air Warfare at the Admiralty before taking 
up the command of the carrier HMS Glory in the Mediterranean. He 
raised the question of whether the RN could afford naval aviation at all. 
In the introduction to the paper he wrote, "the costs of air forces are 
increasing in a staggering fashion and if on top of this must be added to 
the cost of every two or three squadrons, that of an aircraft carrier, it is a 
very pertinent question whether naval aviation is not now a luxury we 
can no longer afford! He developed his argument and the consequences 
for the navy by arguing that the main functions of naval aviation were 
now anti-submarine, and the fighter defence of certain oceans, seas, and 
land areas. If these functions were to continue to be carried out more 
effectively and economically by ship based than land based air forces, 
then co-ordinated operational and technical planning was needed. 
Shattock put forward the case for the specialised helicopter and fighter 
carriers as these could provide the Navy's ASW and air defence needs at 
a reduced cost. In addition he argued that the Navy should press ahead 
with the development of wheeless aircraft and the associated rubber 
landing deck. It was reasoned that this development would overcome 
many of the problems associated with the operation of high performance 
aircraft. 
The Director of Naval Air Warfare responded to Shattock's paper by 
arguing that one of the major cause of the poor state of the FAA within 
the Navy was the way the armed forces conceived of naval aviation. 848 
He argued that it was too narrow in focus and that it should be expanded 
to include land based aircraft that contributed to the achievement of 
naval operations. 
847 ADM 1/21827 Captain EH Shattock Some Aspects of the Future of Naval Aviation 
August 1949 
848 ADM 1/21827 Memo from DNAW dated 10/5/50 
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The Director of Plans also commented upon Shattock's paper and 
drew particular attention to the fact that the role of naval strike aircraft 
was not mentioned. 849 He argued that such a capability provided a 
means of dealing with surface raiders and disrupting enemy sea 
communications in those areas which were beyond the reach of shore 
based aircraft. He considered that they would 'play as important a part in 
a future war as they have in the past! 
Tactical Air ORerations 
It is possible to gain an insight into the Nay's thinking concerning 
the nature of its tactical air operations in the period following World War 
Two by examining the specifications laid down for the provision of new 
naval aircraft. The Admiralty had decided that it was easier and quicker 
to procure aircraft than the vessels from which they operated. Therefore 
scarce funds would be directed to carrier modernization and building 
rather than new aircraft. Nonetheless the Adn-dralty did issue a 
substantial number of specifications for new aircraft whose requirements 
illustrate tactical thinking. 850 
Just prior to the end of the War the Admiralty issued Specification N 
5/45 for a single seat, single engined, naval fighter. This was the ultimate 
development of the Seafire whose operation with the BPF had revealed 
such short comings. Although two prototypes were eventually produced, 
the Seafang was considered insufficiently advanced and consequently 
never entered service. The Seafang was based upon a design produced 
for the RAF and only modified for naval use with a folding wing and able 
to take off from a carrier deck not exceeding 430 ft. in a 27-knot wind. 
849 ADM 1/21827 Memo DoP dated 22/5/50 
850 The details for the following discussion are taken from Meekcoms and Morgan The 
British Aircraft Specifications File: British Military and Commercial Aircraft 
Specifications 1920-1949 [London] Air-Britain Publications 1994. 
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This reliance upon modified RAF aircraft was to hamper the 
development of naval air tactics. The Admiralty found themselves 
procuring aircraft that could be modified to fly from carriers rather than 
designed around the naval task it was intended to accomplish. 
In January 1946 the Navy drew up specification N 12/45 for a single 
seat, long-range, naval fighter. The requirement was for an aircraft with 
the highest possible speed consistent with a high rate of climb and 
manoeuvrability, capable of a radius of action of 240 nautical n-dles. The 
specification was issued to Westland and formed the basis of the Mk2 
Wyvern which entered service in 1953. Despite the specification being 
issued for a naval fighter the Wyvern was extensively employed as a 
strike aircraft. 
The requirement for a single seat jet powered naval fighter and 
strike aircraft, specification No. N 7/46, was issued to Hawker for what 
became the Sea Hawk in October 1946. This aircraft was required to 
operate from carriers in any part of the world and provide long range 
strike support and conduct close air support for a land assault to a radius 
of 400 miles. This would have dealt with many of the problems that had 
been identified by operations in the Pacific, particularly the short range of 
fighter escorts. 
During May 1947 a tri-service exercise was held at the Staff College 
Camberley exploring the techniques and tactics required to carry out an 
opposed landing at the end of a long sea voyage. 851 "In fulfilling this 
object the preparation for the exercise and the exercise itself entailed the 
study of the whole field of modern warfare. 'As such the exercise gives an 
insight into the way the Navy envisaged carrying out some of its most 
important tasks. The scenario considered that a full range of new 
weapons were available from atomic bombs, through biological missiles 
to chemical weapons. In addition jet aircraft, modern submarines fitted 
851MIR May 1947 No. 17 Exercise Spearhead p. 36 
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with schnorkels and shallow water acoustic and pressure mines 
complicated the naval picture. 852 It was acknowledged that these 
weapons 'had far reaching effects on the war at sea, but there was no 
fundamental change to the type of maritime operations. 1853 In particular, 
The gun had not by 1949 been replace by the rocket; anti-aircraft 
gunnery, with tachymetric control and improved radar was 
100% more effective than in 1943. No changes in the technique of 
carrier operations were envisaged, but assault carriers were 
equipped with Vampire IV's and fleet carriers with Hawker 
N/7, Westland N/12 and GR 17/45.854 
The carrier resources available for the operation comprised three 
fleet carriers and ten light fleet carriers, with a total of 388 fighters and 36 
GR aircraft. This force was insufficient to deal with a continental air 
power. Therefore the selection of the assault area was governed 
primarily by the range at which shore-based fighter cover from Sicily 
could be provided. A study was made of the dispositions and sizes of 
convoys during the sea passage and it became clear that large convoys 
would be required to econon-dse in escort vessels; an alteration of 
grouping a number of smaller convoys under one escort force was also 
considered. The number of escort vessels required to give sufficient 
defence in depth against aircraft and submarines was clearly prohibitive 
unless the operations during the previous two years had to a large extent 
mastered the U-boat and reduced the probable scale of air attack. 855 
The Naval Staff drew a number of conclusion from this exercise 
which highlighted a number of problems requiring attention. The first 
issue was the need to restore the effectiveness of aircraft in anti- 
submarine warfare. This conclusion was borne out during the summer 
war exercises held in the Irish Sea and North West Approaches. This 
8521bid. p. 37-38 
8531bid. p. 38 
8541bid. p. 39 
8551bid. p. 40-41 
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underlined the difficulties in providing defence against modern 
submarines, whose attacks on the surface forces were largely 
successful. 856 
The Navy's intermediate solution to this problem was to operate 
two Fireflies in tandem, both with sonar buoys, one with sonar buoy 
receiver, the other with H/F radio to communicate with surface anti- 
submarine vessels and home them in on targets. 857 A long term solution 
would have to wait until the introduction of a dedicated ASW aircraft, 
the Fairey Gannet. 
Tactical Integration with the USN 
One of the most significant aspects of the BPFs tenure in the Pacific 
was its ultimate tactical integration into the USN's Third Fleet under 
Adn-dral Halsey. This was made possible due to the mastering of 
American tactical procedures. This effort was maintained in the post-war 
period. As well as the combined exercises discussed earlier in the Atlantic 
and the Mediterranean the RN and USN operated jointly in the Far East. 
Of particular significance was the combined exercise conducted between 
28 February and 3 March 1950 in the China Sea. 858 The exercise was 
focused around the RN carrier HMS Triumph and the USN carrier USS 
Boxer and the defence of a convoy from shore and carrier based aircraft, 
surface ships and submarines. 
As with the BPF five years earlier American signal books and 
tactical publications were used throughout with little difficulty. During 
the course of the exercise British and US aircraft landed on each other's 
carriers, and the ships of each navy carried out replenishment from 
856MIRSeptember 1947 No. 21 p. 18-21 
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supply ships of the other. As the Director of Tactical and Staff Duties 
observed, 
The obvious keenness of both fleets to work together and the 
comparative ease with which the British Ships assimilated US 
doctrine and procedure - though no doubt it entailed much 
hard work - are particularly satisfactory. 859 
Both navies found something in the other that. impressed. The 
Americans took particular note of the tactical handling of the anti- 
submarine screen by the British Screen Commander, and the direction of 
jet aircraft by the cruisers Jamaica and Kenya. The British force was 
impressed by the efficient operation of Night Fighters by USS Boxer. 
Aircraft from both carriers delivered air strikes against shore bases in 
Philippine Islands and carried out attacks on the fleet. Cross decking and 
cross tactical control of aircraft was also carried out with no apparent 
difficulties. The generally positive impression created by the RN in this 
exercise could not, however, overcome the lin-dtations imposed by 
inferior carriers and aircraft. Lack of wind prevented Seafires being flown 
from Triumph during the second strike, which was thus limited to four 
Fireflies, a very small contribution to the total. In addition the limitations 
of aircraft capacity of Triumph and her lack of speed are painfully 
obvious when compared with Boxer. Admiral Brind, commanding the 
RN force, commented in his report to the Admiralty that, 
No one who witnessed the exercises could fail to be impressed 
by the capabilities of the Boxer with nearly 100 aircraft and a 
speed wl-dch virtually enables her to ignore lack of wind, 
compared with those of Tfitniipli, with her 26 aircraft, half of 
which cannot be flown when the wind drops. 860 
859ADM 1/21868 Combined Exercise with the US Navy 28/2-10/3/50 China Sea, 
DTSDD 19/4/50 
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Despite this the British tactics compared favourably with those of 
the Americans, particularly in the getaway following the strike attack on 
the combined fleet which was made at "zero" feet. Admiral Brind 
acknowledged that the success of the exercise was in no small measure 
down to the foundations laid by the BPF and which were maintained 
post-war. 'there is no question that the wartime cooperation and post war 
efforts at standardisation do enable our fleets to work together with no 
insurmountable difficulties. '861 
Korea 
When the Royal Navy was called upon to provide the first 
component of Britain's contribution to the United Nations it encountered 
an operating environment remarkably similar to that faced by the BPF. 
This was to have a significant impact upon the tactical conduct of 
operations. The Naval Staff History of the Korean War explicitly 
acknowledged the legacy of the BPF in its analysis of the type and form 
of the RNs commitment to the American led operations. Both the nature 
of the threat, the circumstances under which the RN conducted 
operations and the tasks of these operations were direct descendants of 
the BPF experience. 
Despite the best intentions, difficulties were experienced operating 
Tritwiph with the larger US carriers. Her restricted speed862 and the 
limited endurance of her embarked aircraft severely curtailed Tritmipli's 
flexibility. The strike radius of the Fireflies was between 120-130 nautical 
miles, the USN's Skyraiders could manage almost double that, the former 
were thus employed on CAP and anti-submarine patrols rather than 
strike operations, described as 'galling but unquestionably correct in the 
861 Ibid. 
862Tritanph, a Colossus class light fleet carrier could make 25 knots. In comparison Valley 
Forge, the final carrier of the successful Essex Class, could make 32.7 knots. 
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circumstances', by Andrewes. 863 In addition to this problem, the aircraft 
needed a wind speed of thirty four knots over the carrier's flight deck to 
take off with 5001b. bombs, leaving the only weapon both the Firefly I's 
and Seafire 47's could carry as 601b rockets. 
By the time the final version of the Seafire, the 47, was 
commissioned in February 1948 with 804 Squadron the aircraft was a far 
cry from the machine which entered service seven years earlier. The old 
Merlin engines had been replaced with the more powerful Rolls Royce 
Griffon 85s, it also featured increased internal fuel tanks and an improved 
arrester hook, in order to overcome some of the inadequacies shown up 
by war experience. 
The lh-nited number of operational aircraft that Tritniiplt was able to 
offer, not usually more than 12, meant that she only took a limited part in 
the Inchon landings 
When HMS 77zeseiis replaced Tritinipli in October 1950, the increased 
range of her 21 Sea Furies and 12 Firefly V's enabled the RN to participate 
in the interdiction of enemy troop concentrations, close air support of 
land forces and armed reconnaissance. The new British aircraft still, 
however, did not have the flexibility of armament load enjoyed by the 
USN's aeroplanes. American Skyraiders and Corsairs were capable of 
catapult launching while carrying a mixed load of bombs, rockets and 
drop tanks. The restrictions imposed on aircraft outfit by British flight 
deck procedures had a clear impact on tactical efficiency. As the Director 
of Naval Air Warfare explained; 
there is a tendency in British Naval Aviation in Korea to select 
the aircraft weapon to suit the landing circumstances in a 
carrier rather than the tactical situation at the target. The lesson 
to be learned is that the facilities for handling different air 
armaments on our aircraft and in our carriers, must be 
863ADM 116/6342 signal from Commander-in-Chief Far East Station 11/7/50 
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drastically improved so that it is equally easy to launch each 
sortie with the best weapon for the job in hand. 864 
Before taking up the post of Director Naval Air Warfare, Captain 
Bolt had been CO of HMS 77wseits during her first tour of duty off Korea, 
29 September 1950 to 23 March 1953. Bolt reported that operation of a 
single carrier was more demanding for everyone involved than multiple 
carrier operations. 'A carrier operating alone must obviously operate at 
high intensity or all its effort will be absorbed in protecting itself. '865 The 
much larger scale air group embarked on American carriers did not have 
this problem. Adn-dral Fraser had highlighted this concern in his 
dispatches from the Pacific. 866 He had been concerned about the 
balancing of the risk involved in an operation with the potential benefits, 
if the defensive effort required by the carrier was such that an 
increasingly scaled down offensive element was all that could be 
deployed. 
Whereas the BPF faced intense air opposition, a limited surface 
threat and a submarine menace that never materialised, the RN off Korea 
was confronted with practically no opposition at s ea. The Naval Staff 
history of the Commonwealth naval operations during the Korean War 
concluded that the performance of the carriers had been made; 
possible only by the virtual absence of enemy air activity. Had 
there been opposition on an appreciable scale so much effort 
would have been required for fighter defence and escort that 
offensive operations would have been severely curtailed. 867 
864ADM 116/6231 Minute by Capt.. A. S. Bolt DNAW 8/1/52 
865Bolt. Capt.. A. S., HMS Viesetts in the Korean War and soine Special Probleins of Naval 
Aviation in that 7"heatre, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution [RUSIJ vol. 96, 
November 1951 p. 556. 
866ADM 199/118 C-in-C BPF Despatches Nov. 1944-july 1945, see also Chapter * The 
BPF and the Tactical Level of War. 
867BR 1736(54) British Commonwealth Naval Operations, Korea 1950-1953 MoD 1967 p. 
286 
366 
In November 1950 China introduced the MiG-15 jet into the Korean 
Theatre. The Adn-dralty were under no illusions about the ability of their 
carriers to operate in the Yellow Sea if faced by jet attacks. 868 That they 
were able to continue operating was only due to the cover provided by 
the American Sabres. The Chinese were also very restrained over the 
areas pern-dtted for MiG operations. They were unwilling to risk their 
aircraft over the sea which helped the numerically far fewer USAF Sabres 
to contain theM869. The British and American carrier forces operating in 
the Yellow Sea permitted the rescue of downed aircrews, in this respect 
they were therefore complimentary to the USAF effort. 
The RN's major concern in the years after the end of World War 
Two was the threat posed by Soviet submarines to the country's sea lines 
of communication. However, as in the Pacific five years earlier, the 
submarine threat to RN operations did not emerge. There were rumours 
that North Koreans had been provided with two Soviet submarines but 
these were unconfirmed and it is now thought they did not receive any 
before 1957-58. The real fear was Soviet submarines operating without 
any declaration, their success being attributed to mines. As a result 
continuous ASW measures had to be maintained. In September 
COMNAVFE issued the following order to his ships "An unidentified 
submarine can be attacked and driven off by any means available in self 
defence or when offensive action against our forces is indicated. 1870 S. 
Prince points out that whilst this threat did not largely materialise, he 
argues that the R. N. was involved in dealing with a limited submarine 
868ADM 1/24068, Operation of Carriers Off Korea in the Face of Soviet Built jets (1952) 
8691n June 1951 China had 445 MiGs rising to between 800-1,000 swept wing jets during 
the winter of 1952-53 including a hundred 11-28 bombers. In comparison there were only 
150 Sabres. 
870ADM 116/5794, Korean War: Report of Proceedings 1950-1951, C-in-C Far East to 
Admiralty, 08/09/50. 
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threat, resulting in the sinking of a Soviet submarine, which was 
shadowing a carrier force in early December 1951871 
It is clear from the available evidence that transmission of the BPFs 
experiences at the tactical level was one of the most important aspects of 
its immediate legacy. It is apparent that the RN were more than willing to 
study the technical lessons which the BPF had to teach. There were 
obviously some disagreements over interpretation. How limited in time 
and space, for instance, was the experience, how important were the 
geographic and climatic conditions of the war in the Far East. But as this 
chapter has demonstrated, striving to reproduce the performance of the 
BPF in Atlantic and northern European waters, was a major 
preoccupation of the RN in the years immediately following the Second 
World War. Although the RN's next major combat experience was again 
in the Far East, operations off the Korean coast demonstrated that in 
many respects the Navy had indeed absorbed the lessons of the BPF. 
There were undoubtedly continuing problems, often reoccurrences of the 
difficulties that had beset the BPF, but these were more often than not the 
result of pressures at the grand and military strategic level rather than a 
failure to investigate and absorb the BPFs legacy. 
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The British Pacific Feet and the Levels of War 
The general proposition advanced by this thesis is that by adopting 
a levels of warfare methodology important new light can be shed on an 
historical case study. Through an exploration of the grand strategic, 
military strategic, operational and tactical levels of war a more complete 
understanding of the significance of a particular period of the Royal 
Navy's history can be appreciated. 
The Royal Navy that participated in the American led campaign 
directed toward the final surrender of Japan was not the same one that 
had faced Germany five years previously. Nor was the force that 
participated in the surrender ceremony in Yokohama Bay the same as the 
one that sailed from Trincomalee to carry out Britain's political 
commitment to her most important ally. By the time Japan surrendered, 
the Royal Navy had fought on, above and under almost all the world's 
oceans. It had begun deploying and carrying out its wartime tasks before 
war was declared and it had been there at the end. 872 But only just. The 
war in the Pacific was not just the chronological culmination of the RN's 
wartime experience. It marked the eclipse of the Navy's pren-der status. 
At the grand strategic level it demonstrated the UWs decline relative to 
the US as a world power. It was Washington that determined the course 
of the war in the Far East. The UK's global presence did not simply 
disappear immediately but when war broke out in Korea it was the US 
not the UK that led, planned and orchestrated the world"s response. At 
the military strategic level the RN became an adjunct to the USN in the 
Pacific. At the operational it was the Americans who had put into practice 
new concepts. By the time the British returned to the Pacific command of 
872 The Admiralty formed the first convoy on 2/9/39 between Gibraltar and Cape Town 
in anticipation of war -with Italy as well as Germany that would make the Mediterranean 
unsafe 
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the sea had already been won and navies turned their attention to 
projecting their power ashore. Developments at the tactical level 
permitted this to be done in more powerful ways at greater distances 
from shore and further inland than ever before. The USN exploited their 
technological innovations through a greater resource base to develop new 
operational concepts. 
Grand Strategic Level of War 
Britainýs commitment to the closing stages of the Pacific war is, in 
many respects, a metaphor for the changes the country experienced as a 
result of World War Two. The story of this commitment demonstrates the 
changing nature of Britain's position as a global power of the first order. 
When Churchill first crossed the Atlantic to confer with President 
Roosevelt over the grand strategic direction of the war he was able to 
obtain an American assurance that Germany would be considered the 
prime enemy. Britain was able to detern-dne the basic strategy of the war. 
However, as time progressed, the greater resources of the United States 
inevitably meant that she would shape overall grand strategy. This 
changing relationship between Britain and the United States was evident 
in the European theatre but more dramatically in the Pacific. By the time 
that the BPF entered the closing stages of the war against Japan, the 
United States was don-dnant to such a degree that both Churchill and the 
British Chiefs of Staff had to argue long and hard for any sort of role. 
For the UK the dispatch of the BPF was not designed to win the war 
against Japan that was obviously an American dominated task. The BPF 
was a demonstration of Britain's conunitment to her ally. If the British 
had become sidetracked into areas of secondary concern as Churchill had 
initially advocated and the American CNO Adn-dral King concurred, then 
the BPFs value as a tool of alliance building would have been 
undermined. The relationships established in the Pacific between the BPF 
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and the USN had important consequences for the post war period. The 
disquiet at British participation and suspicion at her motives which 
emanated from the USN in Washington was replaced during the post war 
by recognition that the RN and Britain was indeed a reliable ally who 
could be trusted. 
There is a certain irony over British participation in the Pacific, in 
that the Americans both complained that Britain appeared reluctant to 
fight Japan and sought to limit her involvement. For a time there 
appeared to be an unlikely alliance developing between Churchill and 
Admiral King, both of whom tried to restrict British participation in the 
central Pacific. This was quite clearly for differing reasons. Churchill felt 
that Britain needed to regain her lost South East Asian possessions and 
expunge the hun-tiliation of defeat at the hands of the Japanese. King on 
the other hand regarded the defeat of Japan as something belonging 
almost entirely to the US Navy. The British Chiefs of Staff, however, 
recognised both the limitations of the country's military might and the 
need to achieve the political objective of alliance building. The first 
restriction meant that Britain had a limited capability to wage a separate, 
even if parallel, campaign against Japan. In addition the requirement for 
occupation forces in Europe and their sustainment meant that the war 
needed to be ended as fast as possible. The second factor affecting the 
Chiefs of Staff opinion that of the need to build the alliance with the US, 
dictated that diversion into a secondary theatre in the Far East was 
unacceptable. If this had happened then the Americans would have been 
able to claim post-war that the British fought simply to restore Imperial 
rule and that she had regained her lost possessions behind a shield of 
dead Americans. 
If the British were to achieve their desired grand strategic objective 
of utilising a conu-nitment to the Pacific to strengthen the alliance with the 
United States then publicity for their actions was a vital task. Both the 
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Embassy in Washington and Admiral Fraser sought to derive maximum 
publicity from the operations undertaken by the BPF. 
An examination of the constraints placed upon Britain's 
conu-nitment demonstrates the fact that the country could barely sustain 
the war any longer. Her economy lay in tatters, her shipbuilding capacity 
was at breaking point, her fiscal resources had been expended, her 
manpower reserves overstretched and her shipping stockpile devastated. 
All of these factors made both the RN the only available tool for alliance 
building with the Americans and severely restricted even that asset. 
The Royal Navy were the only service available to demonstrate 
Britain's conu-nitment to her American ally in the central Pacific. The 
Army was already overstretched coping with occupation duties in 
Europe as well as continuing General Slim's 14th Army campaign in 
Burma. Although an RAF contribution to operations against Japan was 
planned there was little likelihood of anything concrete being made 
available before 1946. This left the Royal Navy. The neutralisation of the 
last of Germany's heavy surface ships, the Tirpitz, appeared to free up 
heavy units from the Home Fleet for service in the Pacific. This was 
indeed true but only to a degree. All the operations by the BPF were 
constrained by the number and availability of destroyers, tankers and 
replenishment shipping of all kinds. These were exactly the type of 
vessels that were required to support the Army's occupation in Europe 
and deal with a reinvigorated German submarine campaign during the 
second half of 1944 and early 1945. 
The British were not in any position to procure more shipping to 
support the BPF nor did they have the capacity to modify units 
specifically for Pacific operations. The Fleet had to make do with what 
the Admiralty could scrape up and were severely limited in what they 
could achieve at the lower levels of war as a result. 
The Pacific experience at the grand strategic level foreshadowed the 
circumstances that shaped the Royal Navy after the war. All of the 
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features that restricted the Navy's contribution continued to influence the 
service after hostilities ended. However the most startling feature of the 
post-war world at the grand strategic level was the degree to which both 
the British and the Americans initially sought to maintain a degree of 
distance between themselves. Both allies considered that the other n-dght 
draw them into another war with Soviet Union. Further, too close an 
alliance was thought likely to constrain each county's freedom of action 
on the international stage. In this regard it n-dght appear that the hopes of 
utilizing the BPF to cement the alliance with America were n-dsplaced. It 
was to take the realization that a new kind of enemy was being faced in 
the international arena to draw the wartime allies together again in a 
permanent peacetime alliance. However it should be recognized that just 
as in the deliberations between Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff 
on the one hand and Roosevelt and the American joint Chiefs on the 
other, the military in the post-war environment were further ahead than 
their political leaders in their desire for an alliance. 
Planning for British participation in the Pacific had been beset by 
uncertainty and this again was to be a major feature of the initial post- 
war world. The British Government described a period of transition, of 
waiting for the features of the post-war world to emerge. This created a 
difficult environment in which military planning could take place. 
The economic restrictions on the BPF were certair-dy replicated and 
in many ways intensified after the war. The manpower problems that had 
detern-dned and bedevilled the British conunitment were even more acute 
as the Government sought to reinvigorate the domestic economy. This 
was something that hit the Navy particularly hard. Dockyard workers 
were directed away from warship construction and repair and into 
domestic production. In addition the increasingly technologically 
sophisticated nature of naval warfare required skilled electricians and 
sensor operators, just the kind of workers that were in short supply to 
meet domestic demand. 
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When Britain was called upon to once more support the United 
States and the United Nations she displayed many of the concerns and 
features that had shaped the participation in the war against Japan. The 
significance of that commitment, as this study has demonstrated., can not 
be judged simply in terms of the damage that it inflicted upon the 
Japanese. Likewise the participation in the Korean War was about 
support for the country's primary ally and conu-nitment to the United 
Nations. This had a importance to European defence as much as it did 
South Korean. 
Military Strategic Level of War 
The distinction between the grand and military strategic levels of 
war is not an easy one to make. The same actors operate at both levels. 
The Prime Minister attempted to direct military planning. The Chiefs of 
Staff, who might be considered the most significant actors at this level, 
also influenced, informed and directly contributed to the country's grand 
strategy. The interplay of grand and military strategy is not limited to the 
actors. What was detern-dned as a grand strategic object was also 
influenced by what was possible at the military strategic level. 
Grand strategy set the conditions and circumstances under which 
the RN planned the British contribution to the Pacific War. The objective 
of alliance building with the United States was developed by military 
commanders both in London and out in the Pacific. Admiral Fraser 
realised that in order to achieve the necessary leverage at the grand 
strategic level the BPF would have to participate in the most advanced 
operations against the Japanese and this meant in the central Pacific along 
side the main forces of the USN. In consequence the idea that the British 
should focus their attentions on regaining their lost possessions in South 
East Asia was something he constantly argued against. 
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The degree of influence that Fraser was able to exercise over where 
and in what form the BPF would operate reveals a great deal about the 
changing power balance between Britain and the United States. Although 
Fraser expended a significant amount of energy 'lobbying' Admiral 
Nin-Litz to permit the BPF's participation in the main USN operations, the 
ultimate decision was taken by the Americans. The command 
arrangements that resulted from the negotiations between Fraser and his 
staff and Nimitz's staff at Pearl Harbor reflected this developing balance 
of power. Fraser himself would have outranked any American admiral at 
sea and so he had to fly his flag ashore in Australia. The discussions over 
basing arrangements for the BPF also reflected the various agreements 
and disagreements between the two allies. The Americans, particularly 
Admiral King, were keen to restrict British participation and so were 
reluctant to permit the sharing of base and support facilities. This view 
was echoed to a degree by Admiral Cunningham in London. Fraser took 
a contrary position arguing that this was incompatible with what he saw 
as the overriding grand and military strategic objective, participating as 
soon as possible in the main operations against Japan. The disputes over 
command arrangements were not limited to the British and for a while it 
appeared that the BPF would become an object of disagreement between 
Admiral Nimitzs Central Pacific Command and General MacArthur's 
South West Pacific Area Command. 
The BPF's first operation in the Pacific was the neutralization of a 
series of airfields on the Sakishima Gunto, islands in support of the 
American landings on Okinawa. These operations avoided many of the 
problems of how closely the two navies would operate. These had to 
ultimately be faced when the BPF was accepted into the USN's Third 
Fleet for the final operations against the Japanese mainland. 
The relationship that Fraser established with Nimitz was perhaps 
his greatest achievement as C-in-C BPF. He was instrumental in changing 
Nin-dtz's perception of the British from one of scepticism to friendship. 
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This effort was repeated throughout the BPF. Adn-dral Rawlings 
impressed both Admiral Spruance and Admiral Halsey, the latter to such 
an extent that the Navy Department asked him to be a pall bearer at 
Halsey's funeral. This attitude permeated down through the vast 
majority of the BPF and was reciprocated by the USN. It was of course 
not universal. The Senior USN Liaison Officer, Captain EH Ewen, 
described Adn-dral Vian as 'a neurotic type [who] can be, and is, 
extremely rude at times and very difficult to deal with. 1873 
The pattern of co-operation with the USN that was established in 
the Pacific was nurtured in the post-war period and many of the 
relationships established in that theatre were to have a long lasting 
impression. For the Americans the Pacific was the primary naval 
campaign and the post-war leadership of the USN was drawn primarily 
from those who served there. As such it was essential that the BPF 
created a favourable perception. For the RN, dominance at sea was 
replaced by influence with the dominant naval power. 
As has been described the post-war circumstances at the grand 
strategic level were not kind to the Navy. Likewise the military strategic 
situation did not appear to offer any succour. In particular the existence 
of nuclear weapons appeared to undermine the need for a navy at all. 
Warfare in the new age of atomic bombs was perceived by many as either 
making the navy obsolete -altering the fundamental nature of war so that 
the RN's traditional conception of how sea power could be utilised to 
defeat an opponent It was argued that developments in technology had 
rendered previous experience of little use in future planning. In addition 
the only perceived opponent was the Soviet Union who possessed little in 
the way of naval capability. These arguments clearly strike at the 
proposition that the BPF was influential at the military strategic level. 
However, the key relationship with the Americans, towards which so 
873 Captain EC Ewen, Senior US Naval Liaison Officer BPF, Report of the British Pacific 
Fleet in Support of the Okinawa Campaign 23/4/45 [author's collection] 
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much effort on the part of the BPF was directed, remained central to 
British planning. What emerges from this study is the way that the BPF 
legacy at this level was utilised to develop this relationship. 
Examination of the RN's developing conception of the Soviet threat 
at sea, the influence of the of nuclear weapons, the significance attached 
to the defence of sea communications and the relevance of command of 
the sea, all demonstrate how important this relationship was for the Navy 
in the post-war period. In addition these factors determined and shaped 
the operational concepts that the Navy sought to develop in order to 
meet the requirements set at the military strategic level. 
Operational Level of War 
The Atlantic was where the RN encountered its most important 
threat. Defeat of the German U-boat was a matter of national survival. 
The defence of sea communications remained the RNs most significant 
task in the post-war period. But if the Atlantic served as a model for the 
threat then the Pacific demonstrated a new range of operational concepts 
that could be adapted to meet that requirement. Operations in the Pacific 
revealed the advances made in the capacity of navies to exploit command 
of the sea to directly influence events ashore. The ability to project power 
over land had increased enormously with the introduction of the aircraft 
carrier. 
When the BPF arrived in the Pacific the USN had already achieved a 
significant degree of command of the sea. This in turn meant that the 
Fleet's primary task was the projection of naval power over land rather 
than the defeat of an enemy naval force. The RN had clearly been 
developing this naval capability before the out break of World War Two 
and to a certain degree conducted this type of operation before 
participating in the Pacific. It was however, this participation that 
stimulated a fuller development of these concepts. 
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The BPF's first operation, conducted whilst on passage to Australia 
from Trincomalee, was a series of carrier strikes on Japanese controlled 
oil installations on Sumatra. These strikes probably constituted the most 
significant damage inflicted upon Japan by the BPF. It is clear, however, 
that explaining the importance of the BPF simply in terms of the damage 
caused is insufficient. Operations against the Sumatran oil refineries 
demonstrated the ability of naval forces to directly attack the economic 
infrastructure of an enemy. This idea remained an important operational 
concept in the post-war period. Although the USN developed this idea 
further than the RN, the Admiralty explored the way in which such an 
operation could affect the defence of sea communications. The Navy 
explored the notion of projecting power ashore against targets that were 
directly supporting the Soviet ability to sustain their submarine force. 
Although this was a controversial idea and one which met serious 
opposition from within the Admiralty the feasibility of employing such 
methods was seriously studied. 
Operations in support of the American invasion of Okinawa also 
gave the RN direct experience of what termed 'attack at source'. As the 
USN had achieved a degree of command of the sea the main threat that 
allied forces encountered at sea was from land based Japanese aviation. 
With the introduction of Kamikaze attacks tl-ds threat became more acute. 
The BPF"s task was therefore to protect the invasionýs Western flank by 
eliminating the ability of the Japanese to stage aircraft through particular 
airfields. This entailed destroying aircraft on the ground and the facilities 
which were needed for their maintenance. This type of operation did not 
of course negate the need for the BPF to directly defend itself from air 
attack. Indeed part of the significance of these operations was derived 
from the fact that the Fleet did in fact suffer at the hands of Kamikaze 
aircraft. It was an example of burden sharing with the USN. 
The nature of the conflict that the Royal Navy had been fighting in 
European and Atlantic waters was described by Fraser as equally 
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arduous but of a different character to that which the USN had been 
engaged with in the Pacific. One of the other significant operational 
features of the BPF's experience was the length of time that the Fleet 
remained at sea. This ability was crucial to the achievement of their 
operational task and was made possible by the development of the Fleet 
Train. The Royal Navy was essentially a short haul service. It relied upon 
a system of world wide bases from which its various formations would 
sortie either to engage the enemy or attack its sea lines of communication. 
In the Pacific the Americans were operating at such huge distances over 
prolonged periods of time that they had been compelled to develop the 
means of sustaining their naval forces in the area of operation rather than 
retiring to rear bases for replenishment. The British were required to 
follow suit. The development of this capability was important not only 
for the Navy at the operational level but also because it permitted 
Admiral Fraser to achieve his military and grand strategic objective of 
participating successfully in the most advanced operations against Japan. 
The capability to place significant air power, in the shape of carriers, 
within striking range of virtually any Japanese target and sustain them in 
operation was essential to the USN's strategy for the defeat of Japan. It 
certainly appears to be the case that the Americans were sceptical of the 
British ability to manage this type of prolonged operation and it was only 
following the successful conclusion of the operations off Sakishima Gunto 
that the USN was prepared to integrate the BPF into their main naval 
force. What emerges from this study is that though the BPF were severely 
handicapped by restrictions at the grand strategic level of war the RN 
was able to improvise and adapt to a sufficient degree to accomplish their 
operational requirements. The Navy clearly learned a tremendous 
amount in a very short space of time but that their final integration into 
Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet justified their efforts. 
In the post-war period, what Admiral Fraser referred to as a 
revolutionary style of war was adapted to meet the needs of the Navy's 
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developing military strategy. Reference has already been made to the 
way in which the RN sought to adapt the new methods of power 
projection to the defence of sea communications. Post-war exercises 
demonstrated the way in which the Navy sought to achieve this. 
Tactical Level of War 
The assimilation of American practices into the RN can probably be 
most clearly seen at the tactical level, as can the problems encountered by 
the British. In order to participate in the kind of operations that the USN 
had developed in the Pacific the RN was required to develop, integrate 
and adapt a whole series of new tactical procedures. The methods of 
conducting mass strikes against shore based targets, the procedures for 
the launch, control and recovery of such large numbers of aircraft; the 
tactical integration of four fleet carriers as the main offensive unit of the 
fleet; the required new cruising dispositions and defensive screening 
formations, were all substantially new to the BPF. 
When it came to developing these new methods of conducting war 
at sea in the post-war period the RN was both enthusiastic and severely 
constrained. The restrictions were primarily the result of the factors 
identified at the grand strategic level. It is clear that there was no 
shortage of desire to keep up with the USN; rather it was the wherewithal 
to do so that was lacking. In addition because of decisions made at the 
military strategic level concerning when the Soviet Union would most 
likely pose an actual threat the naval commitment to the Korean War 
suffered many of the problems that had been identified during the BPF's 
operations. 
An examination of the difficulties facing the Fleet Air Arm in the 
conduct of operations in the Pacific reveals the way in which the focus on 
short range European operations and the resource restrictions at the 
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grand strategic level had hampered the full exploitation of naval aviation. 
The performance characteristics of British aircraft were inadequate to 
meet the needs of operations in the Pacific. The Seafire, for example, had 
insufficient range for employment in any task other than Combat Air 
Patrols over the Task Force. In addition its weak undercarriage made it 
exceptionally prone to deck landing accidents. The use of American 
aircraft as the mainstay of the FAA in the Pacific went some way to 
addressing these inadequacies but the with the ending of the lend-lease 
arrangements these aircraft were unceremoniously dumped over the side 
as Britain could not afford to purchase them. This left the FAA reliant 
upon an indigenous aircraft industry which was primarily geared 
toward the procurement of aircraft for the RAF. 
The Levels of War 
The application of a levels of warfare methodology to the case study 
was intended to achieve two things; first, understand the BPF and its 
legacy more fully, and second, gain a greater understanding of how the 
levels of war operate. This thesis has shown that is no longer sufficient to 
asses the significance of the BPF simply in terms of the effect it had on 
furthering Japan's surrender. There were also other objectives set at the 
grand strategic level such as the influence it could have on Britainýs most 
important ally. This has been recognized to a degree by some previous 
writers such as HP Willmott, but this study reveals how conditional such 
objectives were upon success at the lower levels of warfare. The Royal 
Navy had a lot to learn in a very short space of time. This experience was 
immensely important for the Navy in the post war period and was 
subsequently transn-dtted throughout the rest of the RN. It shaped 
concepts of warfare; it provided new operational and tactical methods of 
conducting that war. When the Navy engaged in an analysis of the 
changed nature of war at sea through internal policy documents, through 
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exercises and simulations, through lectures and publications, through the 
pages of the professional press and through its own historical research 
the BPF experience was central to that process. 
The experience does demonstrate the complex interplay of all the 
levels of war. How factors at the grand strategic level shaped. and 
constrained the nature of Britain's commitment in the Pacific. How 
considerations of alliance politics set the terms of the debate at the 
military strategic level and how dependent this was on success at the 
operational and tactical levels. 
Exploration of the BPFs experience at each of the levels of warfare 
has revealed how conditional the levels are upon each other. It is no 
longer enough simply to say that the British learnt from their 
participation. This is indeed true, particularly at the tactical level where 
in the field of carrier aviation the RN very rapidly acquired American 
practices. Operational concepts post war also clearly displayed the mark 
of the Pacific war. The openness of the USN in sharing its intellectual 
property as well as its material resources made this process possible. That 
was dependant upon agreement at the grand strategic level. The political 
benefit derived from participation required such an integration of the two 
navies. The influence that the BPF could have on American attitudes, 
public, political as well as military was dependent upon participation in 
the 'most advanced operations against Japan! That required the tactical 
ability to do so successfully. 
At each level of war the BPF was significant for the British as a 
whole and the Navy-in particular. It was important at the grand strategic 
level because of the influence it could have on the Americans. For the 
Navy the sharp exposition of changes in the balance of sea power 
between the two allies demonstrated in the Pacific was ameliorated to a 
degree by the 'special [naval] relationship with the USN. 
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The Navy that fought in Korea was undoubtedly shaped by more 
than just the Pacific experience. Eric Grove's work on the post-war Royal 
Navy has shown how the Service was moulded by the inter-play of 
economics, government policy, international politics and the Navy's own 
strategic thinking. 874 What this thesis has demonstrated is the way in 
which these factors were influenced by the final stages of the war against 
Japan. 
The division of the BPF experience and its legacy into the various 
levels of war is clearly artificial. Issues that are pron-tinent at one level are 
also significant at others. The adoption of American signalling practices 
was at its simplest a tactical procedure. But by doing so the BPF made 
itself capable of integration with the USN that was a military strategic 
requirement in order to achieve a grand strategic objective. At the same 
time this adoption of American practices was an important signal to the 
USN and therefore had a direct bearing on matters at the higher levels of 
warfare. 
John Winton argued in 1969 that the experience of the BPF set the 
pattern for the shape of Royal Navy after the war. What this study has 
done through the use of a levels of warfare analysis is demonstrate that 
Winton was essentially correct in his assessment but that his reasoning 
did not go deep enough. At all the levels of war, the BPF left a legacy for 
the Navy that came after it. 
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